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Abstract 
The thesis critically analyses the dominant foundationalist tendency of modern 
philosophy, with special reference to the sophisticated anti foundational] st critiques of 
foundationalism, formulated bv G. W. F. Herzel and Gilles Deleuze. 
It begins by outlining a general methodological aspect of foundationalism. 
regarding the necessity of radical self-critique in philosophy, which directly connects 
contemporary thought with Cartesianism, via classical German philosophy. 
In the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, this self-chtical project is 
transformed: they undertake to show that reason can, by examining itself gpi give an 
account of expenence that is systematic, or consistent with itself However, each of 
these thinkers fails to accomplish this, and indeect the commitment to a priori 
foundations is itself undermined in Schelling's work, where a philosophical crisis of 
meaning (a 'trauma of reason', philosophical nibilism) emerges. 
Deleuze and Hegel's contrasting critiques of foundational ism, and their positive 
reconstructions of the standpoint of philosophy, are then interpreted as non- 
foundationalist attempts to overcome this intemal cnsis of foundationalist thought as 
inadvertently exposed by Schelbrig. Both Cnticise certain sub - Jective presuppositions common to foundationalist philosophies, which they consider constitute a dogmatic 
, image' of philosophy, a kind of transcendental illusion that is the guiding force behind 
foundationalism. Both also aim to replace this with a genuinely philosophical image. 
The thesis provides an original historical contextual i sation of Deleuze's thought 
in relation to Gen-nan Idealism, and Schelling in particular, with whom., it is argued, 
Deleuze has much in common. Deleuze's conception of pure difference is treated in this 
regard as a kind of 'absolute knowledge'. This contextual i sation also allows the 
sometimes crudely understood antipathy between Hegel and Deleuze to be addressed in 
a more penetrating fashion, which shows that thev have more in common in terms of 
their critical orientation than is usually supposed. 
The thesis concludes with a cntical companson of these thinkers, which argues 
thaý although both succeed in their own tenns, in relation to a critenon of self- 
consistency, Hegel's philosophy offers a more satisfactory treatment of the ontological 
and historical conditions of philosophical activity. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Philosophy, Inimanence and Otherness 
i) Preliminaries 
Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, 
I decided to suppose that nothing was such as they led 
us to imagine. And because there are people who make 
mistakes in reasoning, committing logical fallacies 
concermimg even the simplest questions in geometry, and 
as I judged that I was just as prone to error as anyone 
else, I rejected as unsound all the arguments I had 
previously taken as demonstrative proofs. ' 
With these lines from the Discourse on Method, Descartes announced the 
Reformation of Scholastic philosophy and a decisive redefinition of philosophy's 
conception of itself The modemity of Cartesianism ties in its confidence in the ability of 
the individual reasoning subject to determine the truth about being, and further, in its 
confidence in the ability of the individual to prove that it possesses this truth. It is this 
latter assurance that represents a direct assault on medievalism, for it confers final 
authority on the faculty of reason, and thus removes it from the hegemony of tradition 
and its institutions, the ultimate sources of all Scbolastic arguments previously accepted 
as 'demonstrative proofs'. 
At the close of the twentieth century, such confidence seems to be at once an 
intimately familiar feature of the way we imagine ourselves. and yet somehow outdated. 
to be spoken of With ironic, even cynical detachment. Over two hundred years of 
1 Descartes, 1966, p. 59. 
relentless criticism of traditional accretions of authority. stretching from the American 
and French Revolutions, and taking in the nse of mass industrial societies and the social 
and political convulsions of the twentieth century, have seen Cartesian confidence 
replaced by the riven stance of the individual who listens to and accepts the long-farniliar 
claims of reason, without ever genuinely believing in them, seeing reason instead as 
simply another traditional authority to be criticised, without knowing where the resources 
for such a cntique are to be found. This condition, which Nietzsche referred to as 
'modern nihilism', finds a particularly suitable home in the twentieth century, the time of 
genocide carried out by regimes that employed bureaucratic reason exclusively in the 
service of their 'passions'. 
How does this situation make itself felt in Western philosophy? One definition 
of its violently altered self-image is given by the British philosopher Gillian Rose. 
Commentating on a selection of modern Jewish thinkers within the pantheons of 
existentialism, critical theory and post-structuralism, ranging from Martin BubeT to 
Jacques Derrida, Rose wrote that 'their different ways of severing existential eros from 
1 
.2 philosophical logos amount to a trauma wilhin reason itsef The meaning of such a 
statement is not immediately apparent. Trauma in its usual meaning refers to the 
experiencing of a violent physiological or psychological shock that induces a 
pathological condition within the orgamc or the psychic system. What can it mean to say 
that reason expenences such a shock and is confined by such a condition? 
One thing is clear from Rose's remarks, however. This trauma cannot be reduced 
to an effect of conditions external to the activity of philosophy. Philosophy, in some 
sense, inflicts the wound on itself To anticipate a little, we can say that the trawna of 
reason appears in the modem age because of the nature of the vocation that philosophy 
assumes for itself namely, the Cartesian epistemological prOject. whose goal is the 
discovei-v of incomgible criteria for objective knowledge, and along with this, the I 
Rose, 1994, p. I- 
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justification of the autonomy of pure reason. The goal of my thesis is firstly to outline a 
convincing definition of the philosopbical provenance of the trauma of reason, and then, 
in the main part of the thesis, to assess the work of two of the most trenchant critics of 
the modem Cartesian project, G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze, considered as ways of 
4 working through' this condition that provide resources for reconceiving the vocation of 
pbilosopby. 
ii) The Ambition of Philosophy: Immanence 
Our first object of enquiry has to be the Cartesian revolution itself, with the aim 
of penetrating a little deeper into its meaning as a philosophical event. The sceptical 
metbod is a way of redefining pbilosopby according to Plato's question in the 
Theaeletus: 'what is knowledgeT. Descartes' vision thus still affirins philosophy as the 
highest discipline of human knowledge, that is, as the knoWing of the meaning qj 
knowledge. Critical epistemology, despite its modernity, remains knotted to the longest 
threads of Westem thought. A constitutive element of its definition is the distinction 
between philosophy, which deals with knowledge as such, and specific sciences that deal 
with particular modes of knowing: natural science, psychology, political science, 
economics and so on. Behind this privilege accorded to philosophy is still the complex 
Greek notion of 1090s, the 'gathering' of being that inforrns Plato's conception of 
dialectic and Aristotle's view of metaphysics as first philosophy. Philosophy remains the 
discipline whose eros for being is pure, and which consequently possesses the logos 
absolutely, gathering being for knowledge without presupposing anything specific about 
the nature of being. This is what divides philosophy from, for example, the natural 
sciences, which assume for their purposes the existence of a matter whose nature can be 
described mathematically or empirically. 
The Aristotelian and Platonic legacy to philosophy is this faith in the essential 
purity of reason, and in the universality of what it. when unhindered, discovers of being. 
0 
There is an affinity between reason and being. Reason is the most direct form of access 
to being, a purer mode of seeing. Being is a medium within which reason moves without 
hindrance. That which actually exists, the world that enfolds everyday life and constantly 
upsets our plans and evades our predictions, possesses an essential, internal order which 
reason can reveal precisely because it corresponds to the internal structure of reason 
itself the discursive interconnection of orderly entailments, of grounds and 
consequences. Reason, to use more Platonic language, is the true suitor of being. It is 
always already in union with, is immanent in being. In relation to reason, our other 
faculties through which we become aware of the world, such as our senses, our memory 
and so on, must be judged and found wanting as modes of 'seeing into' being. Tbrough 
them, the world is necessarily distorted, for being resists them. This does not simply 
mean that occasionally we may be rmstaken about the world, but more radically, that the 
world itself appears through our senses and memory as shiffing, provisional, elusive - 
in short, without certainty. Through our other faculties, the unity of reason with being is 
lost, and we become aware of the world as an opaque honzon of awareness; we 
recognise it in its otherness. Reassurance, however, is provided through reason, before 
which otherness recedes. This, we are sure, is because being always already belonged to 
reason anyway. It is reason, for example, that allows us to correct the mistakes we make 
through relying too much on our senses. 
The idea of philosophy as an activity intimately bound up With the internal order 
of being, and which can therefore do without presuppositions about specific modes of 
being, already constitutes an attack on such particular presuppositions. From Parmenides 
onward, the implication is that, despite their necessity in the subordinate sciences, 
specific assumptions about the essence or meaning of being cannot ultimately result in 
anything more than a distortion of pure knowledge. The role of philosophy is therefore a 
sceptical one in relation to other sciences. In claiming for itself the role of arch 6-science, 
philosophy simultaneously withholds from subordinate disciplines the possibility of 
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justifying their own claim about knowledge. Each 'inferior' science is linked to a 
specific region of being, which is cut out of the whole, as it were, through the acceptance 
of axiomatic presuppositions. 
In relation to the fundamental philosophical faith in reason, Scholasticism 
represented for Descartes a negative development. Scholastic philosophy, frorn his point 
of view, did not allow itself to be guided solely by the reason of the individual, but was 
instead assured of its status by Church dogma, a corpus of traditional beliefs whose 
authority was simply assumed. Consequently, the idea of the purity of the philosophical 
eros for being takes on an active, ascetic aspect in the Cartesian sceptical method. The 
certainty of reason's immanence in being cannot be secured sIM-Ply through traditional 
doctrine and belief It has to be demonstrated, and this can only occur through a ftee 
process of reasonmg that is sceptical about all accepted beliefs, and which results in the 
discovery of an ob, . ective foundation of the unity of reason and being. Unless this 9 
certainty is secured in this way, then it will itself remain a belief, a matter of faith. If this 
is the case, then the Cartesian view of philosophy as arch ofLscience is no different from 
that which it cnticises. The need to prove that indiVldualsý siMPly because they reason, 
have a priori knowledge without the need to rely on tradition, thus addresses two issues: 
a) whether a critical viewpoint can be taken upon accepted belief and tradition, and b) 
whether this viewpomt can, once it has raised the issue of the legitimacy of common 
assumptions, justify its own assumption of the unity of reason and being- 
Importantly, this unity is interpreted by Descartes as the correspondence of the 
subject's own representations of the world (sensory, mnemonic, conceptual etc. ) With a 
reality that is really external to or o1her than the subject. All knowledge of the world, of 
the soul or of God necessarily implies the presence of subjective representational content 
of one forrn or another. Thus it is from this content that a foundation must be extracted. 
No specific content (do-va) can be assumed to be such a firm foundation until it has been 
5 
subjected to a test, designed to expose any content whose correspondence with reality 
could be conditional or accidental. 
It is Descartes' third methodological hypothesis. the excessive gesture which 
(temporarily) transfonns God (the theological guarantee of correspondence) into an evil, 
deceiving demon, that makes the question of conditional knowledge decisive: anything 
that objectively (in all cases of its occurrence as an opinion or doxa) presupposes either 
pre-given conceptual knowledge, as in the case of a proposition like 'man is a rational 
anima ', 3 or the intervention of faculties other than thought, as with all opinions that rely 
upon sensory evidence, can be considered to be only doubffuRy valid- Such opinions are 
objectively dependent for their validity upon conditions, and as long as this is the case, 
we cannot know that we know thern to be true, for the possibility of deception is held 
open as long as there remains a difference between an opinion and the criteria of its truth. 
This problem of cerlainty requires its solution to be in the form of uncondifional 
knowledge, foundational knowledge that we immediately know to be true without further 
cnteria- The Cartesian cogito is supposed to serve as such mitnediate knowledge by 
virtue of both its content and its form- the proposition 'I am thinking' Ue pense) together 
with the immediacy of the self-reflection that constitutes this thought is indubitable proof 
of my existence. When I entertain the proposition 'I am thinking' I know this without 
reference to criteria that may be doubted, indeed, to doubt the truth of this proposition is 
to produce a contradiction. Thought and the nature of an existent here correspond 
perfectly, if only temporarily, for the immediate certainty that guarantees the cogno, 
precisely because it is constituted in an act of attending that is supposed to be a direct 
seeing into the soul, only endures so long as this attending is maintained- 
It is thus necessary to go fin-ther. The cogilo grants fon-nal certainty, for it gives 
us criteria for the objective correspondence of representation and reality, narnely 'clanty' 
and 'distinctness', which are possessed by different classes of representation in various 
3 Descartes, 1996, p. 17. 
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degrees, with the highest degree belonging to concepts. The move from the cogilo to the 
proof of the existence of God is thus motivated by the needs of method, for in addition 
to formal criteria of certainty, it is necessary to establish the necessary existence of an 
objective ground of the necessary correspondence between all clear and distinct ideas and 
reality. 4 Again, this can only be achieved through the exarnination of subjective 
representations. Now, however, it is possible to go directly to the subject's store of 
conceplual representations, for these possess the reqwred degree of clarity and 
distinctness. The notion of God, Descartes reports, is unique among these concepts, for it 
alone represents a perfect being. Through the notorious 'ontological proof , Descartes 
connects the idea of the infinite perfection that necessarily belongs to the idea of God 
with the idea of necessary existence: if God were to be thought as non-existent, then he 
would be imperfect and would not be God. Given that this premise produces a 
contradiction, God necessarily exists, as a real ground of the objective correspondence of 
our clear and distinct representations with reality. 
Descartes believes that this result is a justification of the unity of subjective 
representation and reality, qualified by the restriction of this unity in its ftdl sense to 
representations of reason. If this is so, then Cartesian reason proves its autonomy: it will 
have demonstrated that it possesses genuine knowledge of being (of the res cogiians and 
God), Without requiring specific presuppositions about being M order to do so. The 
immanence of reason in being will have been proven, and otherness will have been 
domesticated- 
The charge made against Descartes' rationalism by those who brought a parallel 
and also characteristically modem form of thought namely empincism, to fi-uifion, 
however, is that his critical method is not critical enough- Despite beginning correctly, 
within the representations of the subject, it fails to adequately address the question of its 
own presuppositions, for in order to begin as Descartes does, it is necessary above all to 
See Cottingham, 1995, ppý 64,70-1. 
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maintain a faith in the autonomy of reason in order to eventually demonstrate it. This 
faith is not simply a temporary postulate, but is, in the fonn of Descartes' reliance on 
innate ideas as tools of method, actually an assumption that goes acknowledged. The 
ideas of the res cogitans and the infinitely perfect God are held to have a natural, a priori 
relation to being because of their content, for the content of either, when doubted, 
produces a contradiction. However, the idea that such concepts, because of their 
representative content thereby possess a special ontological status, is placed under 
5 
suspicion by the emphicists, and above aU by Locke and Hw-ne. 
This idea is itself, for the empiricists, an unwarranted assumption about the 
nature of reason, indicating a residual and reassuring faith in the immanence of a priori 
reason that remains unquestioned, which means that effectively Descartes already knows 
the answer to his enquiry when he sets out upon it. Pure reason only grasps being because 
being has already been gathered by reason, via an unacknowledged presupposition, and 
the boldness of the reason that makes God into a devil is simply sbow. Against this 
background assumption of the immanence of reason in being, the empiricist method 
concerns the genesis of representations, and of concepts in particular. The question of 
how representations come to be present in the mind at all is privileged as more 
fundamental than the problem of how it is possible that these representations could 
adequately represent bemg, and be a source of objective knowledge. 
Tbrough his account of the origin of ideas in sensibility, the passions, and the 
associative principles that act as natural laws of the mind, Hume above all others 
constructs on an empirical basis a notion of reason as concerned only with beliefill the 
regularity of our subjective experience, as opposed to objective knowledge of the 
uniformity of the order of external being. Reason is therefore heteronomous, a 
subspecies of passion, an eros without any overtones of 'gathering', its function instead 
being to support those beliefs about experience that are based upon good e-vidence 
"I I As when Hume (1990, Bk 1, pt 3, §1) disting ishes matters of fact from relations of ideas. 
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(constant conjunctions of impressions). Ile issue is no longer the correspondence of 
representations with what exists outside the subject. For Hume. the meaning of the idea 
of necessary connection is not dependent upon its reference to, say, a causal power that 
inheres in substances. Instead, its meaning comes from the relations that exist between 
ideas imprinted in the memory by constantly repeated instances of pairs of impressions. 
The only relation of representation exists between unpressions and the ideas that literally 
.6 or it a certain re-present them 
Hence reason confronts mental contents that retain f 
opaqueness or otherness, for they are somehow given to it, and are indeed its own 
wellspring. The idea that it can overcome this opaqueness is the result of a 
misapplication of reason beyond the bounds to which it is limited by its confingent, 
merely given origin. 
The empincist critique of Descartes' defence of the immanence of reason in 
being is important for our tbeme of the trauma of reason. For Hume, reason is dependent 
on an empirical contingency that it cannot itself account for. The possibility of there 
being a regularity that is internal to the source of impressions, whatever it may be, cannot 
be thought without abstracting from the contents of the mind. The otherness of external 
reality is here seen as the genetic condition of reason itself, for it somehow provides an 
opaque stimulus that gives nse to the habit of reasorung. 
With Kant, the validity of a priori reasoning is defended in a way that cedes 
ground to the empiricist critique, but then goes on to undermine it. The methodological 
stance reason takes with respect to itself is no longer sceptical in Descartes' sense, where 
one only has to nd oneself of the conditionally certain m order to ascend without 
difficulty to the unconditional. Krilik as method signifies that the very capacity of reason 
for knowledge must itself be examined and criticised. Kant agrees widi the empiricists 
that pure ideas alone cannot provide an adequate measure of what constitutes genuine 
knowledge of objects. Sensibility has to have a role, and so if reason is to be 
Hume, 1979, §2, §4,1990, Bk. 1, Pt 1, & Pt 3, §§2-8. 
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autonomously capable of providing a priori knowledge, it must itself be the condition of 
possibility fOTmaking judgements about the exte-mal woTId to whicb sensibility gives 
access. Hence Kant, in agreeing with the empincists, simultaneously turns against them. 
For Kant, it is the spontaneous and discursive-rational structure of the representing 
subject's consciousness that makes possible the kind of discriminating power that enables 
Hurne's subject to even tell the difference between two impressions. For Kant, 
transcendental subjectivity is necessary in order to make subjective presentations 
possible, without which the thought of real extemality and of re-presentations would be 
impossible. 
For Descartes, the immanence of reason in being (the autonomy of philosophical 
reason) had to be demonstrated with reference to the content of our representations of 
what is. This provoked the empiricist response. Kant, however, understands the 
demonstration of the immanence of reason in being, of the right of reason to deten-nine 
what is, in a fon-nal sense. Our very consciousness of external objects, and even of 
individual impressions, is only made possible by the structure of our reason. If we can 
determine this conditioning structure, we will have proof of the autonomy of reason. The 
capacity of reason to determine 'what is' is thus conditioned by its capacity to deten-nine 
itself to be immanent to itself In this way, Kant sees reason as having the power to !I 
recognise its own limits as immanent to it - as necessitated by its own structure, rather 
than being forced upon it from outside, as in Hume's account. Reason has the right to a 
ph . ori knowledge because it also has the power to legislate the forms of possible 
experience, under which alone objects can be presented. Knowledge of these forms thus 
constitutes objective a priori knowledge of experience. Once this right has been proved, 
pure reason will have, through a consistent Critical epistemology, demonstrated that it 
alone has the right to assess truth-claims about being. 
Reason is thus, for Kant, immanent to our experience of objects, and this is 
demonstrated by an immanent self-examination on the part of reason. But this 
10 
deten-nination of 'what is' is our experience, our presentations of objects: an element of 
externality or otherness remains, in the Ding-an-sich, the thing-in-itself, ýNhich is never 
an object of expenence, only a limit on the extension of objective knowledge and the 
source of sensation, the material of experience .7 Nevertheless, this 
limit is immanent to 
reason's own structure, for it establishes the boundaries of objective knowledge. While 
reason has this proper (de jure), autonomous or immanent limit, it nevertheless tends to 
transgress it and mire itself not in error, but in transcendenial illusion, by claiming 
knowledge of the nature of the thing-in-itself, as in the modem rationalist tradition from 
Descartes to Wolff. However, reason is sovereign within its own limits, and must defend 
its domain (ditio) (CJ 174/13) by showing how it is possible to determine concrete a 
priori knowledge of both theoretical and practical or moral matters (what is and what 
ought to be, finite necessity and infinite freedom) within these limits, thus dernonstrating 
that both natural science and ethical life can be accounted for by self-critical reason. 
Kant's defence of a priori knowledge develops as a response to the Gennan 
Enlightenment (A ujkldrung), by taking a stand against the resurgence of an unprincipled 
fi7ith in reason. As such it is coeval with a more direct and negative reaction against the 
Enlightenment, beginning with Hamaim and Herder. Nevertheless, Kant remains allied 
with the Aujkldrer, raising the standard of independent, protestant reason against all 
traditional forms of authority, whether Church, State or academy. The struggle for the 
right to use one's own reason brings to light the implicit political dimension of the 
modem epistemological tradition: all claims to authority must present themselves before 
the tribunal of reason and be judged. But first, as Kant acknowledges, reason has first to 
criticise its own excesses, in order to provide criteria by which illegitimate claims can be 
exposed, and in order to justify the authority of its own tribunal. This is the central 
import of our presentation dius far. 
See P §9. 
Despite Kant's restrictions on reason's right to detennine 'what is', however, the 
problem of presuppositions returns, concerning the sel f-consi stein cy of the cntical 
method. If Critical reason alone is to determine the validity of its claim to a priori 
knowledge, then a question arises: bow is reason's right to criticise jiselfjustified. 1 Chief 
among the tenets of critical reason is that everything can be criticised, except the 
immanent relafion of reason to itself that defines the very concept of criticism. 8 This 
relation seems to testify to a residue of otherness, for reason's right to examine itself is 
accepted as given. The immanence of reason to itself has not been demonstrated, and so 
neither has the right of reason to determine 'what is', even within certain limits. 
Massing behind the vanguard of the direct reaction against the Enlightenment 
and its supporter Kant, and appalled at the political and theological consequences of 
unrestrained critique, opponents of the critical turn gave a different forni to the sceptical 
question: they raised doubts about the supposedly singular right of reason to question 
everything else. One such thinker, F. H. Jacobi, gave a name to a pathological condition 
of modem thought, exemphfied by Kantian philosophy and defined by a need always to 
validate values, to provide sufficient reasons for beliefs: nihilism. 9 The major symptom 
of this condition is an infinite regress of justifications, which results from the attempt to 
locate a first prmciple capable of grounding knowledge. Reason's right to critique must 
be established, and then the right of reason to establish the right of critique, and so on. 
This impossible labour creates an abyss of meaninglessness into which all beliefs and 
values disappear. 10 
At this point, the question of a trauma of reason that is truly - immanently, one 
might say -a pathology of reason can be raised. 'Me modem epistemological tradition. 
by allying itself at a fundamental level with scepticism, has courted this condition in 
8 Beiser, 1987, pp. 1-2; Cutrefello, 1994, pp. 1-5. 
Beiser, op. cit., pp. 81 ff. 
10 Ibid., pp. 30-1. 
I') 
various partial forms. We have still not yet arrived, in this account, at the point where it 
insinuates itself into reason itself, perhaps finallY SeN'ering, in Rose's words, eros ftom 
logos. We have, however, seen reason driven back into itself, from an initially assumed 
position of confidence, forced to become ever more wary of its own pretensions, until, 
with the reaction against the mlightenment, the political and philosophical desire for 
freedom from illegitimate autho-rity becomes paralysed by the self-defeating attempts of 
reason to justify itself as a universally competent judge, capable of stopping the desire 
for freedom from becoming arbitrary and mired in violence and cynicism. 
Nevertheless, a further step remains to be taken in this narrative. Almost a 
century after the sftuggle between Kant and his opponents reached its height, Nietzsche, 
in thernatising 'modem nihilism' as the most pressing problem of the age, described it as 
an antagonism between two tendencies -'not to esteem what we know, and not to be 
allowed any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves', a 'process of 
dissolution'. II The philosopher finds herself faced with a fabricated world to which she 
has 'absolutely no right' sIMPly by virtue of her reason, 12 and must confront it through 
the medium of a force that is Ike a surging 'odierness' at the heart of reason itself, 
namely the will-to-power. The next chapter will give an account of how Western 
philosophy comes to be faced by this situation, by showing how reason, at the height of 
its ambition in German Idealism, subjects itself to this its own deepest pathology. As we 
will see, the result of Fichte and Schelling's attempts to provide foundational 
justifications for the right of reason to examine itself result in the discovery of an 
irrational 'remainder' that is not simply other than reason, but is an otherness that is 
'inside' reason, and indeed is its own condition- This will threaten reason with the 
possibility that it cannol be immanent even to itself. 
" Nietzsche, 1968, §5. 
12 Aid., § 122 - 
13 
Before we take this step, a word about the choice of Hegel and Deleuze as 
mediator-, between otirselves and tbe trauma of reason. The sIgnIficance of this choice 
can only ultimately be proven by the rest of the thesis. However. a few preliminary 
remarks about the general approacb I am taking in relation to these figures are in order. 
Given that my presentation of the trauma of reason is completed with an examination of 
Schelling, with whom the development of the trauma is consummated, the penod of 
historical time in which the trauma could be said to be the central if not always 
acknowledged problem in Western thouglit is one in wbicb Hegel and Deleuze stand at 
opposite ends, and also one in which Hegel's influence has, up to the present, been 
largely decisive. 
Deleuze's desire, to break radically with the Hegelian tradition is, I dunk, 
particularly suggestive of the difficulties that philosophical thought faces M the wake of 
Schelling's critique of a priori reason, for the redefimtion of critique that Deleuze 
undertakes is, in method, execution and result (as I shall show), directly related to the 
results of Schelling's critique. I shall argue in Chapters Three and Four that Deleuze's 
ontological turn against Kantianism (and its phenomenological legacy) in general 
perforrns a similar philosophical role to Schelling's ontological turn against Fichte. My 
emphasis will be on the continuity of Deleuze's thought, from the early 'historical' 
writings to What is Philosophy?, more specifically, the way in which it is an attempt at a 
fully rigorous meditation on the role of the Absolute in philosophy. This stress on 
continuity, and the foregrounding of the Absolute, is in my opinion absolutely necessary 
in order to grasp the uniqueness of Deleuze's position in post-war French philosophy as 
an ontological thinker of difference. For reasons of space, given this concentration on 
continuity, I have unfortunately had to omit any extended investigation of the specific 
social-theoretical concems of the two volumes of Caphialisni and Schizophrenia, 
without, I believe, doing any excessive violence to Deleuze's multifaceted oeuvre, in so 
far as its development is concerned. 
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The relationship between Hegel and Deleuze has often been viewed, by both 
Hegelian and Deleuzean commentators, as one of utter incommensurability. 13 Ho%N ever. 
by reading their work together in the context of a common thematic territory, I hope to 
dispel inaccuracies, or rather, illusions emanating from both camps. The notion that 
Deleuze is simply a bad reader of Hegel, and the opposed idea that Deleuze gets Hegel 
absolutely right and can thus dispense with him, both evince equally Oedipal attitudes 
(widi a conservative and a radical inflection, respectively). Deleuze's own remarks on the 
aesthetic effect of Hegelianism upon him (D 21-3/12-15) should alert us to the 
possibility that his 'creative misreadings' of philosophers such as Spinoza and Nietzsche 
might stand alongside an equally strategic treatment of Hegel. This means that, in re- 
reading Hegel, it is necessary to point out how Deleuze distorts his work, but this does 
not immediately serve as a justification for discarding Deleuze. ne oveffiding issue will 
be the trauma of reason, and how this crisis which, as I suggested at the outset, has 
become intimately familiar to Western philosophers, might be overcome. Hence the 
philosophies of Hegel and Deleuze must be understoodfor themselves in relation to this 
issue, before they can be assessed in relatiol. n. to ench other. 
" See in particular Williams, 1997 (Hegelian), and Hardt, 1993 (Deleuzean). 
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Chapter Two 
Kant, Fichte and Schelling: the Trauma of Reason 
Introduelkin 
For Kant, the emphasis placed by the Enlightenment upon the entitlements of pure, 
disinterested reason requires that these entitlements be proven. Hume's account of the empirical 
origin of ideas, and his distinction between mere relations of ideas and matters of fact 
compromise any rationalist faith in pure reason and mea-n that a justification of the valldity of a 
priori judgements is needed before the Enlightenment's all-encompassing critique of tradition 
can claim any degree of success. I'he political content of this Critique has been well- 
documented: a revolution directed against 'superstition' by a freethinking 61ite in the tiaine of 
the powers of universal reason. But in order not to contradict its own aims, the political CrItique 
requires an epistemology founded upon an objective foundation of reason's authority in 
disputes concerning legitimacy. This project of justification drives Kant's mature thought... 
throughout the three Critiques and beyond. By outlining Kant's crItical project, and the ways in 
which Fichte and Schelling address issues arising out of this project, this chapter will determine 
A- - the meaning of what has already been referred to as the 'trauma of reason'. 
ii) Kant's Cri4me of Knowledge 
Kant's famous remark that it was the philosophy of Hume that first caused hirn to awake 
from the 'dogmatic slumber' into wbicb Wolffian rationalism bad cast bim gives us a starting 
rm-, nt for our enquii-y. Hwne"s denial of objective validity to a priori judgement, and Výi 
particularly to the rationalist keystone,, the pTinciple of causality or of sufficient reason (in both 
its "strong' md "weak' senses) exemphfies for Kant the danger radical scepticism poses to its 
1 On the 'weak' sense (every event has a cause), see Hume, ) 983, §§ 4-5,7, on the 'strong' sense (similar 
events have similar causes), see Hume, 1990, Pt. 111. 
16 
parent, philosophy: an 'anarchy' (CPuR Aix) of the kind he himself was subsequently accused 
of creating, wbere, no sure foundations of knowledge exist. 
With Hume, psychology becomes a sceptical weapon: reason's functions are constituted 
according to habit and the rationally unaccountable and contingent passions. An adequate 
response to Hume must show that knowledge through reason alone does necessarily or de. jure 
possess objective validity. Thus Kant's 'subjective turn' entails an examination of reason 
conducted by reason itself in order to, following Locke, 'examine our own powers, and see to 
what ddngs they fare] adapted'. ' The first move is to distingwish between this preliminary task- 
of immmient critique and real knowledge (metaphysics) itself the possibility of objective a 
priori knowledge must be established by enumerating all the principles without which such 
knowledge would be impossible, a negative canon of principles as opposed to a positive 
organon of actual knowledge (CPuR A 12/B25-6; A62-3/B87-8). 
or example, Hume argues that the principle of causality cannot be objectively valid 
independent of empirical experience, given that it is only through recurring expenences of 
conjunction that we become conscious of it in the first place. This principle is thus only an 
abstract idea., the means by which consciousness represents to itself a feeling connected with the 
character of its experiences, and is thus only contingently valid. Kant questions the 
presuppositions of Buine's genetic account of the 'feeling' ofTeason, by asking how it is 
possible that conscious experience should itself be of such a character as to contain such things 
as conjoined representations. The empiricist labula rasa brackets out the question of the 
possibility of experience, that is, of its necessary formal constituents, in favour of the question 
of its actual, contingent origins. For Kant, as for Leibniz, the tabula rasa must itself already 
possess a certain structure if it is to be capable of representational consciousness, i. e., 
consciousness of real externality. 'niis structure would in fact be presupposed by any enquiry 
like Hume's. 
Locke, 1990, Introduction, §7. 
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Kant entities this deep structure the irameentlental region of subjectivity, through 
which the deten-nination of the empincal, Conscious subjeM the object of psychology. is itself 
made possible. The miciples that govem transcendental subjectiN are the necessaiy 
conditions of any expenence of real existence. whether that of an independent object or that of 
the subject itself If these principles can be completely enw-nerated (CPuR Al'-, ')fl3217. ) and 
proven to be necessary formal constituents of experience, then reason"s nght to a priori 
knowledge, and hence its autonomy, will have been iustified. 
Important to both the Lejbnizian and empiricist lines of post-Cartesian descent is the 
distinction between knowledge of matters of fact and knowledge of relations of ideas- The 
problem of objective validity only arises in the former case,, as relations of ideas mere]), iinply 
anaývfic relations of entailment, whereas synihefic propositions about matters of fact have a 
bea-fing on the actual content of expenence, wbich is given io the subject it) some sense, and 
which, as Hume in particular emphatically points out, cannot therefore be assumed to be 
structured in accordance With the formal, discursive rules that determine conscious reasoning. 
Kant's response is that the very Presentation (Darstellung) of the content of experience 
itself is only made possible by formal transcendental principles or structures. 'Mese structures 
are necessary conditions of all actual empirical knowledge of objects and thus our knowledge of 
them constitutes foundational knowledge of the nature of all possible expenrience. Our 
knowledge of them will be both ývnlhetic, in that the structures that are its object purport to 
describe the inner structure of the given., and yet o priori, in that these structures are the 
necessary conditions of all empirical experience and knowledge. If oblective knowledge through 
pure reason alone can be had, then the discursive or rational components of these formal 
structui-es must ultimately be the necessat), conditions of the possibility of the non-discursive 
formal components. While Kant affirms the traditional diebotom), of reason and intuition, via 
his methodological distinction between spontaneous and receptive faculties (CPuR A5 I/B75), 
he also affinns the inseparability of their respective funefions in relation to kno-odedge under the 
overall dominance of reason. 
is 
This is not the limit of Kant's project. if reason must determme what it can know about 
real entities, and thereby lin-ýt itself t also establish its own freedom, by shoNNing that it it mus 
can prescribe forms of principled action beyond the limits imposed on human beings by the 
present. This practical dimension is both moral and political, for it implies both regulation of an 
individual's own actions, and the possibility of criticising prevailing institutional constraints on 
individual agency. Human being has two major aspects, the powers of cognition and desire (C. 1 
167/3-4), each related through reason to a different object: the theoretical object, which is given 
to the subject as actually existikp- and the practical object or end, that wbieb ought Io be, wbicb 
the subject produces (CPuR Bix-x). Reason thus has a theoretical and a practical fonn, and 
Kant's project must be to determine two sets of conditions, for cognitive and for moral 
experience. A full justification of reason must show that, in both cases, the conditions under 
whieb an object can be objectively known are themselves uncondjfionalýy knowable tbTougb 
pure reason alone, an aim that Kant sometimes describes as the discovery of the ultimate unity 
of these two forms of reason., a proof of its final autonomy (e. g. CPuR A326/B382-3, A3333- 
4/B390-1). 
a) Theoretical Knowledge 
The ultimate conditions of theorefical knowledge are those discursive forms which 
alone present (darstellen) an object as existiAg in relation to subjectivity in general. Objective 
theorefical knowledge is thus only knowledge of objects as determined for the subject under 
these forms. To represent (vorslellen) an object as it is in iiselj'is not at all conhwlictory. 
However, precisely because this represents the object without relating it to the discursive and 
non-discursive conditions of real objective knowledge, Kant assigns to it the status of the purely 
ihinkable., that which accords with the rules of formal logic but not with those of the 
iranscen, dental logic that governs the conditions of the possibility of experience (CPIuR A50- 
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7/B74-82). Nevertheless, Kant does not entirely follow Hume's injunction to commit such ideas 
to the DVnes,, 3 as we shall see. 
Rationalist metaphysics assumes that reason is immanent in being- as we saw in Chapter 
One with respect to the doctrine of 'innate ideas'. The ontological proof is the capstone of this 
assurance- metaphysics, down to Kant's own day, is satisfied that its objective validity is 
ultimately analyfic. It believes it can have objective and a priori knowledge of a thing-in-itself, 
because, above all, the ontological proof demonstrates that reason is capable of proving flie 
existence of the bigbest entity by simply examining it-self and its own idea of God. But the 
empiricist critique forces a re-evaluation of this assurance, by pomtmg out that the mere analysis 
of an idea, even wben this is an idea of G(xt can only evaluate its logical validity and not its 
relation to matters of fact. Kant's response is to give ground to empiricism. by denving 
objective validity to representations of things-M-themselves. Metaphysics assumed that reason, 
considered as an 'intellect" intuition' independent of sensibility, can objectively represent 
tbings-in-themselves. ForKant, this is a wholly unrestrained and therefore Iranscenidem use of 
pure reason (CPuR A569/B597), to which objectivity must be demed. 
With this in-mind, we can now examine Kant's attempt to Inventory the conditions of 
possible experience, beginning with the non-discursive- For Kant, the fonns inherent to intuition 
allow us to both present a given sensation to ourselves in empirical experience as something 
manifold or differentiated, and to present a priori intuitions of objects, as in geometry. These 
forms are a priori because they cannot be abstracted from empirical objects-I instead, they are 
necessary if any presentation of an empirical object is to be even possible. If it is possible to be 
conscious of an object as distinct from anything else, including ourselves, it must first be 
distinguishable according to its spatial and temporal location, miiiimafly, we must be able to 
mark it as 'here" and 'now' (CPuR A23-4/B38-9, A-10-1/B46-7). The divisible unities of space 
and time are thus not given to us widiin an intuition of an objea and so they must 'come first" 
3 Hume, 1983, § 12, FIL 3, p. 165. 
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as formal intuitions, constituting the a priori conditions of the possibility of any intuition. I'lus 
means, tbough, that they are simply forms of our intuitions, and that the manifold of iritultion is 
only the appearance (Erscheinung) of objects in relation to us (phenomena). while still being 
given to intuition and not somehow generated subjectively as an illusion (Schein. ) (CPuR B69- 
70). 
Kant needs to show, however, that it is reason that legislates the forms of possible 
experience. The opportunity to demonstrate this is offered by The fact that the possibillt), of 
fonnal intuitions, Le., intuitions of the forin of space and time in general, cannot be explained 
solely with reference to intuition. From the standpoint of Mtuition, it is not possible to exafniiie 
its essential forms in order to account for them in any way. This is because intuition, being non- 
discursive and passive, is only 'In' its forms. Reason, on the other band, is spontaneous and 
capable of reflecting upon itself In CPuR's 'Transcendental Deduction', Kant develops 
reflexive arguments to sbow that from the standpoint of reason, formal intuitions are only made 
possible by reason's own structure. 
If this Is so, then certain discursive determinations will be necessary to stabilise any 
possible intuitive presentation. These must be a finite set of lawlike principles, )n order to 
safeguard the regularity of experience by giving it definite limits. Kant differentiates these finite 
principles of knowledge from the infinite (but unsecured) posSibilities afforded by pure thougbt 
f CUltieS: 
4 
with the aid of Wolff s distincition between t wo spontaneous, rational a Understandi 
(Yerstan(l) and pure Reason (Yernunfl). The Understanding's a priori elements, the rules that 
stabilise the manifold of intuitioný comprise Kant's table of twelve a priori concepts or 
categories, which mirror, within transcendental logic, the purely formal ftmetions of judgement 
in general logic (CPuR A70/B95, AgO/BI06). The transcendental syntheses of the manifold 
made possible by these rules will be synthetic in an analogical sense: they will constitute the 
identity of heterogeneous elements (CPuR A79/B 104), of the non-discursive and the discursive. 
Ckygill, 1995, p. 347. 
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Kant's use of Deduktion as the title for the cenwal section of CPuR does not, then, 
imply a deductive argument based on an unconditionally true proposition. Instead, the sense of 
this term as employed by German jurists of Kant's time is intended: the tie jure right of reason 
to the matter at band, objective knowledge, must be proven or deduced (CPuR A84-5/B] 16-7). 
The deduction of the categories will be completed by a final, discursive foundation of 
possibility: a condition of all the other conditions that requires no ftu-tber proof of its own 
possibility. 
The A and B versions of the Deduction, despite differences of approach and emphasis, 
both argue that the discursive concept, as a predicate of synthetic judgement, is a necessary 
condition of both the unity of the maMfold in the presentation of an objectý and of the 
possibility of its being subsequently recomsed by the subject or reproduced in acts of 
remembering. Each version also proposes that a foundational condition of possibility must 
entail the necessary formal unity of all possible contents of consciousness. Kant calls this 
condition the transcendental unity of apperception., a thought or representation of the 
fimdamental unity of the subject With itself that is necessary if consciousness is to be 
determinate at all. This unity is thus the UnIty of all the possible presentations which the subject 
can have of an object or the sense in which a1l these contents (whether a priori or empirical) 
must necessarily belong to the same subject in order for them to be synthesised iii the fust place. 
This unity cannot be explained as either a product of mechanical causation or as an attribute of 
noumenal substance, as it is a logical unity required by any representation, including those 
representations detertnined according to the categories of causation and substance. As such, it is 
the most fundamental form of regularity to which the intuited manifold is subject, and can only 
be a relation of the subject to its own activity that does not itself presuppose any of the 
conditions enumerated so far. Kant thus shows that, in order for there to be experience of 
objects, it is necessary for the subject to be implicitly conscious of its own determining activity 
with respect to the obje4 that is, of the fact that it 'takes' itself to be determining an object in 
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such-and-such a way. ' This self-consciousness is neither knowledge of the subject as a 
pbenomenal object nor some 'intellectual intuition' of the. subject as it is in itself 
Kant remarks in the second edition of CPluR that the representafion 'I think', which can 
potentially accompany all repTesentations as a mark of self-consciousness and thus identify 
them as belonging to a single subject, is always itself accompanied by the subject's 
)6 indeterminate empirical sense of its own existence (CPuR B42.6. -3n, . This nituition of existence 
is, unlike empirical intuitions of subiective states, not given through the mediation of other 
forinal conditions Cexistence' here is 'not a category'). Neither, however, is it an intellectual 
intuition of a thing-in-itself. Instead., it is represented by the pureýv intellectual representation 'I 
think', a representation that denotes (bezeichnel) the reality of the foundational spontaneity of 
the subject. 7 The 'I think' does not therefore express a priori knowledge of the essence of a 
substance, as it did for Descartes. It simply points to an actuality that can never be determined 
for consciousness under the rules that make objects of experience possible, as it is itself the 
condition of A conscious representation. This logical and negative (as opposed to metaphysical, 
substantial and positive) result completes the formal deduction of the categories and the first 
part of Kant's ustification of reason. F--- 
i 
The Deduction, however, only demonstrates that a certain formal unity of the subject is 
necessary for the conscious experience of an object in general to be possible. It does not sbow 
that this unity is actually specified as synthetic a priori knowledge of the determinate form of an 
object. Kant undertakes this task in the Schernatism and the Analytic of Principles, wbere be 
aims to show that the categories understood as purely logical functions do provide determinate 
rules for the synthesis of intuitions. This would demonstrate that the rules of synthesis they 
5 Pippin, 1987, pp. 459-60. 
'' See also Makk-red 199 1, P. 10-5 - 
pippifl, ()P. cm, pp- 454-5- 
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represent are aciualýv transcendental conditions, and not merely logically possible modes of 
synthesis. 
Time is the form of inner intuition in which all appearances are given. Each category is 
thus shown to represent a general rule for a synthesis of time. The applicability of this rule to 
particular intuitions has to be established., in order to knot together the faculties of intuition and 
Understanding within a synthetic unity. This is ensured by the role of the productive 
imagination, a mediating faculty that partakes of the natures of both the other faculties (CPIuR 
A] 38/B]77), and which produces a schema, a determination of time that is given a priori by 
the imagination to each category. For example, the schema of pernianence applies to the 
category of substance, while that of im-versible succession applies to causality. Insofar as the 
schema participates in the sensible, intuition gives it specificity in time or particularity; insofar 
as it participates in the conceptual, the Understanding grants it universality. The sebemata show 
that the categories do, in actuality, constitute a priori knowledge of the form of an object in 
general. 
The Ideas of Pure Reason 
The forms of in-tuition, the categories, the spontaneous unity of consciousness, and the 
schemata, complete Kant's inventory of the transcendental conditions that are wwwneni it) or 
consfifulAw qf*possible objective experience (appearance). The first Critique's 'Transcendental 
Dialectic' uses this inventory to criticise the Understanding's natural tendency to extend the use 
of the forms of intuition or the categories beyond the limits of their legitimate employment to 
appearances or phenomena. This tendency consists in the conviction that the fonnal conditions 
of knowledge also apply to judgements about things-in-themselves or nouniena, as in the 
proposition that the basis of consciousness is an enduring soul-substance. To claim either that 
space and time (instead of being forms of our intuitions) actually inhere in the substance of 
things-in-themselves, or that they do not although we can nevertheless objectively determine. 
things-in-themselves as, say, causes or substances, is to contravene the immanent rest .. nctions 
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von valid a priori knowledge. Such contraventions are not, therefore, erroneous judgements 
about real thing-in-thern selves. For Kant flxy are distortions of the HnManent role of reason in 
experience, or tramcendenial illavions that illegitimately presuppose an entitlement for reason 
that it cannot justi fy. 
Despite this, representations of thing-in-thernselves do have a transcendental role with 
respect to objective knowledge. This concerns the sense in which, as a concept of an object 
isolated from the conditions (Bedingutýgen) of obiective knowledge, the concept of a thing-in- 
itself is connected to the logical value of the unconditional (dw Unbedingle). FolloWing Plato, 
Kant entitles such a representation. an idea (ldee) rather than a category. Whereas the category 
bas objective validity because it determines the intuited manifold, the Idea by definition does 
not relate to any possible intuition. As a concept of pure reason, it is only related to other 
concepts, via general logical PfInciples. 
However, Kant finds that he has to give an epistemological role to the Idea in order to 
provide a truly comprehensive answer to flume. By denying objective validity to the pnneiple 
of necessary connection, Hume attacked the notion of causality on two fronts. The prInciple of 
necessary connection, for Hume, conceals the presupposition of the uniformity of nature. 
Behind the 'weak" sense of causality, i. e., that every event has a cause, hes the 'strong' sense, 
i. e., that effects of type y necessarily have causes of type x, and so future occurrences of x will 
necessarily be followed by cases of Y. Kant reeWises these two aspects, arguing that 
&appearmces are themselves subject to ta fixed] rule, and that in the marnfold of these 
representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules [ I' 
(CPuR A 100). 
In order that experience should not be, at bottorn, essentially chaotic, it is necessary that it 
possess a unity both formal and material: it should be subject to a fixed, general order, and 
should also happen 'in conformity with certain rules'. In other words, experience should exhibit 
an overall regularity, together with a concretely specified uniformity. Kant's Transcendental 
Deduction and the schernatism of the category of causality in the Second Analogy demonstrate 
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H= conscious experience exhibits, from moment to moment, a formal regularity. 8 However, 
Hus only demonstrates that causality in the 'weak' sense is a principle that Is constitutive of 
experience and therefore objectively valid a priori. It does not show that similar events have 
similar causes, and cannot therefore demonstrate that the uniformity of nature is a necessary 
condition of experience. 
A further problem is that a proof of the transcendental status of the uniformity principle 
would require that nature is in Usetf uniform. Kant's restriction of properly a priori knowledge 
to the canon of conditions that make experience possible means that such a proof could not be 
given a priori, as the entirety of nature cannot be given to the subject as the object of a single 
intuition (CPuR A328/B384). In this case, it seems that a complete justification of the principle 
of necessary connection is not possible. Nevertheless, the arginnent in the Second Analogy 
cannot be the last word, as Kant has stated from the outset that the critical philosophy must 
show bow natural science is possible (CPuR BI 7-18). Science. presupposes the possibility of the 
objective existence of a regular or unified empirical maMfold, which is guaranteed by the 
category of causality. 
What the category of causality does not guarantee, however, is the actual or material 
regularity of the manifold. There is thus no guarantee that empirical nature exhibits an overall 
systematic regularity, or in other words, that empirical concepts of nature can have necessary 
interconnections. As John 11. Zannnito puts it, while Kant 'argued against Hunie that the 
concept of causality was necessary at the transcendental level, he acknowledged at the same 
time that Hw-ne bas every rigbt to consider any empirical application of that principle 
contingent. ' 9 Hence Kant has not shown tlw- natural science is indeed based on firm 
foundations, and has thus not shown that reason is capable of a priop! knowledge. Unless the 
assumption of the u-nifoniiity or ývstematic unity of the manifold can be deduced as a 
8 On the alm and scope of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, see AJ)Ison, 1983, Pt. I 11, Ch. ) 0, esp. 
p. 216. 
Zaniniito, 1992". P. 159. 
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transcendental condition of the achial employment of the Understanding- then, as Kant 
recooses, not only will there be 'no coherent employment of the Understanding', but also 'no 
sufficient criterion of empirical truth' (CPuR A65 I /B679). 
Kant attempts to solve this problem in CPuR by showing that pure reason is the faculty 
that directs the empirical use of the Understanding. This would prove that the a posieri . ori . 
discovery of the real forms of the uniformity of nature is possible for science, wbile avoiding 
the illegitimate conclusion that these forms can be known a priori. In the Transcendental 
Dialectic, Kant tries to show that the Idea of the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition of 
any empirical use of the Understanding. If this is successfW, then Kant has demonstrated that 
pure reason can fumisb the a prio?! principles of natural science. 
Because the thought of an object in general depends upon the a priori concept of 
causality, Kant can argue that reason, understood as that faculty whose role in general logic is to 
determine the analytic relations between pure concepts, has the transcendental vocation of 
enabling specific empiTical Telations of ground-and-consequent to be deterMined between 
objects of the Understanding, with, the overaH purpose of unt6ring empirical scientific 
knowledge. General or formal logic relates propositions to each other by means of syllogisms. 
In any given syllogism, the truth of its conclusion is conditioned by the truth of its prenfises, 
which can be thought of as determMed by other syHogisms, and so on to infinity. But we have a 
non-contradictory idea of the totality of truth-conditions, which is itself subject to no finther 
condition (CPuR A321/13377ff). This unconditional logical Idea bas to be distinguisbed from 
the categories. Whereas the categories are transcendental versions of the logical functions of 
judgement, the uncondifional logical Idea is the formal basis of the three pure transcendental 
concepts or Ideas. We are aware of our own state and the state of independent objects, forming 
two series of conditioned objective determinations. We can represent with an Idea (soui and 
cosmos) the unconditional totality of conditions in each case, and can also represent the unity of 
the two series in another Idea (Goa) (CPuR A333-4/13390-1), preserving the overall unity of the 
natural order. 
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The unconditional allows, in formal logic, the construction of series of syllogisms in 
ascending or descending directions. Ascending, these detemune the conditions of the premises 
at increasing levels of generality; descending, these situate each conclusion as a premise of a 
new syllogism. In its transcendental role, reason determines appearances in a similar twofold 
way - subsurning them under empirically determined principles of classification at levels of 
increasing generality, or enabhng future cases to be inferred on the basis of previous 
regulanties. 
However,, Kant is careful to withhold from the Ideas the objective and conslifulive 
epistemological status attributed to the categOnes. The unconditional totality of conditions 
cannot be given in an intuition, for the Idea of it represents., not just a finite aggregate of objects, 
but a unity with infinite extension that cannot itself be conceived of as conditioned by, or 
subject to, the fonns of space and time. Hence the Ideas do not represent an illegitimate use of 
reason, but are instead regulafive rules for the svstematic investigation and mapping of 
empincal expenence. In this., they are analogues of the schemata (ICPuR A664-5/13692-3), but 
are not constitutive as they are derived from the merely subjectively valid principles of general 
logic, which operates independently of intuition (CPuR A336/B393). It is thus a necessary 
condition of empirical science that we sbould assume that the order of nature is structured to 
conform to our reason. We do not therefore know that nature is in itself systematically 
structmv4 but we do know that reason is capable of discovering conditions (the Ideas) that 
justify our assui-ning, this so that we can go on to discover actual regularities in nature a 
posleriori .. The Ideas of pure reason, wbile not being constitutive conditions of any possible 
experience, are regulative conditions of empirical experience. 
c) Practical Knowledge 
Kant sets out to explain the possibility of the objective validity of representational 
consciousness, wbieb requires that be divide the actual experiential domain into experience of 
objects that exisl and experience of objects that oughl to exist. Experience of existing objects 
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requires consciousness of necessary connection to be a condition of the manifold of intuition. 
which would prove that natural science is possible. The second kind of experience demands that 
it be proven that consciousness of freedom is a condition of purposive action, which would 
demonstrate that morality is possible. 
Kant's analysis of the practical employment of pure reason in CPrR and GMM is 
intended to demonstrate that there are secure foundations fora priori knowledge of an objective 
morality, which would both prescribe a universal duty for all rational beings, and demand that 
the authority of this moral order be reccgnised as supreme over and above that of existing 
political arrangements. A universal morality would only be objectively possible if reason 
possesses by right a concept of causality that is objectively valid wilhow the schema of 
succession, an unconditional, free and purposive mode of causation (GMM 397-400/10-13). 
The Idea of purposive or rational freedom is central to Kant"s resolution of the Third 
Antinomy of Pure Reason in CPuR, where it is discussed as the purely thinkable, hypothetical 
causality that we can attribute to the unconditional or flfing-in-itself (CPuR A538/B566). The 
Third Antinomy is an undecidable conflict between two theses on causality a) that freedom is 
the necessmy ground of appearance, and b) that the only form of causation is mechanical. The 
first thesis dogmatically posits the Idea as an objective ground of existence, while the second 
assumes that such a ground cannot emst. Kant's answer to this conflict refuses the former as 
transcendent and the second as against the interest of reason in morality. Inste4 he gives a 
negative presentation of freedom as the merely fliinkable Idea of the regulative unity of all 
causal conditions, in the manner discussed in the previous section. 
If this negative, formal definition of freedom could be objectively justified in the spbere 
of practical reason, then pure reason would be shown to have an ob*tive practical component 
that would buttress the regulative role of pure. reason. The assumption that the natural order is 
inherently uniform would therefore not only be theoretically necessary in order for empirical 
scientific investigation to be possible. It would also be an indefeasible moral duty to assume the 
overarching existence of such a unity,, which implies not merely mechanical uniformity, but a 
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purposive totality. Kant thus refers to freedom as 'the keystone of the whole architecture of the 
system of pure reason and even of speculative [theoretical) reason' (CPrR 4.13. ). explicitly 
elevating practical reason above the theoretical form (CPrR 120-1/124-6). 'Me final unity of 
reason would thus consist in this hierarebir-al relation. 
So Kant must show that we can know a priori that we can act freely to produce real 
effects in the world, independently of natural causal series. All motivations that prescribe 
particular goals, such as hunger., sexual desire and so on, belong to such natural causal series. 
These series generate subjective inclinations towards the satisfaction of needs. Such inclinations 
are heteronomous motives for action to whick for Kant we fi-eely accede. They are actual 
determinations of the empirical subject, ratbe. r than transcendental conditions of all practical 
expenence. 
A determining motive with an absolute, objective value as opposed to a conditional, 
subjective one would bave value only through itself A candidate for this role is the love of 
duty, a will to act in accordance with the moral law out of respect for the law alone, rather than 
in the service of a particular goal -a disinteresled practical interest to rmrror the theoretical 
interest in disinterested, objective truth. For this motive to be objectively possible, reason must 
be able to freely determine the will to act without imposing a particular content upon it as its 
conditioned object. In other words, the "I must be capable of being given a purely formal 
determination. Kant formulates this condition of possibility as the 'categorical imperative' in its 
first, canonical fonn: 'Act only according to that maxim, whereby you can at the same time Will 
that it should become a universal laV (GMM 421/30). The only condition to which this 
principle refers is the purely fortnal, and therefore unconditional, rule of non-contradiction. 
The categorical imperative plays the role of foundational condition of possibility for 
morality, just as the unit), of apperception does in relation to science. It is, for Kant, that which 
enables us to assw-ne that we are free, the ralio cognoscenth of freedom (CPrR 5/4) that 
requires no further explanation of its possibility. The imperative operates as a foundation both 
objectively and subjectively: objectively, the criterion of universality it presents is the condition 
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of action as such, for it expresses the ultimate necessity of an action, the rule that something 
Oughl objectively to be the case (GMM 449-50/51)- In such wise, it forms the unconditional 
condition for any action, whether autonomous or heteronomous, for all willing aims to create an 
objective existence. Its possibibty cannot be explained ftirther because it bas the fonn of pure 
universality, which is a priori binding on all rational subjects because it is the formal definition 
of pure reason itself, and is thus 'an apodictically certain fact as it were, of pure reason' (CPrR 
47/48)- 
Subjectively speaking, the law is a disinterested motive, determining the will to want 
only the universal (GMM 401/14n; CPrR 75/77). This affin-nation is felt as an immediate, 
unconditioned determination, nwnely respect or reverence (Achtung), which the subject directly 
associates 'with the consciousness of [its) own existence' (CPrR 162/166). Respect is the 
subjective recognition of the unconditionality of duty, and affmns that no obligation outweighs 
that to obey the moral law. It is also the feeling 'that it is beyond our ability to attain to an idea 
that is a lcmjbr us' (CJ §27,257/114). 
Thus Kant's defence of freedom is simultaneously a defence of an indefeasible 
obligation. The fundamental Kantian methodological principle, that experience necessarily 
depends upon the structure of the transcendental subject, is transformed for the practical sphere 
via the notion of a self-legislating moral subject. In this concept of self-legislation is implied 
both a) the free causality of the will, that is, the nournenal. subjective agency that gives the law, 
and whieb is guaranteed by the objective deduction of the law as a fact of reason, and b) the 
receptivity of moral feeling, the reverential affirmation of an obfigation through which the 
. -I- phenomenal self is given, or subjected to, the law, and constrained into suppressing Inclination. 
Kant derives from the law itself conditions of possibility for the fulfilment of the 
- 1-1 obligation it stands for, given that all action must take place against a background of 
, imperfection'. the realm of nature, incorporating nahn-al needs and inclinations. These 
& postulates of practical reason' (immortality, freedom and God) are no longer regulative 
transcendental Ideas as they were for theoretical reason, but are presuppositions that 
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give objective reality to the ideas of speculafive reason 
in general (by means of their relation to the practical sphere, )- 
and they it in holding to concepts even the possibility of 
which it could not otherwise venture to affirin. 
(CPrR 132/137) 
Therefore, Kant's justification of practical reason and objective morality is meant to 
make the regulative Ideas not just regulative conditions of empirical scientific investigation, but 
objectively valid., constitutive conditions of the possibility of moral experience. The assumption 
of the uniformity of nature, and the affimnation of the ultimate unity of reason, are both 
demanded of us insofw- as we are conscious beings. 
Fichte: the Grculari4, of Transcendental Philosopky 
That Kant was not himself satisfied with his achievements in the first two Critiques is 
indicated by his attempts in the third Crifique to redefine the unity of reason in terins of a 
principle of reflective judgement to which both theoretical and practical knowledge are 
e isternically related. Perbaps more impoirtant bowever., historically spea-ing, were the pi 
objections to Kant's method put for-ward by thinkers identified with the Sturm und Drang such 
as Herder and Hamarm. The first and second C'n'liques both attempt to sbow that a pri . on . 
synthetic knowledge of objects is possible. They proceed by proving that the formal conditions 
of possibility for speculative or moral experience are structures that reason itself possesses de 
jure. Kant thus demonstrates that experience is only possible because the intuited manifold is 
subject to the discursive structure of transcendental subjectivity. The otherness of the manifold. 
its stable objectivity, is thus shown to be made possible by reason itself "' 
Kant admits that his project begins from empincal expenence. and is bound up with 
fundamental interests of reason. In this., it is not piresuppositionless in Descartes' sense. but this 
is not a problem insofar as Kant is not attempting to begin from metaphysical first pnnciples, 
but is instead tying to show how metaphysics is in fact possible (CPIuR BxXji-X-XjjI). However, 
Kant has assumed a certain content for the term 'metaphysics'. by assuming that the field of .I- 
possible experience is restricted to the experience of an object as defined by Newtonian natural 
science, or the experience of a moral object as defined by a Protestant morality. When the 
foundational conditions for the possibility of a metaphysics of nature or of morals are 
determined, they are presented as facts whose possibility needs no further epistemological 
explanation. Bowever, the content that they condition has simply been assurned, and their own 
fonnal structures reflect this content (Deleuze, as we shall see, points this out). 
For exmnple, the first Critique's inventory of constitutive transcendental conditions 
comprises the divisible unifies of space and time, together With the table of twelve categories. 
These fonns are derived from Newtonian science and Aristotelian logic respectively. Kant's 
arguments show that it is possible to deduce fonna. Uy necessary foundational conditions, such as 
the interplay of intuition,, ima0ation and Understanding as subject to the unity of apperception, 
that make possible these particular accounts of what experience is like. What they do not show 
is that these accounts of experience are anything more than particular descriptions of the nature 
of the content of representational consciousness. They can certainly be shown to be universally 
possible forms of experience, but they have not therefore been shown to be unchanging and 
necessary forms of experience for all rational beings. Hamann and Herder's critiques of Kant 
concerned the way in which the forms of experience that the critical philosophy set out to 
JI This reading of Kant is not uncontroversial, Afflison (198 ) ins sts on a different interpretation of Kant's 
account of intuition, focusing on the possibility of 'pure intuitions'. 
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ground could themselves be said to be made possible by preconscious. social or historical 
conditions. ' 1 If this were so, then Kanfian method would be heteronomous m-d in fact uncritical. 
insofar it would be incapable of knowing the source of its own interests. 
The first generation of Kants sympathetic critics linked the weaknesses of the critical 
philosophy to two related problems- Firstly, by linýiiiting philosophy to the negative task of 
enumerating a canon of the necessary conditions of experience, Kant was unable to demonstrate 
the real necessity of scientific and moral experience. In order to prove their necessity and 
universality as modes of experience, an organon of principles would bave to be constructed, a 
complete system of all the forms of experience that are inherent in representational 
consciousness. Secondly,, the real difference between the faculties of intuition and reason, wbicb 
is a condition of the specific problem identified by Hume that Kant's project is meant to solve, 
suggests that they are really heterogeneous. But this is an epistemological presupposition that is 
common to both Newtonian science and Christian morality: Kant is perfectly happy to assume 
that a thing-in-itself influences the receptive faculty of intuition in some occult way (P §91 
CPuR A 19/B3 3), in both speculative and practical experience. 
r*%. - Ome way of criticising Kant while recognising the validity of his overall epistemological 
aims would be to question the foundations of the difference between intuition and 
Understanding, given tbat, in conscious experience, both are subject to the unity of 
apperception- This is the approach of K. L. Reinhold, for whom philosophy had to begin with 
self-consciousness, the unity of apperception itself, as the objective presupposition of all 
representational consciousness, and then derive the forms of experience from this fact as from 
an unconditional first Ciple (GnindvaL-). 12 PM 
This effectively turns the critical philosophy upside down., as it makes the unity of 
apperception into an unconditional prMCIple by positing it as both the formal ground of the 
11 See Beiser, op. eil., pp. 17-22 and pp. 142-4. 
12 See ibid., Ch. 8. 
possibility of experience, and the material ground of its actuality. Formally or negativelý 
speaking, expefience is impossible without it and matenally or positively speaking, if this unity 
is above all rational, then the forms that knowledge and experience take must follow necessarily 
from the actual nature of consciousness, wbich can be discovered via an immanent examination 
of self-consciousness. This would., it was hoped, avoid the Kantian problem of heteronomy, as 
no determinate or positive content would have been assumed as essential to expenence. 
Philosophy would begin from a wholly indeterminate first principle. 
Fichte differentiates his own stance regarding the foundation- of an organon from that of 
Reinhold in responding to criticisms of Reinhold advanced by G. E. Schulze in 1792. Fichte 
agrees with Scbulze that theffiel of the unity of consciousness, as deduced in CP'uR, cannot be 
foundational as there is no absolute certainty that such a pure fact does not depend on a further 
material or formal condition. To define the unconditional, Fiebte follows Spinoza in talking of 
that which is the formal condition and material ground of itself only then to invert Spinoza's 
concept of substance by recasting it in tems of subjectiv4. " 
For Reinhold, the fact of consciousness is meant to remove Kant's division between 
intuition and Understanding, which is still haunted by the thing-in-itself Yet the pure fact of 
consciousness is only the abstracted subjective half of this opposition. For Schulze and Fichte, 
Reinbold, like Kant, is still guided by presuppositions about the essential nature of experience. 
His unconditional principle is still detennined in opposition to the object and represents 
consciousness as the merely abstract foundation of a particular form of experience. For Fichte, 
this represents a regression, insofar as the abstraction of consciousness as a formal condition is 
also an abstraction from subjective freedom. The entire practical spbere would thus remain 
unaccounted for. In his earliest attempts at a critique and successful completion of the Kantian 
project Fichte stresses that the Absolute or truly unconditional is essentially a principle of 
praclical reason. The genuine unconditional must be conceived of as that which underlies all 
13 Gu6roult, 1974, p. S. 
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representation, the Absolute Subject 'the representing subject which would not be represented' 
(RA 9-10/65). 
Mis Absolute Subject would be the ground of all the fonns of consciousness by virtue 
of the free causality that defines the practical will. As a principle, it would be 
a transcendental idea which is distinguished from other 
transcendental ideas by the fact that it is realised, through 
intellectual intuition., through the I am, and indeed, through the 
I sjmpýv am, because Jam JJch bin schlechthin, wed ich bin] 
(RA 16/70) 
'Intellectual intuition' designates the mode, of this subject's indeterminate and 
immediate unity or familiarity with itself. prior to any detenninate representation, and is thus 
'that whereby I know something because 1 do it' (-%VL 463/38). The 'I think', as a representation 
of the subject's own spontaneity and syntbetic Lmity, is seen to depend upon an indeterminate 
and absolute 'I am", which is a synthetic unity produced through the subject"s own act. 'I'his is 
the practical essence of apperception: the Absolute Subject produces itself through its own 
freedom, bringing itself into existence or enacting itself. The subject's 'being entirely depends 
upon its absolutely free aC,. ', 14 and so the subject is not (unlike Spinoza's substance) a self- 
grounding metaphysical enti(y. Instead. it is directly opposed to 'being' or givenness as a pure 
deed of brin&g-into-being, '5 For the early, Fichte, this practical causality on the part of the 
subject secures the unity of theoretical and practical reason by making theoretical consciousness 
dependent on the practical subject. The self-generating subject is thus genuinely unconditional, 
14 Mid, p. 8. 
I-' See williams, 1992, pp. 36-7. 
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for Fichte, unlike Reinhold's subject, which remains. like Kant's, determined in relation to 
assumptions about what constitutes the essential. positive content of conscious expenence. 
Intellectual intuition is not, then, an expression of dWnatic faith in the existence of an 
ab lute substance, but of the absolute certainty fiv the subject of the sub ect's o%-., n 
indeterminate existence as a knowing. The existential proposition it implies 'is valid onlyjbr the 
I itself. rather than being 'valid in itself (RA 16/71). But by being absolutely c&rtam for the II 
subject, it is therefore a formal condition of aH possible experience, as all forms of 
representational consciousness are deteffninations of the indeterniinate symbetic unity of 
consciousness. 
Or put another way: every determinate synthetic proposifion about experience possesses 
mediated validity, -positing a state of affairs which can have meaning only relatively to other 
states of affairs represented by other propositions. The validation of such propositions, if it is 
possible only with reference to other such propositions., would have to be an infinite process in 
order to be complete, thus destroying the very possibility of adequate proof. The only 
alternative, if objective knowledge is to be possible, is a secure rational foundation that is the 
necessary condition of any synthetic proposition. 16 For Fichte, intellectual intuition provides 
such a foundation, as it represents, not a relative synthetic proposition of existence like 'I built 
this house', but rather an absolute or thefic proposition of existence, 17 which depends solely 
upon the proposition 'I am' being made, and not upon any further objective condition. 
Nevertheless, this proposition is only valid for the subject who has the intellectual intuition, and 
is not an 'objecti4ring thesis" " that posits the absolute subject as a transcendent substance, 
which is how Fichte is often misinterpreted. 
16 Z6)ler, 1995, pp. II 9_, 21D, 
17 pfaj, 4 1994, p, IT 
18 Makkreel, 1994, 
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Even though the subject as the absolute enactniew (TahandJ-, n9)'9 of itself is thus, for 
Ficbte, the formal presupposition of all representation, it cannot initially be understood as more 
than a postulated Vound of consciousness. Why is this? The individual sub*t can be 
absolutely certain that its experience of intellectual intuition shows it its own formal ground, but 
the uqv in which the absolute subject is a ground-, that is, what materially makes it a ground, 
remains unknown. The absolute subject bas not yet been posited for subjectivity-in-general, that 
is, in the totality of the forms under which it can determine itself At this point, the Kantian 
problem of theTelation between canon and organon is being raised. Postulating the absolute 
enactment as a thinkable 'notunenon" that underlies all representation provides representation 
with a fon-nal foundation, but does not demonstrate that the Kantian forms of experience, or any 
others, are necessary, universal and unchanging conditions of objective experience. The absolute 
enactment may be the beginning of ali consciousness, but it remains an abstrael or subjective 
beginning until we can draw out the rational forms inherent in itý thus discovering the totality of 
necessary laws through which the Absolute Subject detemiines consciousness as consciousness 
of something, and thus acts as a material ground of experience. 
Ficbte thus recooses that given Ilerder and Hamann's Cnticisms of Kant, if we are to 
demonstrate that reason can have synthetic a priori knowledge, we must deduce a complete 
system of the necessary forms of experience from a foundational principle. The subject must be 
widerstood in two guises: as the unconditional, canonical thes. is, and as the totality of the fonns 
of theoretical and practical experience. an absolute organic synthe-sis. The transition from the 
one to the other, from canon to organon, cannot be effected immediately. A method is required 
in order to ensure that this transition remains immanent to the foundational pnnciple. In Ficbte's 
early work, this consists in the analysis of the pre-representational subjective unity represented 
19 1 have used 'enactment' as a translation of Talhandlung (fiteraBy ýdeed-act) to suggest both the aci of 
the subject and its decree of bringing-into-being, thus mirrofing the two aspects of Kantian self- C9 
legislation. 
20 Breazeale, 1994, pp- 44-5. 
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by the 'I am', and a subsequent deduction of the necessary 
forms of experience that follows 
rules derived firom the preliminary analysis. thus showing that the 
fonns of experience are 
necessary because they are on-ns immanent to the Absolute Subject, 
forms of its own 
appearance. 
But would this really be a deduction in the Kantian sense of 
Kritik, rather than a 
metaphysical method of derivation that assumes the existence of entities? In the 
first version of 
WL, Fichte endows his method with a specific criterion of completeness. Completion entails 
proof that the absolute enactment is the objective condition of consciousness-in-gencral. This 
proof will consist in a system of forms, where each form is the condition of possibility for the 
one that precedes it, and wbich returns, in a grand circular movement to the absolute enactment 
itself, understood now, not as a postulate, but as an objective foundation and real ground. This 
proving its status as will show that the principle of the system is indeed self-groundin& 
Absolute by actually demonstrating that it is the ground of all fon-ns of experience. There is no 
metaphysics here: until the system is complete, its principle can only possess hypothetical 
objective validity. The method is an epistemological experiment (CC 54/113), for the criterion 
of circularity implies that, in the interim, we can only assimie that wbat is deduced from the first 
principje is objectively vali(t and that the principle is indeed capable of serving as the 
GrundsaLz of a system: 'There is thus a circle here from which the human mind can never 
escape. It is good to concede its presence expficitly, in order to avoid being confused later by its 
unexpected discovery' (CC 61-2/119) 
Fichte's method aims to demonstrate that the absolute enactment must support relative 
synthetic forms and thus become determinate as discursive consciousness, and that this follows 
analytically from its nature as a wfity. The indeterminate identity of the subject expressed by 
the thetic proposition 1=1 ('l am F), is the absolute beginning. Ficbte claims that this unity, 
which represents the source of the formal law of identity (A=A), cannot be thought without 
passing to the thought of its opposite, the source of the formal law of non-contradiction 
(A; &-. A), i. e., the proposition 1*--l (I am not not-I'). The I cannot at one and the same tilne posit 
itself absolutely as both I and not-1. The second proposition thus represents a necessary,, but 
, anfithefical act by wbicb the absolute subject produces or posits its own outside as absolutelý, 
independent of it. This absolute other is the postulate of the enactment of the not-1. the basis of 
all knowledge or consciousness of the objective world, which follows necessarily from the 
freely posited unity of the subject. 
The independence of the second postulate anses as the result of a necessary 
contradiction: the 1, quo absolute, cannot be simultaneously I and not4, for then it would not be 
111%so, ,,, lute. But this independence produces another contradiction: if the absolute subject and the 
not-] are both posited absolutely, then they are absolutely external to each other or 
incommensurable, and would be equiprimordial. However, the absolute other depends upon the 
absolute subject, and so cannot be absolutely different and equipn. mordial. Paradoxically, if the 
not4 is utterly independent of the 1, then it must simultaneously be absolutely dependent upon 
it, as the two postulates are linked by analytical necessity. 
A third act of the I is the condition needed to make the positing of I and not-I possible. 
It cannot be fonnulated, via fin-ther analysis, given that an absolute contradiction has arisen. 
Instead, it is thought as a freely generated synthetic product of reason that relates I and not-I to 
each other in a non-contradictory way. This new relation is one of opposition, where each term 
has a limited degree of reality with respect to the other: each is insofar as the other is noi. This 
general synthesis, which completes a triad of postulates, states that in general subject and non- 
subject can only be related without contradiction in a relation of mutual quantitative limitation. 
Ficbte"s method, thm defers to Kant by recognising that the restdt of attempting to NA the 
unconditional is necessarily an antinomy. Like Kant Fichte holds that an antinomy can be 
dialectically resolved once the terins under which it is conceived are explicitly related to the 
subjective conditions of experience. Unlike Kant however., Fichte sees dialectic as having a 
positive role in elucidating exactly what these conditions are - initially, simply this general 
relation of reciprocal Ilmitation. 
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With respect to the Absolute Subject itself, these three postulates show that. in order to 
posit itself f posit itself as relatively different to and relatively Teely at all, it must necessan . -1 1- 
identical with something else. Synthest In general, as the form of positing fliat subsumes s 
relative difference and identity, is thus deduced as the necessan, form under which the Absolute 
Subject. fýeeýy determines itself Each deten-nination of the Fichtean organon will, within the 
overall hypothetical unity of the activity of ! he transcendental subject, constitute a synthetic 
relation between a finite, conscious subject and a presentation of an object -a fon-n of 
oblective experience or knowledge. 
The philosopher must methodically reconstruct the totality of forms - which must all 
be postulated as posited simultaneously within the unity of the Absolute - via a deduction, in 
fime, of the series of triads that constitute these modes, repeating the initial deduction of 
postulates-. the analytic (necessary) deduction of antinomically related opposed terms, and the 
spontaneous (free) generation of a synthesis that resolves the antinomy With a new fonn of 
experience. Each triad thus reflects Kant's conception of practical autonomy, bv embodying, 
autonomous self-legislation, the unity of freedom and necessity. In each and every case, the 
synthesis is a condition of the possibility of the thesis and antithesis, yet can itself be fuTther 
analysed into a thesis and antithesis that also demand reconciliation, In this way, successive 
syntheses, as well as being conditions of the manifestation of the absolute enactment, are 
conditions of previous syntheses. 
Reconstruction begins with the third postulate, the most general and least determinate 
foun of sýmtheSls. I and -not-] are posited as limiting and determining each other, and so either Ii 
the not-I limits the 1, or ii) the I limits the not-I (WL 125-6/121-3). This antinomy is the basis of 
the distinction between theoTetiad and pTactical philosophy. In thefiTSt case the conscious I will 
feet itself determined by an object, while in the second this I will come to know itself as the 
cause of determinations in the otject. In the ewly Fichtean system, Ibis antinom,, ý can only be 
resolve, d by the completion of the system - in other words, only the absolute relation between 
the totality of necessan, forms of kno, " ]edge can be a synthesis adequate to the resolution of the 
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antinomy. The conscious I must come to know itself not as determined by the presented object, 
or as that which determines the presented object but as the absolutely free act that determines 
all presentation in consciousness, the subject-in-itself 
'Me early system begins With the theoretical porfion of philosophy, as the propoSifion 
that the not4 determines the I assumes only that the I fteA itself to be determined., rather than 
asswTdng that the 1, as practical philosophy always already does, is opposed to an independent 
object. The very objecthood of the not-1, and afl the forms under which this can be determined 
(the forms of intuition, the categories) will be deduced from the bare awareness of limitation or 
deterimnation as such (the Anslofl or 'check). Nevertheless, it is necessary that a trmsition to 
practical philosophy should eventually occur, so that practical, active synthesis in general will 
be deduced as a transcendental condition of extemally-delimited theoretical knowledge and the 
system can ultimately return to the absolute subject. 
At the end of the theoretical portion (WL 227-46/202-17), the finite, conscious I is 
aware of itself as essentially different from the presented object. This prepares the ground for 
where the finite I is aware of being divided internally between the practical philosophy 
theoretical 'intelligence", and the active practical subject that transcends the 11MItations of the 
intelligence simply by being aware of it (WL 247/218-9). This internal division is a basic 
practical antinomy wbose final resolution would complete the system by returning to the unity 
of the absolute subject. Crucially., completion will not only depend upon the deduction of the 
moral law, but also on the conditions under whicb it can be acwalýv realised among moral 
subjects, namely the necessary forms that must be realised in history in order to create a rational 
constitution, and wbieb replace Kant's postulates of practical reason. 
The practical portion revas two fatal weaknesses in the system, however. Firstly, the 
transition from theoretical to practical proves impossible to formulate satisfactorily. The unity 
of reason that Kant's deduction of the moral law sought to establish is vital to Fichte's early 
system, as the practical, self-generating activity of the Absolute Subject must be proven to be 
the unconditional foundation of experience, thus showing that theoretical. reflective reason 
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depends upon practical, productive reason. However, the first principle of the system turns out 
to unden-nine this overaU aim: the way in which Fichte detennines the postulate of the absolute I 
that he takes to be necessary for con sci ousness-in-general destroys the coherence of the two 
halves of reason. 
As Frederick Neuhouser has noted 21 Fichte's 'transition' is only necessary if the end 
result of the theoretical portion directly contradicts the first principle of the. system, thus 
maintaining the essential disunity of the finite subject. Otherwise the practical portion would be 
unnecessary, as the conditions of the unity of consciousness would be exhausted within the 
bounds of the general relation between an 1 and a not-! that determines it. The theoretical 
portion ends by showing that the inteHigence knows itself to be separate from the object that 
determines it (WL 249/220-1); for this to directly contradict Fichte's first principle, the 
Absolute Subject must from the outset bave been known to be. the ground of both object and 
finite intelligence. But this knowledge is what the system is supposed to demonstrate. A 
distinction must be drawn again between the canonical form of the Principle and its positive 
form, whose validity remains to be proven. in its canonical form, the principle is, for the 
subject, the necessmy condition of all consciousness and thus claims the right to be a first 
principle, but insofar as it has this form, it is no different from the unity of apperception, which 
may be spontaneous, but is not a free, sufficient ground of consciousness. The prooj'of its status 
as first principle, i. e. proof that it is a self-producing grouwL depends upon the completion of 
the system. Hence the content of the real beginning of the system (the canonical principle) is the 
same theoretical forrn of consciousness that Reinhold failed to transcen(L and does not 
contradict the end of the theoretical part of the system. No transition is necessitated. 
The second difficulty concerns the possibility of completing the system., even if the 
transition were necessary. Practical activity is the reallsation of ends within the natural world. 
Activity, as an ozqhl, is a striving (Streben) that aims to overcome the division between the 
21 Neuhouser, 1990, pp. 49-52. 
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finite intelligence thatfeels itself to be detennined by the natural world and the infinite practical, 
purposive activity that aims to realise absolute freedom witbin this world. However, this striving 
is necessan y unending. Even if the formal conditions of possibility for the realisation of 
freedom (legal institutions, the State, etc. ) can be deduced, this does not itself complete the 
system, 
This is because practical knowledge entails the reafisation of its conditions, mid hence 
the activity of real subjects. The divided subject can only know itself as absolutely free if it 
reallses this freedom. The system is seen in the historical context of a nation of subjects striving 
in unison to realise a single grand practical synthesis. Because the very basis of practical activity 
is a real difference between the autonomous desire for a practical end and one's 
beteronomously-determined consciousness of -natural Mclinations that limit practical activity, 
the realisation of final unity is infinitely postponed. At every level of practical philosophy, any 
realisation of a purpose depends upon a difference that escapes this unity, given that a 
difference itself is necessary for any practical activity to begin. The absolute unity of 
consciousness becomes impossible to reach: once the system opens onto historical time it 
cannot be completed. The demonstration of the objective validity of the postulate of the 
absolute subject remains infinitely deferred, the higbest practical 'ought. 
In later versions of the system constructed from 1796 to 1802, the primacy of practical 
philosophy is, in response to these problems, displaced by a new principle closer to Kant's one 
reason 'differentiated solely in its application' (GMM 391/4), the notion of a fundamental 
subjective activity of 'self-positing'. Firstý the beginning of the system is reworked in the two 
'Introductions' to the WL composed in 1797. The question of beginning is now addresseA not 
in tenns of the quest for an objective beginning or conscious certainty (Geuyj heit), but in ts erm 
of a subjectively necessary beginnin& a belief (Glaube) in freedom. This reorientation also 
responds to a methodological antinorny which Fichte sees as universal for the philosophy of his 
22 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
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time: whether to begin with a subjeefive Grund5a1z. or to revert to a realist first PrMCIple - 
'idealism' or 'dogmatism'. Neither position can establish its validity agwnst the claims of the 
other. In both cases, the validity of any system produced from the first principle is only relative 
to the overall validity of the principle (freedom or causal determinism), wbicb the system itself 
cannot prove but has to assume. For Fichte, the only factor behind choosing one over the other 
must be a subjective one: a practical faith m freedom or determinism. 
ne implication is that the WL's first principle cannot be an absolute confirmation of 
the subject's freedoirn, and that the beginning of the WL is in fact mcompatible with its aim, 
despite being a condition of consciousness-in-general that could be affinned by any subject. 
Instead, the system will begin with a principle that only ought to be affirmed by any subject, 
i-neaning that the system itself will be genuinely circular, grounded only upon the practical 
affirmation of the value of a belief M freedom . 
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The changes in Fichte's method are exemplified by the WLm-n of 1796-99. Here, Fichte 
begins from the postulate that the absolute subject, wbether determined tbeoretically or 
Practically, always posits itself That which is not-I cannot simply be opposed to the I from the 
outset, as in WL. Instead, the deduction must remain wboIIy immanent to the self-positing 1, and 
deduce the conditions that make it possible for the I to ]unit Uself. rather than show how the I 
can know itself to be limited from without. This will entail an 'original duplicity' of opposed 
activities (WLnm 185/365) within the 1, as the ground of all its self-positings or representations 
of itself. 
24The WLmn explicitly shows that 'differetticce is not rnerely the opposite of identitv-. it 
is the wndition of its possibility -) . 
25 
Fichte argues that self-positing is that by which, when one thia-s 'I arn', 'one feels 
one, s consciousness to be determined in a particular manner' (V&nm 28/110). This feeling can 
only be felt in opposition to a feelmg of repose or indeten-nination. however (WLnm 32/116), 
"' On Fichte's 'antifoundationali sm' see Rockmore, 1994, esp. p. I 
24 See Z61jer, 1995, pp. 116,123. 
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eeling of being as if one intuited a figure against the pyound from which it emerges. In the bare f 
detennined, then, is a difference between that which is merely piriven to consciousness, Or 
positedfor it, and the Absolute Subject that posits the determination fi)r itsetf(WI-nm 20/112. 
37/124). This is the difference between the theoretical and the practical, given that it comprises 
a free, actualising activity (practical. ), and an ideal (theoretical) consciousness of this activity 
(WLnm 47/140,49/142-3). In the feeling of being-determinect the most abstract synthetic form 
of experience, the subject's nnmediate intuition of itself wavers between the repose that 
precedes the feeling, which is represented in consciousness by the concept of the indeten-ninate. 
and the feeling itself, represented by the opposed concept of the determinate. For the feeling to 
be posited in consciousness, the passage from indeterminate to determinate must be made 
possible: consciousness must become delenninable. The deterMMable-as-such is the first 
condition of the absolute"s self-determination, and thus the first content of the system proper. 
This condition is now analysed in order to deduce the further conditions which make 
the I detenninable, i. e., capable of being hrMted. This must happen through the I ý's own acti vity. 
we cannot simply assume that it is deten-nined from without. The doctrine of the Anstofl is 
revived to show how this happens. Dame] Breazeale points out that 'check' translates this key 
term inadequately, as it denotes both an obstacle, and an original unpetus that allows the I to 
become determinate. 26 Feeling (GeftiW as a power of the transcendental L can serve as an 
Ansto, # as it is purely subjective and yet is not finally produced by the 1,27 being composed of .F 
the infinite expansion that cba-racterises the absolute Y's activity, together with a limitation or 
contraction that cannot ultimately depend on the 1. So, the immanent examination of the 
conditions that must pertain to the Absolute Subject posits a condition of all detern-tination that, 
because it is basic to the system, cannot itself be analysed further within it. For theoretical 
philosophy, it is sense impressions that both restrict and invigorate consciousness. For practical 
. 245 Breazeale, 1995, p. 100. 
Ibid., P. 88. 
'-7 lbid, p- 94. 
46 
philosophy it is the impression of the freedom of other human beings, the 'demand' or 
4 summons' (Aufforderung) that restricts one's own actions out of respect (Achning) for others' 
autonomy by stimulating the will. 
The emphasis now changes as Fichte analyses the feeling of determination itself 
deducing from it the vafious tbeorefical and pTactical modes of the Fs activity. Once the 
Absolute Subject has become determinable, it then takes on determinations that are the different 
modes of experience, freely posited in conformity with its own nature, and beginning with the 
positing within consciousness of a representation of that feeling which initially made it 
determinable (-WLnrn 65-7/171-3). Feeling is the condition of the fact that the I determines 
itself, an opposed synthesis within the absolute subject conditions the what of the act of 
positin& the representational content of the deten-nination of conscious experience. This 
synthesis, the ultimate condition of being able to represent feeling as dependent upon an object 
that is, the condition of our notion of object-bood itself - belongs to the productive 
imagination, 'the power to grasp absolutely opposed things in a single act' (WLnm 201/399. ), 
which renders discrimination and judgement possible by providing a whole, an overall context 
of relatedness as such (WLn-m 201/398-9). 
As a condition of any representation, this power immediately grasps the totality of 
forms of conscious experience inherent in the absolute subject. This conscious thought 'cannot 
do, since thinking is purely discursive' (WL-nm 202/401). Feeling and imagination are 
equiprimordial, non-discursive powers that are ultimate conditions of consciousness within the 
transcendental subject. The imagination is especially important: it 'creates the material for 
representation: it alone shapes everything that is found within empiria consciousness and is the 
creator of this consciousness itself (DSL 2/193). Ficlite identifies it with Spirit (Geiv), Kant's 
'animating principle in the mind [ ... 1, the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas' (CJ 313-4/181-2). 
The imagination, seems to be a symbol for the Absolute Subject, for it has an autonomy of the 
kind attributed to the Mlhan(llung: imagination 'obtains its rules from within itself It needs no 
]a, %-,,; it is a law unto itself (DSL 71198)- Yet despite its non-discursv%rity, it remains subject to 
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the inherent rationality of the absolute subject, and to determination via the discursive. analytic 
power of judgement, wbich sequentially dismembers the syntbesis of imagination (WLnm 201- 
4/403-4). 
Throughout the system, feeling and imagination allow consciousness to become 
determinate tbrougb judgement: aware of its object aware of itself as aware of the object and 
aware of itself as positing determinations within the object. Consciousness can thus be aware of 
an object that limits it, in various forms; it can also be variously aware of its own acti-6ty. But in 
either case it is aware of itself only as determinate, as limited from without or within, and as 
such remains different from the Absolute Subject which, being the totality of these 
detenninations (the subject-in-itself), can alone be fimly self-detennining. 
To know the Absolute Subiect as absolute remains an infinite task: the imagination 
provides us with an Idea of the whole, giving to judgement a rule or schema which it is to 
follow in reconstructing the instantaneously-grasped whole in time, this rule being that of 
striving for unity within a consciousness split between theoretical and practical activities 
(WLnrn 415/208). This 'striving" is now a generalised rule of self-positing, by which the 
Absolute Subject determines itself according to ever more comprehensive syntheses (the forms 
of intuition, the categories and so on), until it posits itself as aware of itself as containing, as 
transcendental structures, these forms as conditions of the experience of an independent object. 
For this practical self-consciousness., striving is the dernand that absolute freedom, the unity of 
the subject be realised in the world, as in the WL. This vision of mfmite practical striving 
returns us to the demand with which the system began, the demand to affirm freedom as the 
beginning and end of all consciousness. However, the demand is onýv a demand., a Sollen, and 
the question of the objective validity of the beginnin& which is conditioned by a theoretical 
criterion, i. e. the justification of the foundational status of the absolute subject, cannot be settled 
I--- the ftafilment of a merely practical criterion, i. e. that we prefer fmedorn to unfr om. The Dy eed 
question could only be decided by the Perfect realisation of the kingdom of ends, as in the WL. 
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Fichte's failure to demonstrate the foundational status of the Absolute Subject depends 
upon a contingency his method cannot eradicate. The Subject always needs feeling In order to 
become determinate, for feeling introduces deten-ninability, potentially determinate difference. 
into the absolute act's indeterminate identity. Now feeling is entire]y subjective Or Private, yet 
does not depend entirely on the subject. The 1, in becoming determinate, 'is not the sole author 
of its own being"g. Consequently., feeling, as a condition of all consciousness, cannot itself be 
explained by something like a determinate form of consciousness. In other words, the fact that 
the subject is divided from itself and is actually deten-ninate is, as far as consciousness is 
concerned, entirely contingent, and not caused by any necessary law, as was the case at the 
beginning of WL. But if this is the case, all consciousness has for its necessary condition its 
own contingent or unexplainable division from itself This means that in actuality, it will 
necessarily always be divided from itself, as the practical part of the systern shows. 
Early and later versions of the system encounter this same problem- The WL attempts 
to avoid it by using the analytic identity of the absolute I as the means of deriving the difference 
between I and not-1, but this makes the absolute too much like the merely theoretical unity of 
apperception, faibng to go beyond the Reinholdian position that Fichte himself Cnticlsed. The 
problem really surfaces in the practical portion, and is still not solved in the WLnm. Real 
striving on the part of actual individuals is necessary to realise the goal of the system, to make 
the Absolute itself an object of knowledge, but this fulfihnent of philosophy remwns infinitely 
deferred. 
For exwnple, the creation of a legal order derives from the conflict of individual wills, 
and seeks to preserve Universal freedom, thus reconciling the contradiction between fi-eedom 
and domination that prevails in the war of A against all. But as an actual, and not merely 
possible mode of action, this is a piecemeal project depending on the internal diNision of the 
practical subject between determinate ends and natural inclinations, which in turn depends on 
28 ibid, 9.88. 
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the moral feeling of real differences between one's own will and that of others- Every attempt to 
reconcile a difference with a synthetic identity itself depends upon a further difference, and it is 
this dynamic that infinitely postpones the full presence of the Absolute. Reason now finds itself 
faced witb an aporia that is no longer Kantian. Wbereas Kant"s transcendental metbod 
contingently assumes the necessity of certain actual forms of empirical experience, Fichte's 
project appears to show that Reason,, no matter how far it goes In deduCMg and realising 
determinations that are actual forms of experience and conditions of its own employment, must 
always presuppose, a contingent difference that it cannot legislate for. Reason bas been placed in 
a position where it must bear the burden of an infinite labour, without ever knowing for sure at 
any stage if it has indeed proceeded correctly. 
iv) Schelling: The 'EcstmW of Reason' 
a) Reason and the Absr, -Imte: Negalive Philosophy 
Fichte takes up Kant's central contention that objective knowledge depends fon-nally 
upon the structure of the transcendental subject, and attempts to answer Herder and Hamann's 
objections by boldly making this fi-anscendental subject the sufficient condition of all 
consciousness. As we bave seen, this attempt to provide secure foundations for knowledge falls., 
for it sets up a project that is de. jure impossible to complete. However, Fichte's failure changes 
the orientation of foundationalist method. Kant begins With the assumption that reason is 
capable of an immanent examination of its relation to empirical experience, but this assumption 
is qualified by the furtber assumption that empirical experience is itself always already known. 
Fichte argues that, because reason can determine what is fundamentally necessary in any 
experience, that is, the Absolute Subject it is necessarily Di=anent in this foundation, and by 
analysing it, will demonstrate that reason can deduce the systematic totality of the forms of 
experience. 
But the quesfion of criteria of certainn, of knowledge remains. The system is complete 
only when we are certain that the absolute subject is knoim as absolute., when we have its whole 
50 
content before us. But finite consciousness is posited as doubly conditioned- It is conditioned by 
the self-grounding identity of the canonical unconditioned, but also by an 'original duplicItY 
(WLnm 185/365) of feeling. Hence the attainment of absolute knowledge (when the content of 
the system is completed and utterly certain knowledge of the unconditional achieved) is 
infinitely postponed. An other (feeling) that necessarily escapes being fully determined within 
the system proves in fact to be a condition of the system itself 
The failure of reason to prove its autonomy by fulfilling its own criteria of certainty can 
be seen to be at the heajl of the reaction of the Romantic movement against Kantian philosopby, 
which, among other things, centres upon questions regarding the relation between the 
unconditioned foundation of experience and the subject of knowledge. The Romantics took- up 
themes which we have already encountered in relation to the leaders of the Sturm und Drang, 
Herder and Hamann. Chief among these was what we n-figbt call the 'situatedness' of reason, 
the way in which any account of the foundations of knowledge depends upon histoncally 
specific linguistic conventions and wider historical conditions that are presupposed by any 
actual account of what genuine knowledge is. Epistemology may seek to determine the 
conditions of the validity of synthetic a priori propositions, but in doing this it has to 
presuppose the universality of the forms of experience (natural science, morality) whose 
possibility it is attempting to ground. There is an essential cIrCularity in the epistemological 
project as Fichte clearly saw. - in attempting to explain why certain rational terms are universal 
conditions of our expenence, philosophy assumes a pre-given set of meanings that enable it to 
get started, a set of subjective presuppositions - just as, for Fichte, Kant assumed the 
difference between subject and object without showing how this would necessarily anse given 
the nature of reason. In attempting to account for its own first principles, Ficbte's epistemology 
had to impose a doctrine of activity upon practical reason, and the motivation behind this 
imposition was itself practical: a cboice 'governed by caprice, and since even a capricious 
decision must baNe some source, it is governed by inclination and interest' (lW 4-3)3/18). Fichte 
51 
thus recognised that critical philosophy must begin with faith, but this left his own project 
ungrounded. 
The problem of the historical conditioning of reason led the Romantics to consider the 
possibility of a non-rational grounding of reason in a higher, primarily aesthetic faculty. This 
ideaý as developed by Jacobi and H61derlin, proved decisive in breaking Schelling's earl), 
attachment to Fichte, as it seemed to promise a means of leaving behind the circle of subjecti%, e 
presuppositions- Scheffing's earliest work as a student of Fichte concerns itself largely With the 
exposition and defence of Fichte's system and method. During the mid- I 790s, however, a 
decisive change in orientation occurs, with Schelling proposing not a single organon of 
knowledge founded upon the Absolute Subject, but tivo parallel systems, one dealing With the 
Absolute Subject, the other With the unity of nature. This move away from Fichte's refusal to 
assurne the not-I as a posit parallel to the I may appear to be a regression to a pre-Mtical realism 
(which is largely how Fichte interpreted it). However., the reasons for Schelling's change in 
approach stem from the same problems regarding the meaning of 'criticism' that forced Fichte 
to rework his system in the WLnm. 
As we saw above, Fichte found that if he insisted on the practical, essentially free 
subject as the Grundsal. - of his system then be faced an antinomy conceming the objective 
beginning of philosophy. The Absolute could be consistently defined as either essentiafly real or 
essentially idea and a system constructed accordingly, Without either principle being capable of 
refuting the other. 'Dogmatism' and 'criticism" (as. Schefling called them) were incapable of 
contending with each other philosophically, as each clanined the Absolute for itself with the wd 
of an immediate intuition. 
Whereas Fichte sought to resolve the antinomy by preaching an affimnation of idealism 
and criticism in the interests of freedom, Scbelling proposed thatý by redefining the antinomy, it 
could be solved. The opposed 'dogmatic' and 'critical" Absolutes can be viewed together in two 
different contexts that correspond to differing basic philosophical questions. The antinomy itself 
depends upon a pre-Kantian ontological question regarding the essential nature of Being. But if 
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the two absolutes are seen in the light of a specifically Kantian epistemological problem, 
namely jblow do ideas of external things anse in usT (IPN, 15/12). the antinomý- necd not 
come about. If this question is asked, then nothing, is assumed beyond the defixio and formallý 
non-contradictory assertion that the independence of entities can be conceived, whereas the 
ontological question assumes their existence, and then posits an Absolute as a highest entity. 
Two systems could be constructed as solutions to the Kantian problem, one based on 
the concept of a real Absolute, the other on the basis of an Absolute Subject. Both would have 
the sarne explananduni, the emergence of consciousness of objects., wbile eacb utifising a 
different principle as explanans. The system of Naturphilosophie would entail a deduction of 
the actual natural forms necessary for the emergence of consciousness, while the 
G-'eistesphilosophie would follow the Fichtean model of the Wissenscht1fislehre in deducing 
necessary forms of consciousness from the Absolute Subject. Neither system can be constructed 
without reference to the limitations of consciousness, and so each is circular. Given the fact that 
we have ideas of external objects, Nalurphilosophie constructs, on the basis of the concept of a 
self-determining Absolute Life, a natural history of the role of nature in determining 
consciousness, an organon of general principles fornatuTal science. Geistesphilosophie, on the 
other hand, constructs a programme for the realisation of freedom, an organon for practical 
philosopby, on the asswnption that the subject detemiines the object. 
Neither system could contest the claims of the other, as each has a different perspective 
on the ground of the distinction between subject and object. Each holds sway over its own 
domain, the one beginning from the perspective of preconscious fomis of 'experience' from 
which representational consciousness, and thereby philosophy, emerges in the course of natural 
history, and the other beginning from consciousness itself Both systems give a genefic account 
of consciousness beginning from an absolute principle, and reacb the same conclusion: that 
subject and object are in themselves the swne. It is for this reason that in 1797 Schelling calls 
the higher or true philosophical viewpoint that which assurnes 'the fact that the absolute-ideal is 
the absolute-real' (IPN 59/44). Just as the relative difference between the subject and object in 
53 
either system depends upon a higher identity, so the Gnindsdize of either system are actua]INý 
subsumed by a higher principle that is the indj&rence of both nature (Absolute Life) and spirit 
(Absolute Subject). While the principle of a system can be either subjective or objective. the 
principle of principles, Absolute Indifference, is simultaneouslY both sub jective and Objective, 
and neither subjective nor objective. This true Absolute is without a unique essential 
determination, and Sebelling calls it the absolutely necessary presupposition of all philosophy. 
the necessary condition of all. knowledge. 
Sebelling's concept of the true Absolute th-us initially plays the role of a negative 
unconditional condition in the same way as Fichte's Absolute Subject and retains the same 
hypothetical validity. Positing the Absolute as Indifference 
in no way proves anything as to the reality of this idea 
wbieb I ... ) being the ground of all eVidence, can only prove 
itself Our inference is merely hy ypothetical. - if philosophy 
exists, then that is its necessaTy presupposition. 
(IPN 59/44) 
However, Schelling conceives of the Absolute as 'higher' or more inclusive than the 
Absolute Subject, for it subsumes both Natur- and Geislesphilosophie. Fiebte"s major objection 
to his former disciple's foundational concept is that it must necessarily collapse philosophy into 
dogmatism or realism, as it appears to result in a system that, by VNing a genetic account of 
subjectivity that is dependent on natural process, actually reduces subjectivity to this natural, 
necessarily mechanistic process,, destroying the Possibility of real freedom. 29 But Schelling's 
point is that the Absolute, considered as indifference, is the indifference of the subject of 
knowledge and objective being, and is reducible to neither. Hence both subjectivity and 
29 See Vater, 1994, pp. 198-202. 
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objective being have a common root that expresses itself immanently in bo& as different 
polencies (Polenzen) of itself. Subjectivity expresses this root with a higher exponent, as it 
were, given that the forms it takes on express a reflexive awareness of both nature and itself 
Hence a relation between subject and object in the theoretical portion of the Geivesphilo. sophit! 
cannot, for example, be reduced to a relation between expansive and contractile basic forces in 
the Nalurphilosophie, wbereas a lawlike relation between bodies can be reduced to a relation 
between forces. 
Like Fichte's hypothetical postulate, Absolute Indifference must prove itself If systems 
of nature and spirit can be completed upon this basis, tbe. n this Gnindsal. - Will show itself to be 
the necessary and sufficient condition of all knowledge and existence. However, the philosophy 
of nature is based on a misconstrual. The Naturphilosophie purports (unlike, say, Spinoza's 
philosophy or there to be representational ) to describe what nature must be like in order f 
consciousness. In such wise, while positing the Absolute Life as a unifon-n whole, 
Naturphilosophie only renders this whole determinate in relation lo consciousness. If a genuine 
deduction of nature in-jiselj'is not possible, then Nalurphilosophie is not a separate systm-n as 
suck but remains immanent to the general viewpoint of Geistesphilosophie. The 'two-system' 
viewpoint cannot sustain itself if Nalurphilosophie can be reduced in this way to part of the 
system of subjectivity, for then A the principles it derives have the merely subjective status of 
speculative fictions, rather than being necessary detemfinations of nature. 30 
After 1800, a methodological shift occurs. hi 1800, Schelling's STI, the second half of 
bis double system and his attempt at a Fichtean Geisiesphilosophie, ends by foHOWing Novalis 
in making aesthetic intuition a privileged mode of access to the Absolute. The final condition of 
the practical realisation of the Absolute Subject is deduced as the work of art. In the practical 
part of STI, Schelling lays out the dangerous practical consequences of the infinite labour of r--- 
calf-positing required by the Fichtean system. The lack of a promise of final fulfilment results in 
30 See ibid., P. 201, on Fichte's view of accounts of nature as 'fictions. 
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a finaJ dichotomy vvithin consciousness: the entirety of the history of the reallsatiOn Of the 
Absolute is conceived as either being detennined with a prion ., pire-given necessity or being 
utterly indeterminate, and subject to no law (STI 601-2/209). The categorical imperative of 
Jamnite Streben results either in fatalism and accedia, or anarchism and chaos, both equally 
destructive of the polifical and legal order that strives to reallse the Absolute. 
The only way of redeeming practical subjectivity of its ultimate diVidedness is if the 
Absolute can actually be present in consciousness as a 'providential' unity of necessity and 
freedom. Schelling recOgnises that the truth of Fichtean, subjective self-legislation is the 
unending Streben to fulfil an abstract practical doctrine, and proposes instead that true 
experience of the absolute unity of freedom and necessity lies In artistic production. Art unites 
both conscious, subjective activity (the artist-subject's grasp of a lelos) and unconscious, 
objective activity (the meaning of the artwork is lnexbaustible). Art can represent as an aesthetic 
whole the historical situation of humanity,, in all its division and disunity: '[sIcience and 
morality forever seek; ail forever possesses' . 
31 Importantly, the expenence of aesthetic creation 
or reception expresses a unity that is no longer just subjective, but which is instead the unity of 
nature and spirit. This experience is without determinate differentiation, and is thus a productive 
intuition of the absolute unity rather than of the merely relative unity of consciousness, which 
always rehes on differenfiation,, and can thus never be at rest. 
Already in the earlier bi-perspectival system the postulate of a 'higber' Absolute 
divided into natural and spiritual principles demonstrated the presence of a non-Fichtean 
inspiration in Schelling's work. After 1800, Schelling's attempts at constructing an organon of 
the necessmy detenninations of expenence utilise this higbeT foundation as theiT first pnnelple, 
transfonning the STI's aesthetic intuition into an intuition of reason. This turn away from the 
Fichtean Subject can be understood in relation to the critique of transcendental philosophy that 
3( Fackenheim, 1996, p. 89. 
32 Frank, 1995, p. 75-6. 
56 
is furnished by HbIderlin, Novalis and above all, Jacobi, and initiated by Jacobi's rediscovery 
Of Spinoza. " Jacobi argued that the genuinely unconditioned presupposition of Imowledge has 
to be thought of as transcendent to all conditioned forms of knowledge. and thus cannot be 
reduced, as Fichte had argued, to the subject's knowledge of itself3" Fichte's Absolute is 
posited as a subject opposed to the abstract thing-in-itself of realism: it is a form of knowing 
that is defined over against a being, and is thus conditioned. For Jacobi, if the unconditioned 
can be known, then it is in an intuition that is utterly immediate. Our experience of this 
transcendent Absolute would thus be indeterminate, being an intuition, not of an object 
conditioned by a category, but of primordial Being. 35 
H61derlin concurred with this view in the fi-Vnent 'Judgement and Being' (c. 1794-5), 
arguing that Fichte's intellectual intuition cannot be unmediate, for it is supposed to represent 
the subject's intellectual 'perception' of itself, yet this perception of subjectivity cannot be 
defined without mediation, without presupposing a relation between subject and object. 36 The 
absolute knowledge spoken of by Jacobi and H61derlin, however, is a certainty that is radically 
bjj,, (Iý 
37 The circularity that Fichte acknowledges as a necessary feature of his system can thus 
be criticised from a 'higher' standpoint as a kind of transcendental illusion in Kant"s sense (see 
25 above). The unconditioned is meant to allow the possibility of eXPenence to be explained 
with reference to a secure foundation. flowever, Fichte's unconditioned cannot explain this 
possibility. If representational consciousness is charactensed by awareness of the difference 
between subject and object, then Fichte's Absolute cannot account for this difference, for the 
definition of it as a subject already presupposes the distinction between subject and object. It is 
thus not genuinely unconditioned, and is only an abstraction from our experience (this, as we 
33 See Beiser, op. cii., Ch. 2 on Jacobi's discovery of Spinoza and his early critique of Kant. 
34 Frank, op. cii., pp. 66-7. 
35 I&L, pp. 67,74. 
Holderlin, 1988, pp. 37-8. See also Bowie, 199-3), pp. 17-25. 
37 Cf IýMp, 12/48, on the nature of absolute certaintv 
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shall see, anticipates Deleuze). The Absolute is thus assumed to be a substantial image of the 
fori-ris of expenence with which we are familiar. Whereas Kant gave a merely formal deduction 
of the possibility of certain varieties of experience whose universality he simply presupposed, 
Rebte assm-nes, that the Absolute resembles in its internal articulations our familiar (and 
historically situated) experience. Hence he posits the Absolute as having an internal or necessary 
'r. chl * , elation to representational consciousness that is only assumed and cannot be proven. 
Once Schefling had attained a 'hip-her' point of view on the Absolute afforded by the 
non-Fichtean elements of his Nalurphilosophie and the account of art in STI, he could attempt 
to remedy these deficiencies of Fichte's approach. Despite agreeing With Jacobi and H61derlin 
on the transcendence of the Absolute with respect to all conditiomng relations, Schelling still 
wanted to demonstrate the autonomy of pHosophical reason by using this Absolute as the 
foundation for an a priori system. But in order to do this, this foundation bad to proVide a 
genuine explanation of the possibility of experience, and this, as we shall see, raises real 
problems. Jacobi and H61derlin had argued that, if it is possible, then all conditioned knowledge 
must presuppose the immediate identity of the knowing subject and the Absolute- But this only 
meant that a negative, canonical foundation had been adduced. Like Fichte, Schelling saw that 
only a complete organon or system of knowledge derived immanently from this foundation 
would suffice to ground a prion synthetic knowledge and secure the autonomy of reason. 
Hence the necessary relation between the Absolute and the genesis of representational 
consciousness had to be demonstrated- The difference between subject and object had to be 
shown to be an immanently necessary detennination of an Absolute that in itself transcends all 
such conditioned forms. In this way, the Absolute would be knou, n rather than simply 
presupposed., unlike Fichte's Tathandlung. 
With this change in viewpoint Scbelling develops what would become known as the 
'Philosophy of Identity. The dual system is replaced by a single system based on the 
ontological postulate of Absolute Identity,, out of which nature and subsequent], -v consciousness 
in its theoretical and practical fonns have to be deduced- Schelling's project- having rejected the 
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ichtean standpoint, now seerns to have taken on an explicitly pre-Kantlan, Spinozistic flavour- 
However, the Pbilosophy of Identity is not dopriatic in Kant's sense, it does not claim a 
Superior intuition of the nature of the thinig-In-it-self Like Fichte's system, it remains 
hypothetical and circular until it is complete. In order to explain the possibilitN, of experielice. 
the unconditioned foundation or in-itself of expenence, the indeterminate Absolute Identity of 
all conditioned forins must itself be shown to be inherently rational. This rationality of the 
Absolute is the assumption with which the system begins. It can only be proven by a system that 
returns to its beginning, as Fichte's was supposed to, and thus completes and grounds itself 
Despite its SpinoZistic overtones, then., Schelling's approach remains critical, as it 
makes the objective validity of its assumption (that the Absolute is rational and can thus be 
known as the sufficient ontological ground of all determination) dependent upon the proof of 
this assumption, rather than dogmatically assuming that the Absolute Is necessarily rational. To 
paraphrase Schelling, if philosophy, articulated a priori knowledge of the Absolute, is real, then 
the absolute identity is its objective presupposition (IPN 59/44)ý but this means that the reality 
of philosophy, and thus the existence of the Absolute as unconditioned, positive and necessary 
ground has to be demonstrated. in this way, the Absolute will no longer be only -i 
presupposition, but will have proven its absoluteness. The system itself, then, must begiii with 
the hypothetical proposition that, if the Absolute is indeed ontologically absolute or self- 
grounding, fliis self-grounding is also absolute self-knowing. 
For Schellin& this means that the antinomy of 'dogmatism' or 'criticism' that the 
earlier system set out to solve can now finally be addressed properly. While the unity of reason 
and Absolute is the presupposition of all philosophy (whether realist or idealist), in order to 
resolve the antinomy a system must be unfolded out of this unity that encompasses both 
viewpoints. The Absolute must be shown to be the unity of fTeedom and necessity, rather than 
i detemiinacy 38 From it must be deduced a Nan. philosophie that simply a pure, self-abidmg mr 
3"' On the importance of this chtenon for Schelling, see NA-liae, 1983b. 
.; Q 
ject, gives wi a priori account of the determinations of nature in itself, independently of the sub 
and a Geivesphilosophie that accounts for the actuality of bw-nan freedom. 'Experience' is noNý, r 
to be understood as including, not only the practical law, the categories and the forms of 
intuition (Kant), and their internal, preconscious articulations (Fichte. ) but the unconscious 
determinations of nature out of which subjectivity has to be thought as eme ing. In this way, TV 
the subject of 'experience' is no longer the finite, human subject per se. 
Hence the new system, in its higliest stage of development in WS (1804), takes on an 
increasingly theol ical as well as istemol "cal aspect: the analysis of the Absolute will 091 epi 091 
denve the detenninations of subjectivity out of nature, but this nahn-al history will 
simultaneously be the histoiy of the IlVing Absolute"s own progessive self-revelation, its 
experience of itself, in a universe that it creates while still remaining etemally united with itself 
above this process as its transcendent or unconditioned condition and ground. The Absolute is, 
for Schelling, Immanent in the uttiverse, but is also irreducible to it and thus trmscends all Its 
detemunations and the conditioning relations between them. However, at this most developed 
stage of articulafiotiý Schelling begins to abandon the standpoint of the Philosophy of Identity. 
The reason for a further change in Schelfing-s approach concerns, as we shall see, his ow-n 
failure to provide a genuine explanation of the possibility of experience. 
Schelling begins by acknowledging that reason must presuppose that it is identical With 
the Absolute. To reiterate, this unity has always already overcome all oppositions between 
subject and object, and so from the perspective of the system, 'only totality ktioirs in me' (WS 
140/143). Hence reason, in its identity with the Absolute undergoes a kind of ecstasy, as Jacobi 
and H61derlin had already noted; this identity is not conditioned knowledge, but knowledge 
beyond all mediation. I'lie Philosophy of Identity has been interpreted as proto-Heideggerean 
for this reason, given that such an ecstatic unity of reason and Absolute, beyond conditioned 
knowledge, seems to be reminiscent of the primordial openness of Dasein to the Being of 
39 See Schulz, 1954, esp. pp. 349-50. on this transcendence as e\eniplified in Schelling'., later philoophy, 
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beings. ' Schelling's intentions remain tied to the idea of an absolute system however: he 
assumes that puTe reason is the essential mode of the Absolute's self-exPressiOn, through which 
I Ing it immediately knows itself (WS 151/149-50), and thus it claims a certainty tliaL whilst be 
blind, is still 'an intuition of reason or [ ... 
I an intellectuol intuition' (WS 153/151). Philosophy 
can thus begin without having to first hone its methodological tools and search after detenninate 
grounds for its claim on a prior! knowledge, as in Kant and Fichte. This is because the positing 
of the universe is grounded in the very nature of the presupposed identity., or so Schelling 
proposes. However, ibere is a crucial ambiguity in this idea that endangers Schelling's project, 
one with which he would wrestle throughout his career. We will now draw this out. 
Schelling begins by analysing the Absolute. Its defining feature is its immediacy: hence 
the Absolute or God, considered in itself as the condition of all difference, is the pure 
affirmation of itself (WS 164/158-9), and this affirmation is the Absolute's knowledge of itself 
(WS 154-5/152). The Absolute is thus implicitly that which is affirmed of it and that which 
affirms itself On this basis, Schelling argues that the Absolute is implicitly completely 
differentiated. It contains within itself an 'ideal universe' or 'first creation' of its logically 
possible detenninations, whicb follow with analytical necessity fTom the implicit opposition 
between its affirming and affmned aspects. Its eternal unity, Schelling argues, necessarily 
implies its differentiatim because. its unity contains this negative opposition, the arclietype of 
all conditional relations, in which each term (affirming and affmned) requires the other in order 
to be what it itself is. This ideal differentiation is only ideal, bowever, representing the formal or 
purely reflexive side of pw-e reason to which Kant had allowed only subjective validity. The 
first creation is a totality of etemal Ideas, and is thus the merely formal or possible aspect of the 
Absolute (WS 204/187) - it does not explain the emergence of any actual difference within the 
Absolute, and thus cannot ground syntbefic a priori knowledge. With regard to this dimension 
37. Schelfing himself describes absolute reason as 'ecstatic, much later in his Ohashi, 1975, pp. 29-0, -7 
areer in I elf, absolutely ecstatic' (PO 162-3). c. q... I therefore reason is, i this positing, posited outside its I 
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of the Absolute, we should note that, in addition, ow knowledge of it can only be histOncally, 
rather than logically, empleted. We will only find within it content that reflects our histOncally 
situated expenence back to us- 
There is still, thený the question of how the Absolute actualty differentiates itself If the 
Absolute is a genuinely transcendent condition, then it is the unity of all conditioned 
determinations. In order to enter into a determinate relation with itself, to become known to 
itself (and to our reason), it must divide itself. But if it is a genUlnely transcendent unity of all 
conditioned determinations, then the process of division cannot be understood in terms of 
. --I relations familiar from experience that are themselves conditioned. We could, for example, 
imagine that the formally necessary logical determination of the Absolute (the first creation) 
explains the emergence of real difference. But this would be to posit a purely ideal or subjective 
content for the Absolute that, as in Fichte, presupposes the reality of a conditioning relation. 
Here, this relation is that between necessity and freedom, each of wbieb can only be understood 
with reference to the other. Such an explanation of the emergence of real difference would be 
circular and thus illusory, for it would simply presuppose, like Fichte, that the Absolute is itself 
conditioned, being nodfing but the image of our beliefs about experience (e. g., our conviction 
that experience is characterised by necessity). Hence, Mowing Jakob B6hme, Schelling begins 
in the Philosophy of Identity to dfink of the Creation in Christian terms as the FaIL a disruption 
41 
of God"s unity that is both necessary and yet freely enacted - 
In order for real difference to 
actually be posited., there must be a free and hence ungrounded positing of what is already 
h1t it If 4ý formally ýo e se ., 
imphcit in the Abs 
Importantly, Schelling conceives this ungrounded act as an absolute positing of 
determination that is grounded only in the Absolute as an umnediately affin-native unit-y. in 
other words, it is unlike the Fichtean Subject's positing of a not-L in which the negative, 
41 See BroWn, 1977, pp. 107- 1 -1. 
42 Carl Eschenmayer, a student of Schefling's, made this point in 1803; see Esposito, 1977, p. 11 
141, 
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limiting relation between I and not-I that is the necessary basis for all determination of 
consciousness is supposedly freely posited. This would simply assw-ne that the freedom of the 
Absolute or its transcendence is identical with the relation of opposition between the subject and 
the object that is constitutive of representational consciousness. By arguing that negatiNe 
opposition is the archetype of necessity that determines the merely ffirmal first creation, 
Schelling has refused to take this view. The actual, rather than merely ideal or possible, positing 
of opposition requires that the Absolute introduce within itself and through its pure immediacy 
an ontologicA difference (WS 174/165). This posifing is described by Scbelling as the 
potentiation or raising-to-a-power of the Absolute: the differences that constitute the actual 
universe are powers (in the mathematical sense) of the Absolute, for the Universe and 
everything in it can only exist because the Absolute affims itself in them, even though they 
themselves are detennined through negative conditioning relations, from the basic opposed 
forces that produce matter, up to the subject and its object (WS 210/191). In this sense, the 
being of the Universe and its constituents is identical or univocal (WS 187/174-5), and actual 
difference is thought of as having its basis in pure affirmation rather than negation., being 
43 
produced by 'an infinite potentiation [Polenzierung] of the identity of identity' even thougb 
negative relations are comprised within this unity of being. 
However, with this recognition of the difference between possible and actual 
differentiafion that is necessary in order to effectively overcome Fichte's position, the ambiguity 
and circularity of Schelling's own position becomes apparent. nere are, in effect two 
postulated Absolutes in Schelling's system. On the one hand, there is the purely affirtnative 
Absolute in whieb all distinctions are dissolved, and whicb putatively serves as the ungrounded 
and unconditioned ontological ground of all determination simply through its affin-nation of 
itself On the other, there is the Absolute as rational, as immediately self-knowing, which serves 
as the foundation of all knowledge. Schelling has to PrlýýsuPPOse frOfn the outset that these two 
43 Von Uslar. 1968, ppý 503,507. 
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aspects are united, and acknowledges this assurnption. However, his account of the ecstatic 
unity of reason and Absolute allows the latter aspect to predominate. Absolute reason is literally 
beyond itself in that which ti-anscends all mediated knowledge. Tbis is the first Absolute, the 
purely affirmative aspect the distinctionless unity of itself and reason, an arahonal unity. But 
insofar as the Absolute is the unity that is the foundation of genuine knowledge and the 
autonomy of pure reason, the unity whose necessaq consequence is the first creation, then 
reason is assumed to have found itself again in this distinctionless Absolute, as it were. But this 
presupposes that the detenMate conditioning opposition between relations of necessary 
entailment and relations of contingent juxtaposition is already known, and that the relation of 
the Absolute to itself is known to be characterised by necessary entailment. But reason's 
immediate unity with the Absolute cannot provide any such knowledge of determinate 
difference and identity, by definition. Mence the presupposition that the transcendent Absolute 
is nevertheless predominantly rational is as subjective and as circular as Fichte's postulate of the 
Absolute Subject. In order to explain and ground experience, it seems,, we need to presuppose 
that our foundation or explanans always already reflects essential features of expenence, and 
must posit itself determinately in and through them. But this cannot provide us With a real 
explanation of the actuality of experience, as it supposes that the real substantiality or 
transcendence of the Absolute is constituted by its rationality. This, however, is not real 
transcendence: as we have seen, the transcendence of the Absolute and the 'higher' nature of 
Sebelling"s viewpoint are to be constituted by the arationality of the Absolute. Only by taking 
this higher Viewpoint seriously can Schelling hope to explain actual determination. Yet by doing 
this in his later thought, as we sball see, he places the foundationalist project in jeopardy. 
In stunmary, Schelling cannot avoid positing an Absolute whose exact status ws-a-vis 
reason is ambiguous. On the one band., the Absolute bas to be understood as a genuinely 
fi-anscendent, 'higher" unconditioned, which unifies in itself all conditionIng relations, such as 
that between subject and object and which therefore cannot be defined by MY term that is part 
of such a relation. This Absolute is represented by Schelling's talk of the purely affirmative 
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unconditioned. On the other hancL if the Absolute is to be the foundation of a system desit-ned 
to prove that a prioil synthetic knowledge Is possible, and that reason is autonomous and 
immanent to itself, then it has to be defined in terrns of one pole of a conditioning relation, i. e., 
as predominantly rational. But this determination of the Absolute is, therefore, no less 
subjeefive than Fichte's. 
The Philosophy of Identity simply assumes that the overall unity of the Absolute is 
rational, and necessa?! ýy gives rise to the actualisation of the totality of possibilities that follow 
logically from the very idea of the Absolute as an immediate unity. 44The element of irreducible 
freedom has disappeared, and has been subordinated to a theological schema: the Absolute is 
conceived as positing itself because of its internal teleological necessity, a desire to know itself, 
which implies distinction within the eternal Absolute itself In order to demonstrate that reason 
can knou, that the Absolute is the foundation of a priori knowledge, a complete system of the 
Absolute is needed. But if this system is only subjectively valid, derived like the 'first creation' 
from a purely rational foundation, then it is not complete, even if it begins and ends With the 
idea of the Absolute. The only proposition to be extracted from such a system is hypothetical: if 
synthetic knowledge through pure reason alone exists, then this system is the form it will take. 
But does such knowledge exist? Can we know that 'the real and the ideal universe are but the 
same universe' (WS 187/205)? This cannot be decided except by taking up the genuinely 
'hi, v, her' viewpoint on the Absolute. About thirty years later, in criticising Hegel's account in SL 
of the Absolute Idea, Schelling would accuse his fonner collaborator of formulating a wholly 
negafive philosophy,, concerned only with the interpretation of the Absolute as the source of 
categories that stand over against the empirical mamfold as merely possible forms of 
experience. This evaluation was also extended by Schelling to his own earlier Memadissivem 
(LMP 137/142). We will now examine Schelling's attempts to adopt the 'highef', arational 
Absolute as the foundation of his system. 
44 On this necessary character of the actuallsation, see Fuhrmans, 1954, p. 42. 
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b) Development Towards 'Positive Philosvopky ' 
In the Philosophy of Identity, Schelling forsakes the Kantian and Fichtean emphasis oii 
reflexivity as the condition of knowledge, by positing a transcendent, non-reflexive ontological 
.... -Ii founda-fion of knowledge with whicb reason is immechalek united in an ecstanc mtuition. - In 
this, as I noted, lie appears almost HeidetTerean: Schelling proposes that if finite beings are 
disclosed to us, then this necessarily requires in the background a primordial openness to the 
Being of these beings . 
46 This ontological turn had been M evidence since the earlier 
Naturphilosophie, where the unity of nature was conceived as a primordial, self-limiting Life 
(EE 287-8). However, the Philosophy of Identity is more radical in that it makes the Absolute 
fTom the outset a unity of natuTe and spifit that tTmseends both. Nevertheless, this move is- 
despite its theological character, epistemologically necessary, for this definifion of the Absolute 
is, for Sebelling as for Jacobi and H61derfin, the only le itimate, non-illusory or non-cli-culai- 
way to understand that which all detenninate knowledge must presuppose. 
Subsequently, however, it becomes apparent that the transcendent Absolute itself needs 
to be thought as doubled: it has to have rational wid non-rational sides, wid also has to he the 
unity of these. Only then can it serve as the foundation of a system of actual and not i-nerely 
possible determinations of being. This doubled Absolute also appears for the first time in the 
early Naiurphilosophie, where Sebelling notes that, if the unity of NNature is to divide itself, it 
inust be, at one and the same time, both primordial wiity and a primordial 'duplicity' (EE 2881), 
like Fichte's Absolute Subject in WLnm. The problem is, how to take up the 'higher' 
perspective on the Absolute and think these two aspects together, without effectivel,, 
subordinating one to the other. Here, the. Philosophy of Identity produced a transcendental 
illusion. It presupposes that the unity of the rafional and non-rafional Absolutes is itself rafional, 
- 
135, and Frank, 1975, p. 29. See Bcvwie. op. ol., p 
46 On Heidegger and Schelfing. see Box-oe, op. cil., pp. 53,64 and Sikka, 1994, p. 428 ff 
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positing this rationality in an emment, theological f6m i-e., an inner telaý that necessitates the 
self-diVision of the Absolute, thus leaving the actual self-di,. rision of the Absolute, which must 
be ungrounded., unaccounted for. Schelling has acknowledged that reason must presuppose 
from the outset that it is identical with the Absolute, but now this does not seem to be enough. 
His reiiwiciation of the viewpoint of the Philosophy of Identity leads to the middle penod of his 
career, and his most sustained attempts to realise the higher perspective on the Absolute. 
Above all, then, the self-division of ffie Absolute cannot be conceived as a necesswy 
se, Calf-limitation, as this would simply affirm the identity of the Absolute witb the rational aspect 
of experience, i. e-, the conditioning relations of opposition between its determinations, whilst 
ignoring its transcendence or otherness. In this way, no explanation of the actuality of division 
would be given, and, as happened in WS, the identity of Absolute and experience could only be 
secured beyond their distinction by presupposing a pre-existing lelos of complete divine self- 
knowledge, with this division then becoming merely a privation necessary for the realisation of 
A- : 
this higher end. Against this position, Schelling subsequently attempted to think the self-division 
of the Absolute, and its necessary consequences, as a positive reallsation of the Absolute's 
I, -- - freedom rather than as a negative self-limitation.., without however, lapsing into arbitrariness 
and iffationality- 
From 1809 to about 1815, Schelling's preoccupation is with how reason is a priori 
capable of an insight into such a positive notion of freedom without simply reducing it to the 
purely logical possibilities outlined by negative philosophy. 47 He dius proposes diat the 
transcendent Absolute in its eternal unity must be conceived as a free principle or will, yet a will 
without subjectivity,, one which wills nothing. This is now the negative foundation of all 
knowledge, being potentially a conscious will and thus potentially rational and free, or 
conditioned and unconditioned. However, an account still has to be given of how the Absolute 
47 VVM)e Scheffing's works fi-om this period exhibit rea) and important differences in their accounts of the 
Absolute, there are equally, if not more important features that they share, upon which I will concentrate 
in this SeCtiOn. 
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immanently, i. e., through itself, divides it-self If this higher Absolute transcends all dualities, 
then how can it he thought as dividing itself without presupposing the implicit or pre-existing 
possibility of these dualities as the ground which necessilalestbe division of the AI)solute" 
Schelfing's attempts to solve this problem hit on a solution that recalls again Fichte's 
account in WLnm of the 'onginal duplicity' within the Absolute Subject. However, they also 
take on ever more esoteric, mythic forms. But this methodol ical shift is, paradoxicafly. 091 
epistemologically necessary: the higher perspective cannot deduce self-division from the idea of 
the Absolute - rather, it must think a groundless act of differentiation that opens up the 
narrative of the revelation of a transcendent God. Schelfing describes the state of the primal 
Will outside time as that of a restful unity that 'rejoices in its nonbeing' (AW 49/134. ). In 
addition, though, he proposes that this eternal unity is implicitly differentiated. This implicit 
differentiation bas two aspects: the Absolute is conceived as containing its possible 
detenninations, as in the earlier pbilosopby, as its own ideal and specifically eternal dimension. 
But the Absolute is also implicitly deten-nined in a pseudo-temporal fashion, containing the 
shadowy presentiment of itself as split into a 'before' and 'after. In WS, Schelfing was quick to 
identify the implicit 'affm-ned' and 'affirmmg' aspects of the Absolute with logical constituents 
of a knowledge-relation. Here, however, he separates the rational and non-rational aspects of the 
implicit distincfion. On the non-rational Side., the Absolute as Will is iiTu-nediately botb W)iI as 
the ground of its existence, and Will as its actual, detenninate existence (THF 357/31-2). Like 
'feeling' in relation to the Ficbtean subject, the ýwill of the ground' here is witbin God, yei is 
not truly God himself, 'inseparable from hH''n, to be sure, but nevertheless distinguishable from 
bim' (THF 358/32). For Robert F. Brown, the nature of this 'dark" will of the ground is to be 
, inten-nediate between unconsciousness and consciousness and therefore [it] is a stnving that is 
48 
ncitheTrigidly neccssary nor fully frec' . 
Brown, op. c1l., P. 
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'Mis 'dark will' is what will serve as the ground of detennination within the Absolute. 
However, it is an odd sort of 'ground'. if we understand grounding in the sense of necessary 
entailment. Like Fichte's 'feeling'. it is a problematic term that introtluces determfnabllftý into 
the indeterminate Absolute unity. But here, it is an onto] ical factor, the 'incomprehensible Clip 
basis of reality in things' (THF 360/34. ). And consequently, and again like Gý, 6ihl, it is 
somehow 'in' the Absolute, but not entiTely 'of, it, for although it vvill becorne the &q-otind of the 
Absolute's determinate existence, it is not posited bv the Absolute through something like a 
conscious act. Within the Absolute, it emerges as a Iongingý' (',; ehnsuchl) without an objecl 
(714F 359/33-4. ), and the belonging-together of this obscure difference with the pure unity of the 
Absolute can only be articulated as a paradox: 'the more this composure is profoundly deep and 
intrinsically full of bliss, the sooner must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity, without 
eternity either helping or knowing' (AW 53/136. ). This disturbance introduces the impetus 
towards the act of creation. Hence, unlike Fichte, Schelling sees the problemafic, purely 
deten-ninable element as the posifive ground of all determination: precisely becai4se it is 
problematic, its essence (conscious or unconscious wiII9) radically undecidable, its presence in 
eternity creates an existential tension within the Absolute Identity. This tension propels the act 
of actual division in which the world is created... and which replaces the unresolved tension 
within eternity with the stable, UDIdirectional progressivity of Imear time , 
SPL 428/203 ). 49 in 
this act, the Absolute contracts itself into or posits itself in the 'dark will' as its first potency. 
Schelfing proposes that because the dark will and the opposed element, the will to deterrmnate 
existence, are inseparable within the Absolute, this contraction releases the will-to-existence, 
which, by opposing the dark- 'Will, draws out of it the actuality of the logical possibilities 
contained in the Absolute (the eternal ideal universe or first creation). 
in this way, the positing of actual detennination appears as ungrounded. and as positive 
or affinnative in relation to the Absolute itself. The blind and forced contraction of the Absolute 
49 on the po,. -t' of this act, see 
ý'ýek-, 1996, pp 31 
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is, as with the division of the arational Absolute In the earlier philosophy, its 'doubling' 
(Doublirung) or 'intensification" (Zunehmung) (SPL 424-5/200; AW 55-7/137-8). It posits the 
Absolute absolulety., yet as actually differentiated. This difference is simply the affirmed will of 
the ground, however, and is thus problematic or determinable: it is only through the actiN, -e 
opposition of the will -to-existence (the second potency or difference of the Absolute) that a 
deterymnate synthetic product is produced, in which the overall unity of the Absolute is 
reasserted (its third potency or difference from itself). For exwnple, In the classic fonnulation of 
-die Nalurphilosophie, gravity (first potency, A') and h& (second potency, A' ') are the actual 
conditions of the emergence of matter (third potency, A). In this way, Schelling en%, -Isions a 
dialectical deduction of nature and spirit proceeding, once again, from the Absolute. In this way, 
the inherent rationality of the Absolute will exert itself through the second potency, and will 
come to dominate the dark V"ll. The self-unfolding of the Absolute in time is thus conceived as 
comprising three qualitatively different epochs, each ruled by one of the proto-temporal 
dimensions that are dimensions of the Abscdute in eternity, and each of which includes different 
synthetic forms: nature (the dark will), theoretical and practical human consciousness (Will-to- 
existence), and the yet-to-come 'spi-rit world' (tbe Absolute unity of Will) (TIF 405/85-6, -, SPL 
482-4/242-3). 
In this way, Schelling explicitly reintroduces the histonco-practical dimension of 
Fichte's system, but in a theological form analogous to the Joacbimite 'third disMsation'. The 
completion of the Schellingian system is God's work (his experience of his own inherent 
rationality), even more than ours, and so this completion of the system is beyond the labours of 
our reason, requiring an actual transformation of the condition of the world that can only be 
effected through grace rather than human practical effort. The pro-vidential unity spoken of in 
STI, which Schelling had emphasised against Fichte's practical Sollen, thus reappears as a 
Sollen of faith. This is underlined by Schelling"s Wk towards the end of THF of the Absolute, 
qua higher Absolute or Ungrun4, as a unity expressed not by the notion of 
divine Reason, but 
by that of divine Love (THF 404-8/84-90). 
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In this way, however, Schelling's attempts to resok, e the problem of circularity are 
is thought of as having arational (the dark will. ) and rationa ( compromised- The Absolute iII the 
will-to-existence) aspects, but these remain united in a higher Absolute that is still not truly 
transcendent and unconditioned- Tbe Utignind in this period remains a teleological unity. in 
which the emergence of the dark will within eternity, 'without eternity helping or knowing, is 
actually subordinated to the higher unity of the Absolute as Love. this expresses a higher 
necessity, through which the Absolute has to divide itself from itself in order to become what it 
only implicitly is (the first creation). The emergence of difference within the Absolute, which 
also has to be an Ungrund, is actually grounded in a pre-given purpose, the 'final purpose of 
creation' (THF 404/85. ). Once again, the Absolute is only illusorily conceived of as 
unconditioned, for it reflects the forms of expenence with which we are familiar, with this 
resemblance 'grounded' in a higher Oos. The horizon of our theoretical and practical 
expenetice withm the second epoch of the Absolute is thus fixed by the proVidetitial, 
unattainable unity that is always-to-corne. 
Yet again, we have to presuppose that the determinateness of our experience is 
grounded in a predominantly rational unity, but the objective proof of this sulýjectlve postulate 
is infinitely deferred, for it will only be given with the advent of Schelling's third epoch. Once 
more, as in Flebte"s philosopby and in Schelling's own earlier systems, a foundationalist 
method leaves reason ungrounded- The assumption that the Absolute is rafional is only an 
assumption. However, another problem has now emerged. It appears that without this 
presupposition, the system will be based on an unaccountable dissonance within the Absolute 
that is equiprimordialwith its identity. If this ground (the dissonance) is an V)igmnd, that is, not 
itrary determined by another term and hence unknowable, then the system is based on an arbi 
idenfification of our fon-ns of experience v"th the Absolute, for It cannot in principle be knovn 
to be necessanly immanent in them. Yet at the same time, we require this ground (the 
dissonance) to be an I 'ngrund in order to explain the possibility of there being anv 
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deten-nination at all, without getting caught in a circle of presupposing what we are meant to be 
explaining. y' 
The irony of Schelling's middle period works is that, despite their theosophical 
character, they fail, not through their obscurity., but because they are, in their own way. 
rigorously foundationalist. In attempting to prove the entitlements of pure reason., Kant, Fichte 
and Schelling all try to show that reason is capable of immanently deducing the incorrigible 
foundations that are necessary for the possibility of knowledge. Yet each of these foundations 
finds proof of its own sufficjencýy as a condition - the criterion of genuinely objective 
knowledge - always displaced beyond the limits of the enquiry. Kant's unity of apperception 
and categorical imperative are only abstracted from given forms of empirical experience that 
form the subjective presuppositions of transcendental method. Fichte's self-identical absolute 
subject as the negative condition of all consciousness, is displaced by feeling, an element of 
actuality and difference that cannot finally be cancelled within the Fichtean organon, in order to 
complete the system and ultimately demonstrate that the subjective presupposition from which 
it began is in fact objective. And now, Schelling's Absolute Identity, the necessary, negative 
condition of all determinate being and all knowing, is displaced by the 'will of the ground, the 
sufficient condition of real difference and determination, which 'ungrounds' (subverts) the 
subjective presupposition that the Absolute is essentially rational. 
Reason is forced to recognise its own lack of autonomy, its dependence on something 
that is not fully its own. Ile conditions and form of the problem have altered, however: 
whereas, with Kantý reason had to assume the reality of historically given forms of experience, 
Scbelling's version of the foundationalist project demonstrates that reason is jniernalýv 
heteronomous. It has to presuppose a genuinely transcendent Absolute that is incommensurable 
with reason and that is yet immanent within the universe, and thus within reason, in some way 
as an unknowable activity that grounds all determination, an unconscious of thought Within 
50 Cf Bracken, 1972, P. 71 
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thought. Reason, it seems, is no longer even in principle immanent to itself Ilie final period of 
Sebelling's career, his 'positive philosophy' shows how ruinous this problem is for 
foundationallst thought. 
The purely 'negative' philosophy of identity was a dialectical system of possible fon-ns 
of the Absolute, leaving out the problem of actuality. To paraphrase a remark of Scbelfing's on 
E"rescartes (LMP 15/50), it showed that God, the actual unity of the world., exists necessarily in 
certain forms, but only if be actually exists. Earlier. we restated this critique of the ontological 
proof in an epistemological form: a priori knowledge of actuality must conform to certain 
necessary determinations if it exists, but this itself is no proof that there is any such knowledge. 
If philosophy exists, then the pre-eminently rational Absolute Identity is its condition of 
possibility -but does it indeed exist? Is the bypothetical system produced by reason applicable 
to the actual world? This problem is, as we have seen, appears objectively iffesolvable, for an 
affirmative answer can only be based on assumption rather than proof And Schelling addresses 
this problem once again, as did Fichte, in ten-ns of faith. 
With respect to 'negative' philosophy, as Emit L. Fackenheim puts it, 
The problem is that dialectic cannot understand the 
meaning of existence, and this means for Schelling that 
dialectic cannot absorb existence into a system. Dialectic is 
fragmentary knowledge and must turn to experience for the 
knowledge of act. 51 
The okiective applicability of rationality to experience still presupposes the original, 
non-rational act of differentiation that alone can ground actual difference. Existence, for the 
Schelling of the positive philosophy, is therefore prior to essence, or, the ground of conscious 
'Fackenheim, op. ecit., P. 
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experience and of our reason is itself incommensurable with reason and conscious expenence. It 
is the meaning of the fact (Talsache) of the genesis of the world (DPE 228) that the positive 
philosophy takes for its object and this attunement to fact requires a methodological 
realignment: Scbelling, like Fichte in the WLnm, chooses to acknowledge the extent of his 
reliance on faith and the experimental nature of reasoning, referring to the basis of his new 
system as a 'pbilosopbical empiriClsm5. 
This new title signifies a real affinnation of the difference between thought and 
existence, against those philosophers who follow Descartes in collapsing being into thought 
(ýDPE 233-4), like Fichte and Hegel. Reason may be capable of constructing an a priori system 
that begins from the presupposition of the unmoved Absolute, and sets out from the act of 
creation to cover the totality of nature, theoretical and practical spirit, and the futural period of 
God's true existence, but these three penods of revelation remain only possible without actual 
experiential proof if God exists, he does so necessarily, but he must be first shown to exist. The 
transcendental Idea of the unconditional ground is non-contradictory, but the fact of its 
existence is not demonstrable a priori. The reality of its ideal determinations has to be proven. 
Hence Schelling can no longer just employ dialectical constructions, which derive from 
a theoretical reason that merely conducts an a priori reflection upon the nature of the Idea of the 
Absolute. Instead, it is necessary to asseTt again the primacy of the practical, wb)cb here stands 
for a freely willed afffimation of God as the real, absolute ground, which ignores the inability of 
negative pbilosophy to encompass God in this sense. As Fackenheim puts it this 'leap' is, wbile 
being 'outside all reason', still not 'arbift-ary', as the 'predicament from which it arises is the 
.1 human condition itseX in which rationality itself is rooted'. 5ý Schelling's positing of an ecstasy 
of reason as the foundation of the system is now recast as the practical, subjective and private 
affirmation of the exisienfialty and not just historically rooted character of human reason. which 
52 ibid., p. H 5. On the fact that the higher Absolute cannot be reached through reason alone, see also 
Bracken, op. cit., p. 105. 
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is nevertheless simultaneously the affirmation of this existence as somehow rationally 
determinate, despite the lack of a priori foundations for this faith. The only gound for this 
affirmation is that it is in the interests of the philosophical search for foundations and thus of the 
autonomy of reason. 
The experience of the affirmation is meant to add what reason alone could not produce: 
certainty In the validity of the purely hypothetical system. The second stage of the process now 
consists in carrying out an empirical confirmation of the system in detail, which entails the kind 
of researeb that constitutes the empirical part of the later Scbelling's histOncal philosopby of 
mythology. The private, practical affirmation of the sufficiency of the Absolute would be 
publicly vindicated by the elaboration of a positive, factual system, based on historical and 
anthropological research. 
The failure of this final effort of Schelling to construct a system upon a basis that denies 
neither necessity and theoretical knowledge, nor freedom and practical will, is not caused by the 
infinite labour required by the empirical task it sets. In fact it fails because it sets up a new 
antinomy of 'dogmatism' and 'criticism', wbicb actually ffireatens the posSibility of 
foundationalist thought itself it is here that we finally encounter the 'trawna of reason' that we 
made our object in Chapter One. The shift from negative to positive phflosophy, the moment of 
affinnation, derives from a crisis of reason that is caused by the failure of negative philosophy 
to encompass the fi-eedorn of the Absolute. As such, the moment of affirmation presents, not a 
solution to this crisis, but merely an acknowledgement of it and hides a fundamental 
contradiction that has threatened Schelhng'ýs thought from the Philosophy of Identity on. 
What is this conmadiction? Reason, in reflecting on knowledge in generaL is able to 
state that its unconditional negative condition is the mdetenrdnate, immediate Absolute Identity. 
This much Schelling has insisted on since the Nalurphilosophie, taking on the insights of Jacobi 
and liblderlin. It is also the case, bowever, that reason is capable of sbowmg that the 
unconditional condition of determination as such, that is, of there being any stable difference, 
any order, any rational being at all, is a positive ground that is not itself rational. The connection 
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between this ground and that which it grounds is not itself rationally statable. given that the 
grounded ten-n here Is rationality itself. Schelling refers to this tqound as a problematic we On. 
-s wholly without an\! being at all (ganz und gar or a non-heing, not in the sense of that which I 
nichiSeyende), but that which is not ci being, as it lacks essence. (DPE 235-6). 
The problem is that the system of determinations reconstructed in thought out of the 
Absolute can only be objectively valid if the Absolute is inherently rational. But just as an 
arational and free act is presupposed as the oyound of difference that impels the Creation, the 
system itself a rational construction, paradoxically presupposes such an act as the condition of 
its applicability to the real or actual world. So the validity of the system depends simultaneously 
upon the essential rationality of the Absolute, the necessity of a dialectical process of revelation 
(the position of the IdenfildissYstem) and upon the Absolute being essentially incommensurable 
with reason. 
As the positive philosophy shows, philosophical reason is faced with a choice: either 
the hypothetical system produced by a negative, theoretical reflection on the concept of the 
Absolute, or the practical affinnation of the real ground as commensurable with reason, 
entailing reason becoming utterly ecstatic, no longer accountable to itself no longer iminanent 
to itself The inadequacy of the former is matched by the final impossibility of the latter as a 
route for a philosopkv Mai seeks, to justt& the auiononýv q1'reason. Importantly, if the leap is 
just as unstatable as if one made, then flie connection between the ground and reason is 
rernams within the perspective of negative philosophy. Reason is conditioned heteronomousiy 
by something that it cannot assimilate, but rather than impinging from without- as with Kant and 
Fichte, the otherness here is the existential ground of reason itself, internal to its own activity. 
The incommensurable ground is therefore not the negative or opposite of reason- Its relation to 
reason is more problematic, for it is only the ground of reason in so far as it is incommensurable 
with it. in-educible to any detenninate conditioning relation. It thus stands outside any system of 
7 
rational relations, but as the ground of any such system, a ground whose relation to the system is 
unstatable in terms of any such system. 5-1 
The choice of negative or positive philosophy thus becomes a dilemma: either there is 
no proof that the Absolute takes on determination according to the dialectical process 
considered as its own inherent law, or the sole grotmd of achiality is affirtned as that which need 
not give itself any specific law. the ground 'might express its Will in an indefinite nurnber of 
ways, rationality being but one of them. 54 This dilemm-a can be said to mark at once the highest 
point and the failure of the modem philosophical project conceived of as a search for a secure 
foundation of knowledge. The only possible Viewpoints seem to be either an utijustified 
rationalist dogmatism - the affirmation of the apodictic validity of reason - or an ungrounded 
epistemological scepticism. This latter option leads to relati"sm and ultimately to self- 
refutation- there can be no oklective knowledge, either theoretical or practical, because the 
objective ground of reason is itself incommensurable with reason. But if theoretical reason 
reaches its limit in this fashion, it forces us into a crisis. If we go beyond this crisis by affin-ning 
that this gyound. is non-rational, then we affinn that at least one proposition is objectively valid, 
i. e., that notliing is oklectively valld because of the nature of reason. We thus ignore the status 
of this ground as a postulate, and can therefore have no de jure right to either Viewpoint, and 
thus no distinction between criticism and dogmatism can be made, for there is no way to tell if 
one viewpomt is illusory as opposed to the other. 
Wben the Enligbtenment staked its success on the discovery of secure foundations for 
the authority of reason over experience, the conditions for this dilemma were created. With 
Schellln& the Idealist project seems to have committed suicide, and its death has not simply 
placed epistemology in question. As in the case of the early reactions against the Enlightenment 
and its offsprin& the French Revolution, the assumed primacy of pure reason in the matter of 
53 Bowie (, ry. ). cjL) emphasises this point in arguig for Schelling's historical and philosophical importance 
in relation to 19'h and 2& century thought. 
54 Fackenlielin. op. cit.. P. ]-'I 
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judging the legitimacy of traditional institutions is again placed under suspicion. If 
e ight to criticise existing philosophical reason is itself heteronomous, how can it assume th n 
political arrangements? We have reached a stage where, according to N4iietzsche, modern 
nihilism is born, where the highest values, such as objective knowledge. suffer a devaluation of 
themselves. The interest of reason in its own autonomy has, in taking up senOuslY the ssue of 
the justification of this autonomy, shown itself to be ungrounded, requiring instead a faith in 
itself that takes the field against other forms of belief without being able to decide the issue of 
its Tight to do so. The result of the immanent exaimnation of reason by itself undertaken by 
Kant., Fichte and Schelling is that it becomes impossible to distinguish dogmatism from 
_I_: pmlosophy, and the trauma of reason is embodied in the Schellin ian epistemological dilemma. 91 
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Chapter Three 
Deleuze: Philosophy as Practice 
Introduction 
The trauma of reason signifies, above all, a limit point in modern philosophy. In 
examining the versions of antifoundationalism formulated by Deleuze and Hegel, we Will 
discover how these thinkers attempt to account for this limit-condition, and thus surpass 
it, with reference to the Kantian notion of transcendental Illusion, thus establishing that it 
is more than just a purely accidental historical phenomenon. Their own doctrines of 
transcendental illusion, neither of which require the distinction between dogmatism and 
philosophy to be fixed with reference to an unchanging wmscendental or ontological 
foundation, also go beyond Kant by subjecting his influential model of critical thought to 
critique. In this way, the Enfightenment"s conception of reason, which affinns and 
attempts to extend the foundationalism of Descartes, Will be undermined, and with it the 
cnsis that results from the foundationalist pro*ect. I 
In my opinion, the importance of Deleuze in this -regard, which makes hirn 
unique among post-war French philosophers, lies in his commitment, throughout his 
career, to two seemingly incompatible problems: a) how to fon-nulate a consistent 
perspectivism that avoids collapsing into a dogmatic relativism of the kind that posits an 
olýjective foundation (Ithe nature of thought, say) for the fact that we lack genuine (i priori 
synthetic knowledge, and b) how to think the Absolute, iven that an ontological 91 
commitment of this order is, for Deleuze, necessary in order to maintain philosophy's 
unique identity as a genuinely cntical discipline. Deleuze's main inspirations in these two 
areas are. Nietzsche and Bmson, but as I will argue. in the next chapter, he is also 
, 
her' perspective on the (through Beqgson) close to Schelfing's attempts to adopt a 'hig 
Absolute. By tracing this relation to Schelling- I N"ll explain how Deleaze conceives the 
immanence of the Absolute In that which it conditlons. Deleuze's coinminnent to cntique 
79 
means that, as I will show, he remains a thinker of Enlightenment who wants philosophy 
to free itself from its intemal illusions conceming the -Absolute. 
This can on]v be done. 
however, by re-evaluating the t1jealling of philosophy as an ethos or way of living and 
being. 
In a 1971 discussion with Foucauk Deleuze agrees that the essence of philosophN 
can no longer be considered to be disinterested knowledge of the universal. Philosophý 
as primarily theoretical and disinterested knowing bas undergone some kind of crisis in 
modernity. 'Theory' derives from the Greek iheoro. ý, a spectator at a festival, implying a 
pure attitude of disinterested attention, being 'pure4- present to what is mily real'. ' For 
Foucault and Delenze, the question of bow to think the situatedness of philosophy, its 
relation to real interests, has become urgent. The faith of modernity in Enlightenment 
reason, being ungrounded, is implicitly contradictory and nihilistic, for these thinkers. 
When pw-c reason wicovers the extent to which it is wigromided, alongside the 
possibility that it is merely the expression of certain existential conditions, the 
Enlightenment commitment to the uitical dissection of dogmatism is in danger. 
Philosophy can no longer be theory if by theory is meant 'an fliumination from a safe 
distance' (Foucault), a representation of the essence of being. Instead, philosophy must 
take its situatedness, its relation as a practice to other practices, seriously. The new ethos 
of philosophy V"II be that a theory 'is exactly like a box of tools ... 
It must be useful. It 
2 In this WW like Foucw-jlt, envisions the modermq- must function' (Deleuze). -y, 
Deleuze- 
of philosophy as an attitude (lethos) towards its own limits that can be reallsed at any 
time, rather than as a historical epoch in its objective development as a theoretical 
discipline. ' Only by changmg philosophy's image of what it means to philosophise, can 
this modernity be truly established. In this chapter, I Will examine Deleuze's analvsIs of 
1 GadanicT. 1903. p. 124. 
2 See 'Intcllcctuals and Pcn,. -er' in FoucaWL 1977. p, 208. 
3 Cf. Foucault. Ak-hat I-,; Enlightenment', ". In Foucault. 1984. pp. 32-50. at p- 39. 
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what lie considers to he the historical barriers to the realisation of this elhos, -, N Ith 
reference to his notion of the -image of thought. 
Circularitv, and Modern Critical Thought 
One important aspect of Deleuze's relation to Schelling lies in the way he 
appreciates the omnipresence of circularity in philosophies that stand forth and proclaim 
their unique grasp of a foundation that entities them to mark boundaries between 
legitimate and illegitimate truth-claims. This is what I want to explore now, by presenting 
a necessarily brief historical oveMew of certain aspects of the post-German Idealist 
-I- , philosophy of finitude in relation to Schelfing"s inadvertent undennInIng of 
foundationalism. As we shall see, post-Sebellingian developments reinforce the 
epistemological nihilism of the trauma of reason, bringing out more ethical and political 
dimenSions of this nibilism. 
We will focus initially upon Marx's thought, as the most influential post-German 
Idealist philosophy to have accepted Sebelling's entique of transcendental thought, while 
still holding to the desire for a nvorous critique of the present. The similarities between 
Schelling's late critique of negative philosophy and Marx's critique of Hegel have been 
4 
treated in exemplary fashion by Manfred Frank . The result of 
Schelling's cnitique of 
negative pbilosopby is,, as we saw in the previous ebapter, that the existential, contingent 
or factical aspect of hwnan being is seen as more primary than the rational or essential. 
With Kant., thougbt loses its gfip on the infinite, becoming instead immanent only to 
itself T'his pro, %rides an anthropological definition of philosophy, by making human 
reason the measure of knowledge. Schelling- by attempting to overcome this 
anthropological definition, actually takes things a stage further by showing that thought is 
not even Immanent to itself but receives its limitations CTom conditions that it cannot 
comprehend a priori. To overcome this irreducible confingency requires an ungrounded 
4 Frank. )975. 
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and hence dogmatic faith in reason- In this way. the foundationalist proiect, which sought 
to establish a grenuinely universal meaning for human knowledge is rendered problematic 
by the notion that reason is itself rooted in obscure real processes that cannot be 
transparent to pure reflection. This relative -primacy of existence- over the 'essence' of 
the Absolute as delineated by the categories of pure thoughL was taken up as a major 
-. 
F is development means ., 
by tbeme among the Left liegellans, and parhcularly Marx 5 --Ini 
that the P-oal of knowledae of the Absolute is renounced- 
For Marx, the real processes within which philosophical reason is rooted are 
material relations between social classes. These classes are themselves historically 
differentiated by changes in the organisation of the material base of a society5s existence. 
the means of fulfilling its economic needs. 'Morality, religion, metaphysics [ ... 
I thus no 
longer -retain the semblance of independence. I ... 
] Life is not determined by 
lif -)6. consciousness, but consciousness by e Philosophy, which presupposes itself to be 
absolute because of its reliance on pure reason, in fact has objective conditions in the real a 
interests of social classes. The subjective presuppositions of philosophy are thus rooted 
in objective reality, in the material base of a society. 
The meaning of history is vital for understanding this objective base of 
consciousness, for the dividedness of representational consciousness is itself 
representative of the real structure of soclety. Hence Marx CrIticises Feuerbach for 
positing an abstract, ahistorical sensuous bw-nan essence. Human existence is determinate 
or concrete only when it is conceived of in sensuous but also in economic terms, that is 
as defined by relations between hurnans and nature, and by relations between hu-mans 
themselves, that are all subject to a process of constant historical variation dependent 
upon the organisation of production. The meaning of critique is also tied to the meaning 
of this objective process. Critique itself is interestecL but this interest has to he shown to 
199 1. pp. 1' 4-5. 
Marx- 'The German Ideology'- in Mar. \- 1977- p- 164- 
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be more than merely subjective: the social relation its consciousness represents has to be 
the yet-to-be-realised objective resolution of contending subjective interests, and this is 
only possible if crifique is scientific, based on knowledge of the material basis of social 
existence. Pbilosopby, qua disinterested knowledge. is illusory., as it does not take for its 
object the real matenal and social conditions of its own form of consciousness. The 
philosopber's role as a representative of the supposedly universal interest in objective, 
di. vinterested knowledge hides an ideological clam" given that 'disinterested' a priori 
statements about 'the way things are' seek to displace all interested claims about the way 
things oughl to be. In this way, a division between 'domatism" and scientific cnticism is 
set up, with Marxist 'theoretical reason' forming the basis for the prescriptions of 
Marxist 'practical reason. 
The meaning of history has, then, to be based on empirical investigation into the 
real conditions of consciousness. In this way, the divisions of the present and the details 
of the objective goal of history can be determined. However, Marx's critique of 
bourgeois philosophy and its epistemological dilemmas can-not itself avoid the issue of 
7 
circularity. Marx had to develop a positivistic notion of science, as opposed to the 
'absolute knowledge' of German Idealism, in order to get at the history of the real 
conditions of consciousness. But to believe that die facts speak for themselves remains an 
assumption that requires justification. The foundation for this faith in facts is Marx's 
definition of the 'species-being' of humanity., the sensuous human being as homo-l, ýber. 
But then the question arises, which of these terms is the foundation of the other9 Do the 
former establish the latter, or does the definition of human being actually make possible 
the selection of the facts. ) 
This question is not merely scholarly, but has had a real political and historical 
presence. The reasons why the enormous influence of Marxism international IN! as a 
political movernent began to wane after the Second World Way are %, arious- One way of 
7 Cutrcfc)io. op. cn.. p. 9. quolinp Habemas. Knowle4ý,,, c andh:.,? ran 
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accounting for this change, though, would be to show how, in connection with real 
political events sucb as the Frencb colonial wars in Algena, much effort was expended 
on the Continent in drawing out Marx's own a priori ideological presuppositions. For 
example, in relation to the historicist orientation of Marxism, the definition of hw-nan 
beim, that serves as a foundation of history must rest on a non-ideologia science of 
natural distinctions between humans and non-bui-nans. But these distinctions themselves 
are either simply accepted, or derived from empirical, historical docwnents of the 
activity of human beings. Marx's deten-nination of the real conditions of consciousness 
thus rests upon an abstract, unhistorical definition of hurnan essence, which simply 
reflects an interpretation of bistOncal experience that purpo-rts to ahvqvS alrea4y be 
science. The horizon of Marx"s conception of history is the human as homo-Mber, and 
this glVes impetus to his analysis of I 91h century capitalism and the idea of an objective 
interest in critique. But this interest, from which Marx derives his Sollen, communist 
society, is ungrounded if its foundation can only be defined circularly. The Fichtean and 
Schellinglan problem of the inconsistency of foundationalism, of presupposing 
subjectively what was meant to be demonstrated (in this case, that there is an objective 
rather than merely subjective distinction between ideology and science) has not been 
solved. 
Mai-x's supposed foundation could be (and has been) situated as an ideological 
form of consciousness within other histories. The basis of these histories would be the 
difference between other interests, such as those of colonists and colomsed (a history of 
racist imperialism), or those of men and women (a histoiy of patriarchy). These histories 
thernselves would also, however, face the problem of self-consistency in having to 
account for their own subjective presuppositions. Nevertheless, the influential Marxist 
paradigm for conceiving of critique as the distinction between ideology and science has 
thus been placed in question. Its circularitN, is not only epistemologically but also 
politically suspect, wid has occupied Marxists theinselves, with regard to the relation of 
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theory to practice: must the theory of capital wid its anthropologir-al underpinnings 
objectively Justifv practice, or will practice prove theory by bringing about socialism) 
How can we act without objective justificafion of our programme, given that we shall be 
opposed by other interests who claim absolute right for themselves9 But how can we wait 
for the theorists to do their work, when we are oppressed? 
Other movements on the philosophical and political lek particularly in post-war 
France, have taken this problem of circularity to be defiiiitive of the whole 
Enlip-btenment paradigm of philosophical thinking that is established most firmly by 
Kant. This predominant modem paradigrn attempts to establish a distinction between 
knowledge and non-knowledge in relation to the freedoin of an agent. The interest of the 
Enlightenment in autonomv of thoup-ht and action Is thus the justification for this attempt. 
Hence the issue for sorne currents in post-war French thought, under the influence of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, became the possibility of a new paradigm of critique, which 
would remain true to the Enlightenment's mterest in fi-eedom Without getting trapped in 
the dominant paradigm's recun-ent epistemological circulanty. Central to this turn, I 
would argue, are objections to the idea that the interest in critique is founded upon an 
integrated subject of knowledge and action, whose unity is epitomised by the faculty of 
reason. This was true of Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Marx, for example. 
This idea of a subject that ft-anscends the distinctions within the realloy that it is 
. ger. 
In this way, the conscious of In experience is criticised by both Nietzscbe and Heideg 
attack on the autonomy of reason begun by Marx in the name of 'the reaF is continued. 
For Heidegger, any clairn to possess a privileged, transcendent viewpoint on the world 
simply presupposes the identity of being and reason. ' whicb, as Schelfing sbowed., 
. -I-, philosophy has to acknowledge as its own fundamental assumption. Such claims always 
presuppose a pri'vileged subjectivity (the iheoros. ) as foundation or hipokeimenon, 'what 
-ý See t)le remark s, on reason as the 'presupposmg faculty' in Heidegger. ) 98 9. p. -1 7. 
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lies present in advance of everything, what already presences and presences in advance -ý 9 
Even Marx presupposes such a subjectiNity. governed by a positivistic 1090. s that 
performs a pre-gatbenng of what is to count as kiiowledge. This Heideggerean attack on 
the foundational subject is well represented by Foucault's denial of the Marxist idea that 
practice must seek to reallse the true essence of the human being. no longer estranged 
frorn itself by the defon-nations of his. tory. 10 'ýijbjjecfivjty 1,; itselfTooted m existentia) 
conditions, modes of the disclosure of Being, that are pre-rational. This is the 
Heideggerean real 'beneath' consciousness. 
The influence of Nietzsche on the disparate thinkers known as 'post-structurallsts' 
was perhaps even more decisive. " -Tbe result was the adoption of "genealogy' as a rubric 
for a number of different ways of practising critique, whose difference from the 
dominant paradigm was marked by the inversion of the relation between theorýy and 
practice, which I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. This represents, again, wi 
attempt to relate consciousness to its real basis. Genealogical critique, for vanous post- 
structuralist thinkers, posits the dependence of representational consciousness upon 
interest, but refuses to restrict the domain of interest to individual subjects or to social 
classes. These 'interests" are the matenal base of consciousness in that they are practices 
or ways of being (elhoj), in relation to whieb consciousness is an epipbenomenon. 
Consciousness is, for Nietzsche, the product of forgetting the impact of practices of 
training and discipline upon the body. In this way, the idea of a transcendent subject or 
iheoros in which the essential identity of being and thought is preserved is a fiction bom 
of the insecuritv of consciousness. Hence foundationalist philosophy is a practice that 
aims to preserve a fi-agile form of being by fostering illusions, yet it gets caught up in 
dilemmas such as the trauma of reason and those which beset the Marxist paradigm. 
'ý Hcldcgger. 1989. p. 182. 
"Miller. 1993- p. 174ý p 336. 
II Sce Smith. 199 5. Ch- -;, esp. pp, 140 ff. 
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which render it impotent to resolve issues concerning the status of subjectiviN!. For 
genealogical cntique, issues concerning domination and fTeedom. or doginatism and 
criticism, can only be settled by evaluating individual practices according to their own 
immanent tendencies. 
The inevitable epistemological rejoinder to both of these positions concerns the 
issue of self-consistency, pointing back to Schelling and the trauma of reason. If the 
con ition o consciousness is the immanence of an opaque, pre-rational real In it, then 
the question is bow this relation between the real and consciousness can be known. If it 
cannot be known and is thus without foundation, then how can such cntiques of 
subjectivity bave any status beyond that of an mteresting fictionr) But if it is supposed 
that it can be known, does this not once again imply a transcendent conception of 
immanence, a conception of an identity of thought and being that is 'higher still'9 Does 
the persistence of a critical orientation towards the presuppositions of truth-claims not 
testify to an implicit 'higher subject' whose interests drive the denial of transcendence to 
reason? The question of the identity of this subject becomes urgent. In whose name are I- 
entiques of the Cartesian, Kantian, etc. subject conducted? Suspicions that sucli cnfiques 
are not resistant to the emeigence of irrationalist and thus potentially totalitarian or fascist 
subjectivities have been voiced. 
It is from this point of view that we can approach Deleuze. I will contencl, in this 
and in the next chapter, that this problem of consistently grounding critique is a central 
concern of his. Central to this concern is the question of his relation to Schelling. 
Deleuze's Nietzschean emphasis on the question of how the primacy of practice over 
theory should be conceived is, I shall argue, due to his appreciation of the problems 
involved in constructing a discourse of the real once the issue of how this discourse can 
ultimately justify itself has become explicit - problems which. in Schelling's work. 
produced the traurna of reason and an ImPossible choice between dogmatic rationalism 
,ýE-,. Frank I (), S 9. pp, 341 -2. 
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and dogmatic relativism. Further, he attempts to overcome these problems by pursuing a 
recognisably Schellinglan strategv. conceming how the -hlgher' Absolute is to be 
thought, beyond the illusions of foundationalist philosophy. For Deleuze. only by 
reintroducing the theme of the Absolute can the suspicions regarding the cli-cularitY Of 
both the Marxist and post-Marxist paradigms of critique can be addressed. As we saw, 
These positions, from an epistemological point of Niew, seem to renounce the 
transcendence of reason in favour of its finitude, only to smuggle in a transcendent 
subject without realising it. Deleuze wants to establish a post-Marxist paradigm by, in a 
sense, returning thought to the infinite. This, as we shall see, relies on Bergson Is 
transformation of Scbelling's conception of absolute intuition. Deleuzean cnfique, then, 
is neither Kantian foundationalism nor a Niet! schean doctrine of pure 'fictions, but a 
paradoxical version of absolute knowledge. 
iii) The Trauma of Reason aN 'Double-Bind' 
Given that Deleuze remains committed to a notion of philosophy as ciitique, and 
thus in a certain sense, to the goals of the Enlightenment as expressed by Kant, 13 we 
need first to understand the basis of his orientation, given that it cannot be grounded by a 
transcendent foundation. Deleuze's stance can be refeiTed to as antifoundationallst, in 
that it refuses a certain image of what 'philosophy" means, thus reflecting the influence 
of Heldegger and Nietzsche. "' We rmist first up-d- erstand what exactly is being reftised 
here, and why it should be refused, which I will examine in the rest of this chapter. 
Cf the remarks on Delewc and the Enlightenincrit In Hallm ard, 1997. p. 1 7. On the connection betwecri the 
Enllphtcmncni and the 'ne-, N, paradigm . of critique see e. g. Miller. ap. cit., pp. 301-4. on Foucault's 
'Qu'est-ce que la cnliquO'. 
"' The idea of such a refusal. aswe shall see in Chapters Five to Seven- is also ýý hat connects Deleuze to 
Hegel. 
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'Die meaning of philosophy ffiat Deleuze questions is that which has been central 
to the foregoing chapters, namely that philosophy is a discipline of pure knowledge. for 
which immanence is the identity of reason and being in some form. To jusfiN, this 
assumption is what foundationabst thought attempts to do. N-ow, the. OnIN! Proof Of thj'-ý 
immanence can be a secure foundation that transcends all conditioned cases of 
knowledge. Without this foundation, there could be no sure means of distinguishing 
between knowledge and mere belief In this way, foundationalist thought presupposes 
that there is an oNeclive difference between genuine knowledge and dogmatism, i. e., 
between securely grounded knowledge and conditioned or subjective knowledge that 
simply believes itself to he objective. This has been the case, as we have seen, V"th 
Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Marx: the distinction has had to be presupposed in 
order to be proven, but it eventually becomes apparent that if we have to presuppose an 
objective distinction of this kind., we cannot prove it. For Deleuze, these thinkers posed 
the distinction as if it could be made by a iheoros, the perfect disinterested observer of 
being. Following Heidegger and Nietzsche, he refers this hypothetical perfect observer 
back to The 'real' of its preconscious orientations, the realm of practice or actIVIty. in 
relation to which it becomes, in Deleuze's view, an illusory posit. We thus have to 
consider wbat becomes of the dogmatism/CrItique distinction if it is made at this level. 
Can this be done without presupposing a foundation of our 'knowledge' of the practical 
realin? 
This is a complex quesfion and one which will have to be approached 
circumspectly. Firstly, we turn to what Deleuze means by practice. A parfial answer to 
this question concerns what we assume the meanjtýg of an activity to be, that is, what 
rules mark it off against other acfivities. Foundationalism is thus a certain practice or 
acfiVit),, one which defines philosophy as outlined above, and which thus follows certain 
rules of conduct rather than others. This enables us to re-examine the tratima of reasm 
below', as it were, and discover it's mechanics. 'flus dilenrima, as we saw in 
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Chapter Two, is Inherent in Schelling's philosophy, and anses from a meditation on what 
foundationalist method requires in order to be able to explain the possibility of 
knowledge or ex ience. It presents us with two incompatible options' either affirrn the pen 
identity of reason and the Absolute (dogmatic rationalism. ), or affirm the 
incommensurability of reason and the Absolute (dogmatic relativism). Tlils choice is a 
dilemma due to two feattires: a) both options advance truth-claims that are meant to be 
objectively valid., yet b) we are only forced to choose because the possibility of a 
foundation for any trutb--claim bas been denied. 
As with Fichte's 'idealism' versus 'realism', neitlier option cwi be Justified 
against the other. Although the relativist option has the appearance of a limited, 
epistemological scepticism, one suggesting that, fior a// ive know, there are no secure 
foundations, it actually contains an ontological claim, namely that it is because. of the 
nalure of reason that objectivejustification is impossible. Reason, if it is to be consistent, 
has to affin-n that to choose either option would be actually irrational. Worse still, if we 
opt to deny both options as unjustified, and thus remain nominally rational and critical, 
we have nowhere to go. Philosophy is thus caught ]n anxiety over its fate, faced with its 
own nothingness. As Nietzsche suggested, the crucial aspect of nihilism is the 
meaninglessness that it finds in real -suffering. 
" 
The idea of a trap that confines thought is often evoked by Deleuze, with the 
implication that such traps arise because of the rules that govern an activity of thinking. 
A clue to how we can understand the trauma of reason as such a trap is offered by 
Andrew Cutrefello's use of a relevant Foucauldian notion, 'discipline', in examining the 
legitimacy of Kantian en ti qUes 16 The cenval tenet of the modem epistemological 
tradition, as previously discussed in Chapter One, is the idea of the self-iustification of 
E. g. Nietzschc. '1994. Ill. '08. For a different analysis of the a, "fccuvc aspects of nihilism in tcmis of an 
excess of "ovdcd-e. see Ansell-Pearson- 1999, p. 127. 1 
16 CUtrefel 10. )P cit.. esp. Chs. I &- 5 
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reason, which assumes that there is a distinction between knowledge and dogmatic belief. 
Kant's concept of a Dedukhon gives this notion its purest form. that of a legal or 
Juridical proof of objective entitlement derived as Cutrefello notes (cifini-I Dieter 
Henrick), from the real pracfices of German ju-ii, -! -. t--,, 
17 Cutrefello themafises this 
institutional connection in order to make plain that there is at the heart of Kant's project 
an unexamined prciefice of thought, that of legal justification. 
If Kantian philosophy presupposes the universality of certain forrns of experience 
and is thus circular, this is only a secondary phenomenon. It is heteronomous primarily 
because it models itself upon another practice that thus determines its own meaning. 
Philosophy has thus already accepted a method or set of procedural rules as given, rather 
than being truly self-legislating and autopomoti-s. "' Consequently it busic--s. itself with a 
tortuous and circular task without ever actually questioning the le itimacy of this task- as 
a proctice. In Foucauldiwi language, thought has been disciplina and has become 
dominated from Without. Discipline is a process whereby a body, the material and 
existential precondition of thoupJit, is 'trained' by historically specific practices which 
force its capacities to function according to certain babits and rules. There is, then, a 
producfive and reproducfive relafion here between a material ground that operates on 
bodies ('power) and thought, conducted through empirical practices. Once the capacities 
of bodies have been trained so as to render them harmless to and complicit with real 
structures of power,, The discipline exercised upon them becomes domination- 
Tlus kind of conception of domination also plays a role in Deleuze's work. A 
clearly delimited example of a technique of domination is desenbed in AO, Deleuze and 
Guattari's fierce enfique of the disciplinary force of psychoanalysis. [Jsing Gregorv 
Bateson's concept of 'double bind', they describe the wider socio-historical condifions 
within capitalist society that reproduce the underlying social structure by subjecting the 
17 Culrcfcllc). (1p. cn.. pp. 5 -6. CPuR A 84-5jB I 10- 
is CLtrefclio- ()p. c-il_ p. 8 &- Ch- 5. passim- 
91 
individual psyche to the Oedipus complex. The nature of these conditions need not 
concern us now. The structure they produce is more important for our parposes. this 
being the 'double bind' itself, a psychic. existential dilemma which forces the individual 
to accept that his/her very individuality depends upon the choice between the constraints 
on sexual desire that exist within the capitalist family (prohibitions on incest), and 
neurotic fantasies about breaking these taboos (AO 93-4/78-9). The dilemma is that even 
if one 'resolves' the Oedipus complex and avoids neurosis. one internalises the 
constimints on desire and thus reproduces the complex itself in a new mode, witli an 
extenial authotity-figure as object. 
Hence the problem of individual psychic development as constituted by capitalist 
society, the Oedipus complex itself and its resolution, sets up a situation similar to the 
classic prIsoner's dilemma. Either the individual accepts that the restrictions on desire are 
relevant to bim/ber and that sfhe is thereby guilty, tbus effectively affirming the 
irresolvability of the complex even as it is 'resolved', or one becomes neurotic. Neither 
option really resolves the problem, even though one i-nust be chosen, given that the 
structure of the capitalist family actively creates the complex itself. by subjecting desire 
to certain constraints. eitber it takes on incestuous foi-ms or it does not. 19 The siftiation is 
one where 
an alternafive, an exclusive disjuncfion is 
defined in ten-ns of a principle which, however, 
constitutes its two tenns or underlying wholes, and 
where the principle itself enters into the alternative 1 1. 
(AO 95/80) 
19 Sce also Bell, 1995ý p. I pp. 3,5-6. 
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The structure of this ongoing emotional crisis also recalls that of the trawna of 
reason: an irrational eboice between -two te, 11 s' or illusory solutions is rendered 
necessary by an underlying 'principle' - not a principle in the sense of an objecfive 
foundation, but rather aprm-lical imperafive of desire or a subjective presupposition. i. e.. 
a presupposition on the side of desire, that is merely given to desire. Here we can make a 
liný witb the trauma of reason. Psycbic identity is constituted via the imperative 
oedipal crisis of incestuous desire must be resolved', modern epistemology. epitomised 
by Kant, assumes that 'Reason must ustify its a priori employment. In either case, a set 
of practices, rules or procedures is given that must be mastered in order to resolve the 
problem. However, if one plays by the rules in accordance WA the 'principle', resolution 
actually becomes impossible, and the choice, together With the practice that forces it, is 
faced with a Crisis of meanim,. Given a capitalist familial structure, either another 
neurotic is produced, or Oedipus is internalised. (thus producing another neurotic who 
remains Within the Oedipal crisis). If that the practical imperative of foundationalism 
requires that we discover an objective foundation for the distinction between philosophy 
and dogmatism, the result of this imperative as it plays itself out is the trauma of reason: 
either reasoti (inconsistently) denies its own a priori validity, or it dogmatically asserts it 
(Ithus Simultaneously denying it). 
Delcuze and Guattaii remark, in a manner reminiscent of both Marx and 
Wittgenstein, that the oedipal problem 'is not resolved until we do away With both the 
problem and the solution' (AO 97/81). That is, the rules of the gaine must be refused 
outright, but in the narne of an alternative practice, in order to escape, as Cutrefello 
points out vNith respect to the prisoner's dileMMa, 20 Ln order to avoid Oedipus or the 
traw-na of reason, we require a new mode of desiring or thinking that does not fall victim 
to these double-binds. 'nus means that a new distinction between 'dogmatism' and 
'critique" is being suggested. What this might be. we. are not yet in a position to ýýce- The 
'(1 ()p. cii.. pp. 
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first step towards understanding Deleuze's version of this distinction will be to examine 
the practical elements of 'dogmatism', i. e., the rules of the foundationallst 'game5. 
66 iti) The Image Offhought 
For Deleuze, philosophical anxiety is a product of a dogmatic or heteronomous 
fon-n of philosoph that is no longer able to function (N 186/136). As we saw in the last .y 
section, this practical definition of heteronomy implies the unquestioninp, acceptatice of 
problems and methods that reflect those that define other practices. In this stress on the 
connection between the acceptance of problems from elsewhere and philosophical cnsis, 
Deleuze is, above alL Bergsoman ý2 
' For Deletwe, it is the history of pbjlosophy as a 
scholarly sub-discipline that works to reinforce and reproduce this state of heteronomy 
around the repetition of problems that are themselves never questioned - in fact, it is 
philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex' (N 14/5). This emphasis on the 
history of philosopby as a scholarly practice, ralber tban, say, a universal narrative of the 
'forgetting of Being' means that, as Foucault puts it, there is no 'great Repressed of 
Western philosophy' for Deleuze-, instead the history of philosophy is understood in 
relation to local, parti-Ja cornprornises agreed with forces that. seel- to 22 , to dominate thought. 
If pbilosophy unquestioningly takes Up pToblems that are nDt Its own, then 11 will 
develop an image of itself, of what it rneans to do philosophy, based on these problems. 
For example, we saw In the last section bow Cutrefello's reading of Foucault makes the 
link between jUndical practice and Kant's image of the 'tribunal' of philosophv: in this 
image, critique is divided against itself, being botb iudge and defendant. This image of 
thought (DR 172/133 1) fornis the basis of the unquestioned practical imperative that 
21 Scý: Be, g-, ni. ) 9(-ýO. 105. 
22 Foucault. 1970- 890-A 72. modified. 
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drives a heteronomous philosophy. and the rules that it gives itself The history of 
philosophy, in Deleuze's view, functions to consolidate this image of thought as an 
imagined timeless essence of philosophy that is subject to ininor vanafion throughout its 
bistory, as the basic problems of pbIlosopby are subjected to different treatments and 
different solutions are proposed. In this way, philosophy is reproduced as an actual. 
empiric practice that is defined by certain subjective (i. e., on the side of thought. ) 
presuppositions (DR 169/129)., which philosophy reflects back to itself in an illusory 
image of its timl-Iless essence. 
What are these presuppositions? Deleuze characterises his thought as 
'transcendental empiricism' (DR 79-80/56-7). which already contains echoes of 
23 Schelling'. --r- philosophical ern-piric. 11. Aga] i is a complex term that needs in, this 
unpacking. In the present context, it is enough to note that 'empinclsm' here means that 
the subjective presuppositions of a philosophical elho. v or practice are to be discovered in 
its empirical products, i. e., philosophical texts. In this way, the real, i. e., the practical 
preconditions of a form of philosophical experience or consciousness will be laid bare. 
Although Deleuze produces differing empirical analyses of the same philosophical 
practices throughout his career, the idea of an essentially invariant and reproductive 
image of thought reinforced as an 'essential' elhos by the history of philosophy remains a 
self. 
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constant, its continumg i mportance di-rectly, affLrmed by Deletwe him, 
Dunng the late 60s, Deleuze identifies this ethos in DR and LS as 'Platonism'. He 
suggests that there is within Plato's philosophy a moment where the practical imperative 
that pbilosopby will subsequently consolidate as its essential or transcendent image of 
itself can be discerned clearly (DR 82-3/59), and related to other practices. 2- ý Plato's 
philosophy takes up a specifically political problem, which Nve could relate to the 
: ý; Sec Baugh, 1993, P. 26 and Boundas. 1996. p. S 7. 
74 ge of thought'- see Martin- 1993- 'Uttre-PrUace dc Gilles Delcu/c- - r) On the importance of the 'ima 
25 On Deleuz. c and Plato- see also Patton, 1994 
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instability in Athens following ffie Pelopponesian War. This concerns the mediation of 
competing claims on authority within the polis, and desires an ultimate and universal 
standard by wbicb the validity of such claims can be measured. Plato's philosophy takes 
up this problem, binding the destiny of thought to the task of differentiating good claims 
from bad ones, and thus securely distinguishing the meantngs of 'pure' and 'Impure'. 
'authentic' and 'inauthentic' (LS 293/254). The Platonic imperative, which already 
suggests the need for a foundationalist method, reflects the assumption that the most 
desirable State would be one wbere individuals., instead of being free to usurp power 
through violence or cunning, are allocated the roles they are nattirally or essentjalýy sUIted 
to. 
Plato's philosophy thus simultaneously transforms this political problem into one 
that exists for pure thought whose eros is supposedly directed Iowards that which is 
unchanging, universal, and therefore the highest object of desire, the Good itself as a 
higher ontological unity. In this way, the political project receives legitimation fTorn the 
-I- philosopher, the friend (phdos) of wisdom, who claims access, through his mental 
discipline, to that which alone is truly transcendent and foundational, above the 
distinctions and confusions of polis and pkvsis. For Deleuze, Platonic philosophy thus 
claims the right to survey the field of contesting claims and gather them, placing them, 
together with the particular desires to which they give expression, in hierarchical order, 
according to bow close they approacb to the universa the model of whicb they are only 
more or less exact copies. Platonic dialectic is the method by which claims are related to 
the specific Idea Oustice, love etc. ) they refer to., and by which questions such as 'who is 
the true loverT and 'who is the true statesmanT can be answered. The Idea has a positive 
ontological status: the copies refer to their model on the basis of their actual 
participation in its being. Only Justice is fimly jusL but the vanous claimants who 
contend for the position of Judge each possess the quality of being-just In varY. Ing 
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degrees, a distribufion that is decided according to the content of their claims. and what 
this reveals about their way of life or elhos (DR 84-5/60, LS 293-4/2-53-4). 
Platonic philosophy is thus defined as a practice by a political problem which it 
accepts, and in ten-ns of wbieb it imagines itself In reflecting on the possibility of a real, 
stable political unity that would be governed according to a higher criterion, it imagines 
itself as a search for that which is genuinely trmscendent, a puTe unity of thought and 
being that is known as such and which can thus function as a foundation, a criterion for 
jud&g contending claims. In this way, Platomc thou; gbt 'borrows its properly 
philosophical image from the State as beautiful, substantial or subjective interionty', and 
thus 'invents a properly spiritual State, like an absolute State' (D 20/11). Later., Deleuze. 
and Guattari call this Platonic and foundationalist image that of 'State philosophy',, 
whieb is 'capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by ngbý of elevating 
the State to the level of de jure universality' (TP 465,1375). This illusory meaning of 
. -. 
L 
philosopbical activity is thus forced upon tbougbt, and interionsed by it. 
This 'forcing' is important; the adoption of an image of thought is not just an 
arbitrary decision by a thinker,, an implicitly autonomous (and thus transcendent) subject., 
but is forced by the relation between thought and other practices extant within a society, 
a relation which is mediated by the body of the thinker. Hence the notion of habit is 
central for Deleuze. Bodies are educated or trained by forces, a process in which 
fimctional habits that are needed to regulate humans Within a unitary social order are 
26 
inculcated . This, for Deleuze as 
for Nietzsche and Bergson, is as true of the discursive 
faculties and consciousness as mueb as it is of the non-discursive faculties of sensibility,, 
intuitioti and imagination (DR 128-9/96-7). With respect to Platonic philosophy, the 
training of the body of the philosopher is also bound up with political interests. The 
nnlifical desire for the State is realised in physical forms that imply specific spatio- 
temporal relations between the body and its environment (TP 483-4/388-9). The physical 
26 Cf Nietzschc. op. cit., 11. §sý 1.16. 
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space Of ffie P(diS is consolidated as a geometrical space of extension, a diVIsIble unity 
defined by the city's limits, which acts as a material boundary of inclusion for the 
citizens (TP 483-4/388-9). The citizens themselves are distfibuted within the polis 
according to a process of division that assigns them subordinate unities or territories 
within the city (DR 53-4/36). Time in turn is administered in terms of space as a divisible 
unity, and thus subordinated to it. Means of measuring time depend upon a linear and 
iffeversible model of the repetition or addition of smallest units defined by movement in 
an extended space between two fixed points (DR 367/287; B 7-8/18-19,22-3,13 1 ). 
The role of Platonic philosophy is, in essence, to secure the best division of the 
establisbed space and time of the polis: Plato's dialectic, for example, attempts to 
establish differences within an undifferentiated yet divisible material unity, the polis as a 
mass of people (TP 484/389; DR 82-4/59-60), according to the natuTes of classes of 
people and their proximity to an Idea... differences which then form, for example, the 
basis forprescriptions concerning the general administration of tasks within the polis and 
in particular, the organisation of work. In this way, the rules that govem Platonic thougfit q 
will be fimctions of the "sedentary' (DR 54/36) spatio-temporal conditions of pbySlca] 
existence within the polis. In this way, the practice of philosophy is formed through the 
training of the body. Deleuze th-us posits a genetic relation between certain forms of 
practice (such as the ordering of space and time) and others (such as Platonic 
philosophy). Hence a heteronomous philosophy's unquestionmig aeceptance of certain R] 
problems imphes a cluster of pre-existing practices that consfitute the real and 'objective' 
(i. e., external to thougbt) preconditions of this pbilosopby's image of tbougbt (its 
subjective presuppositions), and which inscribe a habitual orientation upon thought. 
The dogmatic image of thought is constituted by a set of rules, the 'institutions' of 
the spiritual State, which are subject to modification, yet derive from the same condition, 
the presence of a problern that thought does not set for itself. In DR Deleuze extracts the 
basic fon-ns of these rules from Aristotle rather than Plato, gl*ven that Aristotle 
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consolidates die doWatic image for thought by intellectuali sing it. For Deleuze, 
Aristotle's criticisms of Plato centre on the perceived inadequacy of the Idea as a ground 
of difference. The allocation of degrees of participation in the Idea is based on an 
esoteric insigbt expressed by a myth of metempsychosis (DR 85-6/61. LS 293-4/254-5), 
in which the souls of the various claimants approach or recede from the perfection of the 
Idea according to their eihos in life. When it is asked wlýy a given claimant is assigned a 
particular rank, only a circular justi fication can be given, one which relates the hierarchy 
in the polis to the mythological heavenly order. The polis should., according to the 
Platonist, reflect the ideal, substantial, spiritual State, and thus reallse its essential relation 
to the ground of its being. 
Against this concept of division, the Aristotelian notion of contrariety is an attempt 
to give, in every case, a reason for the differences between entities, namely a genus 
within which species cati be defined as contraries: e. g., the genus 'animal', specified as 
'with feet' and 'with wings' (DR 45-6/30). 'llie ground of difference is thus to be found 
in the intellect. However, this completes the col()Msafion of thought begun by Plato, by 
making the 'spiritual State' completely internal to thought, rather than positing it as 
dependent on an unaccountable intuition. Aristotle thus presupposes and reinforces the 
subjective presuppositions of the dogmatic image, demonstrating that the role and 
definition of the State within thought is the same as that of the State per se: the 
conservabon of away of being (DR 172-3/1-')2; TP 441/357) 
Deleuze analyses these subjective presuppositions of thought as follows. The 
po itical problem of turning the indeterminate mass of people into a self-sufficient unity Fýl 
is reflected in the philosophical State by the assumption that 'thinking is the natural 
exercise of a faculty, and that this faculty is possessed of a good nature and a good Will' 
(DR 173/132). Everyone can think, and this means that everyone essentially thinks in the 
same way,; this presupposition implies that thought is the source of true unity, and that it 
possesses by right an affinity with the universal, the unchanging, the true. Therefore 
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everyone is inherently a theoros. The virtuous eros of pure thought, its affinity and desire 
for the universal, is reflected in its good sense (bon sens) and common vense (., wnx 
commun), the French senv here designating both a mental faculty and a direction of 
activity common to all minds, a supposedly universal context or horizon of meaning (DR 
171-2/131). 
When thought conceives of an object, it is determined by two assumptions: that 
this object would be conceivable for any other thinker (good sense) and that it is 
conceivable in the same way, or is essentially the same for any thinker (common sense). 
The harmony of these two practices, which constitutes the general form of the activity of 
State-philosophy, is recognifion- good sense in reciprocity with common sense, as when 
one greets firiends, engages in debate, or advances a claim to be judged (DR 174-7/113- 
5). Recognition assumes that individual experiences are representative of the universal or 
essential character of expenence. Recognition itself takes place within an encompassing 
horizon of thought. Platonism assumes an external and an internal essential form of 
unity, 'the Wbole as the final ground of being or all-encompassing borizon. and the 
Sub ect as the principle that converts beinge into being-for-us' (TP 469/379), with the i 
latter deriving its affinity for the former from the virtuous eros of thougbt. Tbese forms 
define a milieu. co-extensive with cosmos and polis, in which State-philosophy can be 
practiced, that of represenlation, which is the fonn of philosophical consciousness as 
such, governed by four principles that make it possible to construct determinate relations 
of difference and identity between the object and the subject exterior and interior. 
First and foremost, the identity qf the concept, the unity of the thinking subject as 
such. Like Kant's unity of apperception., this reflects a fimdarnental fonmal integrity of 
the subject which, for Platonism, is a necessary condition of any discursive thought prior 
to the work of common sense and good sense (Deleuze does not consider this a 
fundamental condition of any thought, as we shall see tn the next chapter). Oppovilion 
makes possible the determination of the empty concept via the differentiation and 
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comparison of possible predicates and their opposites, and regulates the faculty of 
imagination. Analogv allows the faculty of judgement to deten-nine objects with 
concepts, by making possible the apprehension of the difference-in-identity that 
charactenses synthetic knowledge- the object is and is not identical to the concept. 
Finally, the resemblance of the object with respect to itself, its continuity across time, is a 
necessary condition of the application of concepts to objects (DR 44-5/29,49-5 1 /331 -4, 
179-80/137-8,337/262). 
For Deleuze, the model of representation can be clearly discerned beneath 
Aristotle"s notion of contrwiety. I'lie specification of real differences can only take place 
according to the principle of contrariety (perfect opposition), and this only within the 
identity of a higher concept, the genus., a third term that establishes the ground of 
difference for its species: birds and men are different insofar as they are both animals 
(DR 45-9/30-3). Whereas the Platonic mode of determining difference is circular, 
esoteric and 'capncious' (DR 83/59), the Aristotelian mode affirms the real autonomy of 
rational tbought by making the identity of the finite, determinate concept into the ground 
of difference. This complete internalisation of the State is a more efficient means of 
regulation, as it means that thought will not only denounce bad claims that destabilise the 
unity of the polis, but will also police itself, and become engrossed in its own intemal 
dramas, sucb as periodic epistemological crises that render it temporarily unable to 
function: minor double-binds that act as blockages. In this way, it will eventually come to 
write its own history, or rather. what amounts to the history of its uncritical compromises 
withexisting practices, of its heteronomy and don-fination. 
The type of dogmatism Deleuze finds in Plato and Aristotle constitutes an organk 
form of representation (DR 44/29), part of an ethos of contemplation (WP 11 /6-7, 
21/15). This specificity of the eihos constitutes its historical concreteness as a unique 
forin of compromise. Contemplation is a meta-physics: it assumes that it has an esential 
affinity with, and thus possesses as its object, the real ground of all real difference within 
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the pkvsis or physical universe. This ground cannot be part of the universe, and is thus 
Posited as transcending its tangled distinctions and confused mixtures. Platonism thus 
posits its relation to this universal, its idenfity with IL as being beyond space and time. 
We now need to explicitly relate this analysis of the dogmatic image of Platonic, 
foundationalist philosophy to the traurna of reason. For Deleuze, the Christian era, within 
which modern philosophy is firmly rooted, sees the image of thought's outline shift, as 
the form of the identity of thought and being that it presupposes changes from 
contemplative identity to reflective identity,, moving from the relative priOnty of the 
object and the finite concept, to that of the subject and the infinite concept (WP 11/6-7). 
Reflection as the new elhos of Platonism unplies a cbange in the practice of pbilosopby. 
This is brought about by a consciousness of the separation of thought from the universal 
that has to be overcome. Cartesian doubt, as a variation on this ethos, presupposes a 
representational consciousness structured according to a presentation of a unified space 
and time, con-n-non sense and good sense (as presuppositions of the sceptical metbod), 
and the postulates of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance. But now knowledge 
has to be guaranteed by the subject itself as a ground of reflection, in relation to both a 
subjective ground of certainty (the cogilo) that provides unchanging and transcendent 
formal criteria for objective knowledge of the woTld through reason alone ('clarity' and 
'distinctness'), and an objective ground of being that acts as an unchanging and 
transcendent real criterion for this knowledge and is thus the true universal (God). 
It is clear, I think that in the post-Enlightenment period, the difference between 
subjective certainty and objective truth is explicit for Fichte and Scbelling, who 
distInguish between formal and material criteria of truth. The distinction of reason 
between these criteria has to be reduced to an identity, and this is supposed to take place 
via an intellectual journey. wbich begins by reflecting upon the fonnal ground of 
o turn o via certainty undastood as a postulated matenal ground, and then attempts t re t it i 
a well-marked circular path upon which all the forms of knowledge are encounteredL thus 
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-I- snowing it to be the true universal. The formal departure point is defined by a moment of 
absolute experience (common sense) that connects the finite subject to its absolute 
precondition, the foundation of the difference or mediation that charactenses 
representative consciousness. 'I'lie moment wben the circle is closed, bowever. is always 
postponed, because the difference between the necessarily transcendent ground 
(Tathandlung or Absolute Identity) and that which it is the foundation of is in practice 
infinite. That the foundation can be known as the ground of all actual experience, the true 
universal, can only be presupposed and not proven. 
The trawna of reason arises in relation to Schelling's philosophy when we realise 
that negative philosopby cannot make the connection between the transcendent self- 
identical ground and real difference without a practice of affimnation that actually makes 
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Knowledge of sueb a connection ImposSible. 'Me intellectual Intuition or experience of a 
rational Absolute which is presupposed as the inner, common sense (meaning and 
direction) of representational consciousness cannot ground the deten-ninate differences 
that are subsequently deduced 'from' it. Both the Fichte of the WLnm and (more 
radically) the later Scbelling inadvertently sbow that a purely transcendent, self-identical 
univers9 cannot serve as a sufficient ground of diffirrence even though, if philosophy 
exists, it must presuppose that it is a sufficient ground of difference. Tbc modem 
Platonic project of justification must therefore fail. The real existence of the true 
universal (the rational Absolute) and reason's knowledge of it, can only ever be 
presupposed rather than know-n- Philosophy thus ffices the double-bind of the trauma of 
reason, whicb from Deleuze's point of view would be a trap prepared for it by its ero. v 
for the universal. 
This desire for the true universal, in which all differences are unified and which 
can tbus serve as the ground of difference, is related by Deleuze, as we saw, to a political 
project. This desire stems from a problem which is forced upon thought by other 
practices, and which it then transforms, creating a heteronomous philosophical practice. 
103 
In this way, Platonism or fbttndationallsniý as the dominant tradition of Western 
philosophy, assumes that the destiny of thought is to detein ine the essentia timeless and 
transcendent meaning of the universal. In relation to other disciplines, philosophy sees 
itself as setting out to give final unity to burnan knowledge, by detennining the 
transcendent meanin& the Truth, of what is. Deleuze, following Bergson, enticises 
Platonism, not for being a 'bad claimant' with regard to its conception of the True, but 
for begmnmg with a problem which is SIMply assumed to be universally relevant, the 
problem of problemS. 27 It is fliis pToblem flud, along with its various solutions, Deleuze 
will try to 'do away with' (AO 94/8 1). 
The traumas that Platonic/foundationalist tbought undergoes are not wholly 
accidental. They result from an illusion within thought that for Deleuze, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, is a transcendental illusion (one immanent to ontological conditions of 
determination). This illusion, which marks the sens (meaning/direction) of Platonist 
thought arises fi-om the 'social problern' that defines Platonism, and is an illusion of 
thought's transcendence. That is to say, Platonism seeks the true, timeless Universal that 
will act as a foundation for all knowledge of real difference. Because this searcb will 
define philosophy as the discipline that unifies all human knowledge, Platonism thus 
assumes a) that thought's true essence and meaning is to seek this Universal within itself, 
and b) that thought thus always already dwells implicitly within this Universal. For 
example, Descartes constructs a method in order to reach the universat but the method 
. presupposes 
that a medium of universal common sense (innate ideas) exists. Kant already 
proposes that the transcendental method of critique Will show that pure reason has a right 
to claim objective a priori knowledge, but he also presupposes that the tr-anscendental 
method is itself de. jure. universal, given as such within the medium of common sense. 
27 BergSon. 1962. pp. 355-6. 
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The content or meaning of the Universal will thus secure the horizon of meaning 
embodied in the presupposition of a common sense. 28 
This means that Platonic thought is subject to a constraining double movement. 
wbicb is exemplified by the Ficbtean and Sebellingian systems. in particular, Scbelling's 
system shows an appreciation of this double movement as a necessity for thought 
(though Deleuze would ask for what kind of practice this movement becomes necessary). 
As we saw M Chapter Two, Schelling's Philosophy of Identity recognised that the 
ultimate presupposition of all knowledge was the immediate unity of knower and known, 
which in itself could be reduced to neither subject nor ob ect (WS 137/141,145-6/146). j 
I his unity itself bas to be postulated as inberently rational, i. e., as an ontological unity 
that is also an immediate knowledge, a blind certainty. However, as we also saw, this 
postulated foundation could not be posited as simply rational. In fact, if the Absolute was 
neither subject nor object its content was also neither simply rational nor simply 
irrational. I'lic task Scbelling undertook in bis middle period was thus to demonstrate that 
this Absolute had an inherent tendency to become more and more rational through 
positing itself But this tendency itself was presupposed in positing the Ungnind as 
divine love. Schelling's prqjectý to prove that reason could know ffie Absolute foundation 
of experience., the true Universal, eventually inadvertently demonstrated that reason 
could only ever presuppose this knowledge and could neier prove it. Foundationalism 
has to presuppose that the timeless essence of thought is to know the universal. It cannot 
show that this is the case, for thought's search for the universal - the unity of all 
distinctions - within itself presupposes the reality of the distinction between thought 
and its implicit essence (its real unity with what is). The reality of this distinction is what 
foundationallst tbougbt cannot itself account for, even v"th Teference to Scbelling's 
Absolute, All it can do is illegitimately posit that this distinction is a necesswy 
28 Cf. Hei&v_,, m's presentation of -mctaphýsjcs' as the inquiry %khich dismers only bý anticipating 
(vorm-cgnehmen), 1976, p. 108. 
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consequence of the Absolute, as when Sebelling posits a concephial 'first creation' as the 
basis of deten-nination. But this positing of the distinction as necessary can only be 
circular and hence subjective. 
To reiterate, for Deleuze such traps result from the illusions of transcendence that 
ebaracterise foundationallst thought. As we have just seen. the pnmarv aspect of such 
illusions is to posit an essential, timeless inner resemblance between that which is to be 
conditioned, i. e., the real distinctions within the physis and polis, and that which is to act 
as the foundation of these distinctions, proViding an explanation of their possibility (LS 
128/105). The foundation is thus posited as the substantial aspect of these distinctions, 
securing them within itself and abiding immanently within them in their real 
separateness. But all that this means is that a transcendent condition has been posited 
whose only content is the distinctions with which we are already familiar- Its only 
additional determination is formal- it is a "higber' unity of these distinctions. If it 
possesses withiti itself an inherent real tendency to give nse to these distinctions, this 
itself bas to be presupposed, as was sbown by Scbelhng's identification of the possible 
(the 'first civation') and actual dialectics of the Absolute's self-determination. 
The crucial aspect of the illusion of transcendence for Deleuze is the way in which 
it posits the Universal as a reflection of real practices. These practices are those real, 
habitual modes of being that regulate the behaviour of human being as social habits, such 
as common sense and recognition, the harmOnlous functioning of intuition, memory and 
thought that allows us to identify the swne objects at different fimes. Such habits are not 
innate, but are inculcated in us by flie material limits of our social existence. Opinion and 
judgement, practices that seek to detem ine what the meanings of these unitary objects 
really are, follow in the wake of recognition, regulated by common sense and the 
principles of representation. Platonic philosophy thus abstracts from these habits the 
Universal as that which is meant to perfectly regulate opinion, Judgement and 
recognition. In this way. bad opinions and bad judgements can be distinguished from 
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good ones according to a timeless, invariable standard. The transcendent Universal is 
thus an imagined pure case of recognition on the part of a virtuous thinker who attends to 
thought itself in order to trace the Universal Within it and discover its essential 
determinations. 
For Descartes, the Universal was God conceived as the real ground of being and 
knowledge, a role secured for the concept of God by analogical argument. God is the 
supreme being and real ground because his nature is infinitely per&ct. In other words, he 
possesses in an eminem sense real finite qualities whieb denve their meaning from 
familiar opinions, such as goodness, wisdom and power, and it is this eminence of God's 
nature that makes him God (SP 45-6/54-5,60-2/70-3). For Kant the Universal was the 
transcendental subject, whose determinations (such as the categories and forms of 
intuition) reflected the most general constituents of our received opinions about the 
nature of experience. This subject thus represented a tautological, formal abstraction 
from Newtonian science and Christian morality, an 'originary consciousness' at the base 
of consciousness (LS 128/105). 
These elements of eminence and tautology represent respectively the essential 
difference of the Universal from that wbicb it conditions and its essential identity With it. 
This equivocal sense of the Universal is best expressed by Fichte's Absolute Subject, 
indeed., it is just this equivocation that Jacobi, H61derlin and Schelfing reproach him for. 
The Tathandlung is postulated as a) an absolute and thus self-producing act, and b) as 
subjective. T'his, however, is impossible, for to be subjective implies self-consciousness 
over against an object, and this is a conditioning relation. The Talhandlung is thus 
postulated as both unconscious (self-producing or erninent) and conscious (self-knowing 
or tautological). This equivocal definition is also present in Schelling's definition of the 
Absolute as the already rational unity of all difference, for if Schelling's project is to 
succeecl, the Absolute has to be both a 'higher' Absolute. essentially neither rational nor 
irrational, and a predominantly rational Absolute. This requirement of thinking the 
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Absolute as simultaneously radically different from and identical With the field of 
experience also means that Sebelling's project must fail, however. as we saw. 
Ilie abstraefion that charactefises Platonism/foundationalism is thus a supreme 
analoff posited between the Universal and that which it is meant to condition, the real 
differences that make up the world. In this way, the transcendent Universal is posited as 
immanent in the conditioned while still transcending it: like Sebelling's Absolute, it 
posits itself in finite things while remaimm, above them as their eminent foundation. But 
this relation is only presupposed, being secured only by the tautology that is also posited 
between condition and conditioned- the Absolute always already contains lust those 
deten-ninations that we are familiar with, and thus fori-nally justifies tbeir possibility, but 
leaves the real ground of their necessity still to be discovered- The fact that for Platonism 
the stress is on the tautological aspect makes the analogy between condition and 
conditioned a bad one. The problem that we discovered in Kant's philosophy, the merely 
formal tracing of the conditions of experience that assumes the universality of a 
definifion of experience ('psychologism'), is discovered by Deleuze to be a recurrent 
problem for the dominant tradition of philosophy. There is always an internal relation of 
unity being posited between a transcendent Universal and that which it is supposed to 
condition, sucb that the content of the Universal only repeats that of 'received opinion', 
the product of given, empirical practices that goes unquestioned by Platonism. In the next 
chapter, we will see bow Deleuze makes and justifies a distinction between this illusoiN 
belief or dogmatism and a non-illusory critique or philosophy, without making a similar 
move himself In this way, the ethos of Deleuzean 'Enligbtem-nent' will be distinguished 
r-. - from the heteronomous, unenlightened dogmatism of Platonism, which cannot 
acknowledge its own lack of transcendence, i. e., the degree to which it is genetically 
related to the disciplining of bodies and of thought. 
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Chapter Four 
n-1- , emuze and the Absolute 
i) Inlroduclkm 
At the beginning of the previous chapter, I noted that for Deleuze- as for 
Foucault, understanding modernity or Enlightenment philosophically becomes. not a 
matter of defining a historical evoch containing, specific modes of reflection upon the 
timeless problems of philosopby, but one of reafising an eihos, practice or 'attitude' 
defined over against other elhoi, Predominant among which Is 
Platonism/foundationalism. This indicates a refusal of any timeless essential and 
universal meaning that has been posited for philosophy, with the consequence that that 
the task of 'modern philosophy' is the renverwmenl of Platonism (IDR 82/59, LS 
292/253). On the one hand, renversement means 'overturnlin"'. This is the task taken up 
by Deleuze in his analyses of the dogmatic lynage of thought, showing how Platonism 
can be referred back to subjective presuppositions (Internal to thouglit) and okiectiN, e 
presuppositions (external to tboug-bt) tbat, as components of practices, i-ernain 
unadch-essed within it., given that it assumes itself to be a transcendent practice capable of 
seeing, into what is. Remersement also means 'inversion', however. Deleuze's procedure 
of inverting Platonism will be traced in this chapter, in order to show how he redefines 
the task of pbilosopby in terms of non-Illusory problems witbout appealing to a 
transcendent foundation in order to justifY this redefinition. Against the model of 
education appealed to by the Enlightenment, in which a mind is putified of its illusory 
opinions about the world in order to reach the genuine Universal, the foundation of true 
knowledge, Deleuze constructs a model of training or apprenticeship designed to reshape 
the meaning and onentation (sens) of the subject and thus overcome habituated modes of 
thinking that are implicated in nihilism, The loss of all meaning, for philosophical thinking 
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that is experienced in the traurna of reason. Deleuze thus aims to restore meaning to this 
4suffienng' of tbought. 
This chapter will thus show how, even though he provides (as we saw) an 
account of the real, genetic grounds of the illusions that define Platonism, Deleuze does 
not simply repeat Marx's mistake, by relying in this account on a presupposed and 
unprovable definition of a buman essence, and tbus on a 'knowing before knowing'. On 
the contrarv, Deleuze, M his inversion of Platonism, remains true to Schellitig's MsMhts 
into the impossibility of foundational philosophy. MoreoveT, his Bei-gsonian and 
Nietzschean reinventioti of philosophical modernity is consonant with certain tendencies 
within Schelling's own thinking of the Absolute, which I shall draw out in order to 
understand Deleuze's notion of immanence, which is no lon. per defined as the identity of 
being and thought in knowledge. In this way, we shall progress towards an understanding 
of the distinction Deleuze draws between dogmatism and genuine philosophy, illusory 
and non-illusory modes of thought. 
ii) Towards Thinking Absolute Difference 
The key to my interpretation of Deleuze is the conViction that, with bim, 
philosophy returns to the Absolute in order to distinguish doginatism, with its concern 
for the transcendent Universal, from philosophy. It is this attention to a theme that is 
often understood by 20"' century philosophy to bea mvorn-ouft notion that allows Deleuze 
to carry out a radical excavation of the presuppositions of philosopby. In addition, bow 
the Absolute or unconditioned has to be thought in order to 'modemise' and restore 
meaning to philosof)by is, as I Will sbow, a constant concern. In sboNVIng tbis, I voll draNN 
on various sources, ranging from his early work on Bergson where lie first announces 
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that '[tlbe Absolute is difference' (B 27/35) to his final published essay on the meaning 
of the notion of absohite immanence, developed wM Guatt--M. ' 
I referred previously to Deleuze's thought as 'trwiscendental empiricism', and to 
the positing of a transcendent Universal as the foundation of real difference as the 
primary "transcendental illusion' of Platonism. The sense of 'empiricism' was related to 
Deleuze's investigation of actual philosophical pmctices which allowed him to define 
Platonism. What, though, does 'transcendental' mean in these two expressions? In the 
first case, it does not, as with Kant, refer to that wbieb is the essential condition of the 
possibility of experience and which can thus be known as such independently of 
experience. Instead, it refers to those conditions of experience which thought must 
presuppose as real but also as being, actually incommensurable With thoughtý and yet 
whicb tbought must try to tbink (its 'objective presuppositions). Here, a fin-n connection 
with Schelling's concept of a 'higher' Absolute, irreducible to our concept of it, can be 
made. In the second case, 'transcendental' reflects the Kantian sense, thougb modified 
through a reading of Berpon, pertaining to a tendency within the real conditions of 
experience to give rise to illusions within thought. Transcýmdental empincism, as it has 
the goal of dispelling Illusion, Will as we see constitute a kind of absolute knowledge, 
thougb in a very special sense, wbicb owes more to Bergson than to Schelling. 
Like Marx's analysis of bourgeois philosophy, Deleuze's attack on Platonism 
accuses it of reversing an actual, empirical relation. If Platonism, in positing the 
Universal as the object of a privileged thoughtý thus abstracts its obiect from real 
practices of judgernent, inion and reco nition that regulate life within the secure, OPI 9111 
sedentary bounds of the polis, it ignores, for Deleuze, the real conditions of expenence, 
which are themselves incommensurable with Platonic thought defined above all by the 
subjective presupposition of the identity of the concept with being. These real conditions 
are thus defined by their dt&rence from the regulated thinking of Platonism. Deleuze 
' Sec IL 3-4i3-4 (on the diffcrcnec bct, %vocn immancncc and transccndcncc as a djffcrcncc bctx,, -ccn 
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thus claims that they are real differences that are transcendentally prior to the Platonic 
image of thought, in that they can explaln the genesis of such practices. and thus account 
for real fonns of experience. To asswne that these differences are reducible to being 
thought in terms of the identitv of the concept, which seeks to regulate difference within 
the polis so as to secure its overall unity, is the fundamental subjective assumption of 
Platonism, which is incarnated in the positing of a Universal. Of course, Deleuze's claim 
itself appears simply a presupposition at this stage. We will now examine how he 
attempts to show that it is more than just an assumption, beginning by returning to 
Schelling's 'hi p-her' Absolute, throuA Deleuze's late di stinction in II. between 'relative' 
and 'absolute' immanence. This attempt will require that these real conditions, which are 
suppressed by Platonism. are made into the positive basis of a new image of thougk not 
as knowledge of a Universal, but as creenjon. For Deleuze, it is only througb sucb a 
positive mversion of Platonism that a true c-Tifique of it can- be cons"cted. 2 
Deleuze's critical distinction between 'relative' and 'absolute' immanence 0L 3- 
4/3-4) distinguishes two fonns of philosophical tbinking of the relation between thoup-bt 
and being: on the one band, the immanence of the transcendent, and on the other 
immanence 'in itself, which 'is not in something, not to something' 0L 4/4)- The first, 
Platonic form, seeks the Universal that is to serve as the ground or explanans of 
difference. This ground is therefore posited as being immanent in or to what it 
conditions, i. e., real difference, while nevertheless subsisting bevond it. Kant's 
transcendental subject is immanent to the empirical, expeniential medlwn of 
representational consciousness, and yet cannot itself be experienced. Schelling's 
Absolute expresses itself in the determinations of its finite and infinite potencies, yet it 
remains in-itself or essentially neither one nor the other of these potencies (AW 34/1261). 
For Deleuze, even I-leidegger does not escape this illusion, for lie relies on the notion of a 
pre-ontological understanding of Being (DR 169/120- 188 fn. /321 n. 11). In each case, 
unconditioned and conditioned). 
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the condition is posited in an equivocal relation with the world that we experience as a 
differentiated manifold, i. e., as simultaneously separated from and immanent in it. 
Looking back on the issue of the consistency of historical versions of critique, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it seems that we can say that in a eeneral theoretical 
sense, critique after Kant came to refer to the practice of demonstrating the dependence 
of a deten-nination that bad been posited as absolute upon a -around of explanation, an 
objective presup ii . position with greater or more general explanatory power. 
For example, 
in evistemol%, -y Jacobi, H61derlin and Schelfing showed that Fichte's Tathandlung was a 
priori dependent upon a more comprehensive unity. In political economy, Marx showed 
that bourgeois economic theory was dependent upon specific empirical social 
fonnations, and that a history of these formations could be constructed on the basis of a 
general anthropology. The inconsistency of this foundational model of critique lies, for 
Deleuze, in its repefifion of a basic illusion of transcendence. In this way, the cnfique of 
one fon-n of thought by another operates by demonstrating that the principle adopted by 
the fon-n to be critiqued is itself based upon distinctions that it cannot explain, as is 
c1mly the case with Fichte's Tathandlung. The discoveiy of a new pnnciple is meant to 
undercut the old principle by accounting for its determination and relation to those 
deten-ninations that condition it, as when Schellinp, posits the Absolute as neither 
subjective nor objective, yet as expressing itself (somehow) in both. For Deleuze, 
however, the universality of this principle in relation to real difference is in every case 
only assumed and cannot be justified or proven- This is another way of expressing 
Schelling's insight that the essential connection between the Absolute and our 
experience is a matter of faith rather than of demonstration. Such a foundationalist 
principle can, for Deleuze, only be an illusion, the result of abstracfion from accepted 
pracfices: these pre-philosophical presuppositions thus ive form to philosophical 91 
thought, and tio-ra becomes reflected as ur-dava (DR 175-6,1134). 
See Hm-dt- 1991- ;, -sp. pp. xm-x% iii. 
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Deleuze aims, like Marx's critique of the model of exchange proVided by 
bourg, eois political economy, to explain the fact that an abstraction has been posited. In 
this sense, he seems to approach the model of critique just discussed- in aiming to 
explain the determination of a practice. However. the 'gound' he appeals to does not 
imply the Presupposition of a Universal that somehow enfolds or subsumes the 
determination of that which it is meant to explain by transcending it. The difference 
between his critique and this 'relative' mode lies, as we shall see, in his conception of the 
relation between real difference and thought, which does not presuppose that thought, 
thanks to its sup sedly unique identitv with being, is capable of transcending difference f PO 
towards that wbicb, remaining eternay independent of difference, contains it in its 
totality. 
Although Platonism is that ethos of thought that in affirming certain problems, 
drives the history of Western philosophy and thus dominates OUT image of what 
6philosophy' means, Deleuze refuses to posit philosophy as such as monolithically 
dogmatic. He is enthusiastic about an alternative tradition, including Lucretius, Spinoza, 
Hurne, Nietzsche and Bergson (N 14/6) who manage to resist thinking grounds in terms 
of their relative immanence, and instead promote a different image of thought, which 
affirms the centrality of the problem, not of knowing, but of creation. These are thinkers 
who do not adopt an illusory image of thought from pre-philosophical eihoj and model 
concepts upon it, rather. they invent concepts that are not posited as transcending 
difference, but as following its real articulations, as being absoluleiv immanent. 
For Deleuze, thinkers who are otherwise Platonic in the extreme occasionally 
achieve such conceptual invention. An example is the 'pure and empty fonn of firne, the 
medium of the Kantian ego's empirical self-perception, which ensures that the 
transcendental ego and empirical ego can never be identical in and for consciousness 
(DR 81-2/58,116-8/85-7, KP vii-viii. SQ 219-30). Another such, even more emphatic 
case, I would suggest, would be Schelling's vision of the 'higher' Absolute. Mv 
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discussion in Chapter Two of the 'two Absolutes' in Schelfing is reflected by Deleuze's 
assessment of Scbelling's achievements: on the one hand, he brought 'difference out of 
the night of the Identical' (DR 246/191 
_), 
but on the other the Absolute Identity remains 
an abvssal 'nothing' (LS 130/107) that 'cannot sustain difference' (DR 354/276). 
now want to suggest that an important connection can be made between 
Schelfing's account of the Absolute as primordially dissonant Within itself and the nofion 
of absolute immanence, which will help us to understand this Deleuzean idea. As we saw 
at the end of the previous chapter, Platonism believes that the Universal internally 
resembles that which it conditions: as Deleuze writes with respect to Kant., the error of 
transcendental philosophy is to 'think of the transcendental in the image of and in 
resemblance to, that which it is supposed to around' (LS 128/105). Schellina, however, 
shows us that there is no a priori reason to assume that this is the case. It can only be 
jusfified (which is to say. not justified) with reference to our faith m the autonomy of 
reason. 
Schelling proposes that the presupposition of all philosophy is this faith, the 
unity of reason with a transcendent Absolute Identity. However, this is oniv the fon-nal 
presupposition of philosophy. It does not demonstrate that philosophy, qua absolute 
knowledge, in fact exists. In other words, it does not show that this Universal is the real 
ground of difference. To show that this is the case, Schelling attempts to think the 
Absolute as different within itself at the same time as thinking it as a transcendent unity. 
These two aspects prove ultimately irreconcilable, however. In fact, the obscure 
difference within the Absolute, which reason needs to presuppose in order to account for 
real difference, functions like Fichte's GýMhl, making a system impossible to complete. 
Because the difference is itself non-rational and unaccountable, an (Ingnind, it cannot be 
taken up into the systern. which means that the systern is incomplete and not absolute. 
Reason thus has to presuppose a primordial difference that it cannot subsume under the 
identity of the concept. relying instead on the presupposed eminent identity of the 
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ýAbsolute as divine love. An otherness is active wilhin reason itself, a pathological 
condition that makes absolutely a priori synthetic knowledge imf)ossible. 
For Deleuze, Kant's moment of true invention lies in introducing a problematic. 
purely determinable term (the empty form of time) as constitutive of the relation between 
the indeterminate condition and the conditioned it deternfines. Fichte and Schelling, are 
forced to introduce their own versions of this determinable term, thus effectively 
remoVing the possibility of grounding difference in a higher identity. In this way, a 
radical or imordial difference is introduced into philosophical thought: as Deleuze puts pri 
it with respect to Kant, this moment in b-anscendental philosophy is 'a matter of 
establishing the difference and inleriorising it within being and thought' (DR 117/86, my 
emphasis). 
Schelling actually goes further than Fichte or Kant, however, something which 
Deleuze does not explicitly acknowledge. He tfies to think a higher Absolute, one that 
transcends reason, not as an eminent fomi of identity. but as incommensurable with it, 
and yet which can still serve as the foundation of a system. The former requirement is 
necessitated by the need to explain detennination but, as we have seen, it upsets the latter 
requirement. Nevei-theless, Schelling still attempts to think the relation between this 
Absolute and creation throupili his theory of potencies, as a positive dialectic of 
3 
produefion-, an Erzeugungsditilektik 
In Chapter 2 (pp. (2-. 3above), I noted that the ungrounded act of the Absolute 
that posits actual difference is conceived in the Philosophy of Identity and thereafter as 
an absolute positing that is grounded only in the Absolute as an immediately affin-native 
unity. This has to be disfinguisbed from the Fichtean Subject's positing of a not-1, in 
which the negative, limifitig, relation between I and not-I that is the necessary basis for all 
deten-nination of consciousness is supposedly freely posited. Here, Fichte has merely 
assumed that the fteedom of the Absolute is identical with the relation of opposition 
3 This is Ilic icrm cmploý cd by Bcach- 1994, pp. 84--:,. 
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between the subject and the object that is constitutive of the conditioned un1tv of 
theorefical and practical consciousness. Schelling, had argued that negative opposition 
was the pureiv necessarv mode of dIfferentiation that determines the merely Possble first 
creation, and wants to think the freedom of the Absolute differently, so as to avoid 
positing it under the fonn of a conditioning relation that simply reflects the constitution 
of the finite. 
Schelling's doctrine of potencies is thus an attempt to understand the 
unconditioned immediacy of the Absolute in such a way as to account for the emergence 
of real difference with sole reference to this pure immediacy. Difference is thus to be 
thought Without negation, that is, without self-limitation as conceived either on the 
Fichtean model or as in Schelling's more Neoplatonic moments, when the positing of 
difference in the Absolute appears to be necessary. 'Me emergence of difference has to 
be thought of as the realisation of the Absolute and not as its degradation. In Schelfing's 
middle period, this requirement is fulfilled. 'Me act of posifing Is an utterly blind and 
spontaneous passage from the non-actual to the actual that Schelfing describes as a 
contraction, self-doubling., or intensification of the Absolute. It allses from the initial 
impulse provided by the 'dark will', which emerges unaccountably in eternity. within the 
peaceful Absolute. The dark Will Is neither fully conscious or fully unconscious, and thus 
indicates a problernatic. Primordial and pseudo-temporal ('before and after') dissonance 
within the Absolute itself In relation to the actual temporality of the world, this 
dissonance is always already past, a substantial rather than vanished past that continues to 
influence the actual universe (AW 24-5/120-1). In the blind act of contraction, the 
Absoltite posits itself through this dissonance. 
I'he theory of potencies indicates how this affirmafive positing is camed over into 
Creation. The first potency intensifies rather than negating or firnitim4 the Absolute, 
it. The first potency as actuall--v produced. or Bi creating a real tension within I in 
4 On the -ict of contraction. sce Zukck- 1996, pp- -, i-2. 
117 
Schelling's notorious shorthand. is the affinnation of the disturbed Absolute (A) in which 
the dark will and the will -to-exi stence have begun to emerge. and so it repeats and 
intensifies their difference witifin it-self, which Schelling represents wit-b Aý (A=B) or N' 
(SPL 440-1/211-2). Ilie process continues lil, -e a series of li ghtnin g- flashes: the tension 
n A' is the difference between- it and the A (the initialt state) that it augments. N' is not 
identical with itself but implicates this difference within it as its condition. and so its 
ultimate condition is the original, unactualised difference between itself and the second 
potency. the unrest that paradoxicaliv anses within that which is etemaliv at rest, which 
the first votencv britw-, s to life and active1v expresses. Hence A is intensified through the 
first potency again, this time in another direction or mode, that is, in the second potency, 
the will-to-existence, posited alongside the finst as A' (SPL 425-6/200- 1). V----N 
The third potency, that of absolute indifference, is posited next in sequence, as a 
relative identity of the first two potencies. At this point, Schefling is concerned to reassert 
the overall priority of the Absolute Identity. The positing of real difference from Within 
the Absolute 'awakens' the Oterund understood as eminent ident1tv, the Absolute-in- 
itself, God as Love, thus subduing the ray-ing individual powers within a synthetic unity, 
making them into opposites. Like the Fichtean I and not-1, they limit each other, but 
unlike the Fichtean postulates, they do so actively, as they each internalise the potential 
power of the Absolute. Nevertheless, they have entered a relation of limitation that 
defines a synthetic identity. and in this way a 'cooling' of the process of Erzeugung is 
effected. 
This third potency is the stable relation of mutual limitation between the other two. 
With the positing of A', the absolute attains a stable form of actual existence, but thk vý 
oniv a relafive idenfity. for it still implicates within it as its condifion, the primordial 
dissonance of the Absolute. As such it cannot be equal to the L)ngrund. In so far as 
implicates this difference in itq own existence, A-' remains. on1v relativeiv stable. The 
power of the Absolute is once again augmented within the lowest levels of material 
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nature and so on, towards the point where, in human consciousness. the prionty of the 
first potency, that of nature, is subverted bv the developed second potency. that of spint. 
The irreconcilable tension in Schelfing's work has been traditionally understood as 
that between fTeedom and systern. or that between the unification of the absolute and its 
falling asunder into simply opposed real mid ideal principples-5 However, if we read 
Schefling as proposing that philosophy, in order to explain real difference, has to 
presuppose a primordial dissonance within the Absolute, then the tension in his work is 
between positing a "higher' Absolute that transcends all difference as an emment identity 
(and which thus illegitimately resembles that which it is supposed to condition and 
cannot tberefore explain its emergence) or positing a 'bigber' Absolute as a problematic 
difference that creates real difference absoluleýy, that is, through its own relation to itself 
The self-ldentical Ungrund suffers fi-om the disadvantage of relative immanence. It is 
assumed to be the measure of real difference, to be its transcendent foundation, but there 
is no wav of demonstrating that this is the case. To explain real difference, an 
equiprimordial, pseudo-temporal difference has to be presupposed, but this means that 
the self-identical Ungrund cannot serve as a foundation without a difference that it does 
not itself produce. In this way. only the URgrund conceived as primordial difference can 
be Absolute, that is, a self-related condifion of actual difference, for as we have seen, it is 
only through the affirmation of this difference, its raising of itself to a higher power, that 
real distinction is posited, 'Me relation between- A and A' is not therefore one of 
resemblance but one of pure difference between two internalised differences posited 
without relation to Identitv. 
flie onlv ground for reducing this relation to one of resemblance would be our 
'faith in the autonom of reason, but this faith itself, our conviction that thought has an 
affinity for the Universal is, in Deleuze's terms, only a product of our attachment to 
habituated ethoi or forms of experience. fin this way, it can be seen that our positing of a 
5 See e. g., Wlitc- 1983b. 
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transcendent, sell'-identical Universal, and of an internal resemblance between it and what 
it conditions. is relative to our experience and not absolute. The krzzeupmgýidialektik, 
however, is a construction which. thouO, it is meant to explain real difference. implies an 
absolute positing of difference, that is, in relation only to difference. In this vay. it is 
irreconcilable with foundationalist thought for it appears to posit the Absolute as in 
principle unknowable, as infmitely different from or incommensurable with the concept. 
It also seems to be self-contradictorv, proposinu that we can know the Absolute to be 
unknowable. Nevertbeless, the immanence of the disturbed and dissonant Absolute in its 
products is not relative immanence. It is, on the con", the univocal and unilateral 
immanence of one problematic difference in a further difference that it produces. 
It is this kind of relation that Deleuze descnbes as absolute immatience, which 'is 
in itself (IL 4/4), rather than being the relative immanence of a transcendent term iti 
something else. As we saw in Chapter Two, Schelling cannot sustain this thought, 
however. It is opPOsed, even in his middle rwriod. by his commitment to 
foundational ism, which requires that the Absolute be posited as an ernment identity (Ithe 
Ungrund as Love). 'Mis un1tv is assurned to remain 'above' the real dissonance of the 
Absolute, making sure that things turn out alright, as it were. Schelling thus remains 
primarily a thinker of relative immanence, from a Deleuzean point of view. 
We now need to exannne the evisternolowcal status of this Deleuzean absolute 
relation that results from the positing of the determinable within thought as its absolute 
ground. Schelling, as we saw in Chapter Two, posits a special intuition by means of 
which thought is united with the higher Absolute, and in which thought is literally outside 
itself or ecstatic. As a basis for constructing the determinations (potencies) of the 
,, \bsolute, this ecstatic intuition is simply the immediate identity of thought and 
Absolute. 
I -- 
his middle period, Schell' through which the thinker ga-ins in'sight into its nature. 6 In ing 
conceives intuition as the unity of thought With the pw-tido-tempOral 'unconsclous' of the 
, P. 
; o8. 6 See von Uslar. op. cit.. 
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Absolute before time (AW 12-13/116-7,27/122). The exact meaning, of the 
transcendence or ecstasy involved in this intuition is still ambiguous, however. Schelling 
describes it as access to an 'essence outside and above the world' (AW 5/114). which 
might be thought to imply the Ungrund as eminent identity or as Universal. What this 
essence is, however, is the substantial past. the problematically differentiated Absolute. 
which is qualilalively distinct from 'the world', i. e., the time of the present (Alvk' 24- 
5/121), which differs in nature from the past because of its unifineanty, the fact that time 
as we commoniv or habitually expenence it is a succession of instants. 
If Schelling, in thinking the absolute positing of difference soleiv with reference to 
a problematic difference, can be said to have gone beyond relative immanence (Ito an 
extent), it should he noted that this is because the role he asslams to intuition is connected 
with a concept of firne. fin this, a connection should be pointed out with Bergson, one of 
7 
the most important of Deleuze's lPfluences or 'mediators' Bergson had accused the 
post-Kantians of positing a 'timeless intuition' as the basis of philosophy, which. 
although it goes beyond Kant's stress on the finite Understanding and thus his fonnalism, 
remains connected to the false goal of a unitary arch4ý-science grounded in a 
transcendent Universal. 8 This, however, is not entirely tnie of Schelling. Each epoch of 
time, for him, is a qualitatively distinct mode of being. The present exists, ansing and 
vanishing constantiv. but this is because of the substantial being of the past the 
problematically differentiated Absolute, whicb is immanent in the present as its ground. 
Schellitig thus tlies to think the relation between past and present without reducim-, it to a 
temporal scbema of succession that would depict the relation between Absolute and 
world as an already unifinear temporal relation between two instants. In this, he 
approaches Bergson's notions of duration and virtuality, which provide Deleuze N% Ith a 
model of absolute immanence in DR. 
On Bergson and Schell] 
' Berg-son. 1%2. p. 361 
ing, sce Io% cloy, 196) and Mcrjcj,, -P0nt%-, pp. 14 - 
5-6. 
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For Bergson, duration, as qualitative temporal distinction. is the Absolute itself 
the ground of real differentiation. He proposes that knoVAIedpe of this Absolute is 
Q -olute"9 possible via an 'tiltra-intellectuatl intill C that wo-i-i-ld enable us to re-live the abs 
'Ultra-intellectual' here refers to an intuition that takes representational consciousness 
(the realm of V"erstand) beyond itself into its inner lived expenence of fime, whicli Kant 
descnibed fon-nally as the 'pure and empty fon-n of time'. This intuition gives knowledge. 
not of the transcendent, Universal foundation of determination, but of the 'virtual 
tendencies' that are immanent in the present existence of a phenomenon and mark the 
process of its evolution--10 The Absolute here is not the transcendent Ground of whicb all 
things are internal determinations. Duration does not lie beyond all things, but rather can 
be traced in them as their own 'lived time. It is problematically differentiated and thus 
internally different in kind from itself, or self-differentiafinp- like Schelling's disturbed 
Absolute. Because it is internaliv different from itself, it is incommensurable With 
identity and thus with representational consciousness. It is thus transcendent on1v in this 
sense, in that our habitual practical orientations (representational consciousness) do not 
allow us to trace its influence. It is transcendental, in that it is the condition in principle 
of differentiation. yet is also empirical, in that it can only be traced in actual phenomena. 
Dele-uze's 'Wanscendental empinclsm' thus begins with Bergson. 
As with Schelling's dialectic of potencies, Bergsonian duration explaitis 
differentiation as the congelation of its own internal activity. Yet the virtual or pure past 
as the bemg-m-itself of the present does not possess the same substantiality as is 
attributed to a transcendent Umversal. Stich a Universal, e. g., the earlier Schelling's 
eternal, self identical Absolute, is thought of as containing all detenninations internal to 
itself as its own possible detenninations, which somehow it comes to reahse. This 
assumes, as I noted previously, the existence of an internal resemblance between 
condition and conditioned, which, as Schelling shows. cannot he justified a priori. The 
'4 Ibid.. p. 359. p. 15 7. 
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idea of a Substance as that in-itseif which contains within itself all determinafions as 
possible, and which then realises them by limiting, itself. like Fichte's Taihandlung. is 
opposed by Schellinp_'s subversive thought of the dissonant Absolute. even though this 
conception is thought alongside that of a transcendent Substance (the Unkninti as Love. 
which supposedly belongs to the future and the past). 
From a Deleuzean point of View, Bergson opposes this transcendence and the 
relative immanence it implies more consistentIv. Duration. being, different from itself 
has a power of variation which is intfinsically infinite. as each singular duration is 
quahtafiveýv different from all others, and in this, its problematically (for consciousness. ) 
differentiated nature, resides its substantiality and thus its suitability as an evlanans. 
Extension in the phenomena] realm as presented to representational consciousness, which 
is only infinite quanfilative difference under a general fon-n of unity (113 22-3/31). can 
thus he explained w-ith reference to duration, which 'includes' it. All extension can be 
viewed as the phenomena] product of contingent modifications of duration in the 
temporal order of the present (in which time and space are constituted as Infinitely 
divisible unities): a Bergsoman piece of wax is not defined, like Descartes, by the stable 
inathemafical properties that it possesses by virtue of its extension and which allow it to 
be recognised, with the alterations it undergoes being modifications of extended 
substance. Instead, the instabilltv of the wax and its alterations are 'marv: the melting pri 
of the wax in front of the fire is a pure temporal difference, a duration. The wax itself, 
qua extended substance, is an expenence produced by a contingent modification of a 
collection of such variations, which constitutes a threshold of consciousness. 
The substantialitv of a transcendent Universal that contains all determination under 
the form of possibilit-v is illusory for Bergson, and for Deleuze. The idea that this 
Possibilit-v that supposedly pre-exists all actualltv can thus ground actualitv is cn*ticised 
by Bergson as an illusory projection inlo the past of the familiar image of the real that is 
't) Scv Hardt- i 993. pp. 4-7 
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produced in intuition and thought by our habitual ethoi. 11 it is thus an image abstracted 
frOm empirical practices in the sense that we have traced in Deleuze's crifique of 
Platonism. Duration, on the other hand, includes in its virtual dimension a tendency to 
congeal as extended matter, so that actualisation is a matter of duration becoming 
external to itself rather than, as with a trwiscendent Universal, limiting itself Duration, 
because it is internally qualitatively different from itself, is infinitely determinable being,. 
As such, the being of Bery-sonian substance is radically unstable, rather thati being 
eternally self-identical. Deleuze suggests that sucb problematic being be written '9-being' 
(DR 89/64) or as 'non-being'. thouOm not in the sense of ouk on, that which has no 
reality, but rather m4iý on (DR 253/196), that whose essence or sense is undecidable and 
unstable. Schelling himself, as Deleuze recognises (DR 246-7/190-1), refeffed to the 
incomprebensible ground of real existence as a me on, a non-being that is without stable 
essence rather than that which is without any being Cizanz undgar nichi Sevende) (DPE 
235-6). 12 
If this dimension of the real is incommensurable with consciousness, however, 
bow can it be known? Where is the certainty that is demanded by foundationalism and 
which it seeks in a transcendent Universal that secures the unity of knowledge? Will not 
the method of inwition only produce arbitrary explanations of phenomena? For Bergson, 
the intuition of duration is continuous with sensory intuition, being simply a higher form 
of it that takes us beyond consciousness to dimensions of duration to which 
consciousness and sensibility, being fied to the temporal order of the present and the 
ordering and perception of extended matter, is inferior, " Bergsonian intuition, as 
previously noted. is related to the 'pure and empty form of time' that Deleuze sees as the 
truly transcendental moment of Kant's thought, the introduction of a pure difference that 
prevents the subject from knowing itself as it is in itself and which is nevertheless 
constitutive of the being of the suýject. But for Bergson, this intuition is elevated to the 
" Bcrgson, i 960. p. I 10. 
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foffn of a method, in which the incommensurability of different durations. the 'lived 
time' of different phenomena is experienced directiv (as with the melting wax). Absolute 
Difference can be 'known' because it can be felt in this way. 'flits does not. however. 
mean it can be represented, for it k still incommensurable with the identit-v of the 
concept. We now need to explore this notion of absolute knowledge as Deleuze uses it, 
in order to understand bis distinction between doematic and cnticai images of tbought. 
iv) Thinking Immanence 
Platonism's faith in the 'good will' of thought, i. e., In the essential unity of 
thought and being is, for Delcuze, testimony to Its basis in a false problem, that is, how 
to achieve knowledge of the transcendent universal, the foundation of the good order. 
I'lils goal is assumed to be the essential and definitive philosopbical expenence: 
parousia, Enlightenment Deleuze and Guattari invoke another kind of expenence, 
however, which testifies to the necessity of reinventing philosophical practice, that of a 
paihos of thought (TP 368/377-8), in which thought fuids itself suffel-ing a breakdown ill 
which it can no longer find itself meaningfifl. This mode of being, which I earlier 
suggested was definitive of the trauma of reason. our philosophical double-bind, suggests 
another image of thought and different subjective presuppositions about what it means to 
think. This other image is that of the 'ill will' of thought, which arises froin the 
experience of a 'malefic thinker' who is actually ýpowerless to think' either naturally or 
philosophically and thus is 'WIlthout presuppositions' (DR 171/130). Only the thinker 
who undergoes such an intense intellectual Crisis and finds it impossible to begin thinking 
again despite many frustrated efforts has achieved the Cartesian goal of 
presupposilfionlessness, 14 
Such a thinker no longer has an image of what it means to think. IAke Artaud, 
she stlives not for any definite, predefined goal, but 'simply to manage to think 
)ý Scc also Scidcl, 1976. pp. .; -15-6. 
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something' (DR 191/147). There is no longer anywhere to begin from for all the 
habitual practices of thought have broken down. Sinving, to regain the shattered 
perspective of the good will of thought would be a memingless act. The trauma of 
reason tinden-nines the Platonic/foundationalist image of thought itself, and with it. the 
unif, ving, Universal as the destitiv of thowht. The trap set for thou Omt bv external forces 
(the objective presuppositions of Platonism) has been sprung. But this nihifistic 
overcoming of Platonism contains the seeds of something, else. The problem that thought 
has to take up now is one thatis not given to it firom without, but one that is related only 
to its own destitute mode of being: how to carrv on thitiking without an image of 
thought? Referring to the difference between Eudoxus, the Idiot of Descartes who 
represents the innate good will of thougJit, mid Dostoevsky's Idiot, Delcuze and Guattan 
write that 'tt]he old idiot wanted truth, but the new idiot wants to tum the absurd into the 
highest power of thought - In other words, to create' (WP 61/62). 
Importantly. this experience constitutes for Deleuze a different forrn of 
knowledge to that fetishised by Platonism. The trauma of reason arises because thought 
is forced to propose that the necessary condition of any deten-nination is that the 
Absolute is incommensurable With rational thouuht. Philosophy is thus forced to 
conceive its own existence as ungrounded, that is, as dependent upon a difference that 
cannot be taken up into rational thought. This is a conclusion that overturns 
foundationalist presuppositions about the essence of thought, for here thought is without 
any stable meaning. The pathos of thought thus derives from the negative proposition 
that the existence of thought is dependent on and constituted by the infinite internal 
difference of thought from itself This proposition gives rise to the dilemma between 
rationalism and relativism that constitutes the trauma as a double-bind. Nihilism is the 
condifion of living with this difference of thought from itself- the effort to think is not 
renounced, but constantly reasserled a-, the conditions of living continue to make 
" Bcrgson. 1962. p. 3,59 
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demands upon thought. But no beginning with any enduring consistency can be made. 
,,. i IIIII en Nihilism is a lack of meaning charact ised. not by a pure, \irvana-like absence, but by 
a continual activity that fails to constitute anv stable distinctions that constitute meaning. 
In this way, nibilism partakes of the nat-ure of chaos as Deleuze and Guattarl define it, 'an 
infinite speed of birth and disappearance' (WP I 11/118). 
In using the trauma, of reason to throw a little light on the role of the paihos of 
thoup, bt, I waint to suggest here that the aforementioned negative proposition conceming 
the existence of thought would be, for Deleuze, knowledge of nihilism. It is not objective 
knowledge that can be shown to rest on a transcendent foundation, but it is knowledge of 
the existential condition of thought, of the mode of being of thought. And not just of the 
mode: for Deleuze, if foundafionalism is based on an image of thought that subjects it to 
an impossible task (as Schelling shows), then the idea of a transcendent Universal as the 
essence of being beyond its paiticular modes has to be suspended. Hence the knowledge 
of the mode of being (eihos) of thought counts for Deleuze as knowledge of ffie being of 
thought as such. To reiterate, however, this is not objective knowledge of the essence of 
thought, but knowledge of its eihos, of the style of lik of thought. Further, it is not the 
pure insight of a theoros into the essential meaning of this eihos, but is knowledge that is 
bound up with the affective side of nihilism, the sense of constraint, of being unable to 
go on, the pathos of thought. For Deleuze, it is this aesthetic dimension that, 
pat-adoxically. makes this knowledge absolute knowledge, i. e., practical knowledge of 
the real, inescapable forces that drive a heteronomous philosophical practice. 
Foundafionalist thought cannot deny its dependence upon a radical difference that it 
cannot consistently account for. In this way. the ex ience of nihilism contains practical Perl 
knowledge of the constraints of an ethos of thought and thus of the uneaning, of nihilism 
itself Kant's pure and empty form of time is another instance in %vhich this nihilism of 
thought becomes known. In arguing that the empi6cal subject can only knoNN itself as 
14 See also Murphy. 1 `993. pp. I 10- 1- 
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determined under the form of time as the a prion, form of inner sense, Kant effectiN cl\ 
denies the subject knowledge of itself All it can know it that it is determinate. and in 
k, ", weing determinate it is determined somehow. Ile source of this determitiation is dejure 
unknowable, however. This testifies to the limits of the practice of Kantian critique. 
which then becomes dogmatic in positing a unified transcendental subject on the 'far 
side' of the crack of time that prevents the empirical subject fi-om becoming present to 
i tsel f (DR 116-8/8 5 -7). 
Deleuze's argument witli respect to the practical knowledge of a malefic thinker 
is that what it presents is a mlnflnal in'lage of thought. one without Orientation (sens). It 
has thus partially freed itself from the heteronomous problem that drives Platonism, 
namely., the desire to represent in thought the best order of the polis (DR 170-1/130). It 
has discovered another problem, one that- is immanent in its own minimal image of itself 
- in fact, the problem of all problems for philosophy in Deleuzeýs View: how to create a 
new ethos of thinking. For Deleuze, this has alreadv been part of the education of 
thought towards 'Enlightenment', or rather, disillusionment. However, it seerns to have 
left thought without any resources to create with. The education of thought is thus 
unfinished. Thought must create itself, but, for Deleuze, it can only do this by staging 
encounters with other modes of being. 
ne Nietzschean and Bergsonian model of education that Deleuze fon-nulates is 
fragmented and aesthetic. The question is how to force thought to begin anew and 
continue without immediately returning to its chaotic state, that is, how to revitabse 
thought? The key to this model is the paihos of thought, i. e., reconceiving thought, not as 
a pure iheoros that transcends all pbysical interaction, but as itself irnbued with a 
sensibilitv, an aesthetic capacity to be affected from without. This is not to be thought of 
mechanistically, which would imply f6tindationalist presuppositions. Instead. it has to be 
conceived in ternis of the difference that thought has found within itself and yet cannot 
account for. Thought has to undergo a forrn of violent paideja in order to be re-educated 
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('NP 123-4/108-9). This requires a specific kind of singular. sensory -encounter' v-ith an 
object, one in which we are faced with an object thm is incommensurable with the 
supposedly universal contexts of meaning associated with good sense and common 
sen se. 
Deleuze refers to Plato's distinction in the Republic between encounters with 
objects that can in principle he recognised and those which cannot (DR 180-1 /138). If an 
object is in principle recOWUsable, it is consfituted for the subject as commensurable with 
good sense, common sense, and well-trained faculties of intuition. If it is not, then it 
belongs to that order of obiects that Plato called simulacra, and which do not belong to 
either the order of the Idea as transcendent Universal, or to the order of the copies of the 
Idea that participate in it (DR 167-8/128, LS 295-6/256). The simulacrum is a 
problematic difference, which does violence to the habituated thresholds of the 
sensibility. Dcleuze uses the example of an individual learning to swim in order to clarify 
the conception of education implied by the encounter with simulacra. It is only upon 
entenng the water that one really learns to swim suddenly becoming overwhelmed by a 
sense of vertigo on being lifted by the waves (DR -35/22-3,214/165). This encounter 
with the infinite vanations of force propagated throu0i the waves forces the sensibility of 
the swimmer to become habituated to new thresholds of actiVity. There is thus no 
essential method to Deleuzean education, one which would lead us to the truth of 
Enligbtenment. Instead it Is expenmental, based on the determination to risk unforeseen 
encounters. An exemplar of this model of education might be Celine's Bardamu, rather 
than Rousseau's tiMle or Goethe's Wilhelm Meister* 
Still, I believe I gained strength listening to such 
things, the strength to go ffirther, a strange sort of 
strength, next time I'd be able to Po down even deeper 
and lower, and listen to plaints that I hadn't heard befoi-c 
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or had had difficulty in understanding., because beyond 
the plaints we bear there always seem to be others that 
we haven't yet heard or mdersitood-'ý 
Philosophy, then, has to consist initially in forcing thought to risk encounters 
with other modes of being that are incommensurable with it, that is. in findinp 
'mediators' for thougbt (N 168-71/123-5). In order to be sufficient to force thought to 
think and give itself meaning and direction, these mediators have to be either practices 
that are external to pbilosopby (as wben Deleuze encounters Francis Bacon and comes 
away with the new concept of the 'percept' and new analyses of the funcfioning of 
sensibility) or philosophical practices that attempt to think an ontology of Absolute 
Difference, as opposed to Platonic practices that think being, in terms of transcendent 
identifies. Nibilism forces tbouat to recognise its real dependence on difference, and 
this recognition as we saw constitutes a kind of practical knowledge. The only operation 
consistent with this insight is to realise philosophy as an ontology of the kind of being 
that is encountered in nihilism. I'lus would be to transfonn passive philosophical nihilism 
into activity. Hence thought has to seek out among philosophical practices those ethoi 
which attempt to thitilk that which is incommensurable with Platonic thought. In this way, 
pbilosopbical concepts wiU be encountered that act as simulacra, forcing tbougbt to tbink 
Absolute Difference, which appeared to be the basic presupposition and thus the internal 
hi-nit of Platonic tbouebt, and therefore literally imtbinkable for it. bi this way, and as I 
noted above with regard to Bergson's 'Intuition", that which seems to transcend thought 
as unknowable (the Absolute) is not essentially unthinkable (which implies contradiction) 
but only unthinkable in relation to a specific heteronomous practice. If this practice is 
transfon-ned, then the immanence of the unconditioned (. Absolute Difference) in that 
which it conditions can be grasped (DR 182/140). Deleuze thus seeks out Bergson, 
15 pp. 318-9. 
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Spinoza, Nietzsche ei al., in order to pass through a philosophical apprenticeship in 
whicb a new practice of thought Is engendered. The problem of creation is thus faced 
head on. 
11inking will thus pass fTom a state of lack (the knowledge of the absence of 
foundation. ) to a new and singular thought of Absolute Difference in which thinking has 
affin-ned its own difference from or lack of identity with itself as its own excessive 
being. 'Mis occurs a) through exPenmenting With mediators and b) reallsing the thought 
of Absolute Difference in a new fon-n. The inequality of thought with itself remains, but 
is lived differently, according to a new ethos. 16 In this way, thought thinks the 
unconditioned transcendental condition of its activity immanently, that is, without 
presupposing that this unconditioned real difference is itself conditioned by a 
transcendent Universal. In this way, the new ethos of thought that develops an ontolop, 
of difference will be capable of explaining both its own emergence and that of other 
practices, such as Platomsm. Consequently, a new distinction between dogmatism and 
philosophy can be established, iven that Platonism always presupposes its own reality 
and thus cannot explain it. 
An ontology of difference is a thinking of being as Owund, that which is 
without a transcendent ground. In affirming Absolute Difference as its unique object, 
thought is claiming not the transcendent, but the purely immanent, not the eternal, but 
that which moves with infinite speed (i. e., that which cannot be arrested in a single 
perception or thought). Hence there is a Deleuzean quaestio quid juris, but one that 
subverts the Kantian (Platonic) version- 'What thought claims by right, what it selects, is 
infinite movement or the movement of the infinite' (WP 4-0/'37). Thought claims the 
right, not to determine the essential meaning of the transcendent Universal, but to be 
without essence, instead of interminablv seeking its essence posited as a transcendent 
foundation of real difference. The objective (i. e., external) condition of determination is 
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no longer thought of as a fixed transcendent. but as a movement of difference acro, ýs a 
tTanscendental field of conditions, as when Platonism is linked with the training of bodies 
in the polis. The new direction of thought presupposes only the I 4ýgrund of the nfinite 
variation of Absolute Difference as the movement from which thought begins: Deleuze 
concurs with Schelling, that, before any thought of being, there is the beine of thought, 
which is its difference from itself (DR 183-4/141'). This claim to be able to trace the 
itifinity movement of real difference will serve as the 'foundation' for an evaluative 
distinction between a 'beteronomous' (dogmatic) and an 'autonomous' (ICntical) image 
of thought. As Deleuze put it in an interview, 'if we're so oppressed, it's because our 
movement's being restricted, not because our eternal values are being violated' (IN 
166/122). 
A thinking that thinks its own limit in such a way as to be able to immanently 
trace its real conditions has much in common with Bergsonjan intuition. In thinking, this 
limit, it retains a connection to its pathos, and thus refuses to renounce its aesthetic 
aspect in favour of the 'innocent' thought of a theoros. It thus exceeds its own habituated 
thresholds: in tracing the real movements of difference that give rise to phenomena, i. e., 
in analySing, phenomena onto] ically, it will be ecstatic to itself The ontology upon 091 
which such analvses are based will establish this ecstatic ethos within thought. Hence the 
objective conditions of phenomena will be thinkable according to this aesthetic 
remodelling of thought, even if they cannot be objectively known as foundationalist 
method intends- 17 In this way, thinking the unconditioned as Absolute Difference does 
not infTinge Kanfian restrictions on knowledge of fliings-In-fliemselves. Absolute 
Difference is not a concept of the Absolute as such, which reduces it to a transcendent 
unity. Rather, it is always incarnated as a form of practical knowledge of the being of 
thought, an activity of tracing. To mark this absolute knowledge as different from that 
16 On these two modes of mcquality. and the -crack' separating them. see CAR I 19- " '13, x8-9 1. and cf. Ni w-ph% 
op. Cit. esp. pp 06 ff. 
17 Baugh. op. cit p, 17. 
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claimed by the theoros, which is rooted in the supposedly wanscendent un, tv of the 
concept, Deleuze and Guattan refer to it as a djogram (. TP 176-7/141-2, ). 
We now need to consider some aspects of the ontology Deleuze develops in DR. 
in order to see bow the analysis of phenomena can proceed, and to thus flesh out the 
meaning of transcendental empiricism so we can understand how Deleuze secures his 
distinction between dogmatism and this ahos of pbilosopby. Deleuze follows Scbelling 
and Leibniz in seeing conscious experience as the outgrowth of problematically 
differentiated unconscious forms of 'expenence' that are u-nmanent in Consciousness, and 
thus developing a natumra-listic ontology, 18 However, in DR this ontology is developed 
along Bergsonjan lines as a novel account of the relation between virtual conditions of 
differentiafion and actual differenciation, a philosophical practice driven by the problem 
of how to constitute a creative eihos of thought. 
Deleuze's differential ontology is based upon the Berusoman notion of tendency, 
19 
which it employs to explain real difference- A tendency of development js the past of a 
phenomenon which, in line with Bergson's thought, is immanent in or actively continues 
to insist in the present of the phenomenon. As suck the being of a tendency is Virtual (the 
being of m6 on) rather than actual or possible- Such a tendency is the movement of 
Absolute Difference, which differentiates itself as a line of development from other 
tendencies, and differenciates itself as the actual detenninations of a phenomenon that, 
viewed on their own, constitute the history of the phenomenon. There is thus no linear, 
temporal ground-cmisequent relation here between virtual and actual, as if the virtual was 
a transcendent Substance that enfolded all the possible determinations of itself, positing 
them through a negative operation of self-limitation. 'A thing in itself and in its true 
nature is the expression of a tendency before it is the effect of a cause' (ICD 83). 
Deleuze adopts from Bergson the charactensation of tendencies as supenor and 
inferior, depending on whethei- they Implicate differences in nature (. Absolute Difference. ) 
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or differences in degree (relative difference). The fonner are superior because they are 
themselves the sufficient reason of differences in degree. This Is because they include 
within themselves their own difference in nature from differences in degree, whereas the 
converse is not the case. Differences in nature externallse themselves in differences in 
degree: duration 'relaxes' and becomes spatialised or extended. The virtual past is thus 
not an inert entity witbout an internal active principle, unRe a transcendent Substance. 
Tendencies actively differentiate themselves from each other, because they differ 
internally from themselves, and this virtual activity is thus the sufficient reason of actual 
phenomena. Nevertheless, the passage of the virtual into actuality is thus not 
predetermined by the content of the virtual, as there is no transcendent content to the 
virtual that is given outside of the process of its differentiation. There is thus no relation 
of internal resemblance between the virtual and the actual (organisms do not, for 
exwnple, resemble theff genetic codes (DR 239-40/184-5))., whick as we have seen, is 
not the case with the circular explanations of determination provided by foundationalism. 
There is no necessary development of the content of the act" rwming from past to 
future, for the future unfolding of the virtual depends solely on the difference in nature 
between what is actual and the virtual dimension of this actual, and is thus unforeseeable. 
This allows us to understand the sense In wbich Deleuze's ontology is a transcendental 
empiricism. The tendencies that make up flie virtual can only be traced in actual 
. -I- phenomena. Nevertheless, these tendencies remain transcendental, being 
incornniensurable with or different in nature from the actual, as they themselves differ in 
kind from themselves., whereas the actual tends to externalise these differences as 
differences in degree. In this sense, the actual is determined by the virtual, or the 
empirical by the transcendental, but the virtual is simultaneously determined by the 
actual, as only through actualisation do virtual tendencies become 'visible'. Given that 
'175 lg On Lcibruz, sec esp. DR 2 -W 134,325W253, on the gencsis of conscious expcnencc sce also Smith, 
1996. pp. 35-9. 
For fullex wcounts. see e g. Anscll-PcarsorL 1999, and Boundas. 1996. 1 
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the sufficient reason of the actual is Absolute Difference, Deleuze's ontology in DR is 
not an ontology of knowable essences, but one of creative being. 
Further, if thought is tracing these tendencies through its own being, which is 
Absolute Difference, then it is not simply 'dmen' by the virtual past, but is itself acfiN-e 
in differentiating those tendencies that are already active. Thought does not, then, belong 
to the past or to eternity, but to the future, for it intervenes in the past. This is 
exemplified, for instance, by Deleuze's ovai philosophical differentiation of thinkers in 
whom be takes an interest from their 'official' existence as historical figures whose value 
derives from their 'participation' in the essence of philosophy, with Spinoza being 
perhaps the pnme example. By making connections between empirical philosophical 
practices without regard to the necessary processes of descent that have traditionally been 
traced by philosopbers of history. Deleuze clianges an image of thouglit in the present by 
retracing the tendencies of the past. Thought has the ability, by thinking the internal 
difference of its own being, to ascend to a thought of difference, as expressed in the idea 
of a virtual tendency, that in turn allows it to 'descend' to the actual, tracing its genesis 
and thus accounting for its determination. By affin-ning, the substantiality of Absolute 
Difference, thought thus becomes an agent of change and creation in the present ý2" At the 
same time, this can only occur in relation to tendencies that are afready present and are 
actualised. in 'mediators, practices which are am-enable to the thinking of difference. 21 
In this way, Deleuzean thought, like Bergsoman intuition, claims to be tracing 
real movements of difference. The product of this tracing is neither a concept of essence 
nor a concept of history, but a diagram of the becoming of a phenomenon, which for 
Deleuze is real in that it affinns the incommensurability that thought finds within its own 
being as the meaning of being itself, yet is at the same time fictive in that the 
interventions of thought within the actual are creative retracings of the becoming of the 
-20 Sce Dcleuzz's wcoynt of the Nietzschmn cternal -durn in DR (esp. 3 11 -1 41 -44), -,, uh-c- 'untimck 
thought of the future. 
21 CF image of thought, and -. 
Bell, 1993, p- 379 on ffic need for a thougM of botb future and paq for a creative' 
Dclcuz-c's remarks on his own 'history' of philosophy in N 15/0-7. 
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aettial, that make new distinctions visible in what has been accepted as the history of a set 
of phenomen&22Tbe new image of thought that Dejeuze seeks to realise is a thought 
without essence, and the actual reallsatiOn of this image we have surveyed is his 
ontology, a doctrine of being without essence which allows accounts of real phenomena 
to be given. Tracing the becoming of phenomena in this way is thus to explain their 
genesis by 'subsuming' them under a 'higber' point of view. This pomt of view is not, 
however, that of a theoros who possesses the perfect concept of a transcendent Universal 
in which all real difference can be shown to be included, but that of a malefic thinker 
who traces the immanent movement of real difference in a diagram. The difference 
between these two elhoj is thus a matter of their respective fitness to think immanence, 
the infinite movement of difference in virtual and actuaL which is complicated by the 
tracings of thought. Whereas the former can only follow the pre-given and thus 
heteronomous orientation of a problem that forces a double movement away from and 
towards a transcendent foundation, the latter, by affirming witb the aid of mediators the 
problem of creation, rises to diink the unilinear movement of real difference. Thanks to 
the fact that thouglit is capable, in moments of crisis, of discovering its difference from 
itself as the internal limit of its activity, it is capable of affirming the problem of how to 
create as its own de jure problem, a problem that is Immanent in it as its onentation 
towards a (for Deleuze) genuinely self-determining diinking. 
Hence the Deleuzean distinction between dogmatism and philosopby can now be 
understood on the basis of the ontology of Absolute Difference. 'Philosophy' is the 
realisation in praclice of the retracing of the virtual becoming of phenomena so as to 
distinguish them from each other, not according to their essence, but according to their 
overall tendency. Platonism is a dominant tendency immanent in real philosophical 
practices, which is also mixed with other tendencies (as when Kant, Fichte and Schelling 
I On this fictive aspect, see Deleuze-s remmts on die triumph of simulacra over essences (DR 167- 
8/128), and tmnscendental empiricism as 'a kind of science fiction' (DR 3,,, x-x), or, as Ronald 
Bogue (1989, p. 159) has )'t, the modelling of 'imaginary woTids' based on parado: ucaJ concepts. 
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posit a transcendental difference within the subject), which can itself be related to real 
non-philosopblcal practices that constitute its own tendency of becoming (the processes 
in which bodies are trained, the political tendencies of a society in which phi-losophy is 
practised, etc. ). 'Modern', 'enlightened" philosophy is also a tendency, whicb Deleuze 
differentiates from Platonism by an active tracing of its becoming, through Lucretius, 
Spinoza, Bergson ei al., and whose tendency is marked by the thinking of differences in 
nature as absolute, i. e., as constituting the nature of being-in-itself PlatoMc philosophical 
practices on the other band are marked by their thinking of differences in degree as 
CLU I- absolute: 'real' difference is thought of as being established between entities or forms 
that realise, to a degree, the UnIty of a transcendent Universal. Their resemblance to this 
Universal, the amount of its perfection they express, is hierarchically ordered, and 
maximised in philosophy, whose essence supposedly contains the Universal itself 
Deleuze's claims that his ontology (transcendental empiricism) enables the 
differences between actual practices to be traced via the transcendental movement of 
difference, which allows local, non-transcendent explanations of their genesis to be 
constructed. I'lie genesis of practices which are illusory, i. e., practices that take the reality 
of their own internal Absolute Difference to be unreal (e. g., Schefling's negative 
-1- philosopby), is a process that is thus immanent to the internal movement of being itself, 
for Deleuze argues, like Bergson, that differences in nature (Absolute Difference) are the 
sufficient reason of differences In degree that are defined in terInS of identity. 23 Such 
illusory practices produce illusions that are both ontological and transcendental, for they 
are immanent in being itself Nevertheless, the paradox of this thinking of difference is 
that although, for Deleuze, it t1finks the real, it only does so insofar as it is simultaneously 
a fictive thinking, one that intervenes in the past in order to recreate the present. it thus 
only thinks the 'objective" conditions of phenomena (i. e., the active virtual or the 
movement of difference) in so far as it does so 'subjectively', that is, in order to realise a 
13 
- See also Hardt- op. ca. pp. 5,125 n-2. 
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new difference, such as that between Platonism and Deleuze's 
modemism'. I would argue, then, that Deleuze's disfinction bet\ýeen philosophy and 
doi4matism seeks to overcome the trauma of Platonic or foundationalist reason Via a 
perv, erwýv foundationalist move. The traumatic discovery by philosophy of thought's 
lack of coincidence with itself can actually enable thouOt to realise itself as a selt'- 
determining practice on the basis of a problem that is immanent in this discovery itself. 
This problem is how to give meaning to a thought without essence, or more simply, how 
to reallse pbilosopby as a crealive actiVltv. Hence Deleuze's new image of tbought, 
which he attempts to realise in a differential ontology, and his manifold tracings of the 
becomings of phenomena, both on his own and with Guattari, are practices which, as 
practices, are meant to realise the difference between philosophy and dogmatism. Tbey 
are thus exemplars of a practical attitude, rather than representations of a universal which 
we can have access to simply by reading Deleuzean texts. The difference between 
. -I-, philosophy and dogrnatism is a problem of the creation of meaning, not of the 
ktiowledge of essence, mid is only realised as a difference when it is practically reallsed: 
Lit is not enough to say, -Loný, live the multiple", difficult as it is to raise that crv [ ... 
] The 
multiple must be made I ... 
I' (TP 13/6). Foundationalism is thus displaced in Deleuze's 
practice by positing, as ground a foundation that is fact a true Ungrund, a self- 
differentiating difference. The making of the difference between philosophy and 
dogmatism requires a practical construction of the meaning of this distinction, wbich can 
no longer be viewed as an eternally secure. essential difference, but one which is 
continualiv subject to practical vanation. 
To sum up: Deleuze sees nihillsm as the outcome of a partictilar tendency within 
thinking, which manifests itself in Platonic philosophical practices that are not equal to 
the task of thinking the probleinafic difference that, as Schelling showed, is their own 
condition. In order to 'tarne' difference, sucli practices assume that the Nbsolute is 
commensurable with thought. But the expenence of nihifism. as in the traurna of reason, 
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where this assumption is overturned, leads for Deleuze to a potentially positive outcome. 
its own dissonance A itself, it faces the (for When thought finds itself confronted with " VIII 
Deleuze) undeniable fact that this difference is the minimal presupposition of any 
practice of thinking. To suppose that the essential task Of thought is to understand in what 
disinterested knowledge consists is to ignore this fact. The problem that confronts 
thought in the experience of nibilism is, for Deleuze, an autonomous and immanent one, 
as opposed to the heteronomous tasks accepted by Platonism. This is because it is 
immanent to the experience of difference that constitutes the basis of nihilism. Nihilistic 
thought has to try to create itself anew according to a stable practice of thinking, which 
can only be one that recognises the irreducible cbaracter of difference and attempts to 
construct a philosophical practice that can trace the movement of real difference within 
empirical phenomena. Such a practice would be absolutely immanent to being, ratbei- 
than positing be' under a transcendent form of identity and as relatively immanent in Ing 
empirical phenomena. As we shall now see, Hegel, who is often taken by his critics 
(including Deleuze) to be a foundationalist, a Platonic fliinker of relative immanence, 
also conceives of genuine philosophy in terms of absolute immanence, of a thinking that 
avoids positing transcendence. 
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Chapter Five 
Hegel's Critique of Representational Consciousness 
i) Introductkm 
Deleuze, as we have seen, attempts to overcome foundafionalism and its double- 
binds by renouncing, like Bergson, and like Scbelling in his more anfifoundationalist, 
'Deleuzean' moments (see previous chapter), the Kantian paradigm of transcendental 
conditioning- in favour of an ontological account of the real geneSis of determination. 
This was in one sense a response to the recurrent difficulties that critical thinking has 
faced in the post-Gen-nan Idealist pefiod right up to the present, caused by its failure to 
take the nibilism of the trauma of reason seriously enough. Taking Marx as an example, 
we saw bow difficult it was, given a ceTtain foundationalist 'image' of what philosophy. 
4science' or critical tbinking essentially is, to avoid simply presupposing absolute or a 
pri . ori knowledge of the real, wben any n Ot to such knowledge was precisely wbat was 
at issue. Deleuze responds by viewing this image of philosophy ('Platonism') as an 
illusion inherent in the existential conditions of thought, which can be overcome by 
changing our model of philosophy as a practice of thinking. 
The task for Deleuzean thoup-bt is to avoid all presuppositions about the nature 
and desfinv of thoup-ht that impIv the knowledge of a transcendent Universal, which is 
supposed to be immanent in the articulations of the real as their ground. Instead of this 
posited 'relative immanence" of the unconditioned in the r a-, the phjlosophcr is required 
to force thougbt to become equal to the absolute immanence of real difference itself, bv 
recasfing ontology in terms of the ungrounded movement of difference that, for Deleuze, 
is tbe sufficient reason of all determination, and by using this ontology as a means of 
tracinR the 'descent' of empincal phenomena. This requirement is grounded' bv the 
negative, stiýjective experience of the difference of thought from itself that 
I foundationalist thought undergoes when approaching its limits. The rc, ýulfini-,, decav of 
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the meaning of foundationalist philosophy presses home the task of using this ven- 
expenience as the basis of a re-injection of sens (meaning,! direction) into tbougbt. 
Pbilosophy becomes a matter of affirming throuO practical acti. 1ty the immanence of 
the incommensurable 'hiOer' Absolute in experience. with this redefinition of 
philosophy being grounded, not in a timeless Universal, but in a singular expenence of 
cnsis, a loss of essence, that nevertbeless makes a kind of 'absolute knowledge' possible. 
now want to argue that, if we go back to the beginning of tbc bistorical period 
in which the foundationalist conception of philosophy has been in crisis, we can find 
another example of an attempt to reabse an anti foundational ist version of critical thought 
that remains committed to the idea that thia-ing the Absolute is necessary for any sucb 
endeavour. This attempt was made by Hegel. at the same time as Schelfing was 
undermining foundationallsm ftom Within. I omitted any mention of Hegel in Chapter 
Two so as to be able to trace cleariv this intemal dvnamic of foundationalism which I 
have used to elucidate Deletize's thought. In the course of this and the next two chapters I 
will show that Hegel's approach to crifique has many strategic features in common with 
Deleuze's, before examining the differences between their respective critiques of 
foundationallsm in the concluding cliapter, in order to assess their respective success in 
overcoming the trauma of reason. 
Central to this re-examination of Hegel is the clwm that Hegel's Kantian 
commitment to the epistemological importance- of logic, as against the special intuitions 
appealed to by Fichte, Scbelling and others, is nevertheless also critical of Kant in a way 
that is consonant with the ontological turn camed out variously by Schelling, Bergson 
and Deleuze. 1 This claim requires that we distinguish between the reading of Hegel 
purstied here and pre,, lous influential interpretations of his work that fail to take the 
I The importance of Kant for Hegel is affirmed by such recent interpreters as Rose ( 11 98011, 
floulgate (1986,1991), Pippin (1989), ki2ek (19933), Maker (1995), Pinkard (1995) and Dusing 
(1995,1977)ý 
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problem of the incoherence of foundationalism as senously as I think Hegel himself did. 
In addition, we must take into account the enticisms of Hegel advanced by both 
Schelling and Deleuze and respond to them, In order to delineate Hegel's unique reply to 
foundational ism. Hegel's Absolute Knowing is not, I shall maintain, mere knowledge of 
the forms under which thought must necessarily think being. This would be to agree with 
the later Sebelling's assessment of flegel, and to reduce Begelian logic to the status of 
negative philosophy, which deduces possible determinations of the real without being 
able to show that they are also- actu. 41_2 Nor Is it knowledge of a transcendent 
metaphysical substance, which, like the Absolute as Schelling conceives it in the 
-Pbiloscohy of Identity, grounds all real difference as internally related to it through the 
necessary process of its self-limitation, and which is somehow given to thought as a 
positive foundation 3 Hcgel avoids these alternatives because he sees Absolute Knowing 
as knowledge of the structure of Being that does not posit Being as only determinate Ibr 
us (as a Kantian phenomenon), or as a metaphysically determinate substance, a thing-in- 
itself of some kind. Our first task is to show how such a non-foundational, ontological 
reading of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge can bee meaningful. nis Will require that we 
examine his extended critique of foundationallst theory. which is conducted in the 
Phenomenologv. 
.6 
ii) The Idea of a Phenomenolo& 
For Hegel, Absolute Knowledge, the standpoint of genuine philosophy, is 
embodied in a philosophical system that begins with logic. This standpoint has first to be 
attainecL however. This entails a process of educatior4 aimed at overcoming the habitual 
assurance of representational consciousness that its view of the world is definitive of 
2 For a seminal version of this negative reading, see Hartmann, 1976, esp. p- 106. 
This is the Hegel of the British Idealists (see Russe-fl's comments (1995, pp. 701-1-5)), but is also 
reminiscent of Taylor's ( 1975) reading of Hegel's Absolute as a real, substantial lZrOund. 
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experience. Hegel tbus affirins that a critique of presuppositions is a necessan, part of 
attaining a genuinely pbIloso-pbleal viewpoint. He also anficipates Deleuze by arguing 
that this critique will entail overturning, not certain accidental errors or partiCular 
unquestioned babits, but a whole 'imnc' of thought, of what it means to think, and be 
affirms that this image infects both 'natural' consciousness and philosophy. Further. this 
image is akind of transcendental illusion: as with Deletize's account of Platonism, Hegel 
will account for domatism Cabstract' or finite thinking that takes itself to be absolute) 
ontologically as an illusory aspect of being itself, as we will see in the following 
chapters. I'lie education of representational consciousness that takes us to this standpoint 
is undertaken Ill the p&4 
Hegel begins the Introduction to the PS by meditating on the requirement that 
critical thought, as an instrument for the discovery of trutb, should be Critical of itself 
above all. This already assumes a difference between thought and what it knows. It is this 
consciousness of distinction between subject and object that characterises 
representational consciousness. It was the conditions of possibility of this consciousness 
as a form of real knowledge that Kant, Fichte and Schelling were concerned with, as we 
saw. Witb this in n-tind, Ficbte and ScheUMP- responded to Kant's formal deduction of 
these conditions by affin-ning the need for a decisive break ývith the standpoint of 
representational consciousness in order to ground it. Without the unconditioned as the 
ultimate condition of possibility, we wotAd remain in Kant's predicament, in whicb the 
necessity of the forms of our experience was unknowable. However, this move proved 
problematic because the unconditioned, in wbatever form it was determined as the 
necessary ground of experience, could only be presupposed as this necessan, ground in 
relatioin to our familiar forms of experience, rather than known unconditionally as such. 
4 The role of the PS in relation to the Systern has, histoncEdly, been an object of controversy see 
ggeler, 1993, pp. 174-85. Even Hegel's own view altered somewhat (ibid. p. 224) However, P6 
for a statement that remained unaltered even in the final version of the SL, see SL 1,421-3/48-9ý 
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This inevitable circularity became in Deleuze's thought charactenstic of a -N-holc 
recumng practice of tbought, in wbicb the Absolute Is posited as resembling the content 
of familiar beliefs about experience. 
For Deleuze, the issue regarding the Absolute is how to th, tik it as a Schelfingian 
'bigher' Absolute, that Is, as incommensurable witb that wbich it conditions, as genuinely 
neither subject nor object, etc., and yet how this thought can be a kind of 'knowing' that 
is creative rather than contemplative or reflective, where both these latter images of 
thought imply a transcendent Ufflversal that thought strives to know but can only 
presuppose as an illusory ground. For Hegel too, tb-evl standpoint of philosovily requires a 
refusal of the distinctions and oppositions that characterise representational 
consciousness. This will enable us to comprehend the Absolute as a 'neither-nor' 
structure (Spirit), not because thoug-lit has discovered a transcendent, substantial 
Universal that grounds the possibility and necessity of real difference, but because 
genuinely philosophical thougbt knows itself to be being that is insofar as it immanenfly 
deteri-nines itself (PS 25/14 §25). As we shall see in the next chapter, the relation of 
structures of otbemess to this immanent process of self-detennination will be crucial for 
this study. 
Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Hegel sees the turn against representational 
consciousness as justified, not by an appeal to a special intuition in which the Absolute is 
known immediately, but by the structure of representational consciousness itself This 
structure is self-contradictory, for it is characteristic of all detenninations of 
consciousness that they are both immediate and mediated (EL PS 57-8/41, §67, SL 
66/68). For example, if an object is known, then this k-nowledge has to include both 
proof and certainty. The relation between these two aspects is necessarib., circular, as the 
Fichtean and Schellingian systems demonstrate. In these systems, the intuitive certainty 
as to the nature of the Absolute qua condition of experience requires proof if this 
Absolute is to tv olýjectivelv known as the ground of the necessity Of OUT expenence. Yet 
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the method of proof turns out to be an infimte deduction, and possesses no foundafion 
except the initial certainty. In this way, the mediafion of the intuitive certainty by proof 
and the immediacy of the certainty that justifies the method of proof are both needed as 
foundations of knowledge. But if both are essential and foundational. then neither can be, 
for tbey are eacb posited as the foundation of one another, as the means througb wbicb 
the other is known. This circularity, which gives rise to the traurna of reason in which 
foundationalism finds itself unable to continue, is, for Hegel, based on the conviction 
that the structure of representational consciousness which cbaracterises all our familial, 
conscious expei i iah ience, and which could be said to constitute the 'famil' ity' of 
this expenence itself, i. e., the fijndamental ftarnework in wbich expeneince makes sense 
for us, must be relied upon as the basis of philosophy's image of itself 
It can be argued that Hegel was even in his earliest Writings interested in the 
possible untenability of foundational] sm, given its dependence on habitual, unquestioned 
structures of expenence. From bis FrankfuTt penod (1797-1799) on, be was, along WItb 
his fiiend Schelling, concemed with the legitimacy of Kant's distinction between 
Vernunji and Vervand., and the possibility of oklective knowledge of the unconditional. 
In this period, Hegel and Schelling were influenced by their colleague H61derfin's 
critique of Fichte's definition of the absolute suý: Ject. Hegel also deten-nined the Absolute 
as immediate Being (Sein), and gave it a systematic role as the unconditional 
presupposition of synthetic and analyfic knowledge. 5 As we saw III Chapter Two, this 
leads to the view that all detertninate knowledge, even the Fichtean subject's supposedly 
immediate recognition of itself as determinately subjective, must depend upon a self- 
abbiding absolute identity and an act of di'vision that first makes the Absolute 
deten-ninable. As Klaus DfiSing shows, the central problem for Hegel throughout this 
period and the time lie spent in Jena before writing PS is a similar one to fliit %-., hlch 
plagued Fichte and Scbelling: how to demonstrate that the Absolute, defined as the 
5 Dusing, 1976, pp. 43-4,49- 50, Fujita, 1985, pp. 79-8 1. 
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unconditional condition of all knowledge. can be known immediately or in itselfbeyond 
this relation to determinate forms of knowledge. as a genuinely immediate unity that is 
also the real foundation or ground of experience. 6 In the Frankfurt ftagment 'Glauben 
und Sein', for example. faith is assigned the role of kno i is wing the Absolute. But th' 
repeats in another form the Fichtean and Schellingian aporia: one must presuppose that 
the Absolute is known immediately (but subjectively) as the unconditional foundation in 
order to begin, but by doing this, one indefinitely postpones the final, objective 
justification of this beginning, for the immediacy of the beginning simply reinforces the 4 
difference between mediated, conditioned fon-ns of proof and unconditioned immediacy. 
This problem of the circular interdependence of immediacy and mediation is 
thus of primary concern to Hegel, as a basic, inescapable difficulty for the 
foundationalist philosophies of his time, 7 To understand how the PS addresses this 
problem Ma way that owes much to Kant's influence, we must bepin with the early Jena 
period (1801-4), wben liege] becomes explicitly interested in this problem, and wben bis 
critique of his contemporaries, and particularly of Fichte and Schelling, begins to 
develop as a Kantian reflection on the i-ole of logic in relation to a system of knowledge, 
wMst also being bound up with a entique of the foundationalist aspects of KantiaMsm. ' 
Hegel later cbaracterised. Kantianism as being 'overawed by the object', which 
resulted in it being 'left with the residue of a thing-in-itself, an infinite obstacle, as a 
beyond' (SL 1,45/51). Hegel alludes here to certain presuppositions about experience, 
ý1ý about the meaning of what is to think, left unquestioned by Kant and the post-Kantians. 
The central asswnption bere is that of the ultimacy of representational consciousness, or 
6 DUsing, 1976, pp. 51-), 81-3,14-37-5, also 1969, p. 118-9. 
7 Hegel's awareness of this problem thus led him away ftom HoldeTfim see MenTich, 1971 a-, p- 11, 
p. 29., pp. 35-6. 
DiIsing, I Q76. pp. 211 --3 ). 109ff. On the e\idence that liegelýs critique of Schellingy begins here, see 
Fujita, op. cit., pp. 149-50,156-60. 
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in other words, that this structure is representative of the meaning of thought as such. 
This leads to the assumpfion that thought is essentially finite, defined in opposition to an 
object of which it is nevertheless supposed to have knowledge. Out of this contradiction J 
anses the question of the unity of representation and reality. and an image of pbIlosopby 
as the search for an immediately certain foundation of this unity is therefore necessary. 
But bow, Hegel asks, can this vocation of philosophy itself, based on a structure 
of experience which is simply accepted as givem be justified? For Hegel, this self- 
understanding of pbilosopby is well represented by its image of itself as an ultimately 
impartial, critical judge of the legifimacv of representations of the real, which was 
consolidated by the Enlightenment's critique of traditional authority. In 1802, he 
describes contemporary philosophy as 'nothing but the culture of reflection raised to a 
system' (FK 322/64). In the Enlightenment, the emphasis on the empincal, intended to 
combat the excesses of rationalism as well as those of superstition, means that wben 
thougbt inevitably turns to self-reflexively critique its own representations, tbe criteria for 
this critique are derived from familiar empirical experience (IFK 318-9/60). 
Kant and Ficbte reacted to this movement by redefining, the task of philosopby 
on the basis of altered conceptions of the nature of thinking. For Hegel, however, each in 
his own way defines thought as deterinined by the empirical. Their respective 
philosophies base themselves on notions of a self-Idenfical. and universal concept that, by 
rigbt, fonnally subsumes all em incal instances, but wbicb is still opposed to finite pi 
empirical content to which it, in terms of its content, can only be approximate. There is 
always a contingency or difference which these stndpoint-s cannot in principle account 
for (Kant's reliance on presuppositions about the real content of experience or Fichte's 
Gcffihý. Reason thus acquires what it takes to be its essential task by accepting its 
difference from the empirical as given, thus subjecting itself to an infinite labour (FK 
320-2/62-3') that can never be complete. For Hegel, this purely conceptual infinite 'is 
itself not the truth since III unable to consume and consummate finitude [die 
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Endlichkeii aqf-4uzehrenl' (FK 324ý"66). The distinction between infinite and finite reason 
here, or between pure and empirical reason is weighted in favour of the finite or 
empincal. The infinite concept is infinite because it is not finite. and is therefore 
conditioned by the finite, rather than being genuinely infinite or unconditioned. 
Consequently we can see that, for Hegel, if we attempt to reflexively detennine 
the conditions of possibility for expenence, the result Will necessarily reflect our 
assumptions about experience. Primary among, these assumptions is that of the difference 
between subject and object that defines repi-esentationai consciousness. It is this 
assumption that, as noted above, creates an epistemological problem that seems to 
require a foundationallst solution. In this way, the foundation will inevitabiy reflect in its 
form the identitv of subject and object, and in its content, modes of objectivity and 
subjectivity that we are familiar with from experience. Like Deleuze, tben, Hegel 
discovers that the positing of a relation of resemblance between a transcendent or 
abbstract condition and the conditioned is cbaracteristic of foundationalist thougbt. For 
example, Kant's unity of apperception reflects the formal identity of subject and obiect 
in my consciousness, and thus establishes the fori-nal possibility of knowing, but the 
determinations of this unity are simply read off other accounts of experience that are 
accepted as Vven. And with Fichte and Schelling, the Absolute is posited as the 
unconditional unity and foundation of all distinctions between subiect and object, but 
when it comes to deriving the content (the totality of forms of our experience, ) that Will 
establish it as the objective foundation of all experience, this process is unending,, with 
the result that the relation between pure identity and the real distinction it is meant to 
ground becomes problematic. Both flunkers then concelve of this relafion in terms of a 
primordial difference, which undennines their project, leaving the content that they 
construct for the Absolute as a merely subjectively valid reflection of our familiar 
experience, as in Schelling"s construction of a 'first creation'. 
149 
For Hegel, then, foundational ism, in remaining tied to the structure of 
representational consciousness, must always presuppose something about the constitution 
of experience, an unquestioned nominal definition of experience that be reflected in 
the foundation that it deduces. If this is the case, thinks liege]. then the only alternative 
for thought is, instead of beginning with a relation to something simply . 
0ven to it, to 
take up an active relation to jiself, wbieb nevertbeless allows it to provide real definitions 
(EL §24 Zus. 2). All justifications of objective knowledge m relation to experience can 
oniv be valid relative to that content and therefore Hegel's radicai conclusion is that the 
whole foundationalist model of thought, and the assumptions that underlie it (the given 
difference between subject and object), must be done away with, for so long as 
foundational i sm remains a blueprint for philosophy, ffiought will be unable to deterimne 
itself, that is, to stand in a truly infinite and autonomous relation to itself As noted 
previously, for Hegel as for Deleuze it is an image of thought that we must reject, rather 
than ceTtain configurations of this image. This image is that of foundationallsm, the 
Lphilosophical' transposition of representational consciousness into a supposediv 
transcendent realm (cf DR 173-4/132-3). Hence Hegel's first task, as set in the early 
Jena writings, is to overcome the temptation to construct an image of philosophy out of 
presupposifions about experience. Later, be describes in PS the accomplishment of this 
task as the 'way of despair' (PS 69/49 §78) for representational consciousness. In 
genuine philosophy, the finite consciousness 'feels as if, together with the mode of 
representation, the very ground where it stands solidly and is at horne, has been pulled 
from undeT it' (E L §31). 
If this overcoming is to be genuine, then Hegel's properly philosophical 
perspective must not itself rely upon any presuppositions about the object of thought. If 
such presuppositions turned out to be present Hegel would have failed to transcend the 
standpoint of representational consciousness, by remaining tied to a conception of a 
determinate object that is somehow givel, to thought a, ý determinate. This would mean 
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that Hegel makes the same mistake as the early Schelling. by presupposing that the object 
of tbought is an absolute unity of subject and object that is given to us as inherently 
rafional, and thus that negative philosophy alone is sufficient to know the Absolute. 
Despite the fact that the later Scbelling cnlhcises Hegel for just this error (L\IP 14*. ", - 
6/147-9), Hegel is aware of the dariger of positing the Absolute under a conditioned forin 
in this fiLshion, both III the early Jena writings, 9 and ]atter m EL (bis denunClation of 
formalism in §12). His attempt at a solution to this problem centres on the thought that 
the attainment of a truly pbilosophical perspective must be dependent upon concrete 
forms of experience that constitute the living present of thought, and yet at the same 
time, this very dependence can be the means of overcoming representafional 
consciousness per se, tbus providing a total critique of representational consciousness 
that does not fall into a foundationallst aporia by presupposing that it is based on a 
foundation that is somehow immediately known as such. 
In DFS (1801),, which may have had a decisive influence on Schelfing's 
development of the Menfildi. vsystem, 10 the difference between the actual, present 
Condition of philosophy and its eternal truth in absolute knowing is presented as the 
difference between a finite, reflexive Verstand, and an infinite, speculative Vernuqfi. 
Here, ]Hegel affinns that the genuinely pbilosophical standpoint requires a radical 
overcoming of representational consciousness: 'In order to reach the essence of 
philosophy it is necessary to throw oneself into it a corps perdu - meaning by "bod. v" 
bere, the surn of one's idiosyncrasies' (DFS 11 1188). -nie question of the possibility of 
such a rejection of finite reflection then arises, which the Jena Schelling answers with the 
notion of an absolute intellectual intuition. For the Jena Hegel, it is already the case that 
the solution must involve a meditation on method, and the question of immediacy and 
9 See DUsing, 1976, pp. i,;. -14 on 
Hegel's cntique of Fichte- s one-sided Absolute, and p. 1-33 1 on -3 
how this reflects Jacobi's Fichlekrilik. 
"' Dtisirig, 1976, p 139 and 1968, esp. pp. 95-6, pý 114, pp 119-20 
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mediation, which distances him fTom Fichte and Schelling and their idea of an 
intellectual intuition in which the Absolute is kno,. Nrn in-itself, although be still employs 
the notion of a 'transcendental' intuition in a systematic role in the 1801, ý02) lectures on 
lo ic and metaphysics in order to make the leap into philosophy a corps perdu. a move 91 
he would later rej ect, 11 
In the pre-Jena period, Hegel had determined the relation between immediacy 
and mediation as a relation between an ultimately presupposed unity O'Nein) and 
'antinomies' produced by reflection, 12 In the Jena penodý Hegel, in a similar way to 
Fichte, interprets the dichotomy tEnt-n-vejung] that 'is the source of the need for 
philosophy' (DFS 12/89) as an apparently irreconcilable antinomical relation between 
different definitions of the Absolute that is definitive for flic present culture of reflection 
and its plillosopby. The Absolute, the in-itself of being, appears in this milieu as either 
the diversity posited by the Understanding, or the unity desired by Reason. In relation to 
the wider intellectual culture, the history of philosophy is seen here as a series of 
attempts to reconcile various dichotornous definitions of the real that anse through 
reflection on familiar experience (Spint'Extension, Subject/Object etc. ). These attempts 
'have not resulted in a final and absolute reconciliation (for then there would be no history 
of philosophy), but have produced instead a plethora of relative identities that posit a 
resemblance between Absolute and conditioned. Reason continually identifies itself Witb 
the conditioned term that represents unity within the dichotomy (e. g., Spirit, Subject), 
and posits it as absolute (DFS 13/91), abstracting it from its relation to the otber terin. 
Tbe Enligbtenment culture of reflection presents a special opportunity to overcome this 
tendency, howeveT, even as it confinues it, for its own intemal dichotomy, which is 
'' Cf DUsing, 1976, p. j 40-3 on Hegel and Scheiling's use of intuition in the Jena period. 
12 See. jbid, pp. 60-1, on Hegel's non-Kantian interpretation of 'antinomy'. from the Frankfurt 
period onward, Hegel uses this term to refer to the relation of contradictory predicates to a 
subject, rather than to the relation betv, een contTadictor-y jud. -gernem s and a 
lhing-jn-ýself 
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exemplified for the Jena Hegel by Fichte's thought, concerns the veiA relation between 
difference and identity. 
According to Hegel, irreconcilable dichotomies anse for reflection because it is 
representational consciousness as such that is contradictory. rather than just some of its 
definitions of expeiience. The very fact that to represent something is to be aware of a 
difference between relative identities (e. g., subject and object), means that representation 
finds that it is dependent on contradictory Will , presuppositions, in 
the folio ig way. On the 
one band, consciousness of the relative difference that defines representation presupposes 
the absolute unity of the differentiated tenns (e. g., subject and object) (DFS 15/93), for 
only then could they be known as different. On the other hand, the 'el-nergence 
[Herausgetrelensein] of consciousness from the totality, ' (DFS 15/93), and thus the 
absolute difference or lack of relation between the subject and what it is conscious qJ 
must be assumed. Representational consciousness is thus forced to posit both 
presuppositions as essential to it. When it becomes explicitly foundationallst, and reflects 
on which assumption is more essential or foundational for it, it is forced to affirm the 
pTesupposed unity, wbicb it TepTesents to itself as a given determinateness (as Subject, 
Knowledge, etc. ). Without this rec ition and this representatton, it would be unable to ogm 
posit an essential relation at all, 13 But this means that the absolute unity of the 
differentiated tenns is represented as a relative identity, one whose positive content is a 
given deterininateness, and which therefore implies conditioning relations With other 
deterrninatenesses. This representation, assumed as given, is thus conditioned by 
determinate relations that are derived from our familiar experience. A conditioned 
content has therefore been posited as corresponding to the content of the unconditioned 
or absolute that lies, unexpressed, in the background of representational consciousness. 
T'his positing of a relative content for the Absolute means that a resemblance has been 
13 As we'will see in the next nko chapters, this foundationalist requirement of determinateness in 
II sed _ zel 
in SL's Doctrine of Essence. the essential or foundational relation is critici by Heg 
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posited between the Absolute and the relative T111s. for Hegel. is necessanly 
contradictory. The absolute difference wbich has to be presupposed is supposedly 
negated in a relative identity, which has its source in one pole of the difference. This is. 
however, just testifies to the unjustifiable foundationalist assumption (present in 'Fichte's 
philosophy, as we saw in Chapter Two) that the relation and lack of relation between two 
terms can both be grounded in one of these conditioned terms. 
We have discovered here Hegel's account of a 'double movernent'. comparable 
with that which Deleuze suggests is charactenstic of Platonism. Hegel, however, posits 
this tendency as an iflusion constituted by the movement of reflection, rather than as the 
product of a non-conscious ontological tendency. Hegel concurs With Deleuze, thougii, in 
seeing foundationallst philosopby, understood as the tendency of reflection to posit the 
absolute in relation to the relative, as presupposing a subjective orientation that it cannot 
justify (DFS 16/94), an interest of reason (in Kant's sense) in unity. which arises out of 
forins of non-pbilosopbical experience in wbicb diebotomies that appear irreconcilable to 
foundationalist reflection are continually encountered. The trauma of reason represents a 
philosophical dichotomy in which this internal dynamic is laid bare, Without being 
entirely understood. For Hegel, so long as the focus of philosophy falls elsewhere than 
on the inherently contradictory nature of reflection, this lack of understanding will 
continue, and dichotomies Will persist in arising. '111hilosophy will thus be driven beyond 
itself again and again to the later Schelling's 'solution' to the problem of dichotomy: an 
implicit or explicit act of faith In which the reconcilability of the dichotomies of 
representation with reason, or the inherent rationality of the Absolute, is affirined Without 
being proven. 
For Hegel, the difficulty for philosophy is ulfimately that of articulating a 
relation belween tmity and difference sucb that the contradiction bemeen them can 
actually be grasped as an essential element oi'the Absolute itself Ilie major obstacle to 
the success of any such atilculation is the stubborn ngidity of representational 
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consciousness. For representational or 'natural' consciousness. the subject of a 
Proposition is ruled by the principle of non-contradiction: if opposing predicates are 
posited in the swne subject (e. g., the Absolute, x, is both absolute ident' - ity and absolme 
difference), then the result is a disjunction. X can be either, but not both. Ho-*N: e,, er. as we 
saw in Chapter 2 in relation to Schelling's acceptance of 1161derfin and Jacobi's critiques 
of transcendental idealism, for objective Imowledge of disjunction to be possible, one 
must presuppose an Absolute that does not obey this law of disjunction. Hegel's attempt 
to provide a critique of consciousness must sbow bolx one can articulate sucb an 
Absolute in consciousness, without simply dogmatically presupposing that the essence of 
the Absolute in-itself is knowable, and without imposing the burden of pToVing the 
validity of this account of the Absolute as an infinite Sollen upon consciousness. 
So the Hegelian Absolute must be understood as inclusive of absolute 
contradiction, as both 'Subject' and 'Substance' (PS 20/10 § 17), and therefore cannot be 
articulated in opposition to the finite, for then it becomes the source of a Sollen, a merely 
Lconceptual' infinite conditioned by the fitilte. Further, an account of the Absolute, for 
liege], cannot be based on something like a Schellingian ecstasy of reason in which 
representational consciousness is annihilated in favour of pure immediacy, 
14 for this 
option, by pointing to the 'outside' of reason, reinstates a disjunction between infinite 
(immediate) and finite (mediated or conditioned). Instead, critique must focus oil the 
fixity of representational consciousness, the way it, as a babitual mode of tbinking, 
remains wedded to the principle of non-contradiction, and thus to the opposition between 
identity and difference. Hegel will not rigidly oppose the immediacy of an intuition to 
the mediatedness of thoughtý but will instead demand of philosophy that it render finite 
14 Cf, letter to Hegel, 04., "02. ý)7795, in Fuhrmans, 1973, p. 65 'f.. I we should break- down these 
barriers, i. e. we should leave behind the finite sphere for the infinite (practical philosophý,, ). This 
also demands the destruction [Zerxii. )ning] of finitude and vvill take us therebv to the supeTsensible 
world'. 
1 
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thinking itself fluid, 15 i. e., capable of comprehending Its own contradictory structure, 
which would mean that, in transcending the sphere of representational consciousness 
from within, thought has discovered its own genuinely infinite aspect. 
In the later Jena period (1805/06), Hegel moves decisively away from the 
Schellingian theme of intellectual intuition and towards a theory of what might (despite 
the Ficbtean connotations) be called absolute suklectivity, and thus away ftom the 
division lie had hitherto made between a preparatory, critical Logik in which finite 
reflection is undermined by showing bow its determinations are inherently contradictorv. 
and a subsequent, positive organon or Metapkvsik in which the Absolute is kiiown 
througb its reflections in consciousness. This division is dissolved in a Logik that 
considers absolute knowledge, not as intuifion, but purely as cognition, Erkennen. It is 
this move that sets the scene for the development of the model of absolute knowledge 
presented in the PS. 
16 
How could an idea of self-grounding, absolute cognition, however, be anything 
other than a negative determination of merely posSible determinations of being, which 
narcissistically assumes these forms to be true of being in itselP As previously noted, 
this was the charge brought by the later Scbelling against Hegel: the notion of a pure 
thinking of antinomies as identical With absolute knowledge seems simply to have 
ignored Kant's distinction between intuition and the understanding, and Schelling's own 
disfinction between the purely rational Absolute and the problematic, 'higher' Absolute. 
liege] thus appears to be a kind of dogmatic Fichtean who assumes that being-In-Itself 
has the same 'contradictory' structure as thought, 17 By turning now to directly examme 
the PS, we will discover how liege] at least anticipates such olýjections. 
I; Cf Fujita, 1985, pp. 156-8. 
16 See Msing, 1976, pp. 156-7, p. 198. 
ginatic' reading that n orms Wiffianis' (1989, p. 43) and Marc-use's (19,97, p. 10. 17 It is such a 'dot IfI 
p. 38) Marman assessments of Hep-el's account of the Telation between subject and object Hegel is 
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For Hegel, it is foundationalism that Is narcissistic or. in his teii s, fon-nalistic, 
for it is nothing but the reflexive. methodological expression of the 'natural'. or rather, 
familiar and accepted, perspecfive of representational consciousness. and thus it 
presupposes the ultimac,,,, of the divisions that cbaractense this consciousness. 
Fowidationalism understood as an expression of representational. and therefore 
contradictory, consciousness, will itself tberefo-re be a contradictory position (PS 65- 
6/46-7 §73). Hegel's response seems Cartesian: he asserts that absolute knowledge or 
--I- , pnilosopby is absolute (and non-fo-rmalistic) because it is presuppositionless (SL 35- 
7/43-5), i. e., it does not begin from a positive, determinate definition of the meaning of 
experience, 18 The presuppositions of foundationalism concern the modes of experience 
that representational consciousness is familiar With, and are extracted from accepted 
accounts of the inner structure of these modes such as natural science. Foundationalism 
then attempts to show how such accounts are themselves possible as universally 
necessary fonns of experience. Giving an account of the genesis of these presuppositions 
(which as we saw in Chapter 3, is central to post-Hegelian thought. ) that foundationalism 
cannot finally account for then becomes necessary. But if this is done, then a 
Schellinglan objection suggests itself any attempt to objectively explain the genesis of 
presuppositions already presupposes that their conditions are somebow known. Before 
the enquiry begins, a foundational, transcendent subjectivity (Deleuze's 'common sense') 
in which thought and being are unified has already been presupposed. 
In relation to this problem, Schelling made the important point that, if 
foundational i sin is to be self-consistent, then the diversity of presuppositions about 
experience must all be based on a fundamentally non-discursive, non-representational 
(and non-articulable) form of experience -a foundationalist proposition that places 
an 'absolute idealist' because he assumes that the object- in-itself possesses a dialectical structure. 
As we shall see, this is inaccurate. 
18 Cf Butler, 1996, p 1, and Maker, 1995, Ch I eip pp- 59-60 
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foundationalism itself in jeopardy. However, for Hegel this appeal to an ineffable 
immediacy only repeats the reflexive principle that the mediated must rely on the 
immediate, and therefore ignores the fact that the converse is also true. Schelling does 
not consider bow the act of abstracting the Absolute from the finite as its unconditioned. 
which is a form of reflexive mediafion, inevitably implies the quesfion of how the 
possibility of an actual inlififion of this Absolute can itself be proven. 19 This difficulty 
necessarily resurfaces later in the systematic problem of the Sollen, which implies the 
ub s jection of the finite to the 'bad infinite' of an abstract concept in the effort to pi-ove 
the objective validity of the intuition from which the system begins. This imperative 
places the finite under the domination of the tbougbt of Absolute Identity as real ground, 
against which the deten-ninateness of the finite cannot endure. 20 
If we aTe to bave any bope of fon-nulating a successful response to the pToblem 
of overcoming the circle of presuppositions without positing the existence of a special 
intuition, we must Tecognise, liege] argues, that Absolute Knowing cannot begin 
otherwise than with both immediacy mid mediation: its beginning must be both 
pTesuppositionless and bistorically conditioned. This bistoncal conditioning bas its 
proximate philosophical expression in Kant's thought for it is the modes of experience 
reflected in Kant's pbilosopby that provide the intellectual bistorical enIvITonment in 
which Absolute Knowing can exist. Hegel's assertion is that Absolute Knowing will 
flwefore include or comprebend the dicbotomies of Kant's tbougbt. The first intimations 
of this process in the PS are in the Preface, which outlines a wider dichotomy of diversity 
19 Diising, 1976, p. 21, p. 142-1 1977, p, 120, p, 122, p. 127. 
20 Hegel's cl-ItIcIses theSollen becau-se it implies an infmite division of concept and reality (EL §55, 
§60), and through this division, creates an ethical relation in which the concept of the absolute 
clorninates. the natural world, as in the revolutionary Terror (FK 416/174, PS 413-22/355-63 
§ "582-95). Cf Rose op. cil., pp 100-1, pp 171-4) §Z 
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and unity: the cuffent historical situation of philosophical thought is opposed to 
anticipations of the new Absolute. 
is true that these anficipations can easily be misunderstood as unjusfifiable 
abstractions about the nature of the absolute, that are somehow rneant as foundations that 
will justify Hegelian Science from the outset. However, they appear in the midst of a 
discussion of wbat Hegel bad eaTher in Jena called the 'culture of reflection". Hegel 
discusses contemporary views on the relation between the subject of knowledge and the 
Absolute that sbow Kantian, Ficbtean and Schellingian influences. These are abstract 
reflections on familiar forms of experience (science-, Chrisfian morality, pietist faith), and 
have themselves become familiar tendencies within the wider intellectual culture. That 
which is merely familiar (lbekanni), however, is through its very familiarity or 
immediacy, not mediated or genuinely known (erkanni) (PS 31/18 §31). This Hegelian 
disfitiction is not a difference between something, mifially accepted on the word of 
another, subsequently doubted, only to return as a ceriainty grounded in one's own 
reason (PS 69/50 §78_). Such a Cartesian model of doxa versus knowledge is itself a 
foundationalism, wbicli begins from accepied definitions of wbat is to be doubted. As 
previously noted, Hegel agrees With Deleuze that it is the horizon of 'familiarity' as 
such, the inberent tendency of reflexive thougbt to rely upon the structure of 
representational consciousness in defining the relation of thought to being, that must be 
crificised in its totality in order to present a different image of philosophy. 
However, the familiar cannot be negated by immediately proclaiming a new 
Absolute. This would simply reject previous versions of the Absolute in favour of a neNN- 
determination, which would once again reflect dichotomies ansing from a definition of 
expene-nee that would itself be merely given or 'shot from a pistol' (PS 28i2l §37, SL 1, 
65/67). Representafional consciousness, when it becomes foundational i st, demands that 
all tnith-claims be justi fied or proven, and this means that, as Hegel recognises, simply 
insisting on the difTerence between proclaimed knowledge of the Absolute and accepted 
1 -1; 8 
ience opinion will not suffice. This would simply mean that Absolute Kno%vledge or Sci 
Lwould be declaring its power to lie simply in its being, but the untrue ti. e.. familiar] 
knowledge likewise appeals to the fact that it i, ý, and assures us that for it Science is of no 
account' (PS 68/49 06). And a vindication of the possibility of Absolute Knowledae, if 
it is also to be a critique of foundafionalism, must recognise the central Hegelian paradox 
in the PS, i. e., that representational consciousness can only be related to the Absolute 
through its own overcoming of itself Any attempt to specify a new beiond of 
representational consciousness as its negative simply binds philosophy anew to 
representational consciousness, especiafly when this beyond is defined as utterly 
transcendent of consciousness as sucb (as wben Sclielling makes an ecstatic 'Intuition' 
and a Sollen equally essential to philosophy). Hegel's goal is to allow representational 
consciousness, as concretely defined by bistorically-prevalent dicbotomies, to 
demonstrate that the Absolute is not external to it. This demonstration must therefore 
itself be immanent to consciousness, involving no foundational method that has to be 
juss6fied prior to the demonstTation-21 
This enables us to address the apparent inconsistencv that results from a Preface 
that reinstates a duality of diversity (fmiliar dicbotoniies. ) and unity (the new absolute). 
This apparent inconsistency will turn out to be consistent in relation to the requirement of 
an immanent method. A consciousness schooled in the distinctions made by finite reason 
cannot be persuaded to lose its rividity and reject the supremacy of the PrInciple of non- 
contradiction simply by talk of an immanent method. In order to be forced to think 
inclusiveiv, rather than di Junctively, such a consciousness must be subiected to Si I 
paradoxes that erode its habitual orientation towards an object of thought, examples 
"' Ohashi, (. )p cli., p. 21, points out that, for the early Schelling, the absolute had also to be 
conceived of as wilhin consciousness, rather than as opposed to it. But Schelling, like H61derlin 
(Henrich, 1971a. pp. 16-17) conceived of this internal relation as one between productive 
ontolosucal tendencies, which would, for Hegel, be a peftho principfi. 
I -; () 
whose forms of expression are themselves selected abstractly from among the familiar. 
but which nevertheless force a consciousness used to abstraction to see itself and its truth 
Co 
- 
in. 22 H its as farn-fliar the ab. -stractions of in the paradoxes they Pta - -ence the 
Preface present 
mathematical reasoning, formalism, and 'enthusiasm'. before gomg, on to present. 
equaliv abstractiv, the paradoxical 'speculative proposition' (PS 52-6/35-40 §§58-65) in 
which, for Hegel, the Absolute is expresse& and finally, in the Introduction, -, Ne find 
within Kantian and Reinholdian aspects of the relation between the 'for itself' and the 'in 
itself the paradox of 'detenmnate negation. 
So the purpose of these initial moves cannot be to determine the objective 
difference between a condition of 'fallenness' cbaractensed. by our reflexive awareness 
of difference and an intuition of the Absolute, for such a distinction would then itself 
require grounding. The Introduction and, in particular, the Preface (which was composed 
after the rest of the book was complete) constitute an apparatus for tempting 
representational consciousness, not to reject the familiar in favour of the claim of a 
magisterial intuition, but to recognise itself in somefliing initially utterly unfamiliar to it 
and therefore without meaning for it. Thus consciousness must be induced to see itself as 
containing the absolute, rather than as bening oppossed to it. 
23 This will subsequently give 
wav to an nnmanent demonstration of this fact. It is clear, tben, that Hep-el, in opposition 
to Schelling, grants representational consciousness qua consciousness of difference an 
inalienable right over against the 'opposing tendency', the ardent desire for Absolute 
unity (PS 26/14-15 §26). 
This immanent demonstration, the 'method" of the PS, cannot then be based 
ste, 94 i upon a detefrmnate foundafion in expeficnce that fernams unquestioned. 24 1-n- it can. 
be nothing other than a descriptive method, beginning WIlth the experiential assumptions 
22 Cf Rose, 1980, P. 151 
23 See also Lamb, 1980, pp- 15-16. 
24 Lamb. o,,, i? cii-, p. 30. 
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that charactense representational consciousness. and criticising them systematical Iv. thus 
remaimng i; i anent to its -subject matter. 
15 Yet such a 'method' has to begin somewhere. 
We could begin abstractly by enumerating (to use a Kantian tenn. ) the historically 
deten-ninate presuppositions of a consciousness which Hegel charactenses as 'natural' so 
as to sketch its 'Ideological' character, its merely familiar convicfions about NNhat is 
4natural'. We migbi include in this list of assumptions the followlng: that there Is an 
essential relation of correspondence between the subject's representation and the nature 
of the object, that this relation can be articulated, and that the validity of this relation can 
I-- 
be proven a priori. And even more basic, there is the assumption of the ditlerence 
-I, _ between the subject and the object itself And then there is the self-sufficiency of the 
reason of the individual: there may be many doxai about the nature of the world, but the 
individual has the capacity to sort the true frorn the false (an assumption Deleuze also 
points to). 
These opMlons may be basic to the modem 'Image of thought'. But there 
remains the problem of the necessity and completeness of our investigation of tbern. 
Kant's enumeration of the conditions of the possibility of expenence was cnficised 
precisely for its abstract and contingent cbaracter. In attempting to overcome tbis, a 
genetic method as employed by Fichte and Schelling finds itself having to begin by 
assurning the validity of a deterrmnation of the Absolute in order that the forms of 
experience can be deduced from it with necessity. But this necessity is consequently only 
assumed to flow from the nature of the Absolute, and nofliing is thereby genuinely 
explained, as there is no gum-antee, of completeness in the deduction. In this connection, 
it is necessary to understand the PS, in its role as the introduction to Hegel's System, as a 
iranscendenial detluclion of the idea of Absolute Knowing, which operates by 
15 DON, c, 1970, pp. 17-19. 
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progressively deducing the conditions of a basic fonn of consciousness, ending with the 
uncondifional, 20 
There are thus two interpretative issues to be decided: a) the question as to where 
the PS must begin, and b) bow the complete deduction of Absolute Knov, "Ing is to be 
understood. Beginning with the latter, we should note that Hegel's solution to the 
problem of presuppositions is Fichtean, in that be envisages a systematic deduction that 
is self-enclosed, requiring no externally given presuppositions. TbIs influence is, 
bowever, tempered by that of Kant. Hegel refuses to be in from an intellectual intuition gI 
of the Absolute in itself, qua ground of determination. Yet, given Hegel's denunciation 
of Kant's critical philosophy as a merely finite form of reason, bow can he affirm the 
foundationallst idea of a L)eduklion? Does this not repeat the division of consciousness 
that Kant assumes as ulfimate? 
We should note that what Hegel sees as important in Kant's transcendental 
deduction is not the synthetic unity of consciousness defined over against the 
transcendental object, which was transformed by Fichte and Schelling into different 
forms of productive intuition, but rather the ltýgical relation between consciousness and 
self-consciousness that is essential to Kant's argument. On Robert Pippin's 
interpretation, 27 for example, Hegel takes up Kmft's argmnew (at CPuR B138) that it is 
only In relation to the unity of self-consciousness that even any presentation of an object 
in intuition is made possible, and that therefore there are no "pure intuitions' without 
relation to self-consciousness. Experience, for Kant and for Hegel, is therefore not 
simply a change in the state of a subject, the reception of stimidl or the currency of a 
mental state, but is consciousness of an existing object. 28 In this way, Kant (for Hegel), 
: ('On the importance of the specifically Kantian notion of a deduction for Hegel, see Pippin, 1989, 
6 and p. 19. Again, this roie of the PS has not been uncontroversial- see n. 4 above. 
27 Qp. cit., pp. 20-31 and 27-9. 
Mid, p. 116. 
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, ihows that all experience of objects arises through a certain mode of self relation on the 
part of the subject. The question is. bow must this self-relation be conceived9 Is it 
absolute knowledge understood as the self-presence of the sub, ect, ts knowledge of tself 
as it is in itselP 
This cannot be the case, for this supposedly a priori knowledge would be an 
illusion of the kind that Kant refutes in the Paralogisms. Hence the self-relation here does 
not entail that we are intuitively present to ourselves alongside every case of presenting a 
syntbesis of an empirical manifold to ourselves. The Kantian 'I tbink', in terms of 
transcendental logic, indicates an always potential relation of knowing (the representation 
'I think' can accompanv all my presentations): it is this potential knowledge of the 
discursive rules of synthesis for a mwilfold of intuition that is the condition of the 
difference between a merely subjective association of mental states and the 
consciousness of an object29 Kant's insight is thus that any knowledge-claim must 
presuppose that it is possible to become conscious of the discursive rules that allow the 
claim to be made in the first place. 30 In order to present x to ourselves as an objectý it is 
necessary that we should be able to become conscious of the rules, ffic practice or 'point 
of VieW", 
31 
which we employ to present x to ourselves, " Importantly. knowledge of these 
rules is not knowledge of an object, but of the conditions of presentation for an object. In 
a sense, such knowledge is unconditioned, as it arises only through a relation of the 
subject to itself but it is nevertheless not an intuition of the subject in itself 
Just as some of the assumptions, characteristic of flie fmiliar or "natural' 
consciousness, that will appear systernatically in the PSs deduction of Absolute 
Knowing are first dealt Witli abstractly in the Preface, so is the Introduction an abstract 
29 Ihid, p, 19, Diisin_, g 1993, p, 491) 
30 Pippin, 1989, p. 23. 
31 Pinkard, 1995,52, 
12 jhj4j_ p, 46, Pippin, 1987, pp 459-60 
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presentation of the necessary dynarnic of the deduction itself. for it deals with the form 
of this self-relation of the subject. It explicitly discusses this issue in terms of the 
necessary relation between any intended object and self-consciousness. s1iowing that this 
relation is a necessary internal movement of self-consciousness. rather than an intuition. 
This movement is a process of E'rkennen, co&mition. but also (to employ another of this 
word's meanings in German) recognilion, or rather re-cognition, a necessary process of 
re-thinking a relation. This movement of re-cognition is a logical movement from an 
object to the rules that allow it to be posited, i. e., from conditioned to condition, ratbei- 
than being a psychological act of matching up diverse contents with the aid of a concept 
that . wb, -, -umes them all. 
33 Unlike 'psycbological' recognition, the logical movement of 
recognition actually prevents self-consciousness from affirming that the object it re- 
cognises as conditioned by certain niles is the same object of which it was inifially 
conscious. It is this process, through which the object becomes unfamiliar, that the 
Int-t-oduction presents as the inner 'experience' (Eýfahrung) of natural consciousness (PS 
75/55 §86). In this way, the independence of an object is undermined, and consciousness 
becomes aware, not of the object as an independent entity Simply given to it, but of the 
role of the subject in positing it as independent. It Is this movement that will, in the 
course of the deduction, develop througb several levels of complexity into Absolute 
Knowing. 
We now need to examine the nature of this movement as the Introducfion 
describes it. As we have seen, for liege] representational consciousness has for its basic 
structure the awareness of being immediately conscious of an object opposite it. The 
content of this immediacy is what consciousness takes to be the Absolute, or to be the 
h-uth of the object as it is in-itself But this consciousness is also aware of itself as 
different from the object, as the knower of the object, and thus in relation to it. The 
object is thus defined in a second aspect as only fbr consciousness. Thesc two aspects 
33 Pinkard, op. cil., P. 3622 n. 10. For the p.,. rchological usage, cf. CNR A 103-) 0. 
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reflect Kant's account of the two modes of representing an object via Reason and ., -]a the 
Understanding. The difference between these two aspects is thus one between: a. ) 
consciousness of the foundation of truth, and b. ) consciousness of the mode or method 
iousness re-cognises v la which this foundation is known (PS 72-3/52-3 §§82-4). If consci 
this difference, it alters its perspective on itself effectively comparing one moment of 
itself (tbe definition of the foundation or of trutb) with anotber moment (the knowledge 
of method or of the difference between consciousness and the truth. ), and thus becomes 
aware of the difference between a moment of immediate idenfitv and one of mediated 
difference. This difference between moments does not become fixed, however, creating 
an either/or disjunction between the immediate and the mediated, as both these moments 
themselves 'are_/, br the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison, 
it is for the same consciousness to know wbether its knowledge of The object corresponds 
to the object or not' (PS 74,154 ý'85). The awareness of the difference between the two 
moments is this latter, disjunctive comparison, which inevitably demonstrates that the 
supposed 'in-itself is only an immediacy fbr consciousness, that is, that the veiýy 
immediacy of the obiect is only possible tIm-ougb a relafion to consciousness. Througb 
this experience, which is necessitated by the dualistic structure of representational 
consciousness, a further change occurs: 
Since consciousness thus finds that its 
I -. - Knowledge does not con-espond to its object, the object 
itself does not stand the test, in other words, the 
criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was 
to have been the cntenon fails to pass the test, and the 
testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a 
testing of the critenon of what knowing is. 
(P S745/ -5 4-5 ýý, 
g5ý 
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The supposedly immediate foundation and the conditional knowledge are not 
absolutely negated in this process, as in the kind of superficial scepticism Hegel 
denounces earlier (PS 52/56 §59) that knows how to point out the necessary difference 
between the two moments of consciousness but cannot pToduce anything positive 
thereby, and sees only a circular either/or, where each term is the foundation of the other. 
Sucb a capricious and subjective scepticism is opposed to the necessaTN! and absolule 
scepticism that, for Hegel, is absolute because it is immanent to 'natural' consciousness. 
This absolute scepticism does not place in question our knowledge of objects, by raising 
the spectre of the unknowable foundation of knowledge or thing-in-itself, but rather 
questions the idea of the possibility of defining a thing-in-itself, or sel f-subsi stein t 
foundation, as such. 
The in-itself is not iust defined formalIv as 'external' or other, but also, seeing as 
it is defined as a foundation, it must have a specific content. The difference between the 
two moments of identity and difference is thus itself comprehended within a new unity, a 
new foundation or in-itself, a new definition of the object. The content of this new 
definition will follow necessarily from the difference between the two previous moments 
of consciousness: it is thus a delerminaie negation of what went before. And again, 
through its own fon-nal relation to the subject, the content of this definition will prove to 
be afflicted with the difference between in-itself and for-another. This, then, is what 
logical re-cognition initially amounts to: consciousness recogmses that the 'familiar' 
object is in fact unfamiliar to it, for there is a difference between the moments of in-itself 
and for-another that prevents the unity of knoWlng, of crIterion and knowledge, from 
34 
b and immediate Consciousness then fi ; that another object bas ansen ei sl nd, 
,a 
definition of experience, NvInch implies a behind its back., as it were. In this way 
34 Cf Rose, eV. cil., pp. 48-9. 
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specific practice, viewpoint or rule through which a particular obiect is constituted, 
undermines itself As observers of the phenomenological development of recognition. we 
simply contribute to this process the tracing of the necessary connection between the 
content of one 'shape' of consciousness (the moments of identity and difference) and the 
one that replaces it (PS 76/55-6 §87')-35 That is, we can see new objects ansing out of the 
ý30 -Nat IIi ci in old __Mal cn contradictions 
the nsciou.., mess, itself can-not become aware of 
the necessitv of its iournev until it reaches the end, where it reflects on its own progress. 
This movement, wbicb Hemel must simply desCnbe (as a phenonienological 
observer) while at the same time pointing out the necessity with which each new object 
arises, is the phenomenological dialectic. Dialectic is thus inot a method, formulated on 
the basis of assumptions about the content of expenence and then applied reflexively to 
expencnec as to an extcrnal ContCnt, 37 bUt is a movcTnent that anses immancntly witbin 
representational consciousness itself The 'antinomy' of consciousness is thus that 
between the object defined as in-itself and as for-anodier: the only way to resolve an 
antinomy. as for Kant, is to re-late the opposing terms to their conditions of possibility, 
i. e., to a third terin that makes the identity and difference of both possible. This active 
relating is the process that occurs behind the back of consciousness. The progression of 
'sbapes of consciousness' that is the PS is thus the va-netv of immanently-unfolding 
attempts on the part of finite consciousness to determine a foundation for its knowledge 
of the identity and difference between subject and object. And in fact it is only when 
these moments of determinate, relative difference and idenfitv that define 
representational consciousness have been cast off at the end of the PS that this movement 
can finally be understood. By this time. consciousness will have become uttefly 
'5 Dove, op. cif-, p. 26. 
36 This is why it is difficult to appreciate the necessity of the movement onk, with reference to the 
abstract Introduction. which, being abstract, can only a7mcipme whai Is to follow. 
37 Cf Bialer, 1996, p 12 
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unfwniliar to itself, precisely because these constitutive moments will have been 
exhaustively critiqued. Instead of focusing on a determinate object posited opposite it, 
consciousness will have transcended its representational structure. having attained a 
perspective where the process of its own movernent. or its developed relation to itself. is 
its 'object. This movement, bowever. is not a determinate object but the Process 
through which objecti"ty itself is constituted for the subject. If this viewpoint can be 
attained from within the PS, then the structure of representational consciousness Nvill 
have been completely comprehended as a product of this movernent itself T'his, for 
Hegel, is Absolute Knowing. 
The issue of the completeness of the deduction brings us back to the problem of 
beginning. Comprebending the difference and identity of the moments of in-itself an(i 
for-another means that consciousness will gradually come to understand its own role in 
the constitution of'both. The definitions of the in-itself as critenon and of the moment of 
knowledge, which show themselves to be conditioned by a new in-itself Will eventually 
change so that the moment of knowing itself becomes the criterion. In this way, 
consciousness will gradually recognise (as will we) that only through the mediation of 
discursive rules can the immediate (the in-itself) be constituted for consciousness. Self- 
consciousness will thus be re-cognised as the condition of possibility for consciousness 
of an object. At this point of development (Itbe cbapter on Self-Consciousness), the 
general pattern of Kantian and Fichtean consciousness will have been reached. This fonn 
of abstract consciousness, however, already presupposes various complex assumptions 
about the nature of experience (the nature of intuition, the difference between theoretical 
and practical reason etc. ). To anticipate the next chapter, the PS will show how these 
presuppositions, as modes of relating to objects. already presuppose historically- 
deten-ninate relations 'bct-,,,, cen suklects. Intersubjectivity, rather than absolute 
subjectivity. will thus be the condition of self-consciousness. But because of the relative 
complexity of these modes ofk-no,. Ning, it is necessary to be in the PS prope-r elsewhere. 
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This is because the PS must be exhaustive. and the criteria for this 
exhaustiveness cannot be given outside of the phenornenolo&qcal development Itself 
(otherwise the foundationalist problem of circulantv would return). The critique of the 
multiplicity of 'familiar' prejudices that constitute phenomena] kno-iodedge in the present 
can only be consistent with itself if it proceeds with necessity, and begins ftom the most 
basic fonn of immediate identity that is possible for representational consciousness. The 
inconsistencv' of beginning from the sIMPle and immediate fonn of consciousness that 
Hegel calls 'Sense-Certainty', rather than from a historically contemporary Kantian or 
Fichtean presupposition, is thus consistent when -vie-wed in the fight of the reqtitrenients 
of an absolute critique of Tepresemation. 38 Crucially, tbis basic form of consciousnes. s 
can neither be consciousness of an object as it is determined for us, nor can it be 
consciousness of an object in itself Any sucb beginning would already presuppose a pre- 
given foundation and would thus still be cIrCular: either a deten-nination of a thing-in- 
itself in relation to whieb the object 'for us' is constituted, or the unitv of consciousness 
and the thing-in-itself The beginning can only be understood, I would argue, in relation 
to a moment in Kant's pbilosopby wbere the distinction between pbenomenal objects and 
notimena, between obiects-for-us and objects-in-themselves, becomes problematic. As an 
adjunct to his Critique of rational psychology (including Descartes) Kant notes that the 
proposition 'I think' expresses an 'indeterminate empirical intuition' whose exact status 
is ambiguous: it 
siofies only something real fliat is given, given 
indeed to thoubt in general, and so not as appearance, 
nor as thing-in-itself (nounienon), but as something 
whicb actually [in der Tal] exists, and N-,, bicb in the 
proposition 'I think' is denoted as such. 
3ý Rose, op. cil., PP - 
15 0- 1 
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(CPuR B422-3) 
The intuition bere is an undeniable, thouO, indetenninate, feeling, of existence 
associated with consmousness, rather than Descartes' ffilly detenninate 
intuition of a thinking thing. Its exact status in consciousness is problematic, being 
neither a representation of an intuited phenomena] object, nor a presentation ý-, Iven 
througli a special form of h1gher intuition. It can only be called consciousness of being 
without further detennination. In this, it is unconditioned, given that it has no 
determination eitber as for-us or as an in-itself It does not presuppose any foundation in 
order to be known as this Indeterminate terrn, whether this foundation be discursive (i. e., 
a determinate categorial synthesis of intuition) or non-discursive (a special intuition), and 
consciousness of it does not therefore presuppose a circle of conditions. 
This immediate, indeten-ninate consciousness, in which there is no determinate 
distinction between our consciousness of being and being itself, is the 'pure Being' with 
which the PS begins. Upon reflecting on this unity, we find that it splits nito two simple 
unities that constitute the detenTdnafion of Sense-Certainty proper, opposed to eacb otber 
as the immediate awareness of an object and the immediate awareness of being conscious 
of an object. Ilowever, these terms are not tbemselves opposed to the initial 
indeterminate Being. In fact their relation to the initial unity is problernatic: that both 
terms happen to hemerge out of pure being- laus dem reinen Sein 1... 1 herausfallen]' 
constitutes the 'cnicial diversity' iii Sense-Certainty (PS 80/59 §92, modified. ). From this 
initial diNision, the dialectic of PS begins: each opposed tenn is posited in tum by 
iction results the consciousness as the foundation of the other, and the resulting contradi 
" P- of Sense-Cei-twnty as a supposediv consistent fon-n of immediate knowledge overcomin- I 
of an object. The completeness of Hegel's deduction of Absolute Knowledge thus rests 
on a) 'natural' or represcntational consciousness being educated so that it is aware, not of 
a particular oklect but of objectivity itself as onk, constituted through a process that is 
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intenial to consciousness, and b) bewnnimý with a fonn of consciousness that is utterly 
basic in lacking the determinate structure of difference and identity that characterises 
representational consciousness. 
In the next chapter, we will examine the process laid out in the PS in more detail, 
before turning to the SL, which for Hegel elaborates the standpoint of Absolute 
Knowledge as an ontolouv. Now, in concluding this chapter, we will re-view the project 
that PS is meant to fulfil. The immanent dynamic of the PS is, as we have seen, a process 
in which consciousness finds its unacknowledi4ed presuppositions being laid bare, these 
presuppositions being rules that are constitutive of subjective perspectives on the world 
of objects. In this way. this process (understood negatively) can be called deconstructive, 
since it consists of an immanent exat-nination of the claims of consciousness about the 
objective nature of experience that demonstrates that they are only made possible by 
unTecognised rules that are constitutive of objects -for consciousness. 
However, 
acknowledging these rules makes the objeefivity of the claIMS that depend upon them 
impossible to maintain once the link between rules and claim bas been recognised, for 
the apparent givenness of the object has been undermined, and a PreVlouslv' 
unacknowledged element of constitutive subjectivity bas been brougbt to lip-bt. 
While this negative process is vital in demonstrating that the claims of 
representational consciousness about experience are ultimately illusory, it must 
simultaneously be viewed positively as a re-construction or deduction of the perspective 
of Absolute Knowing. Formally, it operates as a deduction (i. e., as a demonstration of 
the possibility of Absolute Knowing), but materially, it is a reconstruction, because it 
presents a new relation of consciousness to object in which 'it [consciousness] getsTld of 
its semblance of being burdened with something alien, that is only for it and as an other', 
for when consciousness comes to reflect upon self-consciousness as the condItion of the 
object. 
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where appearance becomes idenfical with 
essence, l ... 
I its exposition wfl] coincide at just this point 
with the authentic Science of Spirit. And finally, when 
consciousness itself grasps this as its own essence, it 
will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself 
(PS 77/57 §89, modified) 
This is a reconstruction because the Absolute, the enfireiv new and unfamiliar 
'object' of thou-gbt presents an actual task, ratber than a mere bypothesis that remains to 
I- 
be proven.. The deduction of Absolute Knowing would show that all representational 
consciousness presupposes an autbentic and absolute unitv of subject and object, which 
is itself the negation of the structure of representational consciousness, and therefore also 
of the need for a foundationalist image of nbilosaphy. '9 Tlivs final stage will pT-cwM a 
conception of the object defined as in-itself for consciousness that is actually consistent 
with the definition of its relation to coos6ou-"-e., ---s4) 
HoweveT, this will ako entail that 
there is no longer Imowledge' as it has been understood by representational 
consciousness, for in order for there to be representational knowledge, there musi be both 
detenninate difference and ide-ntitv between subject and object. Absolute Knowing, then, 
W1 el ill be embodied in a negative unity of ýsmbjcct -and objw, a 'neitber-nor' structure, 
"' 
39 Pippin, 1989, pp. 10-1-5; Houlgate, 199.1-, p- 71. 
40 Westphal, 1979, pp. 11 -11 
41 Cf 
- 
Maker, 1995, Ch, 3, on this difference between representation and absolute knowledge 
Maker, however, stresses the pure negativity of absolute knowing (pp. 78-82") too much, for it is 
necessary to understand the positivity of this result too (the way in which it serves as the element 
of Science), without transfonning it into a dogmatic unity of thought and intuition as in Schelfing's 
Idei iii0tv. wstem . 
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But this gTasp of the fluidity or the 'x-mishing' of the structure of 
representational consciousness still belongs to the perspective of a rigidly disiumfive 
consciousness that cannot tolerate paradox. and that- despite itself finds its content 
perpetually disappearing in its intemal dialectic. Like Deleuzc, Hegel holds that it is also 
necessary to comprebend this loss of meaning as a positive result. Absolute Knowing, is 
self-conscious knowledge of consciousness as that which only coincides -, N-itb itself 
insofar as it always changes its limits, insofar as it differs from or exceeds itself It is not 
knowledge of a foundational, transcendent meaning that fixes the horizon of a common 
sense. Instead, it is consciousness of the negative movement of the PS as being its own 
innermost meaning, an 'essence' which lacks any transcendent, foundational moment of 
presence. The end of the PS thus contains a fomi of knowing that is equal to the 
problematic, basic consciousness of unity that marks its beginning in Sense-Certainty. 
Self-consciousness as Absolute Knowing knows the logical condition of the 
determination of its object and of itself vis-a-vis each other insofar as this condition is 
simply its own self-differing- its 'failure' to coincide With itself in something like a 
plenary intuition - its fluidity or constant vanishing. The difference between negative 
and positive views of absolute knowledge is, for Hegel, the difference between dialectic 
and speculation, between a sceptical oveTcoming of Versiand or finite consciousness, and 
a comprehensive overcorning, which grasps the positive meaning of the instability of 
representational consciousness (EL §§81-2), an instability which is implicit in the 
beginning of PS and which reflection upon it draws out. 
As witb Deleuze, the minimal presupposition of deterymnate consciousness is 
shown to be the difference of thought from itself But here the difference is a conceptual 
relation, not one thematised in terms of the being of thought as that Nkhich is utterjv other 
than thought. And therefore the structure of this difference is itself comprehensible, for 
Absolute Knowledge still presents the jdentjýý, of identity and difference. However, this 
does not, for Hegei, collapse back into a relative identity of concept and intuition, 
17 3 
subordinated to the concept. In order for there to be even the most minimally 
determinable difference between subject and object (as presented in Sense-Certainty). 
Hegel suggests, consciousness must be capable of knowing itself as self-diffenng- and 
with this knowledge one has authentically broken through the limits of representation, 
without giving up the idea of knowing. 
Absolute Knowledge is not the abolition or destruction of finite consciousness m 
t, nitVz42 
In4 
d it repre. wnts f the name of a presupposed absolute I. -, ý -.. qtca 
3. il"Ite cons r-- Cl 
renunciation of its own fixity, even though finite consciousness will inevitably remain the 
medium through which human beings habitually relate to objects. The Absolute here is 
not an unjustified, one-sidedly practical commandment, whicb subordinates all being to 
the project of its realisation. Instead, it constitutes an insight, won not through immediate 
intuition but through the labour of the negative' (PS 21 /10 § 19), into the non-subjective 
sense in whicb self-consciousness could be said to be a condition of objectivity as such. 
This is self-consciousness as the movement of what Hegel calls Absolute Negafivity, in 
which the subjective presuppositions behind the positing of specific objects are revealed. 
This mode of knowledge tums out to be the negation of all foundationalism, because it is 
inberently without positive representational content and yet it is the positive truth of the 
'way of despair', because it comprehends what Hegel in the Preface called the 
'tremendous power of the negative' (PS 32/19 ý02) which gains expression in the 
deten-nination of the different moments of in-itself and for-another and in the negation of 
this difference. In this way, Absolute Knowing comprehends the whole movement and 
therefore the totality of consciousness, for it discloses a non-representational logical self- 
consciousness that is immanent within the negativity of representational consciousness. 
To recap: Hegel opposes the foundationalist notion (affirmed bv both Ficbte and 
Schelling) that the object of philosophy is a ground of representational consciousness that 
is essentially opposed, as infinite or absolute, to all finite consciousness. Instead, Hegel 
47 Rose, 1980, p. 150. 
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arizues that the Absolute is immanent to finite consciousness. and shows that this Is so bv 
Presenting in PS an internal, deconstructive critique of the structure of representational 
consciousness, in wbich Absolute Knowing emerges as knowledge of the movement 
througb wbicb consciousness undermines the fixity of its own structure. This means that 
Absolute Knowing is not Presupposed as detennined relative to our experience (which, 
as Ficbte and Sclielling sbowed, requires an infinite deduction to prove that it is more 
than just a presupposition), but is demonsirated. Hegel, like Deleuze, thus critiques a 
whole 'image of thought', and does this by tracing the immanent movement of the 
internal difference of consciousness from itself 
17 5 
Chapter 6 
Hegel's Account of Absolute Knowing: Logic and Being 
i) Introduction 
The result of the PS is the dissolution of the basic certainty possessed by 
representational consciousness, namely, that the essential structure of experience is the 
opposition between subject and ob ect. Hegel believes that with this basic certainty j 
vanishes the need for a foundationalist image of philosophy, as the need for a secure 
foundation only arises when we are conscious of a distinction between the object-in-itself 
and the object-for-us. Instead, we can now take up the standpoint of Absolute Knowing, 
in which the nature of the genuine, non-foundational unity of being and thought can be 
determined, or rathei-, allowed to deten-nine itself tbrougb our tbinking. Representational 
consciousness having been exhaustively deconstructed, self-consciousness is not now 
aware of the Absolute as an object (Gegensiand) over against it, but as its own trutb, die 
Sache selbst. Reflection is no longer finite, related to a given foundation, but infinite, 
related only to itself, and thus immanent to itself The SL thus aims to have thought think 
its own unity with being. For Hegel, this process does not begin from a supposedly fixed 
foundation determined reflexively in relation to a definition of experience wbich is 
accepted as given, and is in this sense non-foundational. PresupPOsitionless and self- 
detennining. 
The idea of an Absolute that is identical with self-determining thought is the kev 
aspect of Hegel's Vision of the immanence of pbilosopby. The SL will not merely be a 
logic that details the inner determinations of thought, for then it could not be absolute. 
For Hegel's reconstruction of philosophy to be successful, the SL must also be an 
ontology that details the nature of being itself I'lus strong claim, however. has been the 
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main target of succeeding generations of Hegel's critics. begmning with Schelling. ' In the 
In last chapter, I noted that Schelling was critical of Hegelian logic for being what. i 
Schelling's view, could only be a negative pbilosophy that deduces catmorial conditions 
witbout wbicb being cannot be detenninate for fhougbt- In assessing the SL. it will be 
necessary to consider whether Hegelian logic can also determine being itself. or whether 
this rational unity of thought and being can only be an unprovable assumption for 
philosophy, as Schelling argued. If it is just an assumption, then Hegel has not overcome 
foundationalism, and bas in fact merely regressed to Schelling's foundationalist position 
in the Philosophy of Identity. 
My strategy in this chapter wifl be to defend Hegel's account of Absolute 
KnoWing, against vanous objections that are eitber implicitly or explicitly dependent 
upon Scbelling's position. This will entail a deeper consideration of Absolute Knowing 
in PS, before going on to examine the SL itself By focusing on flegel's deconstruction 
of the notion of a transcendent ground in the SL's Doctrine of Essence, I will then show 
bow Hegel reads foundationalism as a transcendental illusion rooted in being itself The 
Schellingian objections to Hegels position will thus be unden-nined, given that all of 
them rely on Schelling's own account of what reason must presuppose in order to get 
started in philosophy. Hegel's deconstruction of grounding will show how Schelling's 
foundationalism is inherently self-contradictory, and based on the unquestioned 
assumptions of representational consciousness. In the next chapter, I will pursue Hegel's 
claims further by examining, in relation to objections advanced against Hegel by 
Deleuze, the non-foundational ontological account of deterimnation in SL which, I shall 
argue, operates without reference to transcendent grounds. 
'Mere now follows a summary of the objections I will be considering here, whicli 
bave been raised by Klaus Msing, Walter Scbul7. Manfred Fran'k- and Andrew Bowie. 
1 Qv. Bowie, ) 993, Chs 5 and 6. Frank, 1975 gives a good account of Schelling's influence on 
Feuerbach and Marx. 
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a) Dfising a 'strong' interpretation of Hegel, reading SL as both an Provi 
y. For DU ing, the negatiN, e unitN of sl account of absolute subjectivity and an ontolog ? 
subject and ob ect at the end of PS is meant to be a condition both of consciousness of an j 
intuited manifold and of the determinateness of that manifold itself, and in this way, the 
Kantian distinction between intuition and understanding disappears ý2 
Ddsmg relates this 
move, not to Ficbte, but to Kant's account at CPuR B132-6 of the relation between two 
aspects of the synthetic unity of consciousness. For Kant a synthesis in consciousness 
can only be produced by the productive imagination, however, the unitv of this synthesis 
is contributed by the svnthetic unity of apperception. As Dfising notes, the second edition 
of CPuR makes the work of the imagination dependent upon the unity of apperception. ' 
There is an opening here for the idea that one could go beyond Kant by thinking the unity 
of apperception as determining ase/fin the manifold that is synthesised. But this would, 
for Dfising, only be a self-thinking apperception, not a self-knoulptQ one, which for 
DOsing would be one that knows its own determinations to be identical WItb those of 
being-in-Itself Hegel assumes in the SL that self-determining thought will in fact be 
identical with real Substance, that whicb truly exl--, fs. 4 Thai one can thin1c, the 
deten-ninations of what, jbr us, appears to be the only self-consistent candidate for the 
role of Absolute does not prove that these are themselves absolute: this thinking remains 
.5 in 
' ati hypothetical Hence, the SL can only be Circular., In a stMilar way to Schell' 9s neg ive 
pbllosophy. 
b) Schulz focuses on Hegel's formulation of the speculative proposition, e. g., 
Substance is Subject, whicb is meant to express the true unity of subject and object 
achieved in Absolute Knowing, i. e., the dissolution of the fixity of representational 
00sing, 1995, p. 2-335. 
3 Ibid. pp. 237-8. 
jbid 
., pp. 
23Q-40. 
5 Mid, pp. 226-7. 
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consciousness. This unity only arises through natural consciousness's experience of the 
forms of the difference between in-itself and for-another. Schulz thus terms the 
speculative proposition the 'unity of the related terms an(J their relation" that has been 
developed through reflection on what is given in consciousness, with the final unity of 
the two ten-ns being the Absolute that constitutes and is immanent in the whole 
pbenomenological senes. He sees Schelling's essential objection to the SL as being 
directed against the idea that reflection can ground itself by simply reflecting on this 
result. Reflection cannot ground itself in this way and be genuinely absolute, because it 
has, for Schulz, to recognise that there is a minimal difference between the process of 
reflection and the verv-fficl that a process of reflection exists. And so this tbat-ness of 
reflection is not an arbitrarily posited being, but is reflection's mm condition, in which it 
7 
is 'always already inserted' , 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Schelling claimed that it was 
necessary for reason to presuppose a 'hip-her', non-rational Absolute in order to ground 
reason. This Absolute is thus posited as transcendent to reason, as more than simply the 
totality of possible rational determinations of the Absolute, and vet also as somehow 
internally related to reason as its ground. Schulz agrees with Schelling that Hegel, by 
arguing that the fixity of the distinction implied by such transcendence is based on the 
prejudices of consciousness, betrays a basic unprovable and dogmatic assumption, that 
reason is identical v"th being. 
c) Frank and Bowie. The critique presented by Schulz is related to the positions 
held by Frank and Bowie, which again focus on the issue of the absoluteness and self- 
sufficiency of reflection, and, like Scbulz's, refer to Scbelling's 'hip-her' Absolute. Frank 
reco&Mises that Absolute Knowing is meant to be cognition of the immanence of the true 
infinite or Linconditioned in the finite, and that this is a cnfique of both Fichte and 
6 Schulz, 1954, pp. 340-1. 
jhjd_ pp. 144-5 
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H61derlin. 8 "c understands Hegel as wanting to show that the independence of that 
which exists outside the subject is an illusion that persists only because of the finite 
subject itself, 9 and argues that this move is repeated in SL. Here. Hegel begins by 
thinking the Absolute as an indeterminate unity (Being) and subsequently shows that this 
immediate unity requires as its condition of possibility a self-related, reflected untN! 
(Essence) like the finite subject. But, for Frank and for Bowie, the problem %vith this 
move is that Hegel fails to distinguish between two kinds of immediate unity: an 
immediate unity posited in relation to self-consciousness, and a real immediate unity 
(Scheffing's higher Absolute)-lo An un-mediate unity that is the relative other of thought, 
such as an object posited in relation to the finite subject, could unproblematically be said 
to be conditioned by self-related reflection. A real ground that is irreducible to reason, on 
the otber band, is the necessary ground of sUbjectiVity wbicb it can only presuppose, as 
Schulz., following Schelling, has already argued. As Bowie points out, Schelling here 
follows Kant by 'Introducing a non-reflexive fbird ten-n into the structure of knowledge', 
i. e., nournenal being-in-itself as against the subject and the phenomenal object which is 
onlyfi)r the subject. 11 
That reason or reflection is identical with the real ground can only be an 
assumption, and so I'legel's Absolute Knowing cannot be presuppositionless or truly 
absolute. " Frank and Bowie both follow Schellmg by suggesting that Hegel's mistake k 
the same as Ficbte's: imagining that the unconditioned must resemble the finite, self- 
conscious subject as an eminent kind of reflexive self-relation. Hepel thus produces an 
Y rank, 1975, p. 29. 
Ihid., p 30 
10 Bowie, 1993. p. 135. 
11 Ibid. 
ý p. 
1 314- 5. 
12 Frank, op cil., pp 51 -2N 55 
180 
account of the Absolute that simply determines it in relation to the subject, rather than 
determining it as it is in itself 
The Ontological, Vense of Absolute Knowing 
I'lie question concernIng the account of Absolute Knowing in the PS that we 
need to pose in the light of these objections is whether Hegel's phenomenological project 
implies unacknowledged foundationalist assumptions. These assumptions would concem 
a fonn of determinate knowledge that the PS has to presuppose in order to attain the 
knowledge that it claims is absolute. In otbeTwords, I-legel's proposition that Substance 
is Subject would, from this perspective, imply that the actually appeanng detenninations 
of objectivity are manifestations of a Substance that is in itself identical With the Subject- 
in-itself, this unity being expressed by the concept of Absolute Negativity. 'Spirit' would 
then refer to this certainty of essential unity. But, from Schelling's point of view, this 
unity can only be attained if it is first presupposed, and this means that the PS would be 
circular, and thus unable to achieve a total critique of representational consciousness. 
Hegel's acknowledgement of histofical conditioning would thus only he a negative 
deconstruction of the subjective presuppositions of consciousness, and could not be 
absolute, as the only knowledge provided would be relative and negative, concerning the 
inability of representational consciousness to proV]de foundations for knowledge. 
Can Absolute Knowing be characterised in this way? I want to argue that this 
cntique is misplaced, given that the attainment of Absolute Knowing involves 
acknowledging the utter collapse of any foundational. transcendent conception of 
suýjectiVlty, whicb is presupposed as given in advance as a 'knowing before knowing". 
Absolute Knowing is not a process in which the subject becomes alienated from itself 
only to eventually return to its essence, the subject as it is in-itself This NNould be to 
conceive the PS on the Fichtean and Schellingian foundafionalist model, as systernafic 
knowledge of the unconditional based on a special intuition of the non-reflexive unih- of 
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the subject and object in themselves. I will now nwx the development of Absolute 
Knowing as a progressive decentring of consciousness, wbicb will demonstrate bov., the 
Schellingian critique misses its taraet. 
Consciousness is first decisively decentred when it discovers that it cannot itself 
serve as a transcendent foundafion of knowledge. This occurs in the sections on Self- 
Consciousness in PS. The transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness occurs 
because of natural consciousness's discovery that it is itself responsible for the positing 
of its object. The question that then anses for natural consciousness concerns its own 
determinateness as a foundation. Why does it posit objects in certain ways? This question 
was bebind Ficbte's critique of Kant: what is the sufficient reason, the real necessity, 
bebind the specific detenninations of transcendental subjectiVity? How can a 
consClousness that is defined essentially by an activity of positing itself be detent 1-ned? " 
Hegel shows that this question forces us to recognise that the idea of a foundational, 
transcendental subjectivity is not enough to explain its own determination. 
The sections on Self-Consciousness bring out the previously implicit historical 
and social dimension of subjectivity. Self-consciousness, as it tums out, is only capable 
of constituting objects for itself if it is conscious of itself as being as other subjects view 
it through its actions. Initially, self-consciousness is undeveloped, conscious of the 
I 
sensuous world confronting it as 'an enduring existence' (PS 133/105 067), but also 
conscious of itself CI am F) as an undetermined existence. The consciousness of 
problematic being, neither phenomena] nor noumenal, With which Sense-Certainty 
begins, has become this consciousness of ni-v existence. The subject now posits itself as 
the foundation of objective detennination. The criterion that would prove this 
constitutive relation, and thereby, self-consciousness's independence from the sensuous 
world, is the practical relation to objects constituted by its Desire for then-L a relation 
througb wbicb it acts to negate the independence of objects and tbus sbow its power over 
II Pippin, 1989, ppý 146 ff, pp. 154-5. 
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them. Desire is thus the subject's active attempt to realise the determination that it posits 
as its essential oT in-itself side. 
Crucially, this self-awareness turns out to be the sub . ect's awareness of itself as j 
lacking knowledge of its supposedly essential, foundational dimension, subjectivity-in- 
itself Its active relation to objects is a practical attempt to establish its own difference, 
qua subject, from the objective world, whieb would not be necessary if it was somehoNN: 
already present to itself as it is in-itself This attempt fails, however, as the subject ends 
up ideniffiving itself witb the objective world, making itself dependent upon impulses 
which anse in it as given, and upon the objects towards which these impulses lead (PS 
138/109 §175). Simple Desire, then, cannot be the foundation or essence of self- 
consciousness, but appears as a minimal, relatively asocial and ultimately untenable 
strategy of self-confirmation. '4 If consClo-usne&s is to become a self-consciousness certain 
of its constitutive role, it cannot just relate itself to natural objects, but must desire and 
bave contact witb objects that are not just objects, but are also self-conscious, in wbicb it 
can find confirmation of its own freedom. Again, however, encounters with other 
subjects do not simply result in the mifforing, of natural consciousness's essence back to 
it as in a passive medium. The subject's positing of itself as a free, foundational subject 
aggain goes awry. 
Self-consciousness as such, it turns out, is only made possible by a relation to at 
least one other self-consciousness that is recognised as sucb in this relation: this relation 
is what Hegel means by Spirit, the "I" that is "'We" and the "We" that is 'T" (PS 
139/110 § 177). 'Mis is a relation to self that is onýv constituted through one's 
consciousness of being-for-another. However, once self-consciousness encounters a 
being that it posits or re-cognises as self-conscious, it discovers that this %,, er-v, act of 
posititig entangles it in new problems. This act has to be reciprocal, in order that the 
14 This counts against Kojeve's anthropologica) reading of PS (1980, pp. 3-4) On this- See 
Williams, 1997, p. 12, 
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relation-to-other can ground the relation-to-self (certainty of one's independence) that 
self-consciousness posits as its own essence. The initial phase of the sections on the Lord 
and Bondsman, the struggle to the death for re-cognition, is the first of the IncreasIni-fly 
intersubjective procession of attempts to reallse reciprocal re-cognition that form the rest 
of the PS. It fails because it represents an attempt on the part of two self-consciousnesses 
to prove, each to the other, their freedom, and thereby the fact that they are able to re- 
cognise each other. But this can only occur through wl attempt to kill the Other, and 
because of the need for reciprocity, through each risking his or heT own life (PS 144- 
5/114-5 §§188-9). This strateizv, however, is completely self-defeating, for re-cognition 
and knowledge of my own freedom is impossible if I kill the Other or the Other kills me. 
To resolve this problem, one self-consciousness must capitulate, losing the 
struggle but keeping its life, re-cognismg the freedom of the Other and thus coming to 
know itself as unfi-ee. T'his situation is that described in 'Lordship and Bondage. The 
importance of this 'advance' is that it introduces the idea of a shared social project (even 
if this project is not based on perfect reciprocitv), in whicb an imperfect relation of re- 
cognition is facilitated by social practices, " These social practices, of labotu and 
consumption, transform re-cogMtion through the medium of objects that are transformed 
into raw material for labour and goods for consumption. The Lord (re-cognised self- 
consciousness) knows itself as free through consuming the object that the Bondsman 
works on. The Bondsman (Itbe re-cognising consciousness) knows itself to be unfi-ee 
because of its semce. 
As is well known, however, this situation is upset: the Lord comes to re-cognise 
itself as dependent upon the Bondsman's labour (and thus as unfree), whereas the 
Bondsman comes to understand itself as responsible for the determinations of the object 
and thereby partiafly free. Crucially, however, neither discovers itself to be genuinely 
15 Pinkard, op. cil., p. 56. 
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free, for neither other-relation can ground reciprocal re-cogrutiom 16 and so the Bonds-man 
cial relations, for is not as often thougM, the victor. 17 ne result is a retreat from so 
consciousness now posits pure thinking. its ability to reflect upon its relation to 
-I- 
* 
objectivity, as the true foundation and expression of independence, thus metamorphosing 
into those forms that Hegel calls Stoicism and Scepticism. This new direction of desire in 
turn proves inadequate, ending in the Internally riven forin of the reli ious Unbappy 
Consciousness. Here consciousness is forced to re-cognise that pure thought is a self- 
contradictory foundation of the certainty of one's fTeedom, and that in order to resolve 
this contradiction, it is necessary once again to actively take up a relafion to others as the 
means of understanding one's freedom. But this relation is one in wbich the 
individualistic understanding, of freedom is again shown to be inadequate, for the 
Unhappy Consciousness, which posits the unity of Its thinking outside itself as the 
unreachable divine ground of its freedom, is forced to recognise an Other as a priestly 
mediator between it and the divine (PS 168-9/136-7 §§227-9). This means that a 
different object, the impersonal unity of thought has now replaced the natural object that 
fortned the third term of the Lord-Bondsman relation. It is this irnpersonal viewpoint 
which serves now as the means by which natural consciousness recognises itself in an 
Otber, namely, in the unity of the priestly mediator with the diVine (PS 170/138 §230). 
The new object-in-itself, the new foundation of freedom, is this universal thinking. It is 
posited as the unity of all individual wills or desires, a common object for the interrelated 
subjects of the social 'We. The initial indeten-ninate certainty of being with which PS 
began has thus been transfonned into Substance, a foundation posited by representational 
consciousness in relation to other deten-ninations: this was initially the subject's certainty 
of itself, which as we have seen, cannot be a foundation. Now, it is the impersonal unity 
16 Pinkard, op. cit, p. 6' 3. 
17 This claim is above all Koj6ve's (op. eir, p. 20). For a different refutation of this claim, see 
Rose, 1980, pp. 120-30. 
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of thought (Reason) which is take to represent the true in-itself divine Substance. rather 
than the indi,, idual subject. 
The process of re-cognition that takes us from Consciousness to Reason cannot 
be reduced to the common misrepresentation of Hegellan phenomenology that views it as 
a process of simple reflection in which the subject finds, through its 'self-alienation'. 
confirmation of what it presupposed about itself. In fact, the subject's attempts to find 
such confin-nation are continually ftustrated. Simple reflection on an ob I ect simply j 
renders explicit wbat was implicitly assumed to be the case, thus preserving the 
foundational unitv of the subject throughout a inerely illusory moment of difference. Re- 
cognition, however, includes a moment of real difference, through which the subject's 
relation to its own certainty of being- and later, its consciousness of its own existence, is 
transformed -a movement which constitutes Hegelian 'experience. 
Just because self-consciousness has become aware of itself as Spirit, however, its 
education is not over, It continues to be frustrated in its attempts to establish a stable 
foundation. At the end of the sections on Reason, it finds itself once again opposed, as an 
isolated consciousness, to a body of historically given norms that constitute the being, 
Substance or actual Spirit of the society to which it belongs. These non-ns condition the 
content of its desire although it cannot rationally justify them. Passing through the 
sections on Spirit proper, that is, the concrete, historically determinate ethical life 
(Sildichkeu) of the society (wbicb tell once more the same story from a more inclusive 
vet more decentred perspective), naturW consciousness finds its freedom within a context 
of ends and values specific to that society, for wb-Icb it itself is not responsible. The 
transfort-nation of natural consciousness into the subject of Religion produces a new 
object again. Now, self-consciousness, as a developed consciousness of Spint, opposes 
itself to the body of actual practices through which its ethical life is lived (PS 476/412 
§678), and reflects on the purposes that these practices express. It thus represents to itself 
the highest ends of its ethicai life, and reflects on their consistencv as foundations of 
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knowledge. 18 These purposes are now taken to represent the Substance of socl2l 
existence, its foundation and essential being. Self-consciousness that has become 
religious Spirit, which reflects on such ends, is thus reflecting upon their self-consistencV 
when considered as Substance, as ultimate grounds for action. In positing them as objects 
of reflection, it represents them as divine, firstly as part of the natural world, then as 
stemming from the 'life of the people'. The tbird stage, the self-consciousness of 
Christian 'Revealed Religion', is when Spirit represents itself to itself as neither given, 
nor simply posited, but as self-renewing, as 'tbe universahtv of the Spirit who dwells in 
this community, dies in it every day. and is daily resuffected' (PS 547/475 §784). 
Reflecting on the consistency of a notion of actual Spi-fit that finds its ends extemal to it, 
and then upon one that creates its ends, self-consciousness finds that Spirit the otber- 
relation that constitutes all self-relation, must be a self-renewing positing of and 
reflection upon its ultimate ends, if it is to be self-consistent. 
nere is still a difference present bere, bowever, between subject and object. This 
difference represents the infinite ditTerence between the Substantial ground of 
determinations (God as the infinitely mIgbty Lord) and the representational 
consciousness (fallen humamtv) through which reflection uncovers these determinations. 
In the Revealed Religion, the time of reconciliation between the self-consciousness of 
Spirit and its Substwice is thus infinitely deferred (PS 549-50/477-8 §787), as was the 
case with Schelling's postulated third age of revelation (SPL 482-4/242-3). 'Me 
transition between Revealed Religion and Absolute Knowing consists in self- 
consciousness becoming aware of itself as Spirit's oun self-consciousness: the in-itself, 
the represented highest end (self-renewing and self-reflexive Spirit), is not itself different 
from that which posits and reflects upon it. It is different only-ffir natural consciousness. 
Again, it must be stressed that this event is not the becoming-conscious of an intuited 
metaphysical Absolute. Instead, the phrase 'Spirit's own self-consciousness' defines 
I. x Nd, P. -1-11, 
187 
Absolute Knowing as a self-consciousness which is aware of the presuppositions behind 
its own detem inate desires or practical interests, namely. the different levels of 
intersubjective mediation that constitute Spirit, and is thus aware of actual Spirit as its 
own being or Substance. In other words, it becomes conscious of the development of 
Spirit in PS as its t)wn devekýpment, and turns to examine the hision, of this development 
(PS 552-3/480-1 e790,565-6/492 e808). 
Hence, self-consciousness cannot be thought of at the end of PS, as coming to 
know itself as a putative 'in itself, as a Wmscendent, foundational and substantial 
subject. Wben self-consciousness is forced to turn and re-cognise itself in its history, it 
finds itself at the end of the path of despair: its formeT finitude and fixity has been given 
up for total fluidity, for it re-cognises its being as the movement of the determinations of 
Spirit. It bas discovered that its initial, indeterminate and problematic being becomes 
developed as a foundational relation between a constitutive finite subjectivity and its 
objects, and which then becomes a relation between this subjectivity and intersubjective 
structures that act as its foundation. The initial indeterminate being of consciousness is 
thus determined as Spirit, a decentred structure of mediation in whicb self-consciousness 
itself proves itself to be the force behind its own decentring. But in thus re-cognising 
itself, self-consciousness appears to have been left with nothing, to have lost itself: if it is 
nothing but the movement through which subject and object are determined, then it is in- 
itself neither the finite subject nor the object. Absolute Knowing is therefore, from the 
perspective of representational consciousness, nothing, but the collapse of all deten-ninate 
relations into this neither-nor structure. 'Me subject re-coonises itself in the content of its 
development as 'its own restless sublation of itself (PS 564/491 §805, modified), that is, 
absoluie or self-related negativity, an Absolute wbicb 'cannot be stated' in a finite 
synthetic proposition that would express a relative unity, 19 
I t. ) Rose, op. cil.. P. 18). 
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Nevertheless, self-consciousness has thereby come to comprehend jtseýfin a way 
that is neither expiressible in finite propositions nor grounded In an infinite intufion, but 
is not therefore simply nugatory. The distinction introduced bv Hegel in the Preface 
between the finite synthetic proposition and the speculative (, ýpekulahve, but also 
begreýfende) proposition can now be regarded as non-abstract, from the viewpoint of 
self-consciousness that bas, comprebended (begn (en) Absolute Negativity as the process -, 
ffi 
ý 
of its own development. If the standpoint of Hegelian Science is expressed bv the 
propositions 'Substance is Subject' and 'Being is Tbought' (PS 48/33 §54. ), then we 
might understand this Science as reducible to finite synthetic propositions that would 
need to be grounded. Substance would have to exhibit a deten-nination in-jlseýf by virtue 
of which it could be identified with Subject - but then the certainty or knowledge of this 
deten-nination would itself require justification from within the Subject, and we would 
thereby be caught up again in the contradictions of representational consciousness. 
However, Hegel's account of tbespeculalive proposition concerns, not a fixed, synthetic 
relation of two deten-ninate ten-ns, but the experience of the developing difference 
between two terms which is itself finally comprehended as their developed identity (PS 
54/38 §6 1), 20 The emergence of -Absolute 
Knowing is the comprehension of the unity 
within this difference, the unity of Absolute Negativity, which emerges as a 'barmony' 
(PS 54/38 §61) of histoncally determined Substance or objectiVity-in-general 
('thingbood', Dingheit) witb Subject or subjectivity-In-general (PS 551/479 §788). 
., or as 
it will be called in the SL thought or philosophical Absolute Negativity 
consciousness, appears in a positive sense as the overcoming of all determinate, 
representational differences between subject and object, thought and intuition, and thus 
as knowledge of their unity. And this unity results from the breakdown of the fixity of 
finite consciousness. It has not been abstracted from finite consciousness according to a 
foundationalist method, and posited as its absolute presupposition. 
2o See also jbid, pp. 48-9. 
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To understand this overcoming- the sense in which Absolute Negativity can be 
Absolute Knowing or 'absolute reflection', as opposed to finite negatIN-1ty. knowledLe or 
reflection, this unitv of objectivitv and subjectivity must be compared with its Kantian 
analogue, the relation between the transcendental object, the 'concept of something in 
g, eneral' (-CPuR A251). and the transcendental subject or unity of apperception (CPuR 
ý2 
1 The status of these transcendental forms rem3 -ns problematic in Kant's A-346/B404) j 
account of the two 'regions' of exverience. The transcendental obiect is not a noumenon, 
but neither is it a phenomenon, for it is the form of appearances in general (ICPuR A253). 
And the spontaneous transcendental subject is not the ground of freedom which the 
subject as thing-in-itself can be thought to be (CRuR A538-41/B566-9), and nor is it an 
appearance in which the subject is deten-nined for itself, for it is the condition of the 
synthesis of appearances (CPuR A354). 
These unities are required by transcendental logic as ultimate formal conditions 
of experience, unities only comprehensible as determined neither for-anotber nor in- 
themselves. For example, the transcendental object, as the form of an object in general, is 
necessary for the synthesis of -particular empirical objects under the universal categories. 
The formal conditions of unitv are also a limit relative to the subject for they define the 
object as it appears for us. Hegel's Absolute Knowing is knowledge of the relation 
between these formal constituents of representational consciousness in general. It is not a 
reflexive negation of the conditioned or 'for-another" aspect of objects that is supposed , 
simply through negation, to allow us to know them in-themselves, and does not therefore 
entail an identification of reason with intuition or of a postulated real Absolute V"th 
knowing. Thus far, it remains Kantian, for its is simply knowledge of the conditions of 
representational consciousness, and not a special kind of intuitive knowing. But at the 
sarne time, this knowledge has resulted from an exhaustive critique of the verv idea of a 
If 2i2ek (1995) has pointed this out in his innovative and illuminating account of the relation 
between Hegel and Kant, which I have made use of in the discussion that follows. 
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thing-in-itself It is knowledge that Spirit quo Absolute Negativity. the negative unity of 
all determinations of representational consciousness. is identical WItb the problematic 
being of Sense-Certainty. Hegel thus discovers that Kant's indeterminate empirical 
intuition of the being of the subject necessanlY becomes detennined. througb its 
mediation as Spirit as the identity of the formal unities of the subiect- and object-in- 
general. 
More evidence concerning the radically negative (neither ... nor) character of 
Absolute Knowing can he found in EL §44, wbere Hegel dismisses the idea of an 
unknowable thing-in-itself 'T'his dismissal does not mean that he thereby affinns that we 
can know the tbing-in-itself, eitber througb pure reason or in intuition. He notes that it is 
easv to abstract ftom the detenninations of the object for-another, until only what is 
totally 'empty' is left, or at least, what is empty fior-us. namely the 'beyond' of the in- 
itself, that which we cannot know. But secondly Hegel points out that it is equally easy to 
see this 'beyond' qua problematic existent as 'only 1he pr(. -)duct of tbinking'. 'Me thing- 
in-itself as a 'negative determination' is a product of thinking, for it is the reflection of 
the 'empty self-idenfitV of the transcendental subject. It is a product of the empty unity 
expressed by Kant's indeterminate empirical intuition of being, in wbich there is no 
deten-ninate difference between subject and object or tbouOt and intuition. Here, Hegel 
does indeed go further than Kant does, but not in the direction of the positive 
identification of reason with an intuition of a putative thin g-in-itself, Kant pointed out 
that the ftmscendental object is coffelative to the ftmscendental subject (CPuR A109- 
10). Hegel argues that the emptv fbing-in-Itself is simply the reflected fon-nal unity of the 
object rather than an unknowable yet still positively existent beyond. It is a negative 
detennination of the simple unity of self-consciousness, foTit is not found in expenence 
but is 'listed among the Kantian categones' (EL §44, modified) as a concept of an object 
in general, a concept of rqlectjon (CPIuR A290/B346). 
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For Hemel, this identification of the negative unity of the thin g-in-itsel f with the 
absolute reflection or self-determination of the transcendental subject is Immanently 
justified by Absolute Knowing. where the movement of self-consciousness in PS is re- 
cognised as the condition of any positing of a determinate object. '[I]t is the 
externallsation of self-consciousness that posits the thinghood [Dingheifl' of the object 
(PS 551/479 §788). Self-consciousness does not, by knowing itself as Absolute 
Negativity, know itself as a putative subject-in-itself as the Substantial ground of the 
exisience of an object, but rather as the condition of the very externality or otherness of 
the object of expenence. Absolute Knowing 
has a conlem which it diftrentiales from itself 
for it is pure negativity or the dividing of itself it is 
consciousness. This content is, in its difference, itself 
the T, for it is the movement of self-sublation, or the 
same pure negativity that the T is. 
(PS 559/486 §799, modified) 
No positive determination of the object as it is in itself (even if this positivity is 
just that of an existent but unknowable thing-in-itself) would be possible without this 
negative tinih, of subjectivity and objectivity as a 'blank' wbicb can never be directly 
experienced in representational consciousness. It is itself the condition of any 
representation at all, simply by moving througb all representations Witbout ever being 
fixed in a definite 'place' and becoming known in a positive, essential detennination. 
As the positing of an external unity is not a reflection of any positive. 
presupposed or given content it is not a finite but an absolute reflection of the 
indeterminate unity of the suýject. When self-consciousness re-cognises itself in the 
y of subjecfi, %-Ihf and objectivitV. it is 'at home with itself in its Otherness [in negative unit I 
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veinem Andensein beisich, wlbsl is/1' (PS 559/486 §799, modified). But this 'being-at- 
home' is not a confirmation of the finite subject's assumption that it is the foundation of 
the detenninations of the object, which occurs through the subject's 'self-alienation'. 
Sueb an externalisation would be relative to the presupposition that the finite subject 
could be posited as the foundation of the object, and would belong Within the early 
sections of PS on Self-Consciousness, before sucb presuppositions are deconstructed in 
the emergence of Spirit. Absolute Knowing cannot fix the content of the Absolute as a 
foundational subject or object for it is the moment when self-consciousness re-cognises 
itself in absolute fluldity. wbicb is the negation of all determinate content. 
'Me true radicality of Absolute Knowing, tben, is the speculative trutb that the 
identity of Substance and Subject can only be grasped when they have been shown to be 
absolutely different, as never coinciding VVIth each other or themselves except insofar as 
they are always moving, always negative, always internally different from themselves. 
'Me Fichtean and Schellingian assumption that the Absolute is a positive, fixed essence 
in itself which then somehow becomes split, reflected in another or 16r itve//' and 
eventuallv becomes conscious of this fixed essence, is unden-nined. Substance actually 
suffers the absolute loss of itself as a self-subsistent, positive unity: it turns out to be 
Subject, but this subject is not itself foundational or substantial, but is the decentred 
movement of self-consciousness expressed by Absolute Negativity. 
My claim is, then, that Absolute Knowmg is absolute because it expresses, 
unlike Kant's h-anscendental logic, the ontological umtv of subject and object as 
Absolute Negativity, but that it only has this ontological aspect because it is a unity that 
arises out of an exhaustive crifique of a) the idea of any knowledge, whether reflexive or 
intuitive, of a tbing-in-itself, and b) the very idea that a thing-in-itself (Viven as such 
independently of the activity of self-consciousness) could be ontolo ically real. Here, 91 - 
Hegel allies himself with Kant against Fichte and Scbelling, who both find themselves 
having to posit a special intuition through which the Absolute can be known as it is in 
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itself This Fichtean-Schellingian move introduces an infinite difference between this 
Absolute known in itself in intuition and the Absolute determined for us by reason. The 
tbing-in-itself as the unknowable 'beyond' of the limit set by the transcendental object on 
our faculties of knowledge, is the Kantian element that is absent from Absolute Knowing 
at the end of the PS. For Hegel, even the delineation of a posiliieýy unknoulable thing-in- 
itself irWolves positing the real exi.. 4-ence of a Ding on the othercide of a 1, Mit. 
22 '; nlik-e 
many interpreters of Kant, Hegel does not believe that the thing-in-itself is only present 
in the critical philosopb as a subjectively necessary posit. The epistemolo ical .y 91 
difference Kant insists on between receptive and spontaneous subjective faculties 
reflects, for Hegel, an assumption that there is an ontological difference between the 
subject and the thing-in-itself, the objective 'coffelate' (CPuR A30/B45, A19/B33) of 
sensation: 'It]be capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations througb the mode in 
whicb we are affected by objects [Gevensidnden], is entitled sensibility' (CPuR 
A]9/B33). For Hegel, Kant's faculty-model is based on the unaddressed, contingent 
assumption that there is a difference between the subj its ect and the object that 'causes' i 
sensations (P §9). Kant's deduction of the conditions of experience cannot account for 
this assumption, given that this deduction remains consistent only insofar as this 
presupposition remains unaddressed. 'Kant's method is thus itself conditioned by his 
assumptions about the structure of experience. For Hegel, on the other hand, self- 
consciousness (Absolute Negativity) that reflects or repels itself absolutely can be sbown 
to be the condition for the positing of an existent something-or-other that is implied by 
Kant's assumption. 
Absolute Knowing thus expresses the unitv of being and thought, but Hegel 
refuses to identify the detenninations of thougbt witb the posifive essence of a putative 
being-in-itself, which would mean that he had produced a merely negative (in Scbelfing's 
sense) model of absolute knowledge, one wbieb rested on an unprovable presupposition. 
22 Nd., p, 37. 
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The unity of being and tbought in PS begins with the indeterminate. problematic unit-\: of 
Sense-Cenainty - indelermmate being- which is the minimal determination of any I- 
consciousness. On being reflected upon, this splits itself mto, two aspects. This negativltv 
of simple being is eventually comprehended as identical with the immanent movement of 
1-1.1 , elf-consclousness Itself Being is understood by self-consciousness as existence, 
expressed by the 'motionless tautology' I am F (PS 133/105 ý167'). a merel-v 'passive 
[ruhigel unity' (PS 132/104 ý'166). Later, it becomes the unity of actual Spirit, before 
finally becoming the unity of Absolute Negativity, in which self-consciousnessknows its 
own incessant self-differing movement as the negative unity of the opposed aspects of its 
objects. This unity, wbich is on-ly constituted through The experience of real, internal 
difference, expresses both mediation and an immediate certainty of being. This being, 
however, is neither simple Being nor Existence, but the Actuality (Wirkhchkeit) of self- 
consciousness (PS 559/486 §800). Consciousness, in all its developments, is awareness 
of being, but this develops in PS from simple, indeteTminate being to full actuality, 
which is distinguished from pure bemg by its explicitly developed content, i. e., self- 
consciousness as knowledge of being as always different from itself Absolute Knowing 
is pure being once it has become self-consciousness that knows itself as lacking an in- 
itself aspect, an aspect that would mark It as a Subject that knows itself as a transcendent 
Substance that grounds all deten-nmations as Its own inner possibilities. And precisely 
because this supposedly foundational aspect, whicb was still posited in the early sections 
on Self-Consciousness, has collapsed. self-consciousness knows itself as alwavs 
externallsing itself absolutely. ne actual being of self-consciousness is a movement that 
lacks a positive content and is also constantly exceeding itself - Absolute Negativity, I-I 
which passes through all determinations as an empty space through which they first 
become determinate. Being, is thus nothing beyond consciousness, existing as some sort 
of in-itself or givenness, even if this givemess is just the detenTimation of urtknowabilm - 
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Givenness itself has been shown to be an illusory determinatiom one %vhich does not 
include any recognition of the role of self-conscious activit-, - in its positing. 
The Science of Logic as Absolute Knowing 
Absolute Negativity thus expresses the knowledge consciousness has at the end 
of PS of its own uncondifioned presupposifion. For there to be representational 
consciousness, that is, any determinate relation between the subject and an object \\, blcb 
is defined as having positive content both for the subject and in itself, there has to be an 
absolutely negafive relafion of self-consciousness to itself, through which it repels its 
empty form out beyond itself We can now see whv the first of the objections to Hegel's 
model of Absolute Knowing listed at the beginning of this chapter, that advanced by 
Dfising, is mistaken. Dfising claimed that the identity of Subject and Substance in 
Absolute Knowing represented the certaMty that the Subject u, as Substance, as if Hegel's 
speculative proposition were a straightforward finite synthetic proposihon. Tliis, as we 
saw, cannot be the case: Hegel does not p0sifively identify the Subject WItb Substance, 
tbus assuming that the Subject is some kind of transcendent metaphysical foundation or 
ground, in the manner of the Ficbtean and Sebellingian Absolutes. To do this, Hegel 
would have to assume that the difference between thought and being, the object-for-us 
and the object-in-itself, can be erased in an intuition in which the thing-in-itself, 
Substance, is somehow known to be identical with the Subject. This he does not do, 
sbowing instead that any epistemological difference between the object-for-us and the 
object-in-itself presupposes a form of experience in which the ontological difference 
between subject and object is accepted as real. Further, the PS shows that the 
presupposition of any such ontological distinction is the negative relation of self- 
consciousness to itself which cannot be identified witb either a phenomena] or nournenal 
subject, but whicb constitutes the actual being of self-consciousness. 
196 
As noted in the previous chapter, Absolute Knowing is. for Hegel, knowledg-e of 
a transcendental subjectivity However, this subjectivity is radical],,, decentred, yet knows 
itself as such. This unity of self-consciousness with Itself is what Hegel calls the Concept 
(PS 34/20 §34). Absolute NegatiNity is not posited by self-consciousness as a 
transcendent foundation, rather, self-consciousness knows it as its own movement. This 
form of knowing marks a point wbere, foundational i sin bas been exbaustively critiqued 
because there is no longer a difference between for-us and in-itself, knowledge and truth, 
claim and criterion. This foundational relation has been what the PS has sought to 
undermine from the outset. The Concept or Absolute Knowing is not the thought of a 
foundation, a positive in-itself Instead, it is the thougbt of pure negativity, the loss of all 
foundations that is vet the ultimate presupposition of all representational consciousness. 
With the Concept, all distinctions between subject and object, including that 
between possible or hypothetical knowledge and actual truth, have decisively collapsed 
for self-consciousness. No sucb distinction, even tbougb it may be necessary for 
everyday life, can be thought of as absolute. Hence the Concept is not a hypothetical 
form of knowledge of the real, as flaTtmann's 'negative' reading of Hegel suggests. It 
does not impose a Sollen upon thought in the same way as Schelling's or Fichte's 
concept of the Absolute. When the Concept is grasped, not just negatively as the 
consummation of representational consciousness" s loss of itself, but also positively as the 
unity of self-consciousness with itself, it -presents thought with an actual task, for it has 
led finite consciousness to the point where it has become philosophical consciousness. 
This task, which SL is intended to fulfil, concerns the further determination of the being 
of self-consciousness. While PS shows that Kantian or Fichtean representational 
consciousness that posits itself as the foundation of real objects is only conceivable as 
intersubjectively determined and later as the movement of negafix-ity that is 
comprehended as the Concept, the determination of this negative movement has not vet 
been understood. In other words, self-consciousness does not ý-now it-hy it always 
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exceeds its own lIMIt,, - 
23 To au - that, for Hegel am this kn(-)x-. ledge is the positive tassk 
restores meaning to philosophy after the prolonged journey through PS. 
Given that, for Hegel, the Absolute must be the Concept, in which the negative 
movement of self-consciousness is not simply posited as a foundation, but is 
comprehended as self-consciousness's own being, the SL can only begin with this unity. 
It is this being that the SL will analyse. At this point, Pippm's understanding of the SL as 
a continuation of the PS in the sense of being an analysis of the logical rules that we 
require in order to posit any object at all is inadequate, and, in Schelling's terms, too 
negative. 24 The SL will, for Hegel, determine th-essurum-re of being itself, where being is 
understood in the radically negative sense elaborated by the PS. In this sense, the SL is 
historically conditioned: its standpoint presupposes or is justified by PS insofar as 
Absolute Knowing emerges as self-consciousness's 'liberation from the opposition of 
consciousness 5 (SL 1,43/491). 
However, this is not a justification in the foundationalist sense, any more than 
Deleuze's positing of Absolute Difference is. Hegel notes that the PS is not a 'grounding' 
(Begrfinduýkg) of Absolute Knowing (SL 1,42/48). Absolute Knowing is not knowledge 
of a positive foundation, a transcendent Substance which has its being in-itself, and for 
which all phenomenal determinations are its internal determinations. It is the knowledge 
that the fixity of representational consciousness has been overcome, . Dven 
that 
representation is characterised bv determinate structures of relative identity and 
difference that give stability to expenence, and whicb make foundationalist 
methodologies necessary in order to show that these structures represent true knowledge. 
Ilie PS is thus not the foundation of SL in that it Justifies its validity Nvith respect to an 
object of which it purports to represent the true deten-nination. Such foundational notions 
of Justification have been oveTtumed by PS. Instead, the be inning of S1, is immanent in 1 91 
ý3 Cf Rose, op. -jL, p. 183. 
24 Cf Pippin, 1989, p. 176. 
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the PS. The 'object' of SL is not a Gegensland over against consciousness. but is die 
Sache selbst witb respect to consciousness, its internal negativity, its being. In ihis sense, 
the SL is presupposifionless, as its bimprining has not required to be jusfified in a 
foundafionalist fashion. by a determination of being-in-itself that is assumed to have 
been simply given to consciousness, e. g., throup-b an ecstatic or supenor intuition. Hence 
the beginning of SL is both immediate and mediated, for it begins immediate]), with 
being, yet does so in actuahýy only by sublating the whole of the PS, the developed 
actuality of self-consciousness (SL 1,68/69'). The Concept includes Witbin it or 
comprehends the mediated existence, the actuah(v of self-consciousness, yet does so iii 
an inunediate way (SL 1,66-7/68-9ý in 'the meradicable thouot that thougbt is" 
If all that philosophical self-consciousness - or more simply, thought - can do 
in Absolute Knowing is analyse simple being, then all it can do is begin with the sti-nple 
Concept of itself, which cannot be distingiusbed from the empty unity of its beting. This 
means that there can be no critenon for wbetber tbougbt bas proceeded correctly except 
that of self-consistency. In the Fichtean and Schellingian systems, this cntenon was 
applied in ten-ns of the grand circle wbich was to connect the Absol-ute qua formal 
postulate with the Absolute encountered again in the culmination of philosophy, this time 
as objective ground. No such distinction can be made in SL, however. The difference 
between bypotbesis and objective knowledge is simply a determination of 
representational consciousness. The cnten cc-] 'on of scif-consistency can therefore only be 
applied to the content of thought itself. just as the PS allowed consciousness to compare 
itself with itself, so philosopbical consciousness will compare itself with itself in SL. 
Pbilosophical self-consciousness thus simply refuses to intervene in the process 
of analysis that is Absolute Knowing witb any subjective assumptions about the nature of 
the Absolute, allowing instead the matter that tbougbt bas in band (die Sache selbst) to 
determine itself ne necessity of the consequent stages of the process thus anses out of 
25 Houlgate, 1992, p. 50, 
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the immanent self-refutation of Inadequate determinations of the Absolute. Inadequacv 
here can only be indicated by the inconsistency of a determinafion of Absolute Knowing 
ing with itself In this way. philosophical self-consciousness observes itself becomi 
conscious of its own ontological content. Ber-ause 'tbe beginning of pbilosophy' remains 
ccompletely immanent in its furtber determinafions' (SL 1,71/71 . 
), the process Is, like in 
the PS, self-consciousness's own experience of itself, the experience of its actuality (the 
Concept) as mediated by consciousness's real difference ftom itself A closer 
examination of the beginning of SL will show bow this immanence operates. 
The beginning is without 'any deten-ninateness relatively to anything else, and 
Lcannot contain within itself any detenninateness, any content' (SL 1,69/70). Hence the 
beginning is made with a determination of the Absolute which is not known through any 
method or any other deten-nination. Such a non-foundational yet necessary determination 
can only be the unity of self-consciousness with itself that is expressed by Hegel as the 
Concept, and which cannot be distinguished from the being of self-consciousness. The 
beginning is thus made with the determination of Being as such, a simple, indeterminate 
unity. Dieter flenricb argues that, while the beginning has to be unconditioned, and thus 
its initial determination can only be negative, neither this nor that, it also has to be 
. 
26 'his as positively grasped or taken up in order to be the beginning enrich sees t. 
problematic, for the absolute beginning has to be grasped absolutely, and insofar as it is 
grasped absolutely, there is a real difference between it and the rest of the SL, which 
follows from it and is relative to it-- 27 if it is, grasped as the absolute begi-nming at the 
beginning, f7hen this gmsping seems to be intuitive. If the beginning is intuited and the 
subsequent steps arise in thought as a consequence of thinking the content of the 
beginning,, then we are close to the Scbellingian objections advanced by Fran],, and 
Bowie. SL would be founded on the difference between a superior kind of intuition and 
2" Henrich, 197 1, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', pý 
'17 lbi, l., P. 93. 
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thought, which it then attempts to sublate in thought, thus presupposing that the hN: o are 
somebow ýpven to us as identical. 
Ilis is not the case, however. The inifial determinafion is a determination of 
tbougbt in wbicb there is no determinate epistemological difference bet-ween intuition 
and thougbt (SL 1,82-3/82). Such a distinction can only be made for or m relation to 
consciousness, but the basis of sucli distinctions, our conviction that the fixit-,, of 
representational consciousness is basic to all experience, has been deconstructed. The act 
of beginning can be identified with the first of three moments of thought described by 
Hegel in EL. Thought, in thinking the Concept as simple Being, operates as 
Undervanding, which, in thinking the Absolute, 'abstracts a particular category fi-om its 
context and clarifies its specific meaning', 28 The beginning only occurs when thought 
qua Understanding abstracts the simple, absolute unity of self-consciousness from the 
developed actuality of self-consciousness, and holds it fast as a determination of thought 
(SL 1,71/71-2, EL §80). Here, then, it is apparent that the fixity that cbaracterises 
representational consciousness has an analogue in philosophical consciousness or in 
being itself The illusory fixity of representational consciousness will tbus reappear and 
be comprehended in SL as an ontological detennination, as characteristic of being. 
Because this is a necessary deten-nination of bein& illusion is not simply accidental, but 
is ontologically rooted. Like Deleuze and Bergson, Hegel will thus identify the internal 
illusions of consciousness witb the appearing of a tendency of being. 
The inconsistency of the initial detennination with itself (wbicb we will exwnine 
i-nore closely in a moment), the failure of Understanding to render the Absolute fully 
deten-ninate, is the second moment of thougk thought as dialectical. This is not a 
different subjective faculty. but a relation of thougbt to itself that develops out of the 
moment of Understanding. It is thus not external reflection, which transcends what is 
given to it by opposing it to Itself as an object, but the immanent transcending 
28 Burbidge, 1995, p. 42, 
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[Hinausgehenl' of Understanding. and 'the genuine nature that properly belongs to the 
detenninations of the understanding' (FL §81). Through this self-transcending of thought 
'immanent coherence and necessitv enter into the content of Science' (EL §81, Hegel's 
empbasis). 
This negafive moment in which thought experiences its real difference from 
itself is itself immanently transcended in the third moment of thought, thought as 
authenticallyspeculafive. In this moment the difference of thought from itself is grasped 
as the reconstituted unity of thought with itself This unity is no longer simple, like the 
unity of Being at the beginning of PS, but has experienced itself as different from itself 
and so it is "something-concrete [ein Konkreles]' (EL §82)1 like self-consciousness as 
actual at the end of PS. This result has emerged analytically from the initial, abstract 
unity of Understanding, yet it is a synthetic result, for thought has experienced itself as 
really different from itself Through this development, thought recognises itself again, 
but also re-cognises itself, as altered from what it expected to find, for new content has 
emerged out of the preceding difference. The names used for the determinations of the 
Absolute that are arnved at in this way may be contingent fi-om the standpoint of 
Science, for they are taken from a vocabulary that has developed historically. However, 
their scientific meaning as determinations of the Absolute, is not abstract, as it arises 
immanently within thought. 
The transition from Being to the determination of Beconung, provides a concrete 
example of this self-transcending of thougbt. Being is internally undifferentiated, and 
externally unrelated to any other detennination. But Being is thus inconsistent with itself, 
for its content turns out to be Nothing, absolute nullity, empty thiný-jng, lack of content 
(SL 1,82-3/82). There is nothing in Being to determine it as the grasping of content as 
against the grasping of a lack of content. Similarly, wben tbougbt considers the 
determinafion of Nothing, there is no positive content to mark it off against the content 
of Being, because although the detennination of thought is noxv Nothing, this 
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determination still js thought (SL 1,83/82). Every fime thought tries to separate them, it 
cannot find anything in its content to distinguish them. yet is sifill a-ware of them as 
different. Attending to itself as Being and as Nothing, presents a difference. but one that 
is immediate. This distinction disappears as soon as it appears: even- tiine Being or 
Nothing, is grasped, it immediately passes over mto the other, or rather, 'has passed over' 
(. SL 1,83/83) into the otber, for eack insofar as it is gi-asped as what it is, Being or 
Nothing, is always already its other. This paradoxical result is the dialectical moment of 
thought that results. from the initial deteimiination of the Absolute as Being. 
But the difference of each from itself and its vanishing into the other cannot be 
separated from the vanishing of the other In it. This means that the difference of each 
from itself is a unity in thought, but one that has been constituted through a moment of 
difference. Thougbt re-cognises itself in this new unity, Becoming. as the restless relation 
of Being and Nothing (SL 1,83/82-3). This speculative moment comprehends the two 
initial determinations within a totality, which is constituted by Becoming as the 
determination that includes both their identitv and their difference. However, this is an 
open totality, for Becoming is itself the negative unity of Being and Nothing, only 
gmped as a positive, immediate unity of the inconsistencies of each. Becoming contains 
negatiVity witbin itself, and will tbus also sbow itself to be inconsistent witb itself wben it 
is isolated as a positive, fixed determination. 
The process of determining the Absolute in SL can ordy be complete wben this 
inconsistency or negativity of the various determinations itself becomes explicit for 
thought or being as a dimension of itself, comprehended or included within a 
deten-nination that is not inconsistent with itself The positive immediacv of the 
determinations of the SL's Doctrine of Being and their immediate difference from other 
detenninations will themselves be understood in the second division, the Doctrine of 
Essence, as detenninations of a foundation or ground that lies behind or within 
immediacy. Here Hegel attacks foundafionalism head on, for this 'essential relation' will 
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itself turn out to be an inconsistent or illusory detennination of being. This is finally 
demonstrated in the Doctrine of the Concept. where thought comes to comprehend its 
unity with being (the Absolute) as a self-determining unity, which is determined neither 
by its immediate difference from other, iven determinations, nor by the mediation of an 1 91 
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essence. 
iii) Positing, Presupposing and Grounding in the Logic of Essence 
The argument of SL is thus that the absolute umty of tbougbt and being cannot 
be consistently determined as either a simple, immediate unity, nor as an essence, ground 
or foundation, because of the negatiVity that these determinations imply in different 
ways. TbIs, I want to argue now, means that Hegel directly addresses Schelfingian 
objections to the absoluteness and presuppositionlessness of Absolute Knowing in SL. j- 
We have already seen how Absolute Knowing, as introduced by PS, emerges out of the 
deconstruction of finite consciousness and foundationalist method, and is not dogmatic 
in the way Dfising accuses it of being. We now have to consider the objections advanced 
by Scbulz, Bowie and Frank, all of wbicb focus on Schelling's positing of a 'higber' 
Absolute, an immediate non-rational unity of thought and being that is posited as the 
ultimate presupposition of all reason (including Hegel's Absolute Knowing), and which 
reason can experience through an ecstatic intuition but cannot know directly as 
determinate. 
This unity is, as we saw in Chapter Two, posited as transcending even reason, 
and so eventually becomes the subject of a mythological narrative. Its becoming 
detenninate for itself cannot be regarded as necessary, and so it is ungrounded, 
inexplicable. In the PS, Hegel treats the positing of 'ust such an uttefly transcendent i- 
unity, which is nevertheless immanent in what it produces, in the sections on Revealed 
Religion. I'lie religious consciousness posits God as the foundation of determinafion, 
who becornes self-conscious through his relation to the world that be creates. However, 
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the creation itself is inberently mysterious. The sense in wbicb God is immanent in or 
related to the world is impossible for representational consciousness to understand: the 
relation between them appears as an 'incomprehensible happening [Geschehen]', with 
God, the in-itself of religious consciousness, assuming 'the fon-n of jndýfferenl being' 
(PS 543/471 §780). Elsewhere, Hegel distinguishes philosophical cognition from 
L narration[s] of happenings lwas geschiehtl', foT philosophy must 'comprehend that 
which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening [bloOes Geschehenl' (SL 11, 
260/588). 
Recourse to such 'happenings' in philosophy in order to explain deten-ninations 
represents, for Hegel, the inability of a ri idly representational consciousness to think the 91 - 
Absolute successfully. Difference is posited as simply suddenly appearing in the 
Absolute, an event which can only be understood in tenns of the 'before' and 'after' of a 
narrative, as in Schelling's mythology of creation. The positing of an utterly 
transcendent, indifferent term as the presupposition of philosophy which is known as this 
presupposition tbrougb a superior intuition means that knowledge of its immanence in 
the world becomes problematic. There is no way of making a necessary or essential 
connection between the Absolute and the relative without simply illegitimately 
presupposing that the Absolute internally or essentially resembles the relative. 
Hegel sees the positing of a higher Absolute in which dissonance is simply an 
ungrounded 'event' as the illusory product of a consciousness that has not comprehended 
the negativity inherent in the detennination it has posited in the Absolute. In the Doctrine 
of Being, as we saw, the immediate difference of one determination from another is 
something that simply happens to it. 'llie Doctrine of Essence, however, comprehends 
this negativity as an effect of an essence, foundation, or ground. But this relation between 
essence and deten-ninations of immediacy itself has intemal negativity In a new form, and 
thus leads beyond itself I now want to show bow Schelling's positing of a higbeT 
Absolute can be read as inconsistent with itself by relafing it, not to the Doctrine of 
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Being and Hegel's account of immediacy. but to the determinations of PresupposinL, and 
Positing Reflection in the Doctrine of Essence. In this way, the objections of Schulz, 
Bowie and Frank will be shown to be dependent on a definition of the Absolute that 
cannot explain finite deten-nination. 
In SL, Being, and its subsequent determinations are immediately unequal to 
tbemselves: as soon as tbey are grasped positively, they differ from themselves. Being, is 
immediately Nothing; later, Something is immediately Other (SL 1,125-7,1117-19) and 
so on. In the first place, all the deterrninations of the Doctrine of Being simply are, yet 
through being deten-ninate as themselves, they are also something other than themselves. 
All detenninations of Being are tbus inadequate to tbemselves, as they cannot 
comprehend their own basic instability as deten-ninations of Being, which contains 
negativity and hence instability, but as undeveloped or implicit negativity. 
The end of the Doctrine of Being sees Being itself sublated: rather than one 
unstable category of Being immediately beconling another category and thus sublating 
itself, all deten-ninations of Being are sublated in the categorv of Absolute Indifference, 
wbich is the unity of all detel-minations of Being. But it is this unity only insofar as it is 
the negam, e unity of their internal movement, that is, of the immediate transitions that 
relate different determinations of Being to eacb otber. Like the end of PS, it is a result 
that comprebends the beginning of its development, but knows it now as posited througb 
an inherently negative movement. As the totality of the transitions that make up the 
Doctrine of Being, Absolute Indifference is therefore not itself an immediate transition 
(Ilbergang), but a -negatively self-related and i1whicitly differentiated unity which 
comprebends all the foregoing detenninations. 
If Indifference is this unity, then the Being, Determinate Being etc. of anything js 
only because the absolute unity of thought and being shows itself to be Indifference. 
Indifference is the condition of the stabilitv of Being and of its instability (SL 1, 
457/385). I'lie detennination of Indifference is 'a simple and infinite, negative relation- 
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to-self, its inherent incompatibility with itself a repelling of itself from itself' (SL 1,456- 
7/384. ). Hence Indifference is not, for Hegel, the uttefly transcendent 'iffeflexive' 
determination of the higher Absolute that it is for Schelling. 29 it is a unity that is 
understood a) as the unity of the deten-ninations of Being- and then b) as that which is 
other than Being and posiis its determinations, which now appear as being what they are 
only because they are mediated (SL 1,457/384). Indifference has a further determination 
in b), and is consequently grasped as Essence. 
Essence is not therefore simply an immediacy over against Being, and 
determined in relation to it as the immediate Other of Being. Instead, it Is an 'advance' 
on Being, resulting from the sublation of the spbere of Being or of inmediacy as sucb. 
Essence is what Being tums out to be when the inconsistency of the immediate with itself 
bas been fully comprebended as that wbicb defines all determinations of Being, (SL 11, 
14/390). Hegel's claim is thus that any immediate determination of the absolute unity of 
being and tbouglit presupposes Essence as the determination that renders immediacy 
thinkable or determinate. The determinations of Essence will comprehend the 
determinations of Being as mediated througb Essence, as reflected, opposed, grounded, 
conditioned and so on. Essence is self-related negativity, that into which all immediate 
determinations of something are reflected. 717bis mediated unity of Essence with itself (as 
opposed to Being's immediate inequality with itself) is wby Essence is also unstable (SL 
11,16/391). 
Schulz, Frank and Bowie all read Schelling's higher Absolute as a critique of this 
Hegelian claim. Frank and Bowie, like Schulz, argue that reason has to presuppose that it 
is 'always already inserted -00 in itsexistential ground, with which it is united in a superior 
intuition. This around is an utterly immediate, untbinkable unity that is radically otber 
'9 Cf Frank, 1975, pý 148 and Schulz, op. cii., p. 347 on the Absolute as an wivordeiiA-licher 
G, rliiid that is nevertheless the ground of reason. 
30 Schulz, op. cit., pp. 3344-5. 
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than thought, while sfill being the ground of though and thus somehow immanent in it. 
In this way, the relation between the Absolute and reason cannot be reduced to a rational 
relation: the Absolute is not simply the relative other of thought. for this would concevve 
their relation as one of mutual negative conditioning, like that between the Fichtean I and 
not-1. To assume that the Absolute has to be defined through such a negative relation. or 
even as such a relation itself, is nothing more than an assumption which cannot be 
proven. The true Absolute has to transcend al-I such relations. For example, Frank 
acknowledges that Being in the SL is implicitly self-relation, and thus requires a negative 
31 
unity of reflection as its condition- But the idea that this is absolute knowledge means 
that, for Frank, liege] moves in a circle. Irnmediacy is re-cognised as conditioned by 
mediation onlv because the immediacv that fonns the beginning is a mere concept of 
immediacy. 'Me identity of the Absolute and the concept of immediacy can ordy be 
presupposed. 
We now turn to the Doctrine of Essence in order to assess these criticisms. 
Essence initially emerged as the negative movement of immediate Bemg, but defined 
over against Being as immediately nol Being. This is Essence held fast as a qualitatively 
distinct kind of Being, as essential Being over against inessential (immediate) Being (SL 
11,18-19/394-5). But Essence has already been shown to be the negation of all 
immediacy as sucb. Essence, as negative movement., tbus expresses the self-nullification 
of immediate Being, for which all immediacy is now nothing but illusory Being, 'show' 
or "sbine' (Schein). Schein is immediacy that can no longer be self-subsistent simply 
tbrough being immediate. Being turns out to be a moment of Essence, distinguished from 
it through Essence's negative relation to itself, and then sinking back into Essence, as this 
immediacy is itself nothing but the negative movement of Essence (ISL 11,20-1/396-7). 
As Being is now conceived of as the 'shining' oj'Essence, Essence has shown itself to be 
internally different from itself, no longer simply a negative unity into which Bei ing 
31 Frank, 197-5, pp 33-4. 
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collapses, but also Reflection, its own internal movement of posifing and return (SL 11, 
23-4/399; EL § 112). 
Being is not therefore simply nothing. It is an immediacy that is nothing but a 
movement of absolute negativity, yet is distinguished from Essence through Essence's 
own negative relation to itself (EL § 112 Zus. ). Hence there is nothing outside reflecfion 
to negate: there is no longeT any munediately given otherness (SL 11,25j400) . 
32 Essence., 
as that which Being shows itself to be, "I turn out to be a reflection that excludes itself 
from itself, or Opposition (SL 11,59/427), 33 It will thus posit itself as being,, througb its 
own self-relation, reallv different from or other to itself This will be important, as we 
sball see in the next cbapter, for Hegel's account of the emergence of real difference 
from unity in the Doctrine of the Concept. But with absolute or self-related Reflection, 
there is no real difference between Essence and its 'sbining'. onlv a distinction which is 
posited through or for Reflection, and is therefore not real, but constantly collapsing. 
'17his isbecause absolute Reflection has two moments, each of which thought isolates and 
each of which is internally unstable. Positing Reflection is the sublation of the restless 
negative movement that is Essence, and the positing of Being, or immediacy in general, 
which is an absolute positing, i. e., one that occurs through the movement of Essence 
itself But it is simultaneously Presupposing Reflection, as it requires that there be an 
immediacy that is dissolved into the restless movement of Essence that sublates, all 
immediacy. So the positing of immediacy througb reflection only occurs in relation to a 
given immediacy, and is not absolute but only relative (SL 11,26-7/400-1). Essence as a 
self-related unity cannot simply posit Being absolutely. This was the problem that Fichte 
encountered in WL, where the free positing of the not4 by the I has to be reconceived as 
the necessary, negative conditioning of each by the other, because an absolute positing of 
31 Schmidt, 1997, p. 59 n. 80. 
33 lhid, p 71 
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difference is inconceivable in terms of abstract unity -a proposition with NNhich 
Deleuze would agTee. 
Hence Essence bas sbown itself to be that througli whicli Being is posited, but 
only insofar as this positing of immediacy is also the presupposing of immediacy. 
Essence thus presupposes itself as its own Icendation', its own 'in-itself, for it only 
emerges from Being if Being has already been posited as InbeTently negativity, Inherently 
circular, Reflection will turn out to be an inadequate determmation, but not in relation to 
a foundation that is given to thougbt, sucb as the Scbellingian bigber Absolute. Instead, it 
will be inadequate lo iiself, for the incessant to-and-fro movement whereby it posits only 
because it presupposes and vice versa will actually be constitutive of a un, IN, 
(Determining Reflection) in which thought comprehends this internal difference of 
Reflection in a new determination. 
Initially, the presupposing side seems more stable. It may begin from an 
immediate that is only as positedness (Geselzisein), but this immediate is detenninate 
over against Reflection, as nol Reflection. Reflection therefore appears as External 
Reflection, because it presupposes, not an Irm-nedlately different other, whose difference 
from it would be vanishing or illusory, but i1self as other, as an entirelv sublated or 
Reflection's own otber, negated movement of negativity (SL 11,27-8/401-2). n) I 
resulting from its internal difference, so here there is a real difference between Reflection 
'. 
14 -not illusory, however. it and immediacy Precisely because thisdifference is real and 
cannot be maintained: the presupposed irnmediacy is the otber, not of an immediacy, but 
of Reflection as such. It bas been posiled as an immediacy that is absolutely (i. e., througb 
Reflection's own self-relation) other than reflection, or as presupposed (SL 11,28-9/402- 
3). The apparent stability or full detertmnateness of External Reflection is only apparent: 
External Reflection presupposes itself as absolutely subiated, as the negative of 
34 Ihid, p. 49. 
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negativity. but this itself anses through the self-relation of Reflection. Even thought it is 
the negation of all positing, it is still posiled as this negation. 
Extemal Reflection too is not what it was taken to be. It is re-cognised as 
Determining Reflection, in which the immediate is constituted through the negative 
relation -to-sel f of essence, as being itvetf related-to-self. Here the immediate is posited as 
being related-to-self and thus as self-subsistent, and as related to another negative self- 
relation (SL 11,30-2/404-5). In this way, Reflection becomes determinate in relation to 
itself positing itself as determinations (identity, Difference etc. ) which, because they are 
posited as related-to-themselves, subsist as really different to other Concepts rather than 
simply passing over immediately into tbem. 
It is this whole sequence, from Positing through External to Deten-nining 
Reflection, that Frank and Bowie make the object of a detailed critique. The pivotal issue 
for them is whether or not thought can be genuinely infimte and comprehend an absolute 
immediacy that is in-itself neither thought nor an object posited relatively to thought and 
which is the presupposifion of all reflecfion. They all argue that this cwmot be the case, 
that thought can only presuppose that it can comprehend the Absolute. For them, Hegel's 
logic/ontology is purely negative, for it is a kind of presupposing reflection that assumes, 
as did Fichte, that the Absolute must resemble the finite subject, and be a reflexive self- 
relation rather than transcendmg all reflexivity as a truly "higher' Absolute. Bemg, the 
immediacy witb whieb SL begins., is notliing more fban a reflection of the unity of 
thought, rather than being a true immediacy, which could only be known in a superior 
intuition. Consequently, Frank argues that thougbt cannot recognise the unity of Positing 
and External Reflection as absolute in thought, but can only presuppose that this unity is 
absolute. And sucb a presupposition fails to acknowledge the real difference between 
self-related reflection and reflection that is related to a true immediacV given through an 
ecstatic intuition. This is because, as Schulz argues, true immediacy is that . N-hicb is 
positively and substantially self-grounding- that fTom which any reflevve reco-Wition 
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begins. The immediacy that reflection posits. being a negation of the restless movement 
of negativity, is notbing positive, on])- hTtmediate non-being or Schein in relation to the 
true, iffeflexive and real immediacy that conditions the movement. Bo ie notes that the W1 
unity of Extemal and Positing Reflection in thought would have to include the real 
difference between a posited immediacy and the real immediacy of Absolute Identity. 
and their identity. This is not possible in thought, however, for any conceptual unit. %, 
would simply be posited by thougbt, and would thus be negative in Schelling's sense. 
This Cntique is, in Hegelian terms, advanced from the perspective of 
representational consciousness, and posits an illusory distinction between the Absolute 
and the relative, and between intuition and tbought. As we saw, the PS ends Witb the 
dissolution of all distinctions between objects-for-us and objects-in-them selves. Absolute 
Kjjowing is not therefore the dogmatic certainty of the unity of reflection with a superior 
intuition of the in-itself of ob . ects. Instead, it is knowledge of the decentred. mode of self- j- 
relation that is required for there to be any determinate positing of an object-] n -itself or 
object-for-us at all. A possible Schellingian objection to this notion would be that the PS 
itself simply assumes that the real difference between an object-for-us and an object-m- 
itself is a difference ffir consciousness, when in fact it implies an irreconcilable 
difference between thought and intuition. The PS thus relies on an identity in 
consciousness of the object-for-us and the object-in-itself that is merely posited. and 
which thus does not acknowledge the absolute presupposition of all reflection. Hegel's 
response is clear: this objection simply repeats the difference of for-another and in-itself 
without comprehending it ý36 And to refuse to comprehend it is to ignore the fact that all 
experience of the difference between for-us and in-itself is consciousness's own real 
difference from itself its own mode of existence whicb it knaws as its own. 
li Bowie, op. a. t., p. 142 
A6 Pippin, 1989, pp. 94-6. 
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The difference between Schelling's positing of a higher Absolute as the ground 
of distinction and Hegel's immanent overcoming of consciousness is as follows. The 
repeated experience of consciousness's difference from itself is, for Schelling- the 
experience of an unsublatable difference between self-consciousness and the Absolute, 
wlilcli can only be overcome in the ecstatic experience of a higher identity through which 
the reality of the distinction is destroyed. For Hegel, this experience of difference 
constitutes the actuality of self-consciousness, and can only be overcome through itself 
rather than by positing, in addition to this reality, a superior intuition which gives access 
to the true unity that grounds all experience. This intuition of an indetenninate unity that 
is nevertheless deten-ninate as ground can only be posited as something that ougghi to be 
possible, but cannot in principle be kni-, mw to be possible. 37 It can only be postulated as 
the equivocal ground of knowledge, as knowledge that is not-knowledge. The bigber 
Absolute, as we saw in Chapters Two and Four, becomes posited in Schelling's more 
dogmatic moments, not as genuinely absolute, but as resernbling in itself the relative. 
For Sebelling, the relafion between self-consciousness and the Absolute is a 
contradictory one: an absolute opposition that nevertheless includes a ground of identity. 
Self-consciousness is an inessential, negative self-relation that produces nothing but 
Schein, whereas the Absolute has substantial, positive existence. From a Hegelian 
standpoint it appears that, cruciafly. the ground of identity between them is merely 
posited: the Absolute is not just an indeteffninate unity, but the indeten-ninate unity that is 
simultaneously determined as the immanent ground of reason. This problematic ground- 
relation is required in order not to reduce the Absolute to a relative other of thought., an 
object-for-us. Hence the Absolute does not have a deten-nination that is presupposed by 
reason, it is detennined or posited by reason as a foundation. And further, this positing is 
also on its own terms a presupposin& for it only happens in relation to given or 
immediate determinations of experience. The positing of an Absolute which is utterly 
171 Cf Dusing, 199-5, pp. 21,142,197 7, pp. 1-20,122,12T 
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transcendent yet at the same time immanent in reason as its own condition is made 
necessary by presuppositions about experience. Primary bere is the assumption that the 
difference between subject and object is the internal limit of consciousness that 
determines what will constitute meaningful expenence for us. and that consequent]-y all 
consciousness is representational. Hence the positing of a higher Absolute is relative to 
these assumptions. 
Scbelling's reliance on a superior intuition is meant to break the circle of 
Presupposing and Positing Reflection, for reason is understood as only presupposing this 
intuition. But if this presupposed intuition is knowledge of the Absolute determined as 
the foundation of all detennination, then Scbelling contradicts bimself. The Absolute that 
would be experienced in such an intuition could not be intuited, as previously noted. as 
the ground of reason. Sucb an intuition could only contain the dissolution of all 
determination, as Schelling insists in his more consistent moments. In order to knoir the 
Absolute as the ground of reason, Schelling, like Fichte, has to take on the impossible 
task of constructing a complete system of the Absolute in order to fully determine this 
grounding relation. Ile pm-adoxical intuition througb whicb reason becomes ecstatic in 
relation to itself and yet knows the Absolute as determined as its ground is thus merely 
posiled as the foundation of philosophy. Schelling himself affin-ns this when he tiies to 
think the Absolute in his middle period as genuinely 'higher. outside all relation to the 
finite yet still as the ground of determination. But this just affirms that the relation 
between the transcendent Absolute and determinate experience cannot in principle be 
knowm Just li e the relation between the ftmscendent God and the world that is posited j ik 
by the religious consciousness in PS. 
We thus have to consider two points: a) Hegel's model of Absolute Knowing 
does not function as Scbelling and his interpreters believe it does, and b) Scbelling's own 
conception of the Absolute is contradictory, and afflicted with a negativity (the relation 
between Absolute and relative) that it cannot comprebend, but can on]Nr poO .i as 
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unknowable. The inadequacy of Schelling's Absolute can be further demonstrated in 
relation to Hegel's explicit attack on the idea of a transcendent foundation in flic 
subsequent sections on Ground, in which the illusory basis of foundationalist thought is 
furtber undermined. Ground is the consequence of the collapse of the determination of 
Opposition. Opposition proves to be inadequate to itself, because it remains determined 
by the contradictory relation between self-subsistence and positedness (Ire] ati on-to-otber. ) 
that first arises with Reflection. The positive and negative poles of an opposition, sucb as 
Absolute Identity and self-relation, are simultaneously self-related and related to an 
other. This relation is asymmetric4 however, for the positive (Absolute Identity), insofar 
as it is positive, is opposed to the relation of opposition itself or is independent (SL 11, 
58-9/426). The negative (self-related reflection) is the negation of the positive, and is 
thus the relation of opposition itself (St It, 59/427). In this way. eacb is related to the 
other through itself the positive is the exclusion from itself of the relation of opposition, 
and the negative is the exclusion from itself of the positive that is negated opposition. 
Here, the difference of thought from itself is no longer that which was known as Positing 
38 
or Detennining Reflection, but is now Excluding (auvvViý, 0enkle) Reflection. 
Essence is itself insofar as it excludes itself from itself or is external to itself this 
is the result of Opposition, in which is made explicit the previously implicit 
detennination of Contradiction, in which neither side, positive or negative, is positive or 
negative, or rather, each pole is both. Each pole excludes its own self-subsistence insofar 
as it is self-subsistent (SL 11,64-5/431) and is reflected into its other. These opposites 
thus ceaselessly collapse into each other (SL 11,70/4351). This negative unity is 
Contradiction, but grasped as a unity that excludes itself from itself, thus positing the 
opposition, it is Ground. In tenns of the relation between Absolute Identity and self- 
relafion, Ground is the Absolute postulated as the unitv of Absolute and self-relation, or 
of Absolute and relative (SL 11,84/447). However, it is no more stable than the relation 
38 Schrmdt, op. cjt,, pp, 74-5. 
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contained in Opposition, for the contrad, ctory relation between self-subs, stence and 
poS]tedness still determines it. 
Ground is the unity of itself and that which it grounds. However, as ground of a 
grounded tenn, that is, asJust this ground, the ground has both form and content, and is 
determinate, for it is Ground in relation to an opposition (. SL 11,94-5,455-6). From tiow 
on, the problem of the circle of self-subsistence and positedness arises again. For 
example, witb the Concept of Formal Ground, the grounding relation is consfituted by 
the fonnal reflexive relation of Cirround to itself, whereby the content of Ground is 
reflected in the grounded (SL 11,96/456-7) (Absolute Identity qua ground of knowing is 
posited as positing itself in and tlirouO the relative). However, in this way, the Ground is 
just as mucli posited as Ground by the grounded. The notion of an undifferentiated 
Ch-ound that is the unity of itself and the grounded itself turns out to be alreadv the 
grounded of another Ground. There is no stable difference between the posited tenn 
(initially., the grounded) and that which is presupposed (the ground'), as they stand in the 
same relation to each other. 
In relation to this development, Schelling's account of the Absolute as an 
unconditioned presupposition can only be consistent from witbin representational 
consciousness. Hegel shows that the idea that detennination can be explained solely with 
reference to a transcendent ground is illusory, even thougli Ground arises as an immanent 
(thougb incomplete) determination of the meaning of the Absolute. Ground can never be 
simply presupposed: if it is understood as a ground, then, argues Hegel, it is only ground 
because of its determination in relation to that which it is supposed to ground. In this 
way, the Absolute conceived of as transcendent is either posited as a distinctionless, non- 
rational substantial unity, in which case it cannot serve as a ground, or it is posited as a 
rational substantial unit-v, as in Schelling's account of the first creation. In the first case, it 
cannot stil)port determination, for it is posited as a formal unity without any determinate 
relafion to the relative. In the latter case, the determinate relafion bet,, -, -een it and the 
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relative is simply posited in relation to experience, whicb breaks Scbelling's own 
restriction on positing an internal resemblance between the Absolute as an ontological 
unity and that which it conditions. The only other option consistent with representational 
erence is to think the Absolute itself as internalIN. consciousness s awareness of diff 
different from itself, but this also cannot, for Schellmg, ultimate]y explain determination. 
as it undermines foundationalism from within. 
Hegel's deconstruction of the structure of Ground is vitally important, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, for understanding the meaning of his enterprise in SL, for it 
marks the point at wbicli his critique of the ontologically-rooted illusory nature of 
foundationalism begins to become explicit. Through it, he shows that foundationalism 
itself is based on a circular, intemally negative structure of being and thought. A 
transcendent in-itself cannot serve as an unconditioned ground of deten-nination, for 
insofar as it is unconditioned, it is Without determination, and insofar as it is determined 
as a foundation of something, it is determined in relation to the subject and cannot be 
unconditioned. Further, if it is simply understood as a distinctionless unity, it is neither 
for-us, nor in-itself And if this is so, then we are dealing With the thought of a 
problematic, positive unity of Being with which Hegel begins both PS and SL, and which 
turns out to be internally negative. Begel's model of Absolute KnoWing can be defended 
apainst Schelli-rigian objections, then, firstly because these objections misconstrue it, and 
secondly because it can itself account for the structure of the foundationalist position 
behind these objections, shoWing it to be illusory or self-cancelling. In the next chapter, 
we will examine Hegel's Doctrine of the Concept, in order to see bow it realises his goal, 
to formulate an antifoundationalist philosophy. 
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Chapter Seven 
Hegel's Concept as an Antifoundational Principle 
i) Introduction 
Contrasting with the view that is commonly taken of the relationship between 
Deleuze and Hegel, namely, that they are thinkeTs whose visions of the task of 
philosophy are incommensurable, the previous four chapters have laid out a thematic 
territory common to both. A central feature of this territory is the idea that transcendental 
illusions native to reason are the sources of all philosophical misdirection. This idea- 
resulting from Kant's Copernican Revolution. replaces the Cartesian notion of error (DR 
195/150), just as Kant's notion of Darvellung undercuts Descartes' representationalist 
theory of truth. Both Dele-uze and Hegel take Kant to task, however, for failing to I-- 
adequately understand the nature of transcendental illusion. For these thinkers, illusions 
arise from unquestioned presuppositions about the nature and destiny of thought. These 
presuppositions force philosophy to produce a foundationalist model of thought, 
exemplified by the models of critical thinking that dominated the Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment thinking, in attempting to establish a rigorous distinction between 
justifiable knowledge and mere belief was forced to fight a rearguard. action against the 
veqv scepticism it had itself deployed. The possibility of such a distinction was seen to 
depend upon the possibility of proving that theTe is a priori svntbetic knowledge. which, 
as we saw in Chapter Two, was undermined successively by Kant, Fichte, and., above all, 
by Schelling, despite their intentions. 
I have tried to show that the trauma of reason, a philosophical crisis of meaning 
that is the iresult of the Enlightenment obsession with foundations, can be said to be an 
important point of orientation for both Hegel and Deleuze. Both attempt to construct 
models of philosophy that will enable the presuppositions of foundationalism to be 
accounted for and criticised. Both also affirm that the only adequate. non-circular 
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account of these presuppositions will be an ontological one. which focuses on the 
meaning of the Absolute as the 'object' specific to philosopby. Hegel and Deleuze see 
transcendental illusion as rooted, not in accidental deten-ninations of consciousness, but 
in being itself For Deleuze, as for Bergson. Illusion Is the product of ., -Irtual tendencies 
within being that are actualised as differences of degree and which thus distort the nature 
of being, which is to be different in kind from itself For 14egel, illusion is rooted in the 
negatiVltv of being, and its immanent determination as immediacy, and as mediated 
immediacy or Essence. 
We still need to consider that determination which Hegel considers an adequate 
expression of the Absolute, wbich will require us to examine the Doctrine of the Concept 
in SL. In Chapters Three and Four, we traced Deleuze's development of an image of 
philosophy that affinned the lack of incomgible foundations as a positive state of affairs. 
We need to consider now the fulfilment of Hegel's own anti foundationali st ontology in 
SL. I aim in this chapter to exarnine Deleuze's Schellin&"an denunciation of Hegel's 
'hidden' fbundafionallsniý and to show how Hegel can be read against this interpretafion, 
concentrating further upon the critique of the idea of a substantial, transcendent 
foundation that is developed in SL. In this way, the antifoundationalism of Hegels 
ontology will be brought out, and allowed to stand alongside Deleuze's. In the next, 
concluding chapter, their respective versions of anti foundationalism Will be clIfically 
examined in relation to each other. 
ii) Deleuze's Critique of the Immanence of the Pure Concept 
Many of Deletize's criticisms of flegel share their orientation with those 
advanced by Schelling. Both Deleuze and Schelling, accuse Hegel of not acknowledging 
that the Absolute is incommensurable with thought. As we have seen, theN 7 argue for this 
inconunensurability in different ways and with different intentions. Nevertheless, both 
affinn that philosophy cannot construct a presuppositionles& absolute system. For 
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Deleuze, as for many post-war French thinkers. the ideal of an absolute, self-grounding 
and tbus self-enclosed philosopbjcal system is a primary target. As we saw, Scbelling 
first undermined this ideal from within. by arguing that philosophy has to presuppose. as 
the ultimate condition of real determination, a 'hiaer' Absolute that cannot in principle 
be comprehended within thought. This means that there can be no a priori conceptual 
system capable of containing the Absolute. Schelling tbus exposed the basic assumption 
of foundationallst philosophy, i. e., that the Absolute is identical With reason, as an 
ungrounded and unprovable subjective conviction. Deleuze's attempt to account for the 
origins of this belief follows Schelling's general line of thinking by, after Bergson, 
determining foundationalism (Platonism) as a transcendental illusion that expresses 
certain virtual tendencies within being. He argues that foundationalisin always has to 
presuppose a transcendent subjectiVity that knows the unity of reason and Absolute, i. e., 
an act of 'knowing before knowing'. This presupposition is what Schelling makes 
explicit as an act of faith. 
Deleuze's deten-nination of the Absolute, the movement of Absolute Difference, 
is an attempt to think the higher Absolute without allowing it to be determined in relation 
to experience. As we saw in the previous chapter, the wnbivalence of Schelling's higher 
Absolute can be understood vnth reference to Hegel's deconstruction of ground-relations 
in SL. We saw that the Absolute had to be posited as the transcendent, substantial ground 
of detennination. But this meant that an illegitimate resemblance bad to be posited 
between Absolute and relative, with the detenninations of the relative being presupposed 
as inherent in the Absolute as its necessary inner deteffninations. Hence Scbelling does 
not solve the Kantian problem of assuming that certain definitions of the meaning of 
experience are universally true of all expenence, an assumption that, for Deleuze, betrays 
the deeper assumption of a transcendent subjectivity, a common sense, a shared context 
i sbed. in wbich the universal horizon of meaning is always already estabil Deleuze's 
response is to disavow the notion of a common sense implied bv the Platonic image of 
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thought in the hope of avoiding the presupposition of a transcendent 'knowing before 
knowing', wbich forces foundationalist thougbt to move in a circle. Instead. he attends to 
the minimal presupposifion of philosophy considered as a pracu . ce of thinking- which for 
bim is the internal difference of thought from itself. This, for Deleuze, is the inner limit 
of thought, which cannot be comprehended by a concept. It is thought's transcendental 
object, that which is its by nght, because it is its own limit, its own contingent being. 
Deleuze thus takes up Schelling's prq: ject of detennining the Absolute-in-Itself without 
positing It as internally resembling presupposed structures of experience. For Deleuze, all 
conceptual thinking, that is, thinking that sees the identity of the concept as the measure 
of genuine knowledge, must presuppose the movement of the internal difference of 
thought ftom itself as a minimal condition of any activity of thinking. As this movement 
is incomprehensible for conceptual thought, Deleuze concurs With Scbelling that the 
Absolute is encountered initially by philosophy as the contingent being of thought itself 
As with Scbellmg- this contingency is an irreduCible ontolo . cal presupposition that is 91 
forever impossible for foundationalist thought to comprehend, even though the 
tendencies that bring tbougbt into existence are absolutely immanent NVItbin tbougbt. 
Deleuze's criticisms of Hegel centre on the idea that the Hegelian svstem aims to 
be a total, closed ontological system, including both lo ic and Realphilosophie. In this, 91 
he follows his teacher Jean Hyppolite in taking seriously Hegel's claims about the 
ontological import of Absolute Knowing. For Deleuze, then, liege] is a Platonist or 
foundationalist, who presupposes the existence of the priNrileged perspective of a 
transcendent subject, a lheoros. Deleuze reads SL as purporting to deduce the inner 
articulations of Being, whicb will form an a priori logical grammar of the Absolute, and 
will thus constitute the condition of all actual determinafion. The fact that ouT conscious 
experience of the world is structured as it is will thus be grounded in the nature of Being, 
which is accessible to pure thought. The system will thus have a fixed horizon of 
ineaning or common sense within which we can think Being, that of the self-relation of 
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the Concept or self-thinking thought. Any talk of Being that defines it as infinitely other 
than thought, or incommensurable with itself posits it illegitimately as really existing 
beyond this horizon of meaning. Thus far, Deleuze concurs with Schelling's reading of 
SL as a negative philosophy that identifies. the inner meaning of an absolute unity with 
the conceptual unity of thought, and supposedly grounds itself by retuming immanently 
through the analysis of this umtv to the point where it began, havmg unfolded its whole 
content. To assume that this content comprises anything more than merely possible 
determinations of Being is, for Deleuze and for Sebellim,, to posit an illusory unit-v of 
being and thought. 
In an early review of Hyppolite's Logique el existence, Deleuze points out that 
Hegel determines the absolute borizon and meaning of experience by proposing that 
Absolute Knowing is not knowledge of things-In-themselves beyond the veil of 
appearance. Instead, it is Simply knowledge of the internal lo ical grammar of the 91 
familiar meaning of our experience (A 458). Deleuze thus agrees with Schelling and 
Marx that Hegel's analysis of the Concept of pure Being reverses an actual relation 
between consciousness and its real, matenal conditions. This analysis analyses nothing 
but our presuppoSitions about the meamng of our own experience, a procedure that can 
only reveal the internal structure of these presupposed meanings, rather than accounting 
for their existence. Hegel determines this structure through the self-relation of the 
Concept, which for Deleuze is a relation that embodies in Hegel's thought the 
foundationalist assumption of a transcendent subjectivity. Deleuze suggests that Hegel's 
fundamental assumption, that the minimal meaning of Being is as simple, indeterminate 
and so on, is simply a philosophical reflection of an empirical image of Being (DR 
169/129) that posits it as identical with the pure Concept. The real source of interest, for 
Deleuze, is thus bow to explain the genesis of these presuppositions. which be attempts 
to do by leaving behind the intenonty of the self-tbink-ing Concept. 
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Deleuze then, like Schelling, argues that Hegel simply assumes that Being is. like 
reflexive self-consciousness, related to itself negatively. This means that the inner 
determinations of Being anse through its inconsistency with itself, i. e., through the 
logical operation of contradiction. For Deleuze, this determination of difference as 
contradicfion is the highest degree of difference that is thinkable for representational 
consciousness. It tbus remains a difference of degree determined in relation to a 
presupposed identity (rather than an absolute difference, a difference of kind), for it 
represents a unity that is itself only insofar as it differs from all it is not, a negative unity. 
The Absolute, for Hey-el, is that which expresses the contradictorv nature of all 
phenomena., the fact that, in relation to consciousness, any appearance is both itself and 
something else and the negative unity of the two. Hegel thus remains tied to Kant's 
transcendental Ideal of the complete determination of a self-identical individual in 
relation to the totality of other individuals (DR 65/45). The reallsation of this Ideal would 
mean that the real, internal relations between phenomena would have been fully 
determined. Such an Ideal would therefore be a transcendent substance, for which all 
pbenomenal relations would be aspects of its internal relation to itself This goal of full 
determination is, according to Deleuze, meant to be fulfilled by the Doctrine of the 
Concept, where the Concept becomes the Absolute Idea, the transcendent 'ground' and 
substance of all difference (DR 61-2/42). But this whole image of philosophy is based on 
contradiction, an empirical image of difference that is reflected into the Absolute by the 
ahos of thought known as Hegelian Science. 
Ilis absolutisation of a self-contradictory unity is further reflected in the aspect 
of Hegel's philosophy that is most repugnant to Deleuze, namely his treatment of historv. 
Deleuze reads this treatment as proposing that the hidden motor of historv. namelv the 
inner logical grammar of Being, is gradualiv revealed through the historical process as 
the becoming-self-conscious through philosophy of Absolute Spint. In other words, the 
Hegelian horizon of meaning, the common sense behind Absolute Knowing, is our 
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historical knowledge of previous systerns of philosophy. The Absolute is thus 
analytically determined in thougbt as a set of possibilities that are notbing but a reflection 
of a particular domain of historical experience. For Deleuze, Hegel sees history as 
determined by a single transcendent problem: how to disclose the implicit content of 
Being for us through thinking and thus render the Absolute self-conscious and thus fully 
reconciled to itself in a supreme Science. As in Scbelling's PbIlosopby of Identim', 
history would be conceived of as the unfolding of a merely possible first creation that is 
derived in its totality from the pure concept of the Absolute. If the Absolute is a self- 
contradictory unity. then its determinations must be thought as subsisting eternally within 
it in the same manner as the determinations of Schelling's ideal universe. History is tbus 
the external appearance of the Absolute, its becoming for-itself, 'a continual progress 
that is at the same time a "regress into the ground"', ' a gradual realisation of the internal 
possibilities of a transcendent substance through its autonomous self-] iml tati on. 
For Deleuze, Hegelian onto-logic thus claims to be the condition of all 
determination, but can only do this by assuming that its immanent. supposedly 
presuppositionless examination of the category of Being realýv delineates the contours of 
actuality. The opposition between thought and being is, from Hegel's point of view. only 
an illusory one, as the ground of the opposition, the negative self-relation of the Concept, 
remains transcendent to all deten-ninations of thought and being as their foundation., thus 
securMg their resemblance or mner umty. Deleuze agrees With BerWn that Hegel's 
philosophical ethos 'believes itself to be reunited with the real when it compensates for 
the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invoking the opposite 
concept (B 38/44). Hegel's assumption of the transcendence of the Concept preserves, in 
pbilosopbical consciousness,, the interiority of representational consciousness,, for even 
I Balke, 1998, p. 24, quoting SL, 1,70j"71. 
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the largest difference posited in Hegelian thought that between the immediate beginning 
.-1 and the end result of the System, v; internal to the Concept itselt. - 
iii) Hegel, Deleuze and KanIian. Se#-Con-vciou. vnexv 
As we have seen, Deleuze's central objection against Hegel is similar to 
Schelling's, i. e., that Hegel can only presuppose that his analysis of the concept of simple 
Being is a real deduction of the necessary determinations of Being. Deleuze adds to this 
Schellinglan objection the observation that the reason for this predicament is Hegel's 
foundationalist assumption that the essential meaning of philosophy is tied to the 
transcendence of thought. Hegel cannot for Deleuze, what Lessing called the 'broad, 
ugly ditch' between the hypothetical detennination of the Absolute and its real 
determination (DR 254 fn/325-6 n. 15). 
This question of this distinction between bypotbetical and absolute knowledge 
will now be addressed. Our first step Will be to return briefly to the similarities and 
differences between Deleuze and Hegel's respective accounts of reflexive subjectivity. 
Both accounts, I want to suggest, are intimately related to the ambiguous Kantian account 
of self-consciousness I first introduced in Chapter Five. Kant affirms, against the 
rationalist tradition, that the validity of representations of pure reason can only be 
sub . ective or hypotbetical, for only the syntheses of the Understandmg camed out upoin 
the intuited manifold can possess objective validity. This epistemological distinction 
between pure thought and thought as related to intuition is problernatised, however, by 
Kant himself As noted in Chapter Five, Kant holds that there is an immediate form of 
self-consciousness that is embodied in an 'indetenninate empincal, intuition' given to 
'thought in general' (CPuR B422-31). The epistemological status of this Intuition Is 
ambiguous,, given that it represents neither a noumenon nor a phenomenon. It is an 
undeniable, though indeterminate, feeling of existence associated with consciousness, 
ibid., P. 26. 
225 
rather than Descartes' fully determinate intellectual intuition of a thinking thing. For 
Deleuze, Kant's insistence that this intuition is only determinable under the form of time 
is the genuinely Critical moment of bis pbilosophy. The thougbt T marks the feeling of 
existence itself rather than representing anything substantial that is known through or in 
the feeling, such as a soul. Any determinate content of the 1, including the proposition 'I 
exist tbinking' is only given as an appearance constituted for inner sense under the form 
of fime (CPuR B430). Thus my appearance to myself cannot be identified with whatever 
it is that the feeling denoted by T refers to, the entity that thinks. The connection 
between the feeling marked T and the determination of thinking is thus unrepresentable, 
unless we presuppose that the thing that thinks is a spontaneous, foundational subject, 
which is continuous with the phenomena] subject that is determined for itself in self- 
consciousness. 
This Kantian notion of a unified transcendental subject is, for Deleuze, simply a 
presupposition, a retrospective positing of the unity of the passive, detenninate empirical 
subject as its own condition, in an eminent form. The identity of the phenomena] ego and 
that to which the indetemmnate feelmg of existence is understood to refer is purely 
hypothetical. Hence Deleuze reads Kant as assuming that the identity of passive subject 
and subject in-itself, the thing that thinks, is given to us, when in fact it is not and is in 
fact impossible to establish. Deleuze constructs an alternative account of subjectivity, 
however, based on the idea that the "thing that thinks" is a dispersed plurality of 
differences, or the movement of Absolute Difference itself insofar as it is actualised as a 
system of mental faculties rooted in the body of an individual. Deleuze uses Rimbaud's 
proposition 'I is another' to express this fundamental 'crack' in the subject that 
constitutes for bim Kant's discovery of the transcendental. As we saw in Cýapter Four, 
the constitutive role of a purely determinable, problematic element is filled bv GeIiihl in 
Fichte"s account of subjectivitv, and bv the 'dark will' in Schelling's middle-penod 
accounts of the Absolute. in all three cases, a relafion is established between a basic 
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intuition of existence and a problematic, internally differentiated element, prior to any 
actual, stable determination of this existence for-us. Deleuze affirms the prionty of this 
relation by proposing that Absolute Difference is the bemg of the sensible (DR 80'56-'/ý 
182/139-40)ý3 This goes for the feeling of existence associated with consciousness as 
mucb as for sensibility per se. 
Hegel too, however, affirins the Kantian difference between transcendental 
subjectivity and the pbenomenal subject, and even goes so far as to sbow M PS that the 
proposition, T is an Otber., represents a necessary determination of Spirit, given certain 
intersubjective relations. I is another' describes accurately the structure of consciousness 
in the secfions of PS on the world of Self-Alienated Spirit or Pure Culture, in which the 
subject's earlier loss of certainty as to its transcendence of the world (in the Self- 
Consciousness chapter) becomes explicit. The subject finds that its 'true original nawre 
and substance is Spirit as the alienation of natural being' (PS 348/298 §489, modified). 
What 'I am' here is not the certainty of myself as my own foundation, but the difference 
in nature of what I am for myself (finite consciousness) and wbat I posit myself as being 
in truth (the in-itself, natural being, the supposedly substantial. essential or transcendent 
'thing that thinks'). Spirit alienated from its own being is an intersubjectively determined 
consciousness that repeats the earlier dynamic of Scepticism: it repels itself ftorn itself, 
or is only aware of its difference from itself 
Tbis subject is., as a detemiination of Spirit, doubly decentred. Firstly, it has 
come to understand itself as Spirit in gener4 that is, as a relation to self that is this 
relation only through its relation to other subjects. Secondly, it is aware of itself as a 
movement of negativity without a substantial natural foundation, and this movement 
itself Will eventually be re-cognised as identical With Substance. This latter identity of 
Subject and Substance is not simply posited as given, unlike the Kantian identim, of 
passive subject and detennining subject. Instead, the free activity. the 'thing that thinks' 
See also Baugh, 1993, p. 18, 
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which is re-cognised at the end of the PS as the unity of Subject and Substance is 
Absolute Negativity. the actuality of self-consciousness which has developed out of the 
simple beginning of the PS. 'Mere is no longer a substantial 'thing' posited behind the 
activity of deterrmnabon, in fact, the absoluteness of this negativity consists in its being 
both subject and obje4 and neither. It thus represents a complete loss of any dimension 
of givenness, positivity or substantiality,, and constitutes the overcoming of the rigidity of 
representational consciousness only because of this lack of an in-itself dimension. 
Deleuze's reading of Absolute Negativity as the embodiment of the transcendence or 
substantiality of the Concept which will eventually become the ultimate transcendent 
ground, the Absolute Idea, is at odds With this result. 
The PS thus overcomes the transcendental illusion represented by the refusal of 
natural consciousness to see beyond the fixity of the distinction between subject and 
ob . ect. As we saw in Chapter Six, this empirically appearing illusion is, as in Deleuze's 9- 
analysis, ontologically rooted. However, for Hegel it is rooted in ontolo ical structures 91 
analysed in the Logic of Essence, which appear in histoncally concrete fonns. Absolute 
Negativity is. in addition, not only the truth of self-consciousness. As noted in Chapter 
Six, it is the trutb of the beginmng of PS, the mdetenninate being of Sense-Certainty. 
'Phis being, wbich, as I argued m Cliapter Five, must be identified witb the ambiguous yet 
undeniable feeling of existence Kant refers to in the B edition of CPuR, is itself neither 
subject nor object. This being is not the certamty of my existence as a substantial self, but 
a bare feeling that comes eventually to be marked for me as T, and thus becomes the 
illusion of a substantial or transcendent self. This latter representation 'I am' is made 
possible by intersubjective recogMtion, but this is not all-, it is also made possible by the 
structure of Being itself, that is, Absolute Negativity. This is the result of PS. The 
Hdduiýg of the subject is not a process whereby it rediscovers its substantialitV on the 
other side of its difference from itself In fact, the resulting actuality of self- 
consciousness is the absolute loss of any dimension of substantiality The Unconditioned 
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is not an actual, empirical self-consciousness posited illegitimately as its own condifion. 
Instead, PS ends vntb the aclualitv of self-consciousness in Hegel's sense of Wirklichkeir 
through the educative expenence of its own difference from itself self-consciousness 
comes to know this difference as its own condition and truth. 
Deleuze, as we have seen, insists Ue Schelling that the dialectical Authebung of 
simple Being requires the assumption that thought is identical With the substantial or in- 
itself aspect of Being. If one disregards this assumption, then the absolute, undeniable 
thesis, the feeling of existence, cannot be mediated through antithesis and synthesis, it is 
not taken up or 'does not follow' (DR 74/52). However, Deleuze makes this point by, 
again like Sebelling, relying on a somewhat crude reading of the dialectic of immediacy 
in PS and SL. In order to grasP the relation between the beginning and end of PS, for 
example, we miust attend to the specific relation between the initial indeten-ninate Being 
and the two opposed terms that emerge from it. These two simple unifies, opposed as 
- I- 
" 
objective and subjective or as tbesis and antithesis, are not tbernselves opposed to the 
initial indetenninate Being. Each of these unifies is unsuccessfiffly posited in tum as the 
foundation of the other, before any further distinction between subjective and objective is 
posited. However, their relation to the initial, indetenninate Being is problematic that 
both terms happen to 'ernerge out of pure being [aus dem reinen Sein [ ... 
] herau. ýfallen1' 
constitutes the 'cnicial diversity' in Sense-Certainty (PS 80/59 §92, modified). The 
movement of emergence here does not subsequently become known as the activity of a 
substantial, self-positing subject, as was Fichte's goal. Instead, this movement, and the 
simple unity fTom whicb it begins, is known at the end of the PS as Absolute Negativity, 
an unconditioned that remains unstatable in terms representational consciousness (being 
attached to simple positiVity, substantiality and transcendence) would understand, 
requiring instead a ltýgical (philosophical) exposition. 
In the PS, simple indeterminate Bejýkg is re-cognised in the assertion of Existence 
in self-consciousness (I am') before eventually becoming recognised as the Actuality 
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that is Absolute Negafivity. Deleuze's assertion that Hegel's beginning with Being. 
whether in natural or philosophical consciousness, is not presuppositionless, because it 
assumes the identity of being-for-us ('sensible, concrete. empirical bemg', DR 169/1291) 
and being-in-itself, is mistaken. flegel does not begin vAth concrete being, but with 
problematic being, the ambiguous Kantian feeling of existence that Deleuze himself 
affirms in his account of the transcendental difference at the heart of thought. Here, there 
are no distinctions between subject and object., phenomenon and noumenon, or 
bypothetical and categOncal. Hegel's accotint of Absolute KnoWIng does not purport to 
describe what the determinate, positive unity of thought and being-in-itself must be like. 
Instead, it is knowledge of what the unity of thought and being must be if the difference 
between being-for-us and bemg-m-itself can even be presented in consciousness. In this 
way, Absolute Knowing undercuts the foundationalist model of knowledge and its 
aporia., for it is not knowledge of a foundation, but of the simplest possible beýginning of 
thougbt. 
iv) Immanent 'Ungrounding'and the Immanent Concept 
Botb liege] and Deletize employ accounts of self-consCiousness in order to 
undennine the foundationalist image of thought, in such a way that the unquestioned 
presuppoSitions of foundationalism are brought to light. For both thinkers, the problem 
with foundationallsm is that it tries to account for the possibility of detennination with 
the aid of a transcendent fbimdation. This proves to be a self-destructive orientation, as 
Schelfing shows, for foundationalism can only presuppose what it sets out to prove, i. e., 
that knowledge of the real through reason alone is possible. Deleuze accuses Hegel too of 
being a foundationalist, for assuming that the Concept is identical with the putative 
substantial or in-itself dimension of Being. But as we have seen, this is not an accurate 
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account of Hegel's Absolute KnoWing. 4 Absolute KnoWing is knowledge of the structure 
of the immanent, negative movement of consciousness, in which there is no possible 
determinate distinction between thought and being. It is thus the result of the collapse of' 
any possible distinction between for-us and in-itself 
now want to sbow bow Hegel develops an ontology in SL that accounts for 
determination without referring it to a transcendent ground posited as Internally 
resembling that which it grounds. This will entail a further examination, following the 
previous chapter, of Hegel"s deconstruction of foundationalism in the Doctrine of 
Essence, before we pass on to the Concept. This examination will show how the Concept 
comprebends an absolute difference that results in stable determination. 
Our survey will take in the categones of Existence, the Absolute and Actuality, 
before moving on to that of the Concept itself My argument bere, is that the n-reducibility 
of the categories of Existence, Actuality and Concept to that of Ground demonstrates that 
liege] leaves behind fou-ndationalism and all illusory methods of explanation ftom 
grounds. His account of the relation between Possibility, Contingency and Necessity 
demonstrates that Hegel's ontology does not presuppose a transcendent identity 
preposited under the form of possibility or eminent identity. Finally, the Concept itself is 
explicated as a self-deten-nining principle wbose activity is not one of grounding in the 
foundationalist sense, and in which is realised Hegel's Critique of the notion of a 
transcendent and substantial Absolute. The relation between thought and beingfOTHegel, 
4 Given the way in which Deleuze reads philosophical texts strategically for his own purposes (a 
good example being his reliance on a Koj6vean reading of the PS in NP), it would perhaps be 
mistaken to reproach him for interpretative 'errors'. His cntiques of figures within the tradition 
could be understood as deliberate and creative exercises in n-ýsdirection, driven by a sensation of 
philosophical oppression, and the need, acknowledged in his accounts of the process in which 
images of thought are transformed. to Tnark the difference between such negative 'mediators' and 
those he found more conducive to creative thinking. 
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as we shall see, is not an internal relation secured by the transcendence of the Concept 
qua Ground, for the Concept cannot be understood through this illusory category. 
As we saw in Chapter four, Deleuze's ontology presents the relation betN%een the 
transcendental or virtual, and the empirical or actual. in terms of Absolute Difference or 
their mutual incommensurability The virtual is in-itself different in kind from itself, and 
becomes for-itself in actuality by externalising itself Like Bergsonian duration, the 
virtual tends botb to 'relax' itself tbrough actual differences of degree in extension, and 
to remain immanent or implicated within differences of degree as Absolute Difference. 
In this way, the relation between virtual tendencies and their actual expression is external 
and contingent, unlike the necessary and internal relation that is posited in Schelling's 
Philosophy of Identity as existing between the substantial unconditioned and the 
conditioned. This externality, for Deleuze, gives real, creative explanatory power to 
philosophy. As we shall see, Hegel's own account of the ontological principle of 
determination refuses all transcendence to this principle, describing it in terms of internal 
difference and externalisation, rather than ascribing to it substantiality and a transcendent 
self-relation through which it becomes detenninate by limiting itself 
We begin in the Doctrine of Essence where we left off in the previous chapter, 
witli Ground. The detenmnation of Groiind is cbaractensed by a relation of two terms in 
which their mutual exclusivity is necessary or essential, i. e., thev are intemaliv related to 
each other as external to each other. The instability of this determination, which is 
apparent to thinking that goes beyond the stubborn insistence on the fixity of ground and 
grounded, results from this mutual relation of 'shining-into-other'. As we saw in Chapter 
Six, any Ground can only be a Ground if it presupposes an other that it grounds. Ground 
thus includes within its logical structure the unity of itself and its Grounded, and their 
distinction. This distinction is the Form (SL 11,86-7/449-50) of the Ground, and the unity 
becomes determined as the specific determinafion of the Ground, its Content. Given a 
specific Ground, its relation to its Grounded is in the first instance a case of Formal 
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Grounding- in which the inner unity of the two. their common Content, is posited in a 
doubled form (SL H 97-8/457-8). An example of this logical relation menfioned by 
Hegel is the notion of attractive force in physics. where a phenomenon is explained by 
reference to a ground that is Simply the particular pbenomenon posited as existing under 
the fonn of universality or abstract possibility (SL 11,98-9/458-9). Hegel is tbus directly 
criticising the type of explanation of determination that Deleuze accuses him of giving, 
wbere the actual is assumed to pre-exist its actualisation as a possible. internal 
determination of a transcendent unconditioned. 5 For Hegel, this type of explanation is 
illusory because the logical structure of Ground is not self-consistent. This lack of 
consistency is the result of a failure to comprehend adequately the structure of Absolute 
Negativity, for Formal Ground is a determination which still requires that an external 
term, the Content, is presupposed as given to thought, which then inscribes a merely 
fon-nal or accidental distinction within it. 
The instability of Ground and Grounded is repeated in Formal Ground, WItb the 
Formal distinction presupposing the unity of Content rather than being genuinely 
identical WItb it. The result is an attempt to tbink the unity of Form and Content anew. 
Real Ground is the result, where the distinction of Fon-n is internal to Content itself, such 
that Ground and Grounded are external to each other, not solelv because of their Form, 
but due to their Content. However, the insufficiency of Formal Ground, which was due 
to the inessentiality of the Foirmal distinction, is now matched by the excessive 
externality of the Real distinction which is internal to Content (SL 11,103-5/462-3). That 
is to say, if we simply posit the ground of a phenomenon in another phenomenon 
external to it that we simply associate with it, there is no ground of unity between the 
two except in the merely subjective judgement throligh which we link them. In this wav. 
it becomes impossible to say what it is in the phenomena themselves that constitutes a 
grounding relation. Any phenomenon could be adduced as a ground of any other (SL 11, 
5 On Deleuze's critique of this type of explanation, see Chapter Four above, pp. 123-4 
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106-7/465). Here, the unity of the two Contents is presupposed rather than posited, and 
again., no explanation is produced 
The overcoming of the inconsistencies associated with Ground really begins with 
the determination of Existence (SL 11.125/481). With Existence, there Is no Ions-,, er a 
grounding relation between a terin and its essential substrate (Grundlage) (EL § 123 
ZUSý). 7 Ground relies on the given externality of two terms,, whick for representational 
consciousness, implies both spatial and temporal externality. However, the logical 
structure of Existence is not that of grotind and consequent, but implies the totality of 
Conditions that have to exist for one existent to be the Ground of another. A Condition is 
precisely wbat bas, to be present in order for there to be a relation of grounding- an 
immediacy which is simply present, rather than being posited bv the Ground. The 
deten-nmation of Condition thus acknowledges the insufficiency of Ground, which is 
that given two phenomena, it is impossible to explain the necessary detenninafion of one 
by the other simply by considering the phenomena themselves. The necessary relation of 
grounding requires certam contingent Conditions in order to exist. The necessary 
connection between the movement of one Humean billiard ball and that of anotber 
requires a whole totality of Conditions to be established, which are unified in or related 
to just this ground-relation: a level surface, the absence of strong draughts, and so on. 
Tbe determination of Condition marks the comprehension of this fact, in which the 
presupposition of Ground is determined as immediately other., as an Etwas (ISL 11, 
113/469). Yet, as has been the case in the Lojdc of Essence from External Reflection 
onward, this external relation to a Condition cannot be understood without relating it to 
the internal self-relation of Essence, which in this case is that of Ground. 
6 On the insufficiencies of Formal and Real Ground, see also Mure, 1984, p. 108, Taylor, 1975, 
pp. 263-4 and McTaRgart. 1910. pp. 120-2. 
7 See also Mure, op. cu, p. 109. 
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A Condition is a Condition, and not just something immediate without further 
content. because it is related to a Ciround and a Girrounded, yet the Grotmd relation on]v 
exists under certain Conditions. Each side is both immediately itself and mediated with 
respect to the other, or is a posited Contradiction (SL 11,114-5/471-2). Given that 
Grounding and of Condifioning are each both itself and its other, they are idenfical, 
collapsing into a negative umty (SL 11,116-8. /472-4. ), i. e., the active Emergence 
(Hervorgang) of an Existent Fact (SL 11,119/474). An Existent contains or implies both 
Ground and Condition, but as internal moments of its own Form or Show (&hein) (SL 
11, H 8-19/474). The overcoming of the mutual externality of Ground and Condition 
does not., however, imply that Existence is reabsed in a sole Existent. a theological. 
transcendent unitv that acts as a Ground of the relation between conditioned Grounds and 
grounded Conditions. Existence is the immediacy, the Being, of all actual empirical 
things when we consider them as relation4 as inseparable ftom other things. And the 
important point to bear in mind is that the Existence of any thing can-not solely be 
explained by finite grounding relationships that only exist under certain specific 
Conditions. Existence is not a ftirtber determination of Ground, but the overcoming of its 
supposed self-subsistence. 
Why is this? The extemal Conditions of a thing are its own Form, a 
lo ical/ontoto ical stnicture that allow certain temporally and spatially determinate 91 91 
arounding relations between it and other ExIstents to be discerned from the perspective 
of a fimte consciousness. The detenmnation of Existence means that the idea of an 
absolute Ground without Conditions is illusory. Each Existent implies a totality of 
Conditions without which it would not exist. But it is this totality of extemal Conditions 
that brings something into Existence, and not Ground. In this way, Ground appears as an 
illusory determination of the Absoltite, one that embodies the structure of 
representational consciousness and finite reason. The real explanation for the Existence 
of somethiiig must refer to Condition& and the element of necessity here lies in the fact 
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that they must be just this something's Conditions. The confingency of any Oven thing is 
not, then, an effect of our finite understanding- as was the case wltb Kant, for wbom 
knowledge of the true necessity of any given object (Its complete determination) could 
only be a regulative goal for fimte consciousness. Infinite knowledge, for Kant. involved 
the unending hnking of judgements of experience that connect objects to each other, 
within networks inscribed bv reflective judgement. Bowever, Hegel's deduction of the 
determination of Existence shows that the contingency of any thing, its externality to the 
totality of its conditions, is not due to the inadequacy of our faculty of knowledge, but is 
a necessary detennination of Being itself For Hegel, there is, pace Deleuze, no Ideal of 
complete determination In genuine philosophy. The Ideal is a construct produced by 
finite consciousness. Such an Ideal, posited as the regulative goal of theoretical 
knowledge witb regard to my particular thiiig, is itself finite. This is because it fails to 
comprehend the irreducible contingency of any given thing, representing instead the 
unity of the fhing-M-Itself in relation to the IndiVidual phenomenal object, as the 
substantial, transcendent UnIty of appearance. This would, in Schelling's philosophy, 
become the real Absolute Identity., qua Ground of all determination, defined as a Sollen 
for reason. 
For Hegel, the totality of conditions of an Existent is a totality only because all 
Existents transcend their conditions as negatively self-related terms. Every Existent is the 
Condition of other Existents, and as such is equaUy irnmediate, or external to them. In 
other words, the basis for thinking all Existence is, according to Hegel, externality, rather 
than an essential, internal, and necessary relafion between empirical reality and a 
transcendent Substance. 8 Each Existent is grounded in relation to other Existent-s, but 
Faylor (op. cit., p. 289) makes this point, yet his discussion of the 'inner umty' of the effectivity 
of the Concept is shot through with ambiguities regarding the mode of this effectivity-. is the 
Concept still an 'underlying reality' (p- 262, p. 279 ffi. 1) or is there nothing behind Show (p, 
262)? 
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only from the incomplete and illusory perspective of a finite consciousness, which 
projects the unity of these relations as a regulative Idea. From a properly philosophical 
perspective, the problem is to understand in what way the ungroundedness of an Existent 
is a necessarv element of its Being. 
By unden-nining the notion of Ground, Hegel also distances himself from the 
illusory distinction of real and possible that Deleuze crificises, as we shall see now in 
relation to the deten-ninations of the Absolute and of Actuality If the idea that all 
Existents are necessarily Grounded is illusory, then so is the idea that the difference 
between Essence and Existence is one between a possible detennination and the same 
determination witb reality 'added' to it. This illusory difference determines, for example, 
Sebelling's account of the relation between the first creation and the Absolute's real self- 
differentiation. For Hegel, bowever, Essence is Existence. This speculative proposition 
expresses the total 'emptying' or turning-inside-out (Eniduperung) of Essence into 
Existence (SL 11,128/483). The idea of internal relation has, by deconstructing itself 
shown its truth to be Existence, the unity that implies a totality of external relations in its 
own self-relation. '11e Conditions of an Existent are not possibilities abstracted from 
reality, but other real empirical Existents, and a given Existent is not only conditioned by 
these Existents, but also transcends its relations with them, for they are Us Conditions. 
As elements of the Existent's relation to itself, its Conditions are its Appearance, 
its Erscheinung or real Sbow. The difference between Erscheinung and Schein consists 
in the stability of the Conditions. The Conditions have been shown to be, not merely 
vanishing products of a self-related and thus self-tiegating Essence. but Existences, 
immediate terms whose determination has resulted from the deconstruction of the idea of 
a transcendent Essence. 'Mere are thus two totalities here, that of Existents and that of 
Condifions. or in other words, that of the Existents considered as immediate, and that of 
their external mediation. One seems to be the Ground of the other, but this repeats the 
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unstable ground-relation in a new form. The result is the collapse of these totalities into a 
negative unity, i. e.. Being determined as the Absolute. 
The Absolute here means at first the sublafion of Reflection through itself (SL 
11,187-9/530-1). In this way, it is similar to the Absolute as Schelling understood it- the 
necessary foundation of any reflexive distinction., arrived at through reflexlve reason's 
affirmation of its own inability to act as foundation. ne deten-ninations of Essence up to 
this point in the SL have been comprehended here as partial attempts to grasp the 
Existent and its totality of Conditions. The relation between the totality of Existents and 
that of Conditioning relations has collapsed mto the unity of the Absolute, which again 
has an appearance of transcendent Ground about it. The Absolute grasped as this 
positive, indifferent unity is the end of Reflecfion and is opposed to it, in the same way 
as Matter became opposed to Forrn earlier in SL (ISL 11,89-901451-2): 'there is nothing 
in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the Absolute' (SL 11, 
190/532). This is also, for Hegel, the prime characteristic of S inoza's Absolute (SL 11, pi 
197/538). 
This Absolute-as-Ground,, however, is only relative to the process of reflection, 
the 'negative exposition tAus1gguikg] of the Absolute', that sublates itself in it (SL 11, 
189-91/532-3). If we understand the Absolute not only as the vanishing of the two 
totalities, but also as the truth of Being or of immediacy as such, then the exposition of 
the Absolute through Reflection is in fact the positive exposition of the positive, pure 
immediacy of the Absolute itself In this way, Being is compTehended as the Absolute, 
that is, as related only to itself not as passing over into another because of its own 
instability, nor as shining-into-another, but ratber as manifesliiýg iiself as Existents and 
their Conditions. What does this mean? We saw in Chapter Two that Schelfing's 
Absolute, as reflexively or negatively expounded, was the Absolute of purely negative 
philosophy, whose merely hypothetical determinations, the 'first creation, had to be 
sublated in order to pass over to the affirmation of the Absolute as a rational Ungrund. 
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The positive exposition of the Absolute lay, for Schelling, outside the Absolute itself 
relying upon an unthinkable positing of difference in the Absolute that, as the works of 
his middle period showed, had to be thought as equiprimordial with the unified Absolute. 
Schelfing's problem is that the Absolute, in its substantial, grounding role. that 
is, as transcendent to all its modes of expression, including reason, has been abstracted 
from these modes, its own content, which then have to be thought as somehow migrating 
into it through a primordial dissonance. That deten-nination rather than indeterminate 
identity exists Is, as noted in the previous ebapter, an 'incomprebensible bappening' (PS 
543/471 §780). For Hegel, however, that the Absolute is related, not only to Essence and 
Reflection, but to Bein& means that the real content of the positive, immediate. abstract 
Absolute is its own ontological content or its developed logical structure, that Is, thefiki 
that it manifests itself in a totality of Existences related to a totality of Conditions (SL IL 
194/536). Therefore the real content of Being comprehended as the Absolute is not an 
abstractly conceived predicate or positive content, attached to the Absolute as to a pure 
substance. No such predicate could be finally justified against the opposed predicate that 
it reflexively implies, as is the case witb Absolute-as-freedom against Absolute-as- 
necessity, or as subject against object. Schelling's definition of the Absolute as 
transcending all predicates acknowledges this. For Hegel then, the content of the 
Absolute is, in fact, the intemal negati%rity of Bemg, the vejy fact that it mamfests itself 
as different from itself This renders the result of the PS more comprehensible in logical 
terms, for Absolute Knowing there arose as consciousness of the whole process of 
natural consciousness's identity with and difference from itself, be Ing WItb the 911111 
simple immediacy of Being. The deterrnmation of the Absolute shows that the process of 
becoming external to itself and only thus becoming identical With itself, or Absolute 
NegatiVity, is the logical content of umnediate Being itself 
The developed tinity of the second Absolute with itself is the mith of its Being. 
It is Being and its inberent instability, the ceaseless transitions of the Logic of Being and 
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the circular sbining-into-other of Essence, comprehended. As such, it is not just 
Absolute, a unity 'absolved' of reflexive difference, but Actualav, a unity that includes 
within it, as moments of itv self-relation., both the totality of mutually-external Fxistents 
and their Conditions. In this way, it contains more than the determination of Existence. 
Pure Being is comprehended, then, as implicitly Actuality Actuality explicates and 
expresses the meaning of Beirig- whereas Beiiig cannot even explicate its own meaning, 
for its sense is inseparable from Nothing. Bemg is revealed, not as a transcendent 
substance posited outside thought, but as the process of internal difference, 'the activity 
of self-development' through which immediacy becomes Actuality, grasped abstractly or 
subjectively as a positive unity (EL § 124 Zus. ). 
The internal dissonance of Being and its resulting retum to immediacy in 
Actuality is thus ii-nplied, for Hegel, by the intemal structure of H=ediacy itself, in so 
far as it is thought through. As a logical structure, the Absolute is its own reflexive 
exposition as detem-tmate Existences and their detenninate Conditioning relations. As 
posited oulside thought, outside A reflexive relation, as an alogical ontological identity, 
it is posited by the Understanding as removed from any determinate relation with the 
reflexively detennined reahn of experience that is sublated in it. But this relation cannot 
be denied: it turns oa as we saw in Chapter SIX, to be the mutual implication of 
Presupposing and Positing Reflection. Indeed, it resurfaces in the problem of circularity 
that afflicts Sebelling's Absolute, Where the Absolute as alogical umty bas to be posited 
as a ground that resembles the realm of experience even though it is also posited as 
utterly transcending it, as utterly not resembling it. In this result, the transcendent 
Absolute turns out to possess ordy illusory being. Schelfing's foundationalist project can 
only be rescued by explaining the real, substantial genesis of detenninate relations via a 
genuinely non-rational Absolute, Absolute Difference, the Absolute that incamates 
immanence in the form of an externality that nevertheless 'Insists' or 'persists' (to use 
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Deleuze's terminology) in its products. This, as we saw in Chapters Two and Four. 
proves in fact to be the undoing of foundationalism. 
So, to recap: In trying to tbink sometbing as determinate througb its simple Being 
(wbieb refers not to concrete, empirical Being, but to Kant's 'indeten-ninate empirical 
intuition'), we find that we have to think its content, not as substantially or 
metaphysically Grounded, but as a logical process of determination in which its simple 
immediacy Exisis in relation to other Existents. And these Existents are related to it as its 
Conditions only because of their real externality This process is Actuality, which is 
subsequently grasped as its positive, immediate unity, that is, pure or abstract Possibility. 
For Hegel, what for Kant were still only modal categones, that is. relations not between 
objects (as was the case with substantiality and causality) but between objects and the 
subject's faculties of knoWIng, are determinations of Actuality itself Possibility is not the 
truth of Actuality, however. Hegel does not here revert to a conception of the Substantial 
w hole of Existents and Conditioning relations as a possible unity that pre-exists 
empirical Actuality. Possibility does mean such a unity, without real distincfion, but as 
such it is abstract and illusory. As an abstract, transcendent identity, it is an unstable 
determination of reflection, and implies both its own difference and the development of 
an opposition. If we state that A is a pure or logical possibility, we simply state that no 
contradiction is involved in thinýg it. But to hold to pure possibility in this way is to 
ignore the impossibility of A, the opposed state, wbich is equally implied by the 
conception of A. Given the merely possible, there is no real necessity in believing it to be 
any more real than its impossibility (SL 11,202-4/5 9 
In relation to an Actualltv. this means that, although it is related to other 
Existents as its Conditions, it is also immediate, an Existent u-nity that transcends its 
Conditions. Hence it can just as well not exist. Tbe Existence of am Actuality. then, is not 
Grounded by the internal unity of a substantial wbole, but can be or not be, and is thus 
9 Houlgate, 1W. P. 39. 
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necessarily, or as a result of its own content. Contingent: 'necessity is inifially nothing 
but the necessity of contingency ." 
It is a contingent fact that A rather than something 
else is Actual, but the fact that A is either impossible or possible. and is thus really. and 
not just merely, possible, is Grounded in other Actualifies. Nevertheless. Actuality is 
more thaii both abstract and real Possibility Possibility is a determination of Actuafitv 
rather than the other way -round, and 'points to another, to actuality in which it augments 
11# and completes Isich ergan. -Ij itself (SL 11,203/543, modified). Real Possibility thus 
extemallses itself in Actuality. 
Actuality always includes Contingency, whereas pure Possibilitv seeks to 
exclude it and is tbus illusory. That an Actuality exists implies a totality of Conditions, 
the assembling of which is not guaranteed by the internal le/os of some substantial 
whole, but is Contingent. What is Actual is thus Contingent, for there is no transcendent 
Ground or timeless reservoir of Possibility that pre-exists it and guarantees its 
production. Possibility implies nothing but the potential of the Actual as it (the Actual) is 
assembled according to the logical relationships of Conditioning in wbich it exists. The 
Actual is potentially other Actualities, but what these shall be when they emerge into 
Existence is Contingent. Real possibility, then, does not transcend 'the whole set Idas 
Game] of conditions, a dispersed actuality which is -not reflected into itself [ ... ]' (SL 11, 
209/547). 
Real Necessity is not internal to a transcendent principle, but is instead the 
working-out of Existing relations between Actualities that are, in anotber Wect, 
themselves determinants of real Possibilities. (SL 11,210-11/548-9). This reinforces the 
conclusion that the idea of a 'first creation' is a transcendental illusion of the 
Understanding, which, as the static, abstract unity of all possible detemiinations of 
actuality, assumes the existence of a positive Substance, a transcendent thing-in-itself 
Actuality is determined then, not by metaphysical Grounds, but bv the Necessarv 
10 ]hid., -4 ) 
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manifestation of the potentiality of those Actualifies that really, Contingently exist. Real 
Necessity thus presupposes Contingency. 
Looking back, we see that the Being of the given has been deten-nined as its own 
onto-lo ical process of becomIng, i. e., its becoming in thougbt and av tbouat, but also 91 -I-I- 
in and as aclualilv. In this process, it is determined as an Actuality, that is. a self-related 
Existent that includes in this self-relation its mediation by otber FxIstents, its Conditions. 
This self-relation, its unity as an Actuality, is necessarily Contingent, but Contingency 
here expresses the cliance assembly of its Conditions as the Conditions of just ih4s, 
Actuality. However, when these Conditions are assembled. then the Actuality of which 
they are the Conditions emerges Necessarily into Existence. Real Necessity, the unity of 
a set of Conditions as expressed in their resultant Actuality, is thus inseparable from their 
own Contingent Existence. It cannot be understood as transcending it in any way, as pre- 
existing it as the inner detennination. of a Substance. The tinltv of Real Necessltv and 
Contingency is Absolute Necessity. the movement of Being to Actuality itself its unity 
with itself grasped once again as resulting from its internal dissonance or Absolute 
NegatiVity. Being is, in Actuality or in thought, constantly destroying itself and yet 
maintaining itself in this destruction. It is constantly external to itself or Contingent, and 
yet is in this very externality always identical with itself for it is also the manifesting of 
Real Necessity, the appearing of Actuality out of the potential of wbat is already Actual. 
In this way, Being qua Absolute Necessity is shown to be 'simple immediacy that is 
nlý absolute negafiVltv' (SL 11,215/552). 
In Being qua Absolute NegatiVity, finite flungs emerge out of the productive, 
active side of Actuality (Real Possibility) as immediate, Contingent ExIstents. Yet tbey 
are thus the self-externality of Bein& its excess over itself, and so their Existence is 
inseparable ftom negativity. This internal dissonance is their own productive actiNity, and 
so they become external to themselves in turn, disintegrating as their potentialities 
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complete themselves by emergmg as other Actualities. " -Me relation between Absolute 
Necessity and Actuality is not therefore a relation between a transcendent Ground that 
produces, according to its internal lelos, actual determinations out of the totality of its 
possible determinations via an operation of limitation. Their relation expresses not 
internal limitation, but a. ) the self-externalisation of Actualities through their internal, 
Absolute Negativity, b) the emergence of their potential as other Actualities, and c) the 
self-transcendence and self-augmentation of Being through them. ' 
We now turn to the Doctrine of the Concept, in which the self-determining 
aspect of Actuality becomes fully manifest. As I noted earlier, the way in which Ground 
is structured as 'shining-into-other' began to be u-ndennined witb Existence, which 
4contains the [ground] within itself, and the ground does not remain behmd existence' 
(EL § 123 Zus. ). The determinafions of Substance and Causality are the final incarnations 
of the Ground-structure within the Logic of Essence, and their overcoming constitutes the 
final sublation of the residual elements of this structure within Being understood as 
Actuality. In the final determination of Essence, that of Reciprocity, the relation between 
two Substances deterrmned as Cause and Effect, the last manifestation of the implicitly 
temporal and spatial Ground-relation, collapses. In Reciprocity, the Cause and the Effect 
are shown to be indistinguishable from each other (and thus indeterminate), as each is 
necessanly both Cause and Effect of the other (SL 11,237-8/569-70). The same thing 
occurred, as we saw in Chapter Six, and for similar reasons,, With respect to Ground and 
Grounded. A third term., a negative unity, is thus implied., which determines itself In both 
Substances, a 'context' (Ziisammenhang) for their respective processes of change. II 
11 Cf ibid., pp. 46-7. 
12 Cf. Hegel's remarks on theories of emanation, regarding their lack of 'reflection-into-self (SL 
11,198/539) or self-related negativity, i. e., Absolute Negativity. 
13 Schick, 1994, p. 180- 
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Ilis negative unity of the two Substances is the sublation, of their Substantiality 
Substance is Absolute Necessity grasped abstractly as a positive, self-mediated unity, 
'beink that is because it is' (SL 11,219/555), recalling Spmoza's definition of Substance. 
In Reciprocity, however, the internal, causal relation between Substances that appears to 
constitute the metapbysical Essence of Actuality is sbown to he illusory, a subjective 
attempt to maintain the independence of both which does not acknowledge their mutual 
shining-into-each-other and their negative unity (SL 11,252/582). Absolute Necessity, the 
logical movement through which Being determines itself as its Actuality, thus tums out 
to be, in truth, this unity or third, which Hegel calls the Concept. As in the relation 
between Form and Essence, where both terms lose their independence, becoming 
'moments of a singgle activit),. 1 - the determining dynarnic of-fornting', 14 the Substances 
become moments of the ConceM a 'comprehensive dynamic activity. 15 
The recursivity of the logical movement of SL that began to become explicit 
witb Essence, in w-hicb Bemg was explicitly included as one of its moments, is now 
reallsed. All foregoing moments are moments of the Concept, just as, from the 
peirspective of Actuality, the moments leading from Being thTough Existence and 
Condition are elements of its appeanng. The movernent that begins witli Being and 
whose UMty is expressed by Absolute Necessity is therefore itself the self-externallsation 
of the Concept. Actuality and its appearing are equally moments of the Concept of 
thought which knows itself as thought, that is, not as immediate Being, nor as posited 
outside itself as Essence or as Ground, but as the unity that comprebends all the 
determinations of immediacy and of relation. All attempts to sustain difference and 
determination througb some internal relation of Grounding bave proven inadequate and 
self-cancelling, and thus illusory. Categories such as Existence and Actuality, on the 
other hanoý have a higher status in relation to the Concept for they foreshadow its non- 
14 
Burbidge, 198 1, p- 8- 
15 Ibid-, pI 11, 
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foundational nature, in which the unity and internal difference of Being are 
comprehended as moments of one negative unity. However, only the Concept itself. 
along witb its subsequent determinations. will prove truly adequate to sustain difference. 
We saw that Absolute Necessity was the inner logical movement of the Actual, 
which deployed itself through both Contingency and Real Necessity Nevertheless. this 
movement moves Mrough the Actual, it occurs in it, because of the negatiNity, the 
positedness or relation-to-other withm the Actual which constitutes Real Possibility. 
Hence the Actual suffers Absolute Necessity Without compi-ehending it. The significance 
of the Concept is that it transcends the movement of Absolute Necessity, in that it 
includes it as a moment of itself, through which it develops or attains to itself Absolute 
Necessity is primarily the immanent development of SL itself. ne inner negativity of the 
finite, its incessant ansing and perishing, is thought in the Concept as its own moment. 
The characteristic of the finite, as it is thought in the determination of Opposition, for 
example, is to be both itself and its other at the same time: the positive is both positive 
and negative, and vice versa. In this way, it excludes itself from itself and collapses. The 
negativity of the fiMte thus expresses the way in which Bemg both exceeds and la&k-s 
itself at the same time when it is embodied in finite determinations, whether these are 
immediately self-related (Beirig) or related to themselves through an other (Essence). 
Neither Being nor Essence are stable in relation to themselves, and this instability is also 
their self-externalisation, as when, for example, Essence passes into Existence. 
The Concept, on the other hand, has a stable self-relation. This is not, however, 
because it knows itself as Essence, Ground or Substance, subsisting beyond the flux of 
Illusory Being, Reflectiort, or Accidents as a thing-in-itself On the contrary, such 
foundations are, as we have repeatedly seen, transcendental illusions. As transcendent 
'and thus illusory, Ground 'lacks a content that is detenninate in and for itself, and 
consequently it does not act of itself and bring foi-th' (FL §121 Zus. ). As previously 
noted,, this is true of Schelfing's Absolute, which requires that a difference somehow 
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anse in it in order to explain determination. But the Concept has a content as part of Its 
self-relation, namely Absolute Negativity, which has been thought as the internal 
movement of the finite in the determination of Absolute Necessity Hence the Concept 
develops itself through the internal movement of the finite detenninations. This 
development occurs through its becoming-external to itself in both the abstractly positive 
determinations of Being,, and in those of Essence in wbich it finds itself expelled out 
from its abstract unity. It subsequently passes on to determinations in which it determines 
itself as Actuality., that is, as stable (self-related'), but perisbing, self-externality. In this 
way, the movement of the finite is within the Concept, and through it, thought comes to 
determine itself as Concept. Just as simple Being was the abstract presupposition or 
beginning of the PS whose meaning for natural consciousness was explicated in the 
movement that became Absolute Knowing, Being in SL is explicated by the Concept, 
which comprehends Being, the beginning, as itself posited in an abstract, externallsed 
form. Being is, in effect, the self-detennining activity of the Concept - which is 
comprehended ever more concretely throughout the Logics of Essence and the Concept 
- grasped in its most abstract form, the puTe unity of the activity of self-development 
(EL § 124 Zus. )- 
The Concept that has left behind Substance will thus come to comprehend itself 
as the activity of presupposing itself, not as given, as positive, beyond all its accidental 
deten-ninations, but rather as posited external to itself The Concept is not, then, a 
knowilirig that retroactively i self in its own ground, that is. i the presupposes AI In 
foundationalist sense that Schelling, Deleuze and Hegel all denounced in one way or 
another. It does not presuppose that the in-itself, ground or condition resembles that of 
which it is the foundation. On the contrazy, the logical genesis of the Concept always 
presupposes itself as determilled through such illusory forms of fou-ndationalist relation 
(as Presupposing and Positing Reflection, as Opposition. as Ground and Grounded), and 
also presupposes itself as the gradual overcorning of illusion, througli Existence, 
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Actuality and Absolute Necessity It presupposes itself as posited as the implicit actiN ity 
of self-determination (the purely affirmative determination of Being), which explicates 
itself with fully immanent, Absolute Necessity, and then explicates this Intemal 
nega, hvity as itv own, in the determination of Concept. 
Hence Logic is not, for flegel, self-grounding. The self-grounding system as 
developed by Fichte and Schelling is M fact the highest contradiction that foundationalist 
method can express. It involves a thinking that presupposes itself as giren, as abstract 
Substance, and wbich then tries to deny its own negativity, its own reflexivity or 
difference from itself in order to become, finally, abstract Substance. For Hegel, only 
the Concept and its determinations express the tnith of philosophical thinking, because 
they express, not a self-grounding thought, but an actively self-delerminhýg and thus 
autonomous one. 
However, the Logic of the Concept is not a final resting-place. Hegel envisaged 
it as the gateway into the Realphilosophie, the philosophy of Nature and of Spirit. The 
reasons for this Will hopefully become clearer as we examine the nature of the Concept a 
little closer, for they concern again the meaning of the Concept as the actiVity of tbinking 
or being that is detennined by being internally different in nature from itself The 
Concept, as the unity of positing Essence and posited Being, is first of all Universal, the 
negative unity of all its determinations and that which is determined in them (SL 11, 
274/601). But as such, it remams mfected, %qtb Absolute NegatiVity, and so presupposes 
itself, the result of the movement of the SL, as posited in its various determinafions. It is 
not only the unity that compTehends the movement of the SL, it is this movement itself It 
is thus deten-ninate as the Particular Concept, the 'shining outwardv [Scheinen nach 
au#en]" (SL 11,281/606) of the Universal. This 'sbining" is, as in Essence, onl"' 111tisory. 
The illusory fixity of the Particular Concept is that of the Understanding (St. 11,285- 
6/610-11), in which the Universal appears as the Ground of the Particular. This 
subjective perspective on the Concept deconstructs itself, as the Ground-relation did in 
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the Logic of Essence. In relation to the Ground, the Grounded is a vanishing term that 
returns into its Ground, or an Accident of a Substance, and similarly the abstract 
Particular vanishes into the Universal (SL TI, 296/618). Hegel's point here is that, in 
order to sustain real difference, the relation between a substantial Universal and its 
Particulars is not enough. 16 The transcendent Universal of traditional realism is thus as 
powerless to sustain difference as is a metaphysical Substance, such as Schelling's 
Absolute Identitv. 
However, the Particular is also inwardly determinate, as well as determinate over 
against the Concept in its Schein as a Grounded. This is because it is identical witb the C 
Concept. As we saw with respect to Actuality, the externallsation of potentiality through 
Contingency is itself identical With Absolute Necessity, the logical movement of 
Absolute Negativity. The negativity of Actuality entails its movement outwards into real 
externality, but it remains Actual in this externality, rather than simply dissipating. 
Likewise, the Particular Concept is still Universal, and thus a negative unitv with itself 
constituted through mediation and thus unlike Ground or Substance, for example, which 
are illusory negafive unities posited as outside all mediation. As inwardly deten-ninate 
and thus external to itself, the Particular Concept, with its illusory reference to what is 
outside the Concept, is itself immanently the Singular Concept, which has a real 
reference outwards. 
17 
The Singular Concept is Vitally important. because it marks the point where the 
Concept begins to move outward beyond itself, discovering that explicitly real 
mediation, mediation with that which is really outside it is its own immanent meaning. It 
is, firstly, the positing of the unity of Universal and Particular, the emergence of the 
dimension of Universality (Absolute Negativity). within the Particular. The Concept thus 
16 Cf Winfield, 1998, p. 11. 
17 See the Introduction to the English translation of EL, pp. xlx--vc, on some reasons for preferring 
'the Singular' to 'the Individual' for translating Hegel's das Eimelhe. 
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returns to unity witb itself a real unity constituted throuO, mediation ratber than an 
illusory one, posited in opposition to all mediation. However. a paradox1cal result 
occurs. Singularity is 'not only the return of the Concept into itself, but immediately its 
loss' (SL 11,299/62 1). The Concept, as we shall see, marks the point of development for 
philosophical consciousness that is simultaneously its 'highest mawrity, and where 'its 
downfall begins' (SL 11,287/611). This downfall will be the passage from Logic to 
Nature, in which the Concept externalises itself as absolutely different from itself 
With the Singular Concept, the Concept has deterinined ilse/fas a totalm. This 
means that each moment, Ufflversal... Particular and Singular is immediately Identical With 
all the others, or presupposes itself as posited in and through them. Each is Universal, or 
simple negatiVity. each is Parficular, or posited as an illusory determination in relafion to 
a Ground (the Concept determined illusonly as Ground), and eaeb is Singular, a real 
externalisation of the Concept qua activity of thinking in which the Concept is identical 
witb itself In turn, looking back, all the deterrmnations that make up the SL,, having been 
comprehended now as deten-nmations of the Concept, are themselves each of these three 
aspects and their unity. That A otherness is therefore simply a determination of the 
Concept as a self-enclosed totality (and is thus merely apparent otherness) seems hard to 
deny at this point. If this is so, then the suspicion that the Concept is an expression of a 
dogmatic image of thought must resurface. But when we turn back to the Singular 
Concept, we find Hegel describing it as the realisation of the unity of Universality and 
Particular, but oniv in so far as it is the 'posited separation [Abscheidung]' (SL 11, 
300/622) of the Concept from itself Wbereas Particulanty implies only an illusory 
i-eference beyond the Universalitv of the Concept, Singularity implies that something is 
really 'pointed out [monsirierl wirdl' (SL 11,300/622), distinguished in Actuality. This is 
not an illusory relation of self-excluSion or self-repulsion, as was encountered in the 
Logic of Essence before the emergence of Existence as the En0u, #erutkg of Essence. 
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Singulanty )s thus the final term in the totality of the pure ConcepL and also this 
totality's transcendence of itself towards that which is absolutely external to thought. -N,, 
such, it recalls the Fntdu#erum-, of Essence that we saw realised in Existence, the 
Absolute, and in Actuality. Looking back once more over the progress of SL. it becomes 
apparent that, in order to sustain difference, the immediacy of the given has to be thought 
as Universality (its Being), then as Particulansed, in terms of Quality. Quantity, and the 
self-relations that result from the collapse of Essence, such as Existence and Actuality. 
But it is only really differentiated when it is thought in terms of the Concept, which is 
aLy III immanence of absolutely extemal to itself and only thus identical with itself, Hence the i 
the self-determining activity of tbougbt only remains immanent to itself by being 
absolutely external to itself It Is not simply opposed to itself for here there is no Essence 
that excludes itself from itself in a relafion of Opposition. 
And m this way, the immediate is only fully differentiated when it is the Singular 
Concept. As Universal, or simply immediate, and Parficular, or mediated by others, its 
self-relation is still illusory. In these deterininations, it is still under the domination of the 
subjective Understanding, which views the given as Identical, Grounded, or Substantial, 
i. e., as posited outside all mediation, as not including mediation in its self-relation. Only 
when its relation-to-self is secured by a relation of absolute exterionty is this illusory 
aspect removed. Schelling and Deleuze maintain that the immediacy of the given is only 
real outside the Concept, and that all reflection of this immediacy is thus illusory 
(Schelfing), or that this immediacy is real because the being of the sensible is Absolute 
Difference and thus outside the Concept, (Deleuze., DR 80/56-7,182/139-40). Ig The 
implication is that any attempt to define immediacy as self-related is to be enslaved by a 
transcendental illusion that dominates Difference. But this does not take into account the 
determination of the Concept, according to SL. It is the activitv of thought or being that 
is activity, rather than Substance, only insofar as it realises its absolute difference from 
18 See also Baugh, 1993, p. 18. 
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itself Its self-relafion is thus comprehended as a dimension of its irreducible internal 
difference, its Absolute Nlep-afi"ty. 
This is emphatically demonstrated by the passage from SL into the Philosophy 
of Nature, which has perhaps been the most controversial aspect of Hegel's ontology. 
Like other a priori philosophies of nature, including Schelling's, Hegel's has been often 
dismissed as the product of rationalism gone mad. But recent interpreters of German 
Idealism have sought to rescue Nalurphilosophie, by showing that it is not necessarily 
dogmatic or hubristic, 19 The crucial question is whether A'aiurphilosophie must 
necessarily be an attempt to determine nature as it must be in-itself As we saxv in 
Chapter Two, Scbelling's early Nalurphilosophie proposed instead to determine nature in 
relation to our experience, in order to show what nature must be like in order that we 
should have representations of Objects outside us. Hegel rejects both options. Whether 
we ask what nature must be like in-itself, or for-us, we are working with a foundationalist 
image of philosophy. From the perspective of flegel's Absolute Knowinal the question 
has to be whether or not the immanent determinafion of the absolute unity of thought and 
being as the self-determining, Concept also requires that the Concept deten-nine itself as 
Nature, as that which is genulnely other than thought. If this is the case, then a 
philosophy of nature has to determine what is entailed in such a determination, which 
embodies the self-transcendence of self-determining thought. 
As William Maker 'has pointed out, the transition from onto-logic to 
Naturphilosophie cannot mean that Nature is a) posited by thought., so that Nature is not 
itself ontologically real, or b) that Nature has all along been determining thoUgbt_2() Both 
these options remain illusoqv, foundationalist determinations of the Absolute. This is, 
again, because they imply the structure of Positing and Presupposing Reflection without 
19 In addition, Deleuze and Guattari's last intended project was tf ie construct on ot d 
Alaturphilosophie. 
20 Maker, 1998, pp. 8,11 -14 
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comprehending it. Nature cannot be absolutely posited by thought as an immediacy 
outside it, for if the Concept did this. it would simply be an unstable Positing Reflection. 
This instability is caused by its failure to acknowledge its necessary presupposition. an 
immediacy that would have to be piven to it so that it can posit another such immediacy 
relative to the first. Nor could Nature simply be presupposed by thought., for it would 
bave to be presupposed in a determinate form abstracted from accepted data. and 
therefore would have been just as much posited as presup -I] oth these optionss posed. ý B 
would simply posit a resemblance between thought and nature, wbose absoluteness could 
only be assumed. 
These options may be incoherent, but this alone does not mean that an alternative 
is possible. The quesfion is whether or not Hegel's immanent determinafion of the 
absolute unity of being and thought as the self-determining Concept will immanently 
detennine itself further as absolutely other to itself as the idea of Nature. As argued 
"above, the Concept is that which is itself only through dividing itself utterly from itself 
Its negativity is thus comprehended as constitutive of its self-relation. Even the Absolute 
Idea, the final determination of the Concept., is constituted as identical with itself through 
its intemal negativity, or is in unity witb itself only InsofaT as it loses Its unity witb itself 
The negative unity of thought and being includes Absolute Negativity. or is just as much 
the utter lack of relation between thought and being, 22 And the Concept is explicitly 
detennined as this internally dissonant unity. So, if the Concept is that which only 
determines or realises itself through its utter difference from itself, then it must transcend 
itself towards the immanent determination of a genume other. If this other is to be 
genuinely other, then it must be detennMed through the Concept, for it cannot be 
assumed to be other because of some merely given determiation, as then the circle of 
Positing and Presupposing Reflection would arise, again. So it must be determined 
21 Ibid., p. 13. 
22 Miller, 1998, p. -441. 
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tbrough the Concept, but it must be thus determined as absolutely unlike the Concept. As 
Maker notes, Naiurphilosophie implies the 'radical nonidenfiýv" of thought and nature: 
I 'thought and nature do not even resemble one another. , 
The thought of Nature that anses immanently from the Concept is thus one of 
radical externalltv, a mode of deten-nination that is not self-determination-, Jven that this . gj 
characterises the Concept. Nevertheless, it is still fiAly determinate, for it is an expression 
of the absolute uMty of being and thought, rather than being determined in relation to 
something accepted as given. Nature is simply being-outside-jiself being which is always 
immediately other to itself. yet which subsists as such being, rather than losing its 
determinateness because of its sheer immediacy, as did the determinations of pure Being. 
Naturphilosophie for Hegel has then to take up the task of immanently determining this 
mode of deterrmnation,, whicb is utterly different to that of tbought, but whicb is still 
capable of being determined in thought, given that the very idea of this mode only arises 
through the self-determination of the Concept. 
v) Concluding Summary 
Deleuze's image of Hegel's thought has thus been shown to be illusory on four 
related key points: 1) the meaning of the self-relation of the Concept, 1j) the character of 
the Concept as 'self-grounding", 111) the reality of the Concept as a "totality', and vv) the 
consequent inability of the Concept to think real difference. To end this chapter, I will 
reassess these four points in light of the foregoing. 
0 For Deleuze, the Concept interrially resembles the phenomena] 
subject, for it, like Kant's notion of a spontaneous Self simply reflects 
the presupposition that the conditions must resemble the conditioned, 
and is thus a transcendental illusion. However, as we have seen, the 
23 Maker, op. cii., p. 4. 
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Concept does not resemble the pbenomenal subject. In fact, as we saw 
earlier, the PS sbows bow Kant's spontaneous Self is an illusory posit 
that denves, from a cnsis within consciousness. At the end of the PS. 
Absolute Negativity. it is true, retains the charaCtCT of a ground or 
conditioned, but only from the perspective of the natural consciousnesss 
that views it as an abyss, similar to Schelling's Absolute, into NN-hicb its 
own determinations disappear. From the perspective of pbilosophical 
consciousness, which takes it up as identical with the ambiguous Being 
presented in the beginmng of PS, this opposition does not exist. And 
further, it is shown to be an illusory or non-Actual difference. Hegel 
notes that Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is a genuinely 
speculative moment of his thought. But as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Hegel means here Kant's definition of apperception as neither 
phenomena] or noume-nal. Only by beanng this definition in mind Will 
we understand what it means for apperception to be aclhlýv, rather than 
appearance or substance. For Hegel, the 'thing which thinks' is not a 
thing, but a non-foundational actiVity, the 'existent Concept' (ISL 11,253- 
4/583-4). It is a mode of determining (self-deten-nination) that the finite 
subject cannot possess. and which in fact explicates the utter ontological 
decentring of the finite subject in the Doctrine of Essence. 
0 The Concept does not presuppose itself in the form of a 
transcendent Substance which is somehow deterrfflnately given to 
thought, and which secures the inner meaning of thought and of being as 
one tmity. For Deleuze, Hegel saw the absoluteness of the Concept as 
deriving from the fact that it expressed the contradictory nature of all 
pbenomenal , appearance. In this way, it supposedly cwi adequately 
express Kant's transcendental Ideal of complete determination, in whose 
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reallsation the real relations between phenomena would be 
comprehended. Such an Ideal would be a substance for which all 
pbenomenal relations would be aspects of its internal relation to itself 
However, this means that Deleuze has assimilated the Concept to the 
self-groundingfoundationalist systems of Fichte and Schelling. Both of 
these presuppose that the Absolute can be given through a superior 
intuition as a substantial or transcendent foundation, which must then be 
deduced as a full ground by a metbod that, beginning from the absolute 
Substance. eventually retums into it. But this method means that thought 
has to both presuppose and disavow its ow-n negativity (tbe difference 
between Substance and finite reflection cannot be crossed; only 
subjectively cancelled by an act of faith). The Concept, on the other 
hand, presupposes itself in its beginning, but as posited by itself as 
external to itself That is, the difference between begirming and end 
arises, in light of the survey of its own development taken by the 
Concept at the end, from the negatiVity comprehended by the Concept as 
the implicit determination of the beginning. 
w) The Concept is thus -not a totality in the metaphysical sense, i. e., 
an internally differentiated Substance. As the transitions ftom Essence to 
Existence, from -Universal to Particular Concept, and firom Absolute Idea 
to Nature demonstrate, the Concept determines itself as a totality only in 
the moment wben it exceeds itself as toudity. Existence is iffeducible to 
Essence, and becomes a dispersed set of Conditions, which from a 
subjective standpoint, 'ought to' return to unity (SL It 209/547). The 
Singuhar Concept is the moment in which the intemal relation of the 
Universal Concept becomes realised or positecL only insofar as it is 
utterly divided from itself Nature is that which is determined through 
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the self-determining, Concept as being utterly other than the Concept. 
'Me Concept is thus not in pnneiple a closed systern, but a system xvith 
the power to transcend itself to lose itself and only thus to be itself 
Difference is, in relation to the Concept, ungrounded. It is not 
Opposition or Contradiction, for both of these presuppose a Ground. It 
is still, 'however, a dimension of the Concept itself rather than being 
simply given to thought in some determination or other. The Concept is 
thus shown to be that which requires its own Aciual and absolute 
difference from itself in order to be fully itself This is shown by the 
transition to the idea of Nature, in which the Concept detennines itself as 
that which cannot and does not resemble thought, yet is still deten-ninate 
in and for itself as a unique mode of determination, rather than being a 
simple indeterminate negative of thought. The Concept maintains itself 
in 'destruction, but this can never be given in advance as an assurance. 
It can only be shown by expenence itself The negativity of thougbt, its 
perpetual lack of pure, transcendent Substance, expresses itself in doubts 
about thougbt's power of self-determination, by feeding the desire for 
expenence. This is the only way thouglit can in fact attain to its own 
reality, by finding itself in that which is absolutely outside it. Difference 
is intemal to thouglit as activin,, but this is not the same as saying that 
Difference is internal to thought as Substance. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion: Hegel and Deleuze -A Critical Assessment 
i) Introduction 
The trauma of reason, as we have seen. is a dilemma that arises because of 
certain presuppositions that define a specific 'image' or Orientation of philosophy. Both 
Hegel and Deleuze take this view. They also affirm that, if the crisis of meanmg implied 
by the trauma is not to paralyse philosophical thought. this image has to be criticised as 
an illusory representation of philosophy, and overcome by a new. anfifoundational 
model of philosophy that conceives of the immanence of thought in a way that 
adequately explains the production of determination, externality, or otherness. In the last 
three chapters, I have defended Hegel's version of an-fifoundationalism against 
objections raised by various thinkers, including Deleuze, all of which share their 
orientation with Schelling's critique of Hegel. To conclude, I want to bring the 
anti foundational i st positions of Deleuze and Hegel as I have presented them here 
together in a brief critical dialogue, in order to sketch the advantages and disadvantages 
of their respective positions. 
The Deleuzean solution to the double-bind presented by the trauma of reason 
can be summed up by Gregmy Bateson's termý 'counteractualisation'. This involves an 
explicit acknowledgement of the force of the dilemma, which in Deleuze's ten-ns Implies 
an encounter on the part of a foundationalist practice of thought with its own internal 
llmlt the infinite difference of thought from its own being, which foundationalist 
thought cannot think. This experience itself becomes *in Deleuze's thought the means to 
reinvi, gorate philosophy. It forces the recognition of a real internal difference. but thus 
presents thought With a problem that is iII I immanent to this undeniable limit: flie task of 
how to create a stable thinking qj'this difference that remains immanent to it. Thought is 
thus provoked to cbange its image of itself. becoming a, practice that creaieý knowledge 
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of the real, rather than hoping to discover it as given through contemplation or 
Teflection. In this way, the crisis of meaning is not resolved- but remains as the basis or 
non-foundational foundation of new creation, through which philosophy gives sense to 
itself by selecting mediators and analysing the virtual tendencies of actual phenoine-iia. 
To reiterate, the justification for this new image of thought is. for Deleuze. immanent to 
the trauma itself, for the inability of foundationalist thought to think its infinite 
difference from itself is not accidental. It results from an encounter with the 
transcendental oklect of thought, that which belongs to thought by Tight, a minimal 
presupposition that all actual practices of thought must, for Deleuze, acknowledge. 
Hegel's solution, Absolute Knowing. is not really a resolution of the crisis 
either, given that it recognises this tendency of nihilism as inherent in representational 
consciousness itself For Hegel, pbilosophy cannot orgaruse itself around the fantasy of 
dissolving the intemal divisions of consciousness. For him, philosophy has to re-cognise 
bow self-consciousness is detemined, both intersuýjectively and ontologically. In this 
way, philosophy is the immanent determination of the being of self-consciousness, 
which is being that is neither phenomenal nor noumenal. The Concept provides the 
(I context' in which the trauma of reason can be re-cognised as ansing out of 
transcendental illusion. And this context is neither presupposed nor simply posited, but a 
self-determining unity that is constantly moving beyond itself through its own internal 
difference from itself 
The failure of foundationalism to buttress the autonomy of reason is thus 
confronted by both thinkers. Both critique the very idea of an incorrigible, transcendent 
foundation for the constraints that it places on thought. Foundationalism, as we saw in 
Chapter Three, presupposes above all the existence of a transcendent subject in some 
forni, which fimctions as a 'knowing before knowing' and gives philosophy a secure 
place to begin. This becaine explicit in the thought of Fichte and Schelling. where this 
subject is a subject of faitb: knowledge is explicitly posited as 'grounded' in an 
urljustifiable conviction in the identitv of reason and the Absolute. Here, the goals of 
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Enlightenment, which were set solely in relation to human reason. are placed beyond the 
reacb of reason. The anainment of Enlightemment in the sense of secure knowledge of 
the distinction between dogmatism and genuinely self-critical philosophy is made 
impossible. due to the image through which 'self-criticism' is understood. 
ii) Deleuze and Hegelian 'Reconciliation' 
As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, Deleuze reconceives the goal of 
Enlightement as the attainment of a specific practical attitude in thinking, which, like 
thel'ationalist Enlightenment, demands a Te-education of the subject. This education is 
not conducted, however, through a regulated method that functions within the 
interpretative horizon of a common sense, but by forcing thought to undergo encounters 
witb practices botb philosopbical and non-pbilosopbical that drive it to tbink its 
immanent or internal limit. We have seen in the previous chapter how Deleuze's 
readings of Hegel often present a distorted image of his philosophy. -1-here remains. 
however, a dimension of Deleuze's critique of Hegel that can, I think, be separated off 
from the 'Schellingian' criticisms addressed in the last chapter. This aspect has to do 
with the very immanence of negativity In flegel's philosophy, and the theme of 
reconciliation between thought and being that it implies. 
Deleuze's critique of reconciliation is inseparable from his model of education, 
and his account of the subject of this education. As we have seen, he accounts for self- 
consciousness as a pathos of the faculty of thought, which is deten-nined by the work of 
the movement of difference that acts upon and through it. There thus persists a 'crack' 
at the heart of the subject, an irrimediale difference that cannot be overcome, and which 
therefore remains as an immanent otherness within thought. We learn to think, as we 
learn to do mything else, by taking on habits that both ive an onentation to our activitv I1 91 
and constrain it: ""'learning" always takes place in and through the unconscious, therebv 
establishing the bond of a profound complicity between thought and nature' (DR 
214/165). Hence the re-education of thought demands a cntique of unquestioned habits. 
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which can only be based on an acknowledgement and affin-nation of the 'crack' in the 
subject. This means that what has to be rejected In order to re-educate thought is the Idea 
of a method. Method- for Deleuze. always only regulates the faculties of the mind within 
the boundaries of common sense in order to achieve a result that is essentially 
predetermined, i. e., knowledge that transcends the empirical content of experience. 
Kant's Critical metbod, for example, reflects presuppositions about experience that Imply 
a common sense, such as the idea that Newtoman science and Christian morality are 
universal detenninations of conscious experience. The knowledge it achieves is 
knowledge of transcendental apperception, of the fonnal conditions of possibility for 
these determinations, but this, for Deleuze, simply hypostasises. the formal unity of 
consciousness, and determines its categories in relation to these presuppositions about 
expeTience. 
Method, then, is the means to a predetermined end whose value is related to a 
common sense. The value and validity of the end (transcendent knowledge) is thus 
simply presupposed. Deleuzean 'learning' or 'training' (dressage), on the other hand, is 
an end-in-itself This means that it is not relative to a presupposed common sense,, a 
transcendent subject or 'knowing before knowing'. Instead, it fimctlons through the 
affirmation of Deleuze's 'higher' Absolute, the rninimal presupposition of thought, the 
difference that traverses the entire subject and prevents it from really coinciding with 
itself Learning thus occurs throkgh us. and is not 'ours' in the sense of possession 
established by Kant's unity of apperception in relation to the content of consciousness. 
Kant, for Deleuze, shows in his account of the 'crack' that we do not autonomously 
orient ourselves in thought as subjects whose essence transcends the practical exigencies 
of our life. Thinking is not something that takes time; instead, 'time takes thought' (DR 
216/166). Elsewhere. Deleuze notes that 'ftlhere is no more a method for leanung than 
there is a method for finding treasures, but a violent training, a culture or paideia which 
affects the entire individual' (DR 215/165), and ffiat jt1hought never thinks alone and 
bv itself (NP 1231108). 
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Deleuzean learning is, therefore. a matter of becotmng equal to the difference of 
thought from itself, a process that requires encounters with 'mediators' (intercesseurs). 
In this way, Enlightenment understood as the autonomy of philosophy, is for Deleuze an 
attitude that is only established by becoming equal to movements of difference that 
traverse the body of the thinker., and this cannot be realised by the indiNidual alone. As a 
response to double-binds such as the trauma of reason, Deleuze's model of education 
thus disavows the Kantian, self-conscious aspect of the double-bind, the awareness that 
it is a product of my actuality (the rules out of which it is generated are, as in Kant's 
account of the categories, an aspect of my self-consciousness), and that it thus 
deten-nines in turn my actuality as a thinking being in the present. In this way, Deleuze 
implicitly acknowledges Adorno's observation that the transcendental dimension of 
subjectivity (the Kantian unity of m_Y consciousness) is a posited reflection of the 
powerlessness of the suklect. The trauma of reason, for example, subjects thought to 
domination on the basis of a presupposed image of philosophy, one which implies the 
now-farniliar transcendence of the subject for whom everything that is thought is an 
object of unobscured observation. The subject that presupposes itself to be transcendent 
thus has no resources to deal with the trauxna of reason. It experiences itself therein as 
infinitely separated from its essence, and this is accompanied by affects that it cannot 
accommodate, as it undergoes a crisis of meaning. Deleuze accuses dogmatic images of 
thought of narcissism, and solipsism in the sense of a lack of belief in 'the world' (ECC 
87-8). The transcendent unity of thought with being is a presupposition that simply gives 
one 'a reason to Mflate [ones] own ego' (ECC 58). as is the crisis that results when this 
assurnption is revealed for what it is. Learn-ing works against such tendencies, by 
affirming directly that which exceeds thought, precisely through being immanent in it 
(Absolute Difference). ' 
1 On the overcoming of banality, or the negative aspect of thought's difference frorr. Itself, and 
the reinvigoration of 'belief in the world', see Toole, 1993 - esp- pp. 239-42. 
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Learning in Deieuze is thus firstly learning about the realltv of double-binds. 
i. e., about the internal limits of accepted pTactices, and affinning these limits as Internal. 
rather than as external limits imposed by accident on a theoros who, in principle, 
remains united with its essence. Secondly. it is learning about the singular. local 
interventions that may be carried out in thinking in order to free it from traps. In both 
cases, for Deleuze, learning is knowledge. But it is absolute knowledge. which for 
Deleuze means practical knowledge, the inculcation of habits that create unforeseen and 
novel responses to situations. Absolute knowledge is th-us synonymous with training, 
with the accumulation of augmentation of 'good habits' and the active forgetting of bad 
ones. 
In this light, we can read Deleuze's critique of Hegel as a critique of Hegelian 
education, and thus of the PS above all (DR 215/166). 1 would suggest that, for Deleuze, 
Hegel still sees education as a matter of method, in the sense that the goal of PS is 
foreseen in its beginning - even if we understand this beginning, not in terms of a 
positive unity of thought and being-in-itself, but as the kind of immediate consciousness 
of being that Kant refers to as an 'indeterminate empirical intuition'. Absolute Knowing 
is nothing but the reconciliation of self-consciousness with its being, with its own 
dividedness. Even if Hegel deconstructs all oppositions between subject and object, 
including that between possibility and actuality, he still assumes, for Deleuze, that the 
problematic being of self-consciousness is identical with the negatively self-related 
character of reason. 
Hegel claims to have overcome the internal divisions of consciousness, 
including those within Schellingian self-consciousness, between faith and 
foundationalist reason or between absolute and relative, that give rise to the trauma of 
reason. But this would be, from Deleuze's point of view, an incomplete overcoming. 
The historically determinate presuppositions of representational consciousness mav have 
been deconstructed, but the result of this. the idea that self-consciousness is the 
movement of Absolute Negativity, does not enact the full renversement of 
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foundationalism. It comprehends the movement of self-consciousness in terms of its 
internal dividedness, but because this movement is observable, or nij, internal negati%-ity- 
it implies once again a theoros who recognises the drarna of the PS as her own. This in 
tun implies a common sense, a horizon of meaning in which the drama Will be enacted. 
which is represented by the negative unity of the Concept. The nihilistic tendencies of 
representational consciousness are not thereby overcome. only internalised. It conserves 
the present by baptising it as 'my' actuality (NP 185 -6/16 1). 
Hence, in order to -understand how Deleuze does more than sIMPly accuse Hegel 
of a foundationalist conflation of hypothetical with absolute determination, I think we 
need to emphasise that he has criticlsed Hegellan education as a process of leaming to 
live with' nihilism. This conserves the past as the underlying necessity of the present, by 
trying to sbow that the way to overcome the present is to grasp the bistory of a common 
sense (of the Concept) as one's own actuality. In Nietzschean terms, Hegelian education 
is a vast prcject of remembering the development of the Concept as 'my wound'. It is a 
titanic effort to bear the present by affin-ning one's own complicity in it (the dividedness 
of consciousness is nýy dividedness), and is thus the partial, reactive affirmation of 
Nietzsche's ass or came] (NP 207-9/180-2). Tbs is the only 'absolution' achieved by 
Hegel's Absolute, according to Deleuze (DR 61/42), an absolution in which the internal 
differences of self-consciousness from itself (the shapes of consciousness in PS) vanish 
into that which supposedly transcends them, the inner, negative identity of the Subject as 
their Whole. The self-transcendence of this whole at the end of PS is thus illusory. There 
are no open totalities in Hegel, for Deleuze. Eacb moment of self-b-anscendence - at 
the end of PS, at the end of the Doctrine of Essence, at the end of SL in the transition to 
Nature - is simply a reaffirmation of the transcendent, negative unity of the Subject, 
which grounds 'the evanescence and production of difference' (DR 62/42). The 
immanence of the Subject is thus a relative immanence, which presupposes the negative 
unity of the Subject/Concept as its common sense. Hegelian 'Enlightenment' can onIN, 
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be an acquiescence in the present that cannot respond creatively to the divisions or 
blockages that it encounters. but can only relate them to the unified, negatively self- 
differing Subject of which none can be an adequate representation, and thus deconstruct 
them .2 Adorno's observation about transcendental suklectivity !s thus confirmed. for 
Deleuze. bv Hegelian Absolute Knowing, which he denounces as a refinement of 
nibilism that retains unquestioned subjective and 'objective' practical presuppositions. 
iii) Hegel contra Deleuze: Absolute Difference and Experience 
This Deleuzean critique of Hegel's I-Mage of thought as 'reconciliation' goes 
further than those criticisms we examined in the previous chapter. It claims that Hegel's 
--I- philosophy is epistemologically (and politically) suspect, not just because it confuses a 
negative, hypothetical mode of determination with an absolute one, but because it 
deten-nines the Absolute as negative difference. Although Hegel acknowledges that the 
Absolute is internally different from itself he still assumes that the process of 
differentiation here can be observed., and thus presupposes a transcendent subject 
capable of being a theoros. For Delettze., the negative character of Hegelian difference 
arises precisely through its being difference posited for a self-identical subject that 
possesses negativity as a kind of transcendent essence upon which it can reflect. This 
difference is not a truly internal, immediate difference, as it remains related to a suýject 
that posits itself as the transcendent measure of difference, i. e., as absolute. Difference 
and determination arise, for HegeL from a process of mediation. Difference arises from 
self-relation, but this relation is itself mediated by other-relation. Deleuze, on the other 
band, argues tbat, unless differentiation is understood as unmediate or absolute, it will 
be always posited as occurring within or for a transcendent subjectivity, a common 
sense. which repeats once again the foundationalist error. The epistemological 
2 See Rogue, 1989, p. 159, on this reactive character of deconstructlon from a Deleuzean point of 
view. On the limitations of a conciliaton, model of thought, see Ansell-Pearson, 1999, pp. 207-8 
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assumptions of Hegel's thought reveal a foundationallst eihos that, as always for 
Deleuze, is driven by a moral and political imperative, namely the reconciliation of 
conflicts even at the expense of nihilism. It is thus an obfuscating philosophical shell for ýAL 
an essentially political project: the suppression of real difference. Deleuze envisions 
Hegelian autonomy as self-imposed complete subordinafion to the Absolute Idea, which. 
as the System reveals, is perfectly incarnated in the fon-n of the State. Reconciliation. in 
reality, means a narcissistic deconstruction of antinomies u-nmanent in experience that is 
perfectly corrunensuTable with political domination. 
The centrality of reconciliation as a theme in Hegel's thought is clear. However, 
the exact meaning of this ten-n is as ambiguous as any other supposedly firW definition 
of his thought. Hegel uses it, for example, in EL with reference to Absolute Knowing, 
not to phenomenology, when be states that the goal of philosopbv Is the reconcillatIon of 
setf-deiermining lhoughi 'with the reason that is [mii der seienden Vernunfil, or 
actuality' (EL §6). Reconciliation has, then, to be understood in the first place, I would 
ar ue, with reference to Hegel's onto-logic, and the deten-ninations of Possibility and 9 
Actuality. Reconciliation here is not simply the phenomenological result of a negative 
unity into which A shapes of consciousness vanish. This, as we saw in Chapters Five 
and SIX, is only theTesull of PS from the viewpoint Of Tepresentational consciousness. 
Another view of this result is possible, as we have seen, in which the structure of Being 
itself is comprehended, after the possibility of a distinction between hypothetical and 
absolute thinking has been undermined. 
The fact that Being is immanently detemiined in SL as the self-detennining 
Concept does not immediately Imply anything about Hegel's evaluation of political 
actuality. Without going into the much-debated details of Hegel's politics, I want to 
argue now that. in the light of Hegel's (In)famous proposition that the actual ad the IIn 
rational are identical (PR 24/20), and in relation to the onto-logical determination of 
Actuality, that Deleuze's interpretation of 'reconciliation' is mistaken. Further, the 
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relation between thought and actuality that emerges in Hegel allows some criticisms of 
Deleuze's vim of the heteronomy and autonomy of philosophy to be advanced. 
In Hegel's view, the actual is not that which is simply accepted as given in 
experience. Actuality in SL emerges out of a long, complex dialectic in which the 
immediacy of experience is deconstructed. It has for its content the relations between 
existents and their existent conditions, which are not relations internal to their tenns. 
instead, they are external. 11iis means that Actuality is not thought of in terins of 
metaphysical notions of grounding or causality, but in terms of thinl6ng or big tat 
determines itself through self-externalisation. Actuality is thus a dimension of the 
Concept, and is rational, whereas immediacy is abstract and irrational, i. e., indeterminate 
and uncomprehended. Empirical reality. for Hegel, whether conceived of as natural or 
social, must tberefore be conceived in terms of Being, Existence and Actuality, It will 
include within it elements that are relatively abstract and others that are relatively 
concrete. But if that which is genuinely Absolute for Hegel is self-determination, as 
embodied in the Concept, then there is, as we saw in the last chapter, a real difference 
between the Concept and being determined as Nature (or as Spirit). Although the 
Concept is self-determinmg, it is relatively abstract. The Absolute Idea in SL is not 
known as containing Within it, as a substantial unity, all the deterrninations of reality 
under the form of possibility. It is the negative unity of the Theoretical and Practical 
Ideas, or the abstract unity of thougbt and actuality in generat' The Concept may be 
absolute in the sense that it is a self-deten-nining activity (rather than a Substance), but it 
is also not-absolute, in that it is not fully concrete as this activity. 
It is thus internally negative, with the result that it passes over into Nature and 
eventually Spirit. This pTocess yields the Hegelian System, but at the same time, this is 
the system in thokizht. Tle political Act"ity detailed in PR, for example., is not 
identical with either the Prussia of Hegel's time, modern totalitarianism, or liberal 
3 Rose, 1980, p. 186-7. 
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democracy. If this is the case, then the immanent necessity of the Concept can be 
expressed as 'reconcillafion', but this has a specific mearting. Reconciliation means, 
would argue, that thought becomes acquainted with the immanent determinations of the 
self-detennining Concept, with the historical Actuality of its own present. and with the 
identity and difference of the two. Philosophy has to reconcile itself with the identity of 
thought and reality and their difference. This means that there is a kind of Sollen in 
Hegelian thought, without which it would risk becoming purely acqmescent. ThisS'o/len 
lies in the re-cognition of the difference between the Concept and reality, which implies 
the abstractness and irrationality of reality, and which dernands real action in the present. 
However, the determination of this Sollen, of what 'ought-to-be', is not based on a 
foundational, abstract presupposition, which makes Hegel different from Fichte and 
Schelling. Instead, it is grounded in a re-cognition of the rational elements of the real or 
its Actuality, those elements that accord with the immanent determinations of the 
Concept. 
Actimlity is, as Hegel notes, a dispersed set of conditions that 'oughl to return 
into itself (SL 11,209/547, my emphasis). Hence the Sollen is an tmmanently necessary 
consequence of Hegel's ontology. If the re-cognition of the real in relation to Reason 
implies knowledge of the conditions of Actuality, then it always implies a perspective on 
the real and its conditions taken by consciousness. The totality of conditions, being 
'dispersed' cannot be known as a totality. To imagine that this could be the case would 
be to posit an abstract,, subjective regulative Ideal. It is a consequence of the nature of 
Being, for Hegel, that existents imply an element of contingency, rather than being an 
effect of the internal limitations of our mental faculties. Hence the re-cognition of the 
Actual on which the Sollen is based is mevitably partial, foT it will be a pTocess 
conducted as a negotiation between a histoncally detein inate consciousness and its 
awareness of the real social relations between it and other subjects. So the attempt to 
make self-determinafion an Actual feature of political reality is both required by the 
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Is Concept and problernabsed. bv it for the re-cognition of the Actual elements n th' 
reality is made possible by the Concept, but also has its reachi-estricted. 
From the practical side, the re-cognition of the Actuality of the present implies a 
determination of the Practical Idea., the Soflen, in relation to wbat can be re-co sed as 
the Real Possibilities of the Actual. Again, this orientation of action will be negotiated, 
just as the re-cognition of the conditions of the -present is negotiated. And if it too is a 
partial re-cognition, then the outcome of any practical action is unforeseen. " In this way, 
Hegelian 'education' does -not end with the -negative unity at the end of PS, or with the 
completion of a System. It is an immanent consequence of the nature of the Concept that 
its concrete meaning sbould be negotiated by reai subjects wbo determine and are 
determined by real political structures. The Absolute Idea is not absolute because it is 
deten-nined at the end of SL: it is absolute because it is concretised a) through real 
processes of negotiation, in which possibilities for action are determined both in relation 
to the immanent determinations of the Concept and in relation to existing political 
structures, and b) in practical activity, which intervenes in the Actual. The ceaseless 
detemnnation of the Absolute is thus a task for existin& fmite consciousnesses, and this 
'an education is thus is a direct consequence of the nature of the Concept itself. Hegel] II 
inconceivable without real activity 'im the world', and there is no guarantee that its 
outcome will be successful, for a subject's re-cognition of its Actuality will always be 
partial and limited. 
This education is also Absolute Knowing. It can only be conducted once the 
internal structure of Being has been cogrUsed. Hence the transition between PS and SL is 
a real advance, for it makes possible the theoretical and practical orientation toward the 
present that I have sketched above. Hegel's philosophy does -not, I would suggest, 
simply capitulate to the present. And if the education of consciousness does not end even 
4 Certain currents -within Marxism reflect this strand of Hegelian thought. See e. g., Debray, 1975, 
ppý 45-6, 
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with the System, then there is no transcendent subjectivity embodied in the Concept. The 
Concept is indeed a kind of conu-non sense- in that it is a 'context'5 in which meaning is 
detennined. But this context is without any foundational determination. 'Negativity' 
cannot be regarded as transcendent or foundational, as it cannot be stated or represented 
in a finite proposition. It is not hypostasised, for it is graspable only as process, not as 
atffibute or predicate. The Concept is not therefore, a transcendent subjectivity. because 
its self-deteffnination occurs through its internal negativity, and not because i is a 
positively detennmate Ground. It does not possess a transcendent perspective on its own 
being or on external being. It is at once the result of the deconstruction of the antinomies 
of representational consciousness, and the reconstruction, througb its immanent self- 
determination, of an ontolo that demands that finite theoretical and practical gy 
perspectives on the real be developed that can acknowledge the meaning of Actuality. 
The supposed transcendence of Absolute Knowing is, viewed ftom the broader 
perspective on the System I have sketched above, an illusion. The articulation of the 
Systern and its relation to the real does not detennine a presupposed transcendent 
subject. Rather, it determines the context in which the relation of an intrinsically divided 
finite subject to the real (Bemg- Nature and Spirit) must be understood. 
This sketcb of the relation between onto-logic, System and empirical reality 
suggests a direct critical response to Deleuze, regarding his model of absolute 
immanence. Absolute Difference is, for Deleuze, the absolute presupposition of thought. 
the expression of the otherness that is unmanent within thought and which is its genetic 
condition precisely because it prevents it from coinciding with itself The tracing of the 
tendencies that constitute this difference is, as in Bergson, the work of a superior 
intuition, with which thought becomes identical when it is forced to encounter its 
difference from itself This is reminiscent. once again, of Schelfing's position. However. 
it resuits from affin-ning that which Schelfing cannot truly affirm, that the being of 
5 Schick, 1994, p. 180. 
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thought is its difference from itself Once thought has encountered this internal limit. its 
transcendental object, it is capable of altering its image of itself, and affirming that the 
sole problem of philosophy is the creation of concepts. 
The requirement of a new image of thought based on the minimal 
presupposition of the difference of thought from itself is, for Deletize, immanent to 
certain experiences of this difference as the internal limit of thouglit. It is not tberefore a 
transcendent requirement that reflects Platonic assumptions about the unity and 
difference of thought and being. I have suggested that the trauma of reason is one 
example of this experience, which is encountered by foundationalist thought as a crisis. 
Deleuze does not argue that Absolute Difference can be known by a superior intuition 
that is simply other than thought. This intuition is in fact a higher power of thought 
itself, wbicb tbougbt can attain by undergoing certain encounters. The exPerience of 
crisis is vital for this power, for it subverts settled habits of thought that become 
sedimented in response to the exigencies of living. A crucial element of Deleuze's 
position is thus the acknowledgement of a real double-bin& which, as I argued in 
Chapter Three, is a double-bind because it depends on certain rules that create a 
dilemma. Deleuzean ontology refers these rWes back to objective conditions, practices 
external to thouglit that ne-vertheless become immanent in it, training it to filnction in 
certain ways. But there are rules, nonetheless, of which we can become conscious. This 
conscious recognition of constraining rules actually creates the dilemma. As with the 
trauma of reason, we become conscious that, because of the way the game is set up. once 
we have made certain moves, we can P-o no filrtber. Once it can no longer be played, the 
6 
game' loses its value or meanmg, 
It is in relation to this experience that Deleuze sets up the requirement for a new 
image of thought. He does not, then, try to think the opposite of Platonism, which would 
be a dogmatic relativism. Instead., he tries to think the inverse of Platonism, where unity 
is an effect of difference rather than the other way around, and where all virtual and 
actual relations are external relations. SchellIng's positing of a 'higher' Absolute Is, as I 
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argued in Chapters Two and Four, an unsuccessful attempt to realise a sirrular account of 
the Absolute, in which there is no internal resemblance between condition and 
conditioned. When such a resemblance is posited, the result is a relative identity, which 
can only be posited by thought and cannot be known. The need for an unconditioned I 
ground of knowledge, i. e., a 'higher' Absolute that is still a ground of knowledge, is 
determined in relation to experience. It has to be a unity of all determinations. for only 
then will it be unconditioned, but it has to still be a predominantly rational unity in order 
to be a ground of knowledge. Schelling is defeated by these two criteria. 
Deleuze. however, appears more successful in thinking the 'higher' Absolute, 
determined without resemblance to that which it conditions. However, the move towards 
Absolute Difference in thought is, as I have argued, inseparable from a certain kind of 
experience, wbere thougbt becomes conscious of its difference from itself, Deleuze 
argues that, to escape the trap with which this experience threatens thought, this 
difference cannot be understood as mediated by a prior identity. It must be affirmed as 1 .1 
immediate, which makes thou6t incommensurable with itself By thus inverting 
Platonism,, Deleuze believes he has avoided simply positing the Absolute in resemblance 
to that which it conditions. But the initial impetus here is not from the "higher power' of 
thought, but from the experiences of a foundationalist or representational consciousness, 
as with Schelling. 
We saw in Chapter Six that Schelling's conception of the Absolute as a pure 
presupposition failed to acknowledge the dimension of positing it implies. The Absolute 
could not be detennined as Absolute or unconditioned except in relation to expenence, 
which meant that it was inevitably posited as resembling that which it was meant to be 
the condition of The positing of this Absolute was guided by a foundationalist image of 
thought, NNqtb transcendent knowledge as its goal. With Deleuze, however, a different 
ii-nage of thought guides us. The incomprehensible or immediate difference of 
consciousness from itself as embodied in Kant"s account of the 'cracked" subject, is to 
be posited as absolute. By simply inverting the procedure through which the Absolute is 
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determined, however, Deieuze fails to recognise that his version of the unconditioned is 
also just as much conditioned by the experience that gives nse to theTequirement for it. 
The difference of consciousness from itself gives us a different image of thought, and 
Deleuze, in my opinion, works out with utter consistency what the epistemolo ical and I- 91 
ontolo tical implications of this image are. However, this consistency is in relation to a 91 
detennination of representational consciousness. The procedure of renversement 
involves a recognition of the actimlity of consciousness (Its deterymnatlon by cert., 
rules that constitute a suklective practice of thinking) that cannot itself be recolgnised, 
because Deleuze, in his zeal to overturn transcendence and return effectivity to 
philosophy, posits the immediate difference of consciousness from itself as its immanent 
'foundation'. Hegel, on the other hand, deals with the relation between representational 
consciousness and philosophical consciousness in a way that allows the relation between 
the former and the latter to be acknowledged and understood immanently, as well as 
enabling the immanence of the Absolute in fmite consciousness to be comprehended. 
Deleuze effectivelv hv en immanent to , postasises 
the exp 'ence of crisis that is i 
consciousness,, without fiffly acknowledging the role of self-consciousness (knowledge 
of the 'rules of the game') in constituting this crisis. 
iii) Concluding Remarks 
I would suggest that the Deleuzean Absolute tends to fefishize the experience of 
abstract difference in the sarne way that foundationalism tends to fetishize identity. The 
operation of renversemeni is rather too hasty in, its refusal of identity and mediation, for 
it does not recognise that even the positing of an Absolute that is utterly unconditioned, 
utterly unlike what it conditions, is still a positikg that presupposes a self-conscious 
deten-nination of expenence. In fact Deleuze's Absolute must, I think, be judged as the 
product of an illusory practice of thinking,, one that remains tied to an image of the 
Absolute as Substance, utterly removed from negatiNity and mediation. 
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The epistemological issue concermng whether difference must be thought as 
positively immediate or as mediated turns, I believe, on the crucial antifoundationalisi 
question of the relation between the positing through which the conditions of difference 
are established and what in expenence detennines this positing. I have suggested in this 
Conclusion that Deleuze's version of this positing cannot comprehend its own 
determination. I bave also suggested that Hegel's conception of the relation between 
relative and Absolute can do this more successfully, because it recognises the aspect of 
identity in representational consciousness as well as its internal difference. Because 
does this, with the result that the unitv of self-consciousness is the decentred unity of I 
Absolute Negativity, it is immanent to experience in a way that Deleuze's new image of 
thought is not. Consequently, Hegel advances a version of anti foundationall sm that I 
believe empbatically demands consideration today 
Nevertheless, it is also necessary to recog-nise that the issue of the 
acknowledgement of the determination of thought demands fuTther examination, beyond 
the scope of this investigation. For instance, the question of Hegel's relationship to 
sophisticated materialist accounts of social relations. such as the later Marx's dialectical 
materialism, or the libidinal materialism of Deleuze and Guattari in the two volumes of 
Capiialism and Schizophrenia, could be addressed, in order to deter-mine just what 
dimensions of social reality 'acknowledgement' should refer to, and in what it should 
consist. The relationship between the two latter positions would itself be interesting from 
this point of view. But such concems would take us beyond the limits of this enquiry- 
which has focused upon philosophy's 'image of thought, and into political and social 
theory proper. 
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